THE CONTEXT OF THE IRAQ GENOCIDE

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Abbreviations:

2nd IW – Second Indochina War.
CentCom – Central Command.
CFR – Council on Foreign Relations.
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency.
CPD – Committee on the Present Danger.
CPV – Chinese People's Volunteers.
DCI – Director of Central Intelligence; head of the CIA.
DK – Democratic Kampuchea (the name of the former Cambodia during the reign of the 'Khmer Rouge', 1975-1979).
DPRK – Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
FAR – Forces Armées Rwandaise.
GDP – Gross Domestic Product.
GMD – Guomindang.
GWOT – Global War on Terror (herein taken to include US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan).
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda.
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia.
IMF – International Monetary Fund.
ISI – Import Substitution Industrialisation.
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff.
KCIA – Korean Central Intelligence Agency.
KMT – Kuomintang (alternate spelling of Guomindang).
KPA – Korean People's Army.
KPR – Korean People's Republic.
KR – Khmer Rouge.
NIE – National Intelligence Estimate; a comprehensive multi-agency intelligence report.
NLF – National Liberation Front.
OSS – Office of Strategic Services; a comparatively small World War II fore-runner to the CIA.
PR – Public Relations.
ROE – Rules Of Engagement; the rules governing the use of force by armed personnel.
ROKA – Army of the Republic of Korea.
RPF – Rwandan Patriotic Front.
RVNAF – Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or 'drone'.
UK – The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
US – The United States of America.
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Preface

I had a story to tell about Iraq. About suffering, deprivation, want, death, grief. About the horror of white phosphorous, the slow agony of depleted uranium, and the terror of air strikes, street shootings and night raids; a population afflicted by everything from disease and hunger to social and cultural disintegration to deaths squads and unprecendented sectarian strife. Though journalistic and scholarly commentators like to forget the fact as frequently as possible, the root causes of all of this are clearly and patently exogenous and equally patently can be attributed to the US and UK. There is a word for this, a word specifically coined to describe the 'manifold' combination of physical, cultural, social, economic and/or biological destruction of a population. That word is genocide.

For over two decades the US has put a large amount of its energies into systematically committing genocide in Iraq with whichever means were most expedient at the time – bombing, sanctions, invasion, occupation. Using everything from depleted uranium to fraud to neoliberal 'ideology', the US has dismantled the economic and social fabric of Iraq, immiserated most of its people, and killed in massive numbers, probably well in excess of 2 million, a very large portion of whom were killed directly by US munitions and personnel. Isn't this obviously a case of genocide? Apparently not.

For a start, in what Gore Vidal describes as the 'United States of Amnesia', the past really doesn't exist and it sometimes seems that the whole world views the US through that same amnesiac lens. Thus not only is there no continuity between different phases of the Iraq Genocide, there is no admissible strategic similarity between the Iraq genocide and previous US genocides. The amnesia works in conjunction with accepted academic and journalistic practices to create an interminable unconsolidated and entangled 'discourse' on motives, policy and intent. Some seek to understand policy by taking official pronouncements at face value, others are more 'discerning' looking for the 'real' policy in words from inside sources, in declassified or leaked documents, and in those memoirs which US officials churn out lucratively in such large numbers. Few refer to, let alone give primacy to, the nature of US deeds themselves as a way of understanding what US policy actually is. What the US actually does is always incidental. All of the dead people are, more or less, collateral damage.

I did not want to further the amnesia and atomisation of knowledge by treating the Iraq Genocide as an isolated incident, dismissable as an aberration. I thought it would also be valuable to demonstrate the intentionality of US actions by showing the precedents – other examples of complex and systematic behaviours often employing identical methods to achieve the same genocidal ends. I additionally thought that I should demonstrate the motive, the strategic logic which has impelled the US to commit a number of massive genocides. The available theories in the scholarly fields of international relations, genocide studies and the literature of imperialism gave no help. To be frank, they are all ideologically rigged fields which preclude any serious analysis of Western liberal polities except on levels almost so abstract as to be meaningless. They certainly don't provide any insight into US actions in Iraq and, as will be seen, scholars may quite blatantly refuse to apply the same criteria to Western behaviours as they do to those whom it is more polite and acceptable to critique.

I consider that using historical examples to demonstrate patterns of repeated behaviour is the only possible means of proceeding in this work. Often the behaviours of interest are those which would never be admitted to in documentary form. This, in turn, is part of the reason why they are neglected in orthodox scholarship. Inevitably this results in verbosity. This becomes acute when dealing with matters which are irreducibly complex. The origins of wars, for example, are often the subject of much complicated debate and possess many levels of significance. I detail herein the origins of wars which were to provide the opportunity and means of genocide in Indochina,
Rwanda, Japan, Korea and Iraq. In each case some actors were undeniably covert in bringing about these conflicts, which adds considerable complexity. Through comparison of repetitions of behaviour I can demonstrate with certainty that the US engaged in foreplanning for some or all of the resultant genocides, but each individual case in isolation leaves some room for doubt, not so much doubt about US responsibility as doubt about the unstated motives and expectations of the US, hence the need for repetition.

The crucial thing here is to demonstrate the intentionality behind US genocides. It should be remembered that apologists for every genocide claim that there was no intent to commit genocide, that the perpetrators were fighting a war (usually a counterinsurgency) and that civilian deaths were incidental byproducts. Thus for reasons of both wordage and time I have not actually reached the intended topic of this work, the Iraq Genocide. Consequently this has become a survey used to construct a thesis on the context of the Iraq Genocide. Once I had detailed events in Korea, I realised that I had reached a point with a workable beginning, middle and end.

The one aspect of context which has been omitted is the humanisation of the victims of US genocides and a proper and proportionate accounting of their suffering. Ultimately it is in the suffering of the victims that we find the most important historical context, not in the strategic approaches which impel the use of genocide. That strategic level, however, cannot even be understood without accounting for the suffering brought about. These are not incidental victims, but rather the victims of careful calculation. The planners and instigators of genocide may attempt to sanitise even their own thoughts, but to truly understand their logic and processes one cannot hide from the fact that they carefully and meticulously plan for mass death and all of the pain, grief and terror entailed.

It is also important to counter the well reinforced imagery and sense that the US, and other developed states, commit violence in a manner that is more clinical and surgical. Somehow ‘our’ violence is clean, and by extension we feel it is less emotion laden than, say, chopping people up with machetes. This come partly from our sense of technological sophistication and partly from a deliberate propaganda stance adopted in the West. More than this, however, it comes from our deeply engrained sense of that Western liberalism is Civilisation whereas brutality is the realm of the Barbarian. This is an enabling factor for genocide, this sense of distance, of cleanliness, of dispassion. The realities of violent death, however, are intimate, dirty, and laden with horrible passion. Death rips away the pretense that we are not animals. All that the West has done is to sometimes put geographical distance between perpetrators and victims while largely suppressing the knowledge of those other instances where violence is carried out face to face by people who are just as capable of brutality as a Roman legionary, a crusader, a Khmer Rouge cadre, or an Interahamwe militia member.

The circumstances in which Iraqi civilians are killed are complicated and subject to debate. This is itself symptomatic in that there is a need for deniability when committing mass murder. One can no longer build massive gas chambers and crematoria, but equally I feel that urban firebombing or carpetbombing may be altogether too obvious a means to be deployed in this era. Mass murder follows a grotesque fashionability. Those actions which are too closely associated with genocide or mass murder must be avoided. In Iraq this has led full circle to a return to very personal violence in which tens of thousands, probably far in excess of 100,000, civilians have been killed in a very atomised and geographically dispersed pattern with small arms by coalition forces.

In a work based on veteran testimony, Chris Hedges and Laila al-Arian explain that the very nature of the Iraq occupation is that of an ‘atrocity producing situation’ and that US personnel have gone from killing – the shooting of someone who [can] harm you – to murder. The war in Iraq is

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1 The phrase comes from Robert Jay Lifton’s work on Indochina and is discussed below.
primarily about murder. There is very little killing. They are talking about the systematic murder of civilians in small increments multiplied many times over. This is the result of a disproportionate fear and lack of security induced within US personnel as well as such policies and tactics as force protection; reactive firing; suppressive fire; and reconnaissance by fire. These are of relevance during convoy operations, house raids and at checkpoints – all situations shaped by US policy in such a way as to maximise civilian deaths, often putting US personnel in the situation of being unwilling murderers. Joshua Key describes, from early in the occupation, having to build a 'corpse shack' where Iraqi's could go to collect the bodies of relatives killed by his company. It was 'near our front gate, so relatives could retrieve their loved ones without entering our compound.'

Those who doubt the systematic manner in which the US killed civilians need only view the gun camera footage from an Apache helicopter released by Wikileaks under the title of Collateral Murder. It reveals the psychological state of US personnel desperate to kill when, despite the evinced outrage at spotting what they claim to be an 'RPG' (which was actually a camera), those personnel were never endangered. As a Syrian blogger explained: 'I also have to add that RPGs used by the insurgents are anti-tank weapons and not a ground-to-air weapon. Trying to hit an Apache with these is similar to trying to kill a flying wasp with a slingshot. Suspecting the journalist’s camera to be an RPG which is quite an outrageous mistake to make and still does not hold as an excuse for the trigger-happy soldier operating that 30mm machine gun.' Permission to fire is sought properly through the chain of command and all that occurs is according to the official Rules of Engagement (ROE), including the murder of those who innocently stopped to help the injured. This contravenes International Humanitarian Law on a number of grounds including protection for civilians but also Article 49 of the additional protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention which protects combatants rendered hors de combat. The fact that it is legitimate according to ROE means that it is systematically applied murder which in turn means that the US is in clear breach of the UNCG.

For reasons which will become obvious it is nearly impossible for writers to use the word genocide in connection with US actions against the people of Iraq. Hedges and al-Arian wrote a book about the systematic murder of civilians on a vast scale, but the book contains not one use of the word. Hans Von Sponeck wrote a work which, to anyone familiar with Lemkin and the UNCG, is basically all about genocide, yet scrupulously avoided the term. I would argue that virtually any work on the occupation of Iraq is really an exposé of genocide, no matter how little the authors suspect it. There is Peter Galbraith's sugestively titled The End of Iraq, or works about the systematic economic, social and cultural destruction undertaken under the occupation such as Rajiv Chandrasekeran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City. And then there are those many works which detail how the US created its own insurgency, created a civil war, killed and mistreated large numbers of civilians for no military purpose, destroyed infrastructure, depleted patrimony and generally wrecked Iraq through what are held to be unrelated mistakes tied together only by a putative US proclivity for miscalculation, hubris and naivety (e.g. Ricks Fiasco, Cockburn The

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5 Sponeck's work is discussed in the conclusion.
Occupation,9 Allawi The Occupation of Iraq).10

Whilst people were confused and struggled to find answers with regard to US action in Indochina, people are complacent with regard to Iraq. 9-11, Bush, and the Neoconservatives seem to be all the explanation that people need for the US embarking on what is otherwise a rather hard to explain set of actions. It is a striking difference, for example, between the Winter Soldier Investigation of 1971 and that of 2008. The remarkable incuriosity shown as to fundamental causes could only be envied by 'totalitarian' societies. But I contend that the only fashion in which US actions against the Iraqi people can be analysed with meaningful success is as part of a broader long-standing genocide with origins in a clear strategic paradigm and ample precedent. But since 'genocide' is, as a term, unthinkable to many and unemployable to others, I felt the need to put great effort into an exposition of the context – the context in which, far from being unthinkable, it is quite predictable that the US would respond to the challenges posed by the state of Iraq by committing genocide.

My point, therefore, is to beg the reader's indulgence for what may at times seem an excess of detail. I have attempted on many occasions to find a way in which I could separate some part of the following and make it into a more suitable length standalone thesis. Each time, however, as I think through the implications perhaps for days on end, the necessary contextual inclusions expand to the point where the original dimensions are more-or-less regained and I have nothing for my troubles but a headache and a deep sense of frustration.

I have also largely eschewed a chronological approach. The fundamentals of genocide are relatively timeless and the post-World War II instances are related in such a way that I do not wish to allow temporal distance to obscure more fundamental proximities. If I have failed to make the relevance of any matter clear, I apologise and assure the reader that such opacity is the result of my unsuccessful and often ugly attempts to curtail my natural tendency to a comprehensive and holistic exposition. However, I do hope that I convey herein a sense of interconnected matters and a robust analytical perspective (relating to contemporary imperialism) which might be extended to more than simply the direct subject matter.

Introduction

For the German occupying authorities war thus appears to offer the most appropriate occasion for carrying out their policy of genocide - Raphäel Lemkin

Samantha Power wrote a Pulitzer Prize winning book (published in 2002) entitled “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. The purpose of the book is to critique US ‘inaction’ (which is the word she often chooses) in the face of genocide. This is part of a literature which, while not entirely unique to the US nor the modern era, is the predominant current form of imperial apologism. Like other such works it is highly critical of US foreign policy, indeed relentlessly so, but through miscontextualisation, omission and systematic deception its ‘critique’ becomes an affirmation of exceptionalism. US administrations are criticised for not acting in the self-arrogated role of world policeman. Though more subtle and pragmatic than some, Power is claiming that the natural place of the US is as the pre-eminent force for good in the world. Indeed, this is a work promoting “humanitarian” interventionism, and Power has since become part of the Obama administration and is partly credited with bringing about the recent military actions against Libya. In the US her stance has provoked considerable scepticism. Journalist David Reiff tells of her response to his suggestion that “her reasoning on foreign policy was similar to that of neoconservatives who supported the Iraq War. “She said, jokingly, ‘I am not Paul Wolfowitz,’ and I said, ‘Yeah, actually, I think you are,’” Rieff recalls.

Indeed the separation between neoconservatives and advocates of “humanitarian” intervention is almost purely stylistic. Each camp advocates the use of mass violence justified using the same moral rationales. One may, and indeed should, doubt the sincerity of some neoconservatives, while accepting that some probably are sincere. However, exactly the same applies to people such as Power.

In her book Power presents a very one-sided and selective account of genocide. The first glaring problem is that although Power emphasises US ‘inaction’ in her introduction and conclusion, the actual body of her work more often details instances of US action which, with varying degrees of culpability and effectuality, serves to facilitate genocide or support its perpetrators. Even in this matter, though, she deliberately understates the case. East Pakistan/Bangladesh and East Timor are given only very cursory and deceptive passages. In the two paragraphs devoted to the 'between 1 and 2 million Bengalis' killed she describes how alarmed US diplomats were ignored, but not the messages of support sent by Henry Kissinger to Pakistan's dictator Yahya Khan. The single sentence she devotes to East Timor merely says that the US 'looked away'. However, documents released publicly by the National Security Archive confirm what Power certainly should have known at the time of writing: the US gave the 'green light' to the initial invasion of East Timor, and the US continued material and political support essential to the ongoing genocide in full knowledge of what was occurring. Power does not even mention Guatemala, which saw an horrific genocide which was fully backed by the US, as will be detailed.

15 Power, “A Problem from Hell”..., p 89.
Even Power's distortions with regard to other perpetrators of genocide pale into insignificance in the face of a far more glaring omission. How can a book about "America and the Age of Genocide" make no mention of genocides perpetrated by the US? My contention is that not only has the US committed several of the worst and most deadly genocides in history, but that these genocides, though masquerading as 'wars', are almost archetypical examplars of genocide. Further, I argue that US actions can only be understood under a paradigm of genocide and cannot be understood when viewed as being the prosecution of wars. Further still, I argue that the concept of genocide is not only an apt and revealing means of analysing these US actions, it is the only concept available.

To illustrate why one cannot understand US actions in the Second Indochina War (2nd IW), for example, as being consistent with what one might understand as fighting a war, consider the following experiences, which I previously touched upon in my Honours research exercise. S. Brian Willson was assigned to guard Bin Tui, an airbase in South Vietnam, in which position he was given the duty of helping assess bombing missions, in April 1969, to ensure that pilots were not deliberately missing their targets. His description of the first such mission includes, '...a sea of bodies. Probably 100 to 120 corpses. A few of them were moving, most were still. This was 15 minutes after the bombing.' The village had been bombed in the middle of the day, when the healthy adults were at work in the fields, so the victims were all the children, the elderly, the infirm and childminders. The military situation was such that just two officers were able to arrive 15 minutes after the bombing without any endangerment to themselves. Willson's companion, an VNAF Lieutenant replied to Willson's protestations: 'They're communists, this is a victory,' and they left the wounded to die. Willson believed there was some mistake, but soon discovered that, because the entire province had been declared a free-fire zone, the villages were systematically being destroyed without reference to whether or not there was intelligence of enemy activity. Willson described this as 'a deliberate systematic plan to wipe out the civilian population.' This does not have a place in anyone's conception of war except in as much as genocide is conceived by some as being a type of war.

Willson, I will argue, was one of the few among the millions of US personnel cycled through Indochina who actually saw what was really going on, who pierced the veil and saw the fundamental nature of the genocide. Most US personnel never witnessed, let alone partook in a major atrocity, yet the strong association of the 'Vietnam War' with US atrocities is not the product of liars, nor of some elevated moral stance which caused US personnel to be far more honest in reporting the inevitable lapses which occur in war. The association comes about because atrocities were prolific. Consider the recent experience of Nick Turse and Deborah Nelson. They travelled to part of Quang Nam province to find the site of a massacre detailed in US investigation files. They had an uncertain location. In three days of looking for the site they were shown a total of 5 massacre sites where a total of 8 different massacres had occurred, 5 committed by US personnel. They were unable to find the site of the massacre: 'we thought we’d be looking for a needle in a

19 This description is from a speech given in Los Angeles at the United Methodist Church in North Hills on July 20, 2003 which was recorded by the L.A. Sound Posse. S. Brian Willson, 'US Intervention in Korea'. Los Angeles: 20 July 2003. Retrieved 16 May 2007 from http://www.radio4all.net/index.php?op=program-info&program_id=7485. Willson also gives a written account on his own website: 'On one occasion in April 1969, in eerie safety, I witnessed the incredible destruction that had just been inflicted in daylight morning hours on a typically defenseless village about the size of a large baseball stadium. With smoldering ruins throughout, the ground was strewn with bodies of villagers and their farm animals, many of whom were motionless and bloody, murdered from bomb shrapnel and napalm. Several were trying to get up on their feet, and others were moving ever so slightly as they cried and moaned. Most of the victims I witnessed were women and children. At one dramatic moment I encountered at close range a young wounded woman lying on the ground clutching three young disfigured children. I stared, aghast, at the woman's open eyes. Upon closer examination, I discovered that she, and what I presumed were her children, all were dead, but napalm had melted much of the woman's facial skin, including her eyelids,' (S. Brian Willson, 'Biography'. Retrieved 13 February 2008 from http://www.brianwillson.com/bio.html).
haystack of hamlets, not a haystack of massacres. This too is indicative of genocide for the factors which lead to such widespread mass murder were not cultural but rather systemic results of deliberate choices. US personnel were primed through indoctrination and then situated in such a manner as to generate a predisposition towards atrocities. US personnel were placed in what Robert Jay Lifton has referred to as 'atrocity-producing-situations'. This was a symptomatic component of genocide and very similar behaviours can be observed in Korea and Iraq.

My purpose is to demonstrate that a number of US genocides are very classically structured systematic genocides undertaken for specific strategic purposes. However, it is seldom possible to find documentation or statements which indicate a genocidal intent in any instance of genocide. As Mark Levene puts it: 'Genocide is not only rarely, if ever, actually conceived by popular acclaim but – at least in the post-1914 record – is usually the outcome of decisions taken secretly in the very inner sanctums of state power....' Not only do decisions such as that to commit genocide remain unrecorded, but I would argue that the documentary record, however classified, is thoroughly unedifying when it comes to a number important matters. As former Israeli Knesset member Uri Avnery points out: 'Documents are misleading. If Talleyrand (or whoever it was) was right in saying that words were invented in order to hide thoughts, this is even more true for documents. Documents falsify facts, hide facts, invent facts – all according to the interests of the writer. They disclose a little to hide the rest. Anyone who has been involved in public affairs knows this.'

It is not that the voluminous documentation produced by the US reveals nothing, but rather that it is subsumed systematically within very strict discursive boundaries. In fact, one of the most important things that a certain type of document reveals is the creation and maintenance of such boundaries. In effect a 'Party line' is created, primarily and often exclusively for the benefit of more or less powerful 'insiders'. Most believe the Party line and, indeed, are immersed in a situation of peer relationships wherein, despite considerable cognitive dissonance, a phantasmagoria stands in place of reality, or indeed is reality for those in its grip. Those few who don't believe the Party line, which must include those who deliberately deceive in order to foster the Party line, are nevertheless well instructed by it. For example, Daniel Ellsberg wrote of the situation he found wherein many government officials had ceased to believe an aspect of the Party line on the US presence in Vietnam (on extremely narrow concerns of practicality) but failure to cleave to the official line was career suicide. Explaining why it took him such a long time to take action over his convictions, Ellsberg wrote: 'Like so many, I put personal loyalty to the president (and to my career, my access to inside information and influence, however I idealized my purposes) above all else. Above loyalty to the Constitution. Above obligation to truth, to fellow Americans, and to other human lives.'

How then to analyse these acts of genocide? What sources can be used? In fact the evidence is prolific. It would be impossible to commit genocides of this scale without leaving masses of evidence. It is actually a strong testament to the power of official discourse, which penetrates easily into the journalistic and scholarly spheres, that the almost immutable rule is to interpret US actions, even where critically, in terms defined in the official discourse. The result is an orthodoxy that comfortably accommodates the putative dissent of critics. In contrast, the evidence of genocide is hard to avoid wherever it has occurred. Take, for instance, all of the dead people. Millions of dead in Korea, Indochina, and Iraq are a very strong testament to the perpetration of genocide. In the orthodoxy this is explained as a by-product of war, but when pressed as to why war should

necessitate the systematic killing of civilians, the rationalisations get rather convoluted and cannot withstand scrutiny.

The primary sources drawn on in this work are generally either major policy documents (which again are often only used to demonstrate systematic deception rather than to reveal true political intents) or testimonies from civilians and military personnel. One can establish, through such testimony, that certain practices are systematic, their consequences are understood, and they are maintained over a period of years even in the face of various forms of resistance, internal opposition and whistle-blowing dissent. These practices aren't just a better indication of US policy than any policy documents, pronouncements or 'revealing' memoirs, these practices are US policy. US policy is as US policy does. More specifically, by viewing US behaviour not as an attempt to coerce or defeat through the use of force, but as a genocidal war system, it is easier to understand the logic in US behaviours, particularly if one discards the rhetorical veils of public relations and of self-justification cast over political and military decision making. The way, in short, to understand US policy is to seek the logic in their actions, not their words.

The reader will note, however, that this work draws mainly on secondary sources. The main reason for that is the scope. This is a comparative study, the point being that no single genocide discussed herein is an aberration. These are recurrent events, evidently part of an imperial doctrine, yet false divisions are created to conceal continuities. This is not only true between different genocides, with the 2nd IW and Iraq war each treated as unique departures from basic US behaviours, but also within single long acts of genocide. Hence the basic continuity between the First Indochina War (1st IW) and 2nd IW is concealed, as is the basic continuity between 'Desert Storm', the 'Sanctions Period' (including the 'Oil for Food' period) and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Yet they all have the same effects on the target populations – social, cultural, environmental and economic destruction and mass deaths of the population. In the Iraq case there was no time between any of these supposedly different policies, and yet it is meant to be assumed that the fact that they achieved the same substantive results is somehow coincidental.

Secondary sources are also used for critical purposes. Mostly this is done in order to strengthen my assertions against a hostile scholarly discourse by demonstrating the fundamental weakness of the orthodoxy with regards to US foreign policy and with regards to genocide. Additionally, however, it is because reality and perception bleed into each other inextricably in matters of US policy. There is no longer any real dividing line between a military action and a publicity stunt. Time and again the US has departed from the realm of the military in its fundamental strategic approach. My emphasis is on the fact that the adopted strategic approach does have a logic and it is that of genocide, but it must also be acknowledged that in the absence of a politico-military logic, US actions do take on a rather 'simulated' aspect.

The premise of this work is thus that major US military actions are acts of genocide. Genocide can be said to mean 'war' undertaken against a whole population, not against its military nor, in any immediate sense, its military capacity. Further, the manner in which the US commits genocide is under the guise of fighting wars. In fact, these are best viewed as 'war systems' in that, far from seeking military victory, the US has sought to avoid decisions (even victorious decisions) in favour of extending the period of violence for as long as was feasible. The prototypical example was the Korean War, wherein attempts to achieve a military decision were abandoned in favour of an 'attrition' strategy. This was putatively aimed at forcing a negotiated settlement, but the US itself was clearly the greatest impediment to reaching a settlement. In Indochina and Iraq the war systems became more sophisticated. The US, in various ways, undertook actions which would ensure that it faced an armed enemy, including acting as the effective recruiter and supplier of its opponents.

These genocidal war systems have torn at the social fabric of targeted nations. Millions have died
while the remainder are weakened, divided and impoverished. The purpose is to achieve
dominance, and any 'friend/enemy' distinction is only important in matters of detail. A weak
'enemy' is better than a strong 'friend'. Often even a strong 'enemy' is better than a strong 'friend',
because the 'enemy' can more easily be subjected to military, economic, diplomatic and propaganda
actions to weaken and isolate it. Korea, Vietnam and Iraq were all targeted because of two crucial
circumstances. Firstly, they were potentially strong nation states and, secondly, they were
vulnerable.

The reader may object to my 'misuse' of the term genocide, but allow me to anticipate some
objections and make some observations. Genocide does not mean extermination or even intended
extermination. The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG) specifically uses the phrase 'in whole or in part', and for good reason. Consider
what is generally held as the ultimate exemplar of genocide, the Judeocide committed by Germany
in Europe. The Germans never intended to exterminate all of the world's Jews. Even confining the
matter to European Jewry, there was a huge problem simply in defining who was and was not a Jew.
They had to rely ultimately on confessional identification to define an alleged 'race'. As Yehuda
Bauer wrote: 'One can see how confused Nazi racism was when Jewish grandparents were defined
by religion rather than so-called racial criteria.' As well as the fact that many with Jewish heritage
would inevitably successfully evade detection, in the Nuremburg Laws (and later when deciding
who to kill at Wannsee), exemptions were made on various criteria, such as being a decorated war
hero. In Eastern Europe they killed, or intended to kill, every Jew that they could find, but
detecting non-religious, culturally integrated and/or mixed race 'Jews' was problematic. Thus, even
in this most extreme and systematic of cases, an insistence on genocide-as-extermination opens up
grounds for exclusion and denial.

Equally, genocide is not the exclusive domain of irrational and evil perpetrators. The very point of
coining the term genocide, as will be explained, was to indicate a strategic paradigm with a
functional logic. Irrationality is therefore a moot point and I prefer to distinguish between
'functional' and 'dysfunctional' genocides. Equally, 'evil' is in the eye of the beholder. The hateful
and racist rhetoric of the Nazis is an unavoidable feature of their existence, but in most instances of
genocide there is a predilection for highlighting the evidence of fanaticism and hatred for the
official villains (those at odds with Western interests) while ignoring identical statements made by
Western personnel or their allies. In the case of the US there are plenty of instances of significant
officials using fanatical, hateful or exterminationist language regarding communists, Asians, Arabs
or Muslims.

This work will begin in Chapter 1 by examining US social and psychological militarism and US
exceptionalism. It will be found that matters which would bring the most extraordinary
condemnation and fuel demonisation of official enemies of the West are ignored, brushed aside, or
treated as insignificant when occurring in the US. The academic discourse will be found to support
this exceptionalism, even to the point of promulgating basic untruths about significant events. My
purpose is to make the reader aware that there is systematic distortion throughout the literature of
US foreign policy and that of genocide.

The second chapter will outline the basic natures of war and genocide, treating each as a separate

24 See Appendix A.
New York: Franklin Watts, 1982. Reprinted in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of
26 See Chapter 2.
27 Throughout this work I will use the notion of 'the West' which has connotations of Eurocentric culture (and
cultural imperialism), whiteness, liberalism/capitalism and material/economic hegemony; as well being redolent
of a hegemonic/imperial history. For consistency I do not use the alternative terminology of 'the North' even in
instances where, considered individually, it might be more relevant.
phenomenon. Despite the links between the two, war and genocide are easily separated conceptually and it is wise to do so. War, as it is widely understood and as it is theorised, is distinct from genocide. War is the application of military means for military ends – these ends being, by nature, inherently political. Genocide, which some have synonymously referred to as 'genocidal war', works under a different logical paradigm. More often than not it is carried out by military organisations, but its fundamental premises do not correspond to what we understand as being military.

The third chapter is a critique of genocide scholarship. The contention is that in the short history of the discipline genocide scholars have, as a whole, systematically destroyed the meaning of the term genocide. The mass of contradictions, loopholes and unusable definitional conditionalities creates an almost infinite space for 'genocide' to become a term of political rather than analytical utility. This is very strongly linked to de-emphasising or almost completely denying the prevalence of genocides perpetrated by Western nations (whose history of committing genocides is actually unsurpassed) and emphasising those committed by Third World perpetrators. They also emphasise dysfunctional genocides, which may be more dramatic and compressed in time, over functional long-term genocides which offer surer evidence of systematic intentionality and may bring about many more deaths over time. They emphasise the less common occurrence of internal genocide against minorities and virtually efface the existence of cross-border genocide which is both more common and generally more deadly, but must be ignored because the primary perpetrator in modern times is the US.

Chapter 4 examines US actions in the Philippines, and against Japan in World War II. The first instance, though horrific, is an all too familiar case of colonial genocide. In the second case there was a very real military war against a substantial opponent, though it should be borne in mind that a true US defeat was never a real possibility. This was also, however, an instance of genocide on a massive scale – genocide undertaken at the expense of military efforts. What most prominently links these genocides, however, is the development of a racist ideology and system of military indoctrination which explicitly transferred racist tropes developed with regards to the indigenous inhabitants of North America. Naturally these were carried through to Korea and Indochina, but equally, starting abruptly in 1990, military leaders deliberately inculcated nearly identical attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims.

The last chapter examines the Korean War, a foretaste of the genocides in Indochina and Iraq where efforts towards military victory were deliberately subverted in order to extend out the situation of conflict as an alibi for genocide. In Korea this mostly meant simply maintaining a very bloody stalemate whilst ensuring that armistice negotiations were drawn out for as long as possible. In Iraq and Indochina the 'war system' became more elaborate and involved. It must be asked, by way of illustration, why a power which has by a vast margin had greater involvement in counterinsurgency than any other in human history should be deemed so incapable of fighting insurgencies. The answer is that military solutions would not serve US imperial ends. The US uses genocide where other forms of dominance are unavailable and to funnel resources to strategic corporate interests, not for the sake of profits but as part of a system of maintaining a global dominance (hence the exposition of the economic and military US imperialism given in Chapter 2 in relation to genocide).

The conclusion focusses on the direction that all of the foregoing leads towards up to the present moment, in particular two aspects evident in the Indochina and Iraq genocides. The first is their nature as 'war systems', the second their nature as genocides. In both cases the fact that the vast majority of US personnel do not think that their role is to maintain a genocidal war system serves to conceal this nature. At the same time this factor necessitates policy and strategic decisions which must maintain clearly criminal and militarily counterproductive tactics obdurately over very long periods of time in the face of both moral and pragmatic opposition from their own personnel. This is why, when preconceptions about US aims are abandoned, it becomes clear that the US
deliberately creates and maintains a situation of armed conflict (however uneven) in order to commit genocide. The US created the insurgencies which it has fought and has pursued policies which would ensure their continued supply of arms and personnel. Equally, they were steadfast in pursuing policies which would ensure that their 'counterinsurgency' response would be genocidal, not least in the level of civilian casualties inflicted.
Chapter 1 – US Militarism, Exceptionalism, and Academic Propaganda

Militarism is not a precise concept but it should be noted that the US is a highly militaristic state by any standards. Only Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) might be argued to be significantly more militaristic than the US and it should be noted that the DPRK is not an interventionist power while Israel, contra Walt and Mearsheimer, is a military dependency of the US. On the physical level US militarism is attested by its military spending and the central role that the 'military-industrial complex' plays in its economy, not to mention its record of prolific and bloody interventionism. There is however, also a social, cultural and psychological level. The US is highly unusual in that it not only celebrates the mythologies of military virtue (the US Defense Department having created a very successful propaganda system through its relationship with the entertainment industry) but it also celebrates atrocities. This is most prominent in the figure of Jack Bauer, the hero of television's 24 who tortures terrorists. This is not, however, purely confined to fiction and the 2010 US congressional elections saw the emergence of the 'Jack Bauer candidates'. These were two war criminals who ran for US Congress, choosing to highlight their own crimes as a campaign issue. Their story is included as Appendix B, but what is important to understand is that they proved that there is a considerable support in the US public for atrocities with one being elected another losing by a very narrow margin.

Small wonder then that former President George W. Bush felt confident enough to admit ordering torture in his recent memoir, but in a very deceptive manner. Bush firstly claims that 'waterboarding' is legal. Despite the legal opinions solicited by the Bush administration to that effect, it is not. Although the US refuses to ratify the UN torture convention, other laws apply and the US has itself prosecuted both Japanese and US personnel for using this very method of torture. Secondly, in an exclusive and widely broadcast interview with Matt Lauer, Bush states that only three prisoners were tortured by the US: 'first of all we used this technique on three people. Captured a lot of people and used it on three. We gained value – information to protect the country. And it was the right thing to do as far as I'm concerned.' In fact, under his presidency the US operated an international torture system of a great breadth and complexity. In Iraq and Afghanistan torture of prisoners has been routine, although exact figures would require an impossible determination of where 'abuse' ends and 'torture' begins. Make no mistake though, the choices are between thousands and tens of thousands – not three. In fact, there are 5 known cases of detainees being tortured to death. However, there is nothing that unusual about the Iraq/Afghanistan carceral complex and its use of torture. Precedents include Algeria, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Kenya, South Africa and many more. Where the US 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT) torture complex differs is in the duplicative or redundant use of multiple systems. In addition to detainment in militarily occupied areas, the US also used so-called 'Black sites', as well as Guantánamo Bay and 'extraordinary rendition' (widely seen as a means of 'outsourcing torture' or 'torture by proxy').

29 Space does not allow a full exploration of the structural dependency which ensures that it is Israel that is obesant to US diktat, but for a refutation of the opposing contention that the Israeli tail wags the US dog through its lobbying power see: Stephen Zunes, “The Israel Lobby: How Powerful is it Really?” Foreign Policy in Focus, 25 May 2006. Retrieved 8 October 2006 from http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3270.
It is known that the CIA sought authorisation for and used 'waterboarding'. The numbers of specifically authorised uses of waterboarding certainly exceed 3, but they are only the tip of the iceberg. In addition to these instances the CIA used the authorisation more broadly to torture many suspects without documented authorisation, which in turn inspired military personnel to replicate their techniques.

What I have outlined above are merely minor symptoms of something far greater. The Bush administration openly embraced torture, but it did not commence the practice, nor has the subsequent official repudiation of torture ended the practice. The question is, how do people react? Torture is common (though the majority of states do not practice torture) but such blatancy is unparalleled and it must surely be taken into account when giving a general character to the US polity and the basis of its actions. We don't examine historical Prussia with no account of its militarism, nor the Soviet Union without reference to Communist Party ideology. Yet somehow, the characterisation of the US centres around democracy and liberalism or greed and capitalism, not around its striking features of militarism nor the existence of extremes of religious and patriotic fervour.

Equally, when discussing the US in terms of international relations any balanced discussion should centre around its illegal acts of aggression, its use of covert violence to impose brutally repressive regimes on victim populations, and its overwhelming predominance as a source of structural violence causing immiseration and death on an unimaginable scale. One might object that surely these alleged genocides are then, at best, debatable. That's the puzzle though; these are not debatable genocides, they are rather blatant. Carpet-bombing; fire-storms; nuclear explosions; massacres from the air; massacres on the ground; whole populations poisoned for generations to come; death-squad killings of community leaders, political leaders, union leaders, intellectuals, artists, teachers; economic destruction; cultural destruction; terror, torture and violent death used to traumatise whole populations and destroy the social fabric of nations. These are all well documented behaviours. How does it come to be that these patterns of behaviour could be seen as anything but genocidal? What else could they be?

For most, the US wasn't committing genocide, it was fighting wars. Only... the Armenian genocide was a war – according to the Turks; the Holocaust was a war – according to the Germans; the Tutsi genocide; the Herero genocide; Bosnia; even Democratic Kampucchea – all wars according to the perpetrators and their apologists. What is more they are all against insurgents, 'terrorists' and guerillas. The difference between US genocides and the others? There isn't one. The different perspectives, on the other hand, are easily explained. The bad things that they do are both symptomatic and purposive; the bad things that we do are aberrant and unintended. We act out of honourable motives but may stray or be forced by the nefariousness of our opponents into regrettable acts; they rationalise their hateful murderousness with excuses which wither in the face of mass death. This simple chauvinism can be very robust and fact-proof, something well attested by the persistence of denial of the Armenian genocide in Turkey.  

36 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, pp 500-1.
37 Note that in the case of Turkish denial, like the denial of US genocides, there are fundamental political reasons for denial: 'Denial was and is for Turkey the final phase of the Armenian question itself, and is intrinsically associated, as was the First World War murder process, with the simultaneous goals of securing Anatolian land and fighting off external intervention in Turkish affairs' (Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 207). This is not to deny the importance of chauvinist ideology, but ideologies are frequently in tune with political/strategic ends.
Historically there is a great deal more reluctance to see genocide in the acts of major imperialists than in the acts of those fighting desperate wars on their own doorsteps. Lesser powers slaughter civilians because of atavistic and vicious historic race hatred; great powers and superpowers send troops thousands of miles to slaughter civilians because of ideals – they bring civilisation and democracy, they end tyranny and liberate women. In short, they kill people for their own good.

What also differs is that partisanship in favour of the US is so widespread that denial is the norm, and where denial is the norm it is not going to be perceived as denial. What is striking, therefore, is that so many of the standard techniques of genocide denial are used to explain US actions by those who do not even take accusations of genocide seriously. Adam Jones summarises some of the most common discourses of genocide denial as being: ‘Hardly anybody died’; ‘It was self-defense’; ‘the violence was mutual’; ‘The deaths weren’t intentional’; ‘There was no central direction’; ‘There weren’t that many people to begin with’; ‘It wasn’t/isn’t genocide, because . . .’ . . . the victims were not members of one of the Convention’s specified groups; because their deaths were unintended; because they were legitimate targets; because ‘only’ specific sectors of the target group were killed; because ‘war is hell’; and so on; ‘We would never do that’; ‘We are the real victims.’

With only one exception these are common elements to almost any analysis of US ‘military’ actions. Indeed some are quintessential.

‘The deaths weren’t intentional’: In the US case it is more that nothing is intentional. The US doesn’t commit aggression, it is sucked into quagmires. It is, in this, the true successor to the British Empire which, according to John Seeley, ‘conquered and peopled half of the world in a fit of absence of mind.’ When Michael Ignatieff described the ‘Empire Lite’ he largely replicated Seeley’s contentions, and he was by no means alone. Jim Garrison, having established that the US has been thrust unwillingly into the role of imperial master, writes that ‘America must consciously view itself as a transitional empire, one whose destiny is to act as midwife to a democratically governed global system. . . . it could become the final empire’ [emphases in original].

Note that this liberal utopianism, leading to universal ‘democracy’, is exactly what we were supposed to fear when it emanated from Moscow, or when it now comes from Islamists propounding a new Caliphate.

Such imperialists don’t really like to get to the nitty-gritty of exactly how the US would need to act in order to impose its will on those who do not share their belief that the US has the right to impose its rule upon them. Nor, equally, do they much like writing about the more extreme behaviours which have been undertaken in order to establish this supposedly unintentional empire. Take, for example, the killing of children. It is intrinsic to the manner in which the US uses violence that children will die in agony and terror; burnt to death, asphyxiated, torn apart in explosions, poisoned, riddled with bullets or shrapnel, or dying slow deaths of cancer. Being both intrinsic and predictable, it can hardly be said that this suffering is unintentional, and yet many do so. Part of the rationale lies in the next of Jones’ denial techniques....

“We would never do that.” This is so closely linked to US apologism that Jones even uses a US exemplar: “Comedian Rob Corddry parodied this mindset in the context of US abuses and atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. ‘There’s no question what took place in that prison was horrible,’ Corddry said on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. ‘But the Arab world has to realize that the US shouldn’t be judged on the actions of a ... well, we shouldn’t be judged on actions. It’s our principles that matter, our inspiring, abstract notions. Remember: just because torturing prisoners is

something we did, doesn’t mean it’s something we would do.”

“We are the real victims.” Films abound which show US military personnel as the victims, often the only victims, of US policy. But this extends far beyond the entertainment industry. A whole discourse of ‘asymmetry’ is devoted almost exclusively to the proposition that enemies of the US have an unfair advantage due to the fact that they have only a tiny proportion of the military power possessed by the US. Even in the matter of massive war crimes the US is a victim to its nefarious enemies. Many Vietnamese civilians died not because US weapons killed them, as you might think, but because of Hanoi was willing to allow the US to kill lots of people. The very same logic is applied to inculpate Pyongyang during the Korean War and Baghdad during the sanctions period. In addition, the US is as much a victim of its ‘allies’ (meaning the entirely dependent leaders it has itself emplaced) who are capricious and uninterested in ‘democracy’.

In addition to Jones’ list of denial tropes, I can add a few of a very similar nature: “We didn’t mean it”; “We meant well”; and the rather extraordinary but common corollary, “We are innately stupid and arrogant.” Everything bad that the US does is a mistake by definition because, as above: “We would never do that”—at least not intentionally. The stupidity and arrogance attributed to the US sometimes revolve around its misguided alleged attempts to bring ‘democracy’ to people. Thus, although it was the US which prevented unified elections in Vietnam and gave support to blatantly rigged RVN elections, many authors see US idealistic attempts to bring enlightenment and democracy as arrogant because they were dealing with people who were culturally (or racially) indisposed towards freedom and human rights. And since the US uses war as a way of imposing freedom on those who spurn it, the inevitable losses in ‘blood and treasure’ bring us back to the proposition that “we are the real victims.”

Of course, when I write of the US, I am writing of whomever it may be that determines US policy, not the people as a whole. Consider this passage from Robert Brigham:

During Vietnam, it became more difficult to convince Americans that all the fighting and dying were worth it. Too few Americans believed Vietnam was worth the sacrifice. Johnson’s appeal to ideals, much like Bush’s today, ran its course, and Americans eventually concluded the troops should be brought home.

43 Many authors are happy to suggest that the US was mistaken because it thought that Hanoi would not be so complacent about the deaths of its own people. By this means the whole public relations paradigm of graduated response reverses victim and perpetrator in the same manner as a large bully using a smaller child’s hands to hit his face while saying, ‘stop hitting yourself.’ Jeffrey Record writes that the air campaign against the DRV failed because: ‘As a fiercely nationalistic totalitarian state prepared to sacrifice entire generations of its sons to achieve Vietnam’s reunification, North Vietnam was a very poor candidate for coercion through bombing.’ Jeffrey Record, “How America’s Own Military Performance in Vietnam Abetted the North’s Victory” in Marc Jason Gilbert (ed), Why the North Won the Vietnam War: New York: Palgrave, 2002, p 128. Cawthorne, referring to US use of fire-power more broadly reads into a Defense Department report that Hanoi calculatedly maintains a level of casualties just below its birth rate (Nigel Cawthorne, Vietnam: A War Lost and Won, London: Arcturus, 2003, p 114). This sort of ‘analysis’ relies on unexamined racial notions and also the unexamined presumption that the DRV leaders were presented with any choices in regard to either war on the ground or the air campaigns.
44 See Chapter 5.
45 See Chapter 2.

In Brigham's fantasy land (inhabited by many others) it is only the leaders who are overly idealistic while the broader populace is more self-interested. 'Americans' cared about the 'fighting and dying' but not the killing. However, in reality, a very clear majority in the US came to see the US involvement as a fundamental and criminal wrong. Some protesters chanted for Ho Chi Minh, while some antiwar veterans cheered for the NLF.

I have devoted considerable wordage thus far to introducing and giving a foretaste of the sort of apologism which is critiqued throughout this work. There exists a system of distortion which takes varied stances (frequently involving one party violently disagreeing with another) but which invariably acts to conceal the fact that the US is a systematic and serial perpetrator of genocide. Even trenchant critics of US foreign policy are drawn into denial. I am not suggesting here that such people are not heartfelt critics, rather that their criticism falls comfortably within the bounds of a discourse which, against their intent, supports the very policies which they object to.

For one example of the power and subtlety of contemporary US perception management I will return to the subject of torture. As shown in Appendix C, no other contemporary state can be more intrinsically associated with torture than the US is now. This comes from its long history of torture, from its innovation in torture, from its aforementioned overtense in torturing, and from the unprecedented global scope of its current torture practices. The crucial point is that, despite the fact that its methods of torture are deeply rooted in its own inventions and those of Britain and France, even the most strident critics construct torture as being an aberrant, indeed 'un-American', practice which has been transmitted to it like a contagion from its nasty 'totalitarian' enemies. In the final analysis it is the context which determines the historical judgement on the significance of any given occurrence. On the subject of torture (or any other atrocities including acts of genocide), the prevailing historical narrative is one of a series of unconnected exceptional acts.

The US is thus able to engage in very overt systematic torture ensuring, on the one hand, that people in the Arab world and elsewhere are very well aware of the fact, but are still able to maintain among Westerners an ideological commitment to the proposition that the US does not, by nature, torture. The fact that dissident voices support the hegemonic discourse further illustrates its power. This is true not only of this given topic, but more generally. I will argue that opponents of US foreign policy have significantly strengthened the imperialist agenda by miscontextualisation. This is particularly true of the many who conflate imperial interests with those of the US people or those of the US nation-state and insist that US military actions are strategic mistakes. They take the easy option of trying to garner support for an antiwar stance by highlighting the alleged stupidity of US war leaders. Hence they criticise on the grounds that US actions do not increase security, build nations, fight terror, spread democracy, deter aggression, and so forth. This supports crucial claims of inadvertance (namely lack of intention) and wrong-headed idealism which further the discourse of exceptionalism.

The only alternative critiques are based on a materialist conception of imperialism as being either in service of the capitalist class as a whole, or a narrow imperialist plutocratic class. I will later argue that these critiques – Marxist, Marxian, Leninist, Hobsonian – are equally wrong. On the one hand 'elite' interests are not served, nor are their desires heeded, while on the other hand the narrower imperial interests posited by a Hobsonian or Leninist analysis of imperialism do not conform to the

50 For example during the 1971* Winter Soldier* hearings transcripts of which are available from http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary/Winter_Soldier/WS_entry.html.
51 It is not only journalists and scholars (who are almost always convinced that military and political leaders have far inferior intellects), US officials themselves often blame each other's 'counterproductive' behaviours on stupidity.
materialist basis upon which they are supposed to rest. Instead they are all specifically strategic interests wherein commercial dominance and acquisition of wealth are very clearly secondary to the ability to exert power over people. As will be shown, this fact can even be discerned in Hobson's century old critique of the British Empire.\(^{52}\)

My contention is that a very narrow imperialist interest exists which operates on a paradigm of power and control, one which not only does not distinguish between state and 'private' power but actually systematically conflates the two. It is only by understanding this that the US proclivity for genocide can be understood. It is equally crucial to note that a full spectrum of analytical discourse (which includes dissenting analyses) serves to obliterate this perspective. The US uses war to systematically destroy nations in acts which are comprehensively genocidal, but all analyses preclude direct genocidal intent and hence genocide.\(^{53}\)

**An Academic Propaganda Model**

Part of the manner in which the academic world maintains a stance of subservience to power is by presenting immense obstacles to those who would contradict the fundamental distortions. If someone with letters after their name (and using citations) writes something stupid, fictional and bizarre, one cannot simply write 'this is stupid' and move on. In some ways this is right and proper; after all, an assertion is only my opinion unless I can demonstrate the truth of it. The problem arrives when you have a great number of people writing an immense number of really stupid things in ways which form a multiple-threaded discourse which, despite being ridden with contradictions, is self-reinforcing. This is an eerie phantasmagoric world, clearly bounded but inchoate, where passionate debates are held whether the sky is green, or purple, or really more of a magenta with flecks of brown around the edges. It can be very difficult to point out that the sky is blue if one must address all of these claims and counter-claims when the bounds of what is considered debatable exclude blue as an option.

I am disgusted and angered by this, but it would be a mistake to think that I consider all of the authors and the material I critique to be worthless. There are respectable publications which are nothing more than propagandistic glorifications of mass murder, but there are also works which, although completely specious with regard to my area of enquiry, are in other respects absolutely admirable. My topic lies within the bounds of an area of unusually extreme distortion. It is as if there are two massive singularities – black holes – which warp space-time around them. One is US foreign policy, and the other is genocide. They are a binary system but the linkage between them is obscured. The larger, US foreign policy, distorts all views of the smaller and it seems that the only angle from which one can perceive an outline of US foreign policy occludes completely the smaller black hole. Hence Michael Mandel's excellent book on US exceptionalism, *How America Gets Away With Murder*, turns completely anti-intellectual when the subject of genocide occurs. Suddenly this law professor, who bases his work on international law and its underlying moral basis, simply rejects the law which pertains to genocide.\(^{54}\) Like others of his ilk he perceives the black hole of US foreign policy as a disk and extrapolates that its must form a sphere, not understanding how the gravity of genocide distorts it nor the streams of matter and energy linking each singularity. At least such people understand the Law of Gravity (which, in this analogy, is proposed as the principle that power trumps all other considerations). From other perspectives the system presents an array of forms, twisted to a greater or lesser extent. Taking the shape presented

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53 Some genocide scholars allow for 'constructive intent' as will be discussed, but in the more general literature it is almost always held that the US cannot have committed genocide because its intent was to make money, or spread freedom, or deter Soviet aggression, *et cetera*. The problem with this is that these are all false contentions.
at face value is always unedifying. Yet all that is needed to understand properly the shape of the binary system is an understanding of the substance which constitutes each singularity and the application of the Law of Gravity. This cannot happen, though, when the vast majority claim that the Law of Gravity does not apply to US foreign policy and almost everyone claims that genocide can have no knowable constituent substance. Any discussion of US genocides runs headlong into this double-whammy of exceptionalism.

When Herman and Chomsky applied the 'propaganda model' to the output of news media, they were able to demonstrate its applicability with quantitative data. It would be easy to outline an academic propaganda model, but it is probably unnecessary. The opportunities for restricting access to advancement are manifold and patently manifest. On the one hand it is only too easy to make unsupported statements that are based on faulty logic and ignorance if they reflect commonly held ideological beliefs, but on the other hand countering such statements requires meticulous argument. These are assumptions, and more often than being stated as arguments they provide the a priori contextualisation. Hence, for example, one does not need to prove that the driving force behind US Cold War policy was the fear of the Soviet military threat, but one might be forced to answer questions posed with that assumption and it is difficult to answer a given question and argue against the underlying assumptions in a restricted space.

But while the media may be analysed in quantitative fashion, the academic world may not. As Noam Chomsky put it, 'the universities... in many respects are not very different from the media in the way they function – though they're a much more complex system, so they're harder to study systematically.' I would suggest, however, that it is fitting to adopt an implicit 'propaganda model' in dealing with the Academy. It is not only an institution which indoctrinates its inmates as a matter of course, it is also the source of a huge wealth of propaganda (when I use the term 'propaganda' I refer specifically to works which deceive in some manner).

In general, the academic propaganda system relies on the fragmentation and compartmentalisation inherent in a system which forces high levels of specialisation. Normally speaking, the specialist literature is less distorted than the more general literature. A good idea of the sort of distortions that occur in the general literature can be garnered by looking at textbooks. I will use some textbooks to provide examples pertinent to the genocides in Iraq and Indochina.

A work summarising 20th Century history has the following to say about the events leading up to the 2nd Indochina War: '[Ho Chi Minh's] brutal land reform and religious persecution drove a million northern-born Vietnamese, many Catholics and ethnic Chinese, and triggered a peasant revolt that was put down by the army.' In fact, what happened was that there was no religious persecution, the exodus occurred before the DRV regime was formalised. As Marilyn Young wrote:

Of particular propaganda value to Diem was the exodus of almost 1 million Catholics... who were said to have 'voted with their feet' for freedom. They did not really use their feet, nor was their flight entirely about freedom. Encouraged by the Catholic hierarchy and organised by [Edward] Lansdale and his team, entire parishes were carried south in American ships, following priests who told them Christ had moved south, as well as making promises of land and livelihood.

Once the Northerners arrived in Saigon what they actually received was forced resettlement. A Catholic working for Diem put several randomly acquired old people in a refugee camp and then

58 Lansdale (a key figure) will be discussed further.
made a great show of arresting them as Communist infiltrators, so that those refusing resettlement could be threatened with denunciation.\textsuperscript{60}

The refugee matter is not the only deception in this single sentence. The DRV regime instituted what was actually intended to be modest land reform, not wishing to severely alienate the landowning class,\textsuperscript{61} but it was the peasants themselves, in cooperation with cadres specifically outside of the Party hierarchy, who took extreme measures, killing between 3000 and 15,000. The DRV ended the programme and immediately 'reexamined the entire course of the reform and set out to correct its abuses.'\textsuperscript{62}

That is a fairly standard example of outright deception, but omission also plays a crucial role. Take the example of Charles Tripp's \textit{3rd edition of A History of Iraq} (2007). This textbook is undoubtedly a foundation of 'knowledge' for thousands of students across the globe, but what does it have to say on the sanctions period from 1991 to 2003? On the subject of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Tripp walks a fine line teetering on the edge of complete irrationality. Firstly he makes the highly dubious claim that 'eight years after the initial inspections, the UNSCOM teams still feared that Iraq had retained a substantial capacity for manufacturing and delivering chemical and biological weapons.'\textsuperscript{63} This is more or less a complete falsehood. Tripp continues by explaining that Saddam Hussein deliberately wanted to maintain some doubt about his possession of WMD as a form of deterrent. This means that he is privileging his own rather flimsy 'insight' into Saddam Hussein's thinking over what Iraq actually did which was to strenuously deny that it had any WMD with increasing desperation building to a fever pitch in advance of the 2003 invasion. This is nothing more than a very slightly veiled repetition of John Keegan's claim (which comes straight from US/UK government propaganda) that Saddam Hussein deliberately concealed the fact that he had no WMD and thus, 'a victim of his own fictions and evasions', effectively tricked his opponents into invading his country.\textsuperscript{64}

On the subject of the suffering brought about by the sanctions, Tripp is worse: 'The ferocity of his determination to maintain this posture [namely, Hussein's alleged determination to create the impression that he might have WMDs] can be measured in part by the price Iraq was made to pay for doing so.'\textsuperscript{65} What Tripp is implying is that all of the suffering caused by UN sanctions (which will later be seen to be exclusively the product of very deliberately vicious callous policies on the part of the US and UK acting substantively alone) was in fact due to the callous intransigence of Saddam Hussein in pursuing a supposed policy which, in fact, was a completely fictional construct of the US and UK governments which really were responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

I could detail more deceptions, but what is omitted by Tripp? There is no mention of Scott Ritter (who resigned as UN chief weapons inspector in 1998), whose testimony is only one of numerous pieces of evidence which completely belie claims that the UN, or the US and UK, harboured doubts over the elimination of WMD by 1999.\textsuperscript{66} There is no mention of numerous reports of mass civilian deaths, largely through malnutrition and degradation of health services, nor Madeleine Albright's extraordinary response to the stated figure of over 500,000 Iraqi children's deaths that 'we think the price is worth it.'\textsuperscript{67} In fact, although figures are tentative, 1.7 million people may have died due to sanctions and the after-effects of bombing from 1991 until April 2003, and Tripp makes

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Young, \textit{The Vietnam Wars}, p 50.
\item Tripp, \textit{A History of Iraq (3rd ed.)}, p 251.
\end{thebibliography}
no mention of that whatsoever. The issue of numbers is admittedly fraught, but in many respects no more so than other deadly historical events, and one can only imagine the poor reception that a work on Cambodian history would receive if it just omitted all mention of the mass deaths which occurred under the Khmer Rouge. Once the numbers are analysed to the best extent possible it seems almost certain that more Iraqis died in the sanctions period than Cambodians died under the KR.

My final example is one which extends beyond textbooks and pervades all of the scholarly literature. The Tonkin Gulf incidents and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution paved the way to 'Americanisation' and what many view as a completely new war. These events are irreducably complex for the simple reason that, though the US engaged in a long-planned and blatant act of aggression, they created a huge amount of distraction. A short summary is given in Appendix D, but the central point is that both the first and second incidents were deliberately brought about and initiated by the US. The incidents were in effect PR stunts staged by the US as a post-modern sort of Gleiwitz incident intended to give grounds for distraction and misapprehension rather than as the basis of a robust claim of self-defence. They became the basis of an extremely distorted and deceptive narrative which caused all analysis, including the most critical, to focus on the US reaction to these incidents as relative to the origins of the War, as if they were not of its own making. The US committed a blatant act of aggression, but my point is that critics and supporters alike bent over backwards to maintain the characterisation of US action as being reaction, doing considerable violence to the known facts to do so. This continues to this day.

If I were to write simply that, being desirous of war, the US embarked on a long series of provocations against the DRV and, when that failed, the US created false reports of an attack by the DRV to justify war, I would lose credibility for over-simplifying and misrepresenting events. On the other hand it is quite acceptable to make the bald-faced assertion that no collusion, conspiracy or foreknowledge could possibly have been involved. But if one actually weighs the options it is the latter assertion that looks rather incredible.

A Militaristic Empire

I have used the example of what can only be termed the glorification of torture to illustrate an extreme aspect of US militarism. One might also add the general glorification of the US military and its personnel. Take the reaction to the killing of Osama bin Laden, estimated to have accounted for 69% of all news coverage in the US in the week after the event. The New York Times featured an article which commenced: “They are America’s Jedi knights: the élite of the élite, an all-star team of commandos, ‘tier one’ special operations warriors given mission-impossible assignments in the most dangerous parts of the planet.” This was all too typical, and not really different from the construction of the nature of US military personnel in both news and entertainment media generally. The word ‘militarism’, however, may also be used pertaining to military ‘interventionism’ and military spending. The US spends an estimated 47% of the world's total military spending, about ten times as much as the next most profligate military spender, its ally the UK.

The most obvious way of demonstrating that there is a US empire is to simply show that it has a

68 One can argue somewhat about who initiated the first incident, but the US was systematically engaging in provocations and fired first, while DRV naval actions and intentions leave considerable room for speculation.


very widespread and extremely powerful military and 'intelligence' presence and that it uses these assets with great frequency. On this subject it is impossible to go past Chalmers Johnson's oft cited TomDispatch article “America's Empire of bases”,\textsuperscript{72} which condenses much of the relevant material from his 2004 book The Sorrows of Empire.\textsuperscript{73} He begins the article:

As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize... that the United States dominates the world through its military power. ... [A] vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire - an empire of bases with its own geography....

Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians, teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task forces built around aircraft carriers whose names sum up our martial heritage.... We operate numerous secret bases outside our territory to monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are saying, faxing, or e-mailing to one another.

He writes of the 2003 Base Status Report, which acknowledges 702 overseas bases in 130 countries – that is to say, a comfortable majority of the countries in the world. As Johnson points out, however, this very significantly understates the scope of the US military presence. Omitted are not only those bases with a replacement value of less than $10 million, but also recently built bases in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan. Also:

For Okinawa, the southernmost island of Japan, which has been an American military colony for the past 58 years, the report deceptively lists only one Marine base, Camp Butler, when in fact Okinawa 'hosts' ten Marine Corps bases.... The Pentagon similarly fails to note all of the $5-billion-worth of military and espionage installations in Britain, which have long been conveniently disguised as Royal Air Force bases. If there were an honest count, the actual size of our military empire would probably top 1,000 different bases in other people's countries....

Additionally, in 2003 the US began militarising its embassies. By 2006 this had coalesced into a plan for using embassies as a base for military operations undertaken under Special Operations Command (SOCOM) without necessitating ambassadorial approval. By early 2006, 'SOCOM has dispatched small teams of Army Green Berets and other Special Operations troops to U.S. embassies in about 20 countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, where they do operational planning and intelligence gathering to enhance the ability to conduct military operations where the United States is not at war.'\textsuperscript{74}

These forces would presumably operate under the precedent of the US invasion of Panama – or, to be more specific the 7th US invasion of Panama since they had created it by annexing a piece of Colombia in 1903.\textsuperscript{75} According to William Blum, 'the leading legal minds of the Justice Department, the State Department, and the Defense Department put their heads together and came to the unanimous conclusion that the invasion of the sovereign nation of Panama, the abduction of its leader, and his criminal trial of the in the US were all legal and proper.'\textsuperscript{76} As Chomsky writes, the invasion, 'Operation Just Cause', was 'undertaken to kidnap a disobedient thug who was sentenced to life imprisonment in Florida for crimes mostly committed while he was on the payroll of the CIA.'\textsuperscript{77} The significance is best summed by William Engdahl:

According to eye-witness accounts, upwards of 6,000 Panamanians, mostly poor civilians, were killed when


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

U.S. Special Forces and U.S. bombers invaded the small country on the pretext of arresting General Manuel Noriega on charges of being a drug cartel kingpin.

Bush's Attorney General, Richard Thornburgh,... had formulated an incredible new U.S. doctrine. The Thornburgh Doctrine stipulated that the American FBI and Justice Department had authority to act on foreign territory, if deemed necessary, 'in the course of extraterritorial law enforcement.'

This goes only a small way towards indicating a propensity for what is referred to as 'interventionism,' which in reality means a long-standing habit of frequently committing acts of aggression and state terror, including, but not limited to, assassination, torture, destabilisation and executing coups. Before World War II, the US sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times and by the 1920s was involved in 'something akin to perpetual war' in its counterinsurgency efforts. After World War II 'perpetual war' became more entrenched. After listing 66 major US interventions until 1999, most of which are not mentioned in orthodox scholarly or journalistic discourse, William Blum concludes, with some exasperation: 'The amount of US government roguery appears to be infinite, while the author's time is finite. The U.S. intervention machine has been, more or less, on automatic pilot ... perpetual war for perpetual peace.' The last felicitous phrase became the title of a book by Gore Vidal which lists 201 overseas military operations from World War II until 2001 as compiled by the Federation of American Scientists.

According to Andrew Bacevich things have gotten much worse since the end of the Cold War:

During the entire Cold War era, from 1945 through 1988, large-scale U.S. military actions abroad totalled a scant six. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, they have become almost annual events. The brief period extending from 1989's Operation Just Cause (the overthrow of Manuel Noriega) to 2003's Operation Iraqi Freedom (the overthrow of Saddam Hussein) featured nine major military interventions. And that count does not include innumerable lesser actions such as Bill Clinton's signature cruise missile attacks against obscure targets in obscure places, the almost daily bombing of Iraq throughout the late 1990s, or the quasi-combat missions that have seen GIs dispatched to Rwanda, Colombia, East Timor, and the Philippines. Altogether, the tempo of U.S. military interventionism has become nothing short of frenetic.

In fact, Bacevich is glossing over some facts. For much of the Cold War, for example between 1960 and 1975, the US killed many more people directly per day than it does now. What has changed is that there is a more open aggressiveness and a more stable tempo of mass violence. For example, under the Cold War paradigm, a massive troop commitment required an opposing army, whereas in both Iraq and Afghanistan any opposing force of remotely credible parity had dissolved before the largest amount of US troops were committed. It is the equivalent of sending 100,000 troops to fight the El Salvadoran revolution in the late 1970s – something that was not only unnecessary but which may have been untenable. Now, however, there is the 'Bush Doctrine', a doctrine of preventive war.

At West Point in 2002, George W. Bush announced a policy of unilateral 'preemption' which, in fact, omitted all of the conditions necessary for an act to be considered preemption under international law or under 'Just War' theory, notably the existence of an immediate and palpable threat. 'If we wait for threats to fully materialize,' he said, 'we will have waited too long.' As Barry Lando summarises, 'The U.S. had the unilateral right... to overthrow any government in the world it

judged a threat to American security. In September of 2002 this doctrine was enshrined in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Like many of the 'policy' documents there is a great deal of rhetoric and hyperbole. Introducing it, Bush writes of 'shadowy networks of individuals [which] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.' With a touch that smacks of calculated propaganda he minimises potential controversy, mentioning, as if in passing, that 'as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.' Likewise, the policy proclamation itself almost glides over the redefinition of preemption: 'The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.'

Michael Mandel points out the fundamental elements which make any attacks carried out under the Bush doctrine legally unjustifiable, and therefore acts of aggression:

...[T]he doctrine would justify the deliberate infliction of death and destruction on a massive scale where no evidence had been produced to show that this was necessary to prevent any broadly equivalent tragedy from befalling the people doing the inflicting. That would mean treating the lives of the people of the country attacked as less worthy of protection than the lives of the people of the attacking country, because it would displace all the risks onto them: to counter an unsubstantiated risk to the people of the attacking country, the people of the attacked country would be sentenced to death and destruction. You can imagine that international law cannot proceed on that assumption... [T]he Bush doctrine is a disguise for the doctrine of Might Makes Right so thin that a child could see through it, because it would also theoretically give every country the right to attack the US, but no means to do so. The US has threatened the world with weapons of mass destruction for about 60 years now,... It has the world’s largest cache of weapons of mass destruction, however you care to define them. In the wildest delusional fantasies of the American administration, the capabilities of Iraq to threaten anybody were infinitesimal compared to the threats the US brandishes every day. There is no law or morality without 'universalizability,' which means the US would have to recognize the right of any country to act preventively against the US itself, and you won’t find that in any of President Bush’s speeches.

Mandel makes very valid points, but it is also worth noting here that like other such pronouncements, the function of the Bush Doctrine seems less to be a way of enunciating policy than it is an instruction on the interpretation of official intent behind any given military action thus justified, no matter how inapt. After all, there is no need to announce a policy of Might Makes Right, the whole essence of such a policy is that one acts without justification. Equally, the lack of a Bush Doctrine has not constrained the US from unilateral acts of aggression in the past. It is a piece of propaganda which is part of the construction called (or formerly called) the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT). The function is to divert analysis of acts of aggression into the framework provided, even if it is in resounding rejecting the tenets of the 'doctrine.' In over thirty pages of text enunciating the Bush Doctrine, the key element of announcing intent to commit acts of aggression is confined largely to the two sentences quoted above. The rest is devoted to embedding such actions in a thoroughly mythical framework of alleged threats and noble causes. As with the Cold War, in the long term the point is not to convince the public, or even the 'élite' of the rightness of the cause, it is to provide a semi-plausible alibi – a defence of good intentions which, as has been detailed, finds predisposed acceptance in the world of punditry and scholarly analysis.

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86 See below.
Chapter 2 – War, Genocide and Empire

This work concerns large-scale genocides committed by the US, but like other perpetrators of genocide the US goes to considerable lengths to disguise the fact. It has done so by adopting the guise of fighting wars, but these alleged wars are nothing of the sort. These are not wars as generally understood by the public nor by theorists. Instead, these are ‘war systems’, prosecuted not to achieve victory but to facilitate genocide. For this reason it is necessary to explore what it is that we mean when we use the term ‘war’. In order to understand what war is taken to mean I think it is useful to refer to Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*. From this we can construct a view of genocide in opposition to this understanding of what might be termed ‘military war’ or 'Clausewitzian war'.

In a recent article, war historian Hew Strachan emphasises the continued relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz's *On War* despite the drastic changes that technology has brought to military conflict.\(^\text{87}\) At first blush this seems quite true. Clausewitz is most famous for his contention that war ‘is a mere continuation of policy by other means’,\(^\text{88}\) and as Strachan emphasises war remains a means for achieving political ends. However, there are two interrelated factors which cause some conflicts to contravene Clausewitzian norms, particularly larger conflicts prosecuted by the US since WWII. The first is that announced policy may differ considerably from actual policy, and the second is that the application of military power is not necessarily entirely, or even principally, focussed on coercion of an enemy.

For Clausewitz war was 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.'\(^\text{89}\) He used analogies of duels and wrestling.\(^\text{90}\) Clausewitz actually recognized that there was no 'true polarity' between antagonists,\(^\text{91}\) but was still unable to escape the broader idea of contestation, perhaps because war seemed to him too serious to be undertaken except under the urgent desire to force another party to bend to one's will – 'a serious means for a serious object'.\(^\text{92}\) For Clausewitz, thus, war was the pitting of military forces against each other with each seeking a victorious conclusion of military predominance which would allow for the imposition of 'our will'. In its pure form 'its aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him.'\(^\text{93}\) But Clausewitz understood that wars themselves may change the political environment and thus the political aims of waging war,\(^\text{94}\) and that full destruction of an enemy's forces may not always be required.\(^\text{95}\) Thus when Clausewitz came to discuss 'absolute war', which is a theoretical ideal which he *contrasts* with reality\(^\text{96}\) (as well as acknowledging the existence of 'limited aims')\(^\text{97}\) he was still discussing destructive contestation between military forces. He bases his conception of war on inter-state military contestations and despite the centrality of 'moral forces', which includes that of the public as a whole,\(^\text{98}\) he does not envisage the use of military force to directly destroy the public will by attacking the public.

Clausewitz is just one theorist, but my point in citing his work is twofold. First, he is representative of the common underlying conception of war. When war is discussed it is always implicit or explicit that there is contestation between forces. Hence if military coercion is used against a

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\(^{89}\) Ibid, 1.1.1, p 5.

\(^{90}\) Ibid, 1.1.2, pp 5-6.

\(^{91}\) Ibid, 1.1.15-7, pp 16-7.

\(^{92}\) Ibid 1.1.23, p 21.

\(^{93}\) Ibid 1.2, p 31.

\(^{94}\) Ibid.

\(^{95}\) Ibid, 1.2, p 33.

\(^{96}\) Ibid, 8.2, p 333.

\(^{97}\) Ibid, 8.5, p 356.

\(^{98}\) Ibid, 3.3, p 150.
populace which does not pose a military threat it is not considered war. However, those who use military force against the masses often claim that they are engaged in war. This brings me to the second point which is that, in the US instance, it is often false Clausewitzian rationales for the use of force that are consciously put forward to conceal different and less palatable policies pursued through different and less palatable means. The simplest examples in this regard are the US military actions in Korea and Indochina, putatively predicated on forcing a negotiated end to wars through 'attrition', but which the US had no wish to end.

Thus Clausewitz becomes a propaganda tool – a means of engendering support for military actions, particularly among military personnel. Gabriel Kolko describes the impact of Clausewitz on the military: 'Clausewitz infused a new moral and pseudoscientific vision into thinking about war... War... presumably could now be conducted in a rational fashion.' Tropes of martial prowess were replaced with a sense of mission in both public and military minds. Mass violence was legitimised as a means to a laudable end. For Kolko this concealed and intensified a self-destructive irrationality and 'social myopia' amply demonstrated in the bloody trench warfare of World War One. However, in later times, ‘Clausewitz's notion that a 'science' of strategy and war could be articulated remained pure ideology concealing the preconceived agenda of those who alleged this was what they were doing.

To Kolko such thinking remained a source of 'blindness', a cause of behaviour with 'no sane basis' which wrought destruction on the society of the aggressor. He assumes, however, that those who deceptively use Clausewitzian imperatives to prosecute war do so in narrow self-interest against the interests of their own society. He references the vested interests behind military spending, but also echoes here an understanding of the use of military power found in theorists of imperialism such as J.A. Hobson and V.I. Lenin. The same understanding was succinctly summarised by General Smedley Butler in the title of his pamphlet, War is a Racket. Butler based this conclusion on his own career in the US Marine Corps, which he had summarised in the following terms a few years earlier: 'I spent 33 years... being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism... I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1916. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City [Bank] boys to collect revenue in. I helped in the rape of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.

However the interests which Butler saw as the the cause of wars, while still extant, have become subsumed in a system devoted to strategic predominance – a system which is destructive of the profits of most private concerns. Those interests which are beneficiaries of this 'corporatist' system are all strategic in nature – arms and 'security', finance, food and biotechnology, essential infrastructure, medicine, and energy. These interests have access to the US public purse and exert a considerable degree of sovereign power in the US and, through that, elsewhere. It is an imperial system maintained by military predominance. That military predominance is used to secure an extreme form of predominance over strategic sectors of the global economy and the resources behind them. This occurs in a mutually reinforcing system. In particular the control of petroleum is

99 Kolko, Century of War, p 6.
100 Ibid, p 7.
101 Ibid, p 63.
102 Ibid.
105 I realise that this term may be semantically problematic, but I use it here merely to convey the linkages between government and 'private' interests much as others might use the equally problematic term 'military-Keynesianism'.

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used to maintain global financial hegemony, and the economic hegemony underwritten by military might is the fundamental basis of that military might itself.\textsuperscript{106}

The maintenance of the US-centred system of dominance, the maintenance of the US empire, is antithetical to meaningful economic development, particularly where benefits are broadly distributed, either to states or to individuals within states. The overweening strategic imperative is to exert dominance by maintaining or extending material disparity. Between states this antidevelopmental approach has been described as 'kicking away the ladder,'\textsuperscript{107} but it is also true at the individual level, including within the US itself wherein the social order would be threatened by unconstrained and undirected economic growth which might increase the autonomy of working and middle-class citizens. The logic of this system of domination inevitably inclines strategic policy towards genocidal means, as outlined below and in the next chapter. In this imperial system the use of military force does conform strictly to Clausewitz's dictum that it is a 'continuation of policy by other means.' Military force may be used directly or indirectly (by demonstration) to coerce states to submit to the abdication of economic sovereignty necessary to enforce antidevelopmental policies against the will of the populace. When the military is used, however, it is also used to effect the same policy by degrading economic and social foundations of a society as well as directly and indirectly killing numbers of civilians within the constraints of maintaining denial and dissimulation.

Thus the ruse of evincing a Clausewitzian strategic aim does not conceal irrationality, nor a profit motive. It conceals a strategic approach which is morally unacceptable to the vast majority; one which involves the systematic killing and immiseration of whole populations. It is also used to distract from the fact that when the US wages war the resources of the US as a whole are drained while power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few.

It must also be recognised that Clausewitz does not effectively encapsulate the general nature of colonial/imperial uses of military force. Although on the surface nothing seems to embody a Clausewitzian approach more than a typical imperialist punitive expedition or the use of 'gunboat diplomacy', not only in the obvious crossover to 'other means' to pursue policy, but also in the tendency to involve using maximal force to bring about a decision. However, such uses of force are embedded within a circumstance of power relations which are inherently hostile to all forms of power which might be a source of independence for the targeted population or polity. Consequently the gunboats are as often turned on economic or cultural targets as they are on military ones. Even when military forces are targeted, it is not necessarily to a military end. For example, in 1898, a British punitive expedition killed around 11,000 of the Dervish army at the battle of Omdurman in Sudan. The level of military threat posed by these forces, however, is indicated in some degree by the British losses of 140 killed.\textsuperscript{108} More indicative, perhaps, are the punitive/coercion attacks on 19th century Chinese. These attacks, described further hereafter, weakened the Qing dynasty to a point which allowed a more general domination through what I would argue to be genocidal means.

'Punitive' action, like 'terrorism', may lend itself to either Clausewitz's 'war' or Lemkin's 'genocide'. The coercion of 'gunboat diplomacy', on the other hand, effectively presupposes a degree of disparity sufficiently great that the power employing the tactic is immune from retaliation or even costly resistance. In other words, it takes place after the target has been rendered more or less militarily ineffective either by attrition or by pre-existing material disparity, hence it really falls outside of Clausewitz's concerns and focus.

Likewise, I would argue that genocide is also outside of Clausewitz's scope. It is true that his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} See Appendix J.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} This comes from a quote by Friedrich List in 1841: '...when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up... ' (Quoted in Johnson, \textit{The Sorrows of Empire}, p 262.)
\end{itemize}
writing might lend itself to the strategic logic of genocide, but as we shall see below, Clausewitz envisaged the use of violence for clearly delimited political ends which, when attained, would bring about a state of peace. He wrote: 'Were it a complete, untramelled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting.'

But if the policy is genocide, the limits on military violence, which Clausewitz assumed would naturally arise, may simply disappear.

Leaving aside imperialist violence, the foregoing can be further confirmed by examining the two World Wars. In World War I whole societies were put on a war footing, and their opponents did whatever was within their means to attack the war capacities of those entire societies. This corresponds with Clausewitz's advocacy of aiming to destroy an enemy's capacity for violence, including that which is only potential. But in Clausewitz's understanding, strategy would be shaped and delimited by whatever policy or set of policies brought about the choice to go to war. Belligerents had no shortage of policies, but actual 'war aims' were developed along the way. At the operational level, where Clausewitz felt that strategy should reflect purpose, there was a disconnection. Strategy became ultra- or post-Clausewitzian, a dysfunctional instrument of destruction just like the mine of his analogy.

At the same time, Britain and the US, if not others, were pursuing purposes which were facilitated by war, but were actually beyond any Clausewitzian conception which would see force applied to the enemy in pursuit of a political aim. Britain sought to establish a massive dominance of oil resources to maintain its naval dominance in actions described below. The US, similarly, entered the war largely to secure future international financial hegemony. Debt diplomacy became an instrument of a type of inter-state economic warfare. The British ambassador to Washington commented in 1921 that the US intended 'to prevent us from paying our debt by sending goods to America and they look for an opportunity to treat us as a vassal state so long as our debt remains unpaid.'

The US and UK strategic purposes in World War I thus effected relations with allies and non-belligerents as much as it did their enemies, putting their strategy outside of Clausewitz's scope.

Operationally, however, it was World War I which saw the application of Clausewitzian logic reach its zenith, though ironically he was largely out of favour at the time. Clausewitz advocated the 'utmost use of force' in the following terms:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war.

Thus the aforementioned theoretical ideal of absolute war using maximum force. This is never to be attained in reality, but taken broadly World War I fitted this conception in some degree.

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110 Ibid, 3.1, p 135.
111 At least it must be admitted that this is an obvious and highly predictable outcome of the US desire to secure its loans and trade with its immanent allies. It would surely beggar belief to think that the dramatic transference of financial dominance from London to New York would pass unnoticed, or would not be an attractive proposition to US policy makers who, in the event, wasted no time in putting this dominance to use.
114 Ibid, 1.1.10, p 12.
Mobilisation of personnel and materiel were profoundly inclusive which meant that economic attacks on the civilian sector had a military purpose, much as a mediaeval siege would have. The privations visited on the civilian populaces were incidental, a genuine example of collateral damage. In World War I this applied even to the US and UK. Their strategies might have partly lain outside the normal bounds of war, but the means to which they put military resources and the ends intended were military. The US was using military force to ensure a desired military outcome, even if the ultimate purpose was to do with loans and trade to its allies.

World War I, and its version of 'total war' thus became a watershed: in some degree the entirety of civilian society became the target for the application of military violence, but, apart from the aerial bombardment of civilians, the objectives were military. This broadening of acceptable military practices was to lead directly to the widespread perpetration of technological genocide. This occurred simultaneously with an alteration of combatants' deeply held values. Eric Leed refers to this as 'the internalization of war' and clearly intends to create an association with the rise of the Nazis and their subsequent actions, including the holocaust. Even before 1914 there was evidence, from the unprecedented incidence of neurosis in the Russo-Japanese War, that the very conditions of modern warfare had a particular and peculiar impact on the psyche of combatants. This was not confined to those officially incapacitated, the psychiatric casualties. Denis Winter writes that Great War veteran Richard Aldington 'concluded that after six months most line troops were off their heads...'. Robert Graves considered that after three months under fire all soldiers were neurasthenic, while a medical officer felt, at the end of the Gallipoli campaign, that 'all [Allied troops] were in a condition of profound neurasthenia.' The mechanisms of normal instinct and normal judgement were burnt out, 'It was a war in which Don Quixote assumed the features of Sancho Panza....'

One might argue that in World War II 'Panzaism' (defined as seeing the most extraordinary things as ordinary and rational) would reach its ultimate expression as the 'desk murderers' went about their 'banal' tasks of plotting flight paths or train schedules which would end in the incineration of hundreds of thousands. This is slightly different from the observed phenomenon of 'Quixote's' becoming 'Panza's' which references a neurasthenic dazedness, but the link can be seen in the coinage of the term Panzaism. A more detailed survey of the psychic impact on combatants and their resultant animus against civilians is given as Appendix E.

After the war the troops' sense of angry estrangement was intensified by the difficulties of adjusting to civilian life. Most became withdrawn. Winter describes as 'typical' one who was 'depleted physically and mentally... demanding to be treated for the time as an invalid.' They experienced fits of depression and uncontrollable, often inchoate, fury. They were prone to commit acts of violence, including domestic violence. Many had nightmares, or horrific waking visions.

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117 Ibid, pp 97-8, 165.
119 Leed, No Man's Land, p 181. Winter echoes this diagnosis, 'Some endured, more broke entirely, the majority ceased to fight except in a shadow-boxing way....' Winter, Death's Men, p 140.
120 Ibid p 81.
121 Winter, Death's Men, p 242.
123 Ibid p 243; Leed, No Man's Land, pp 200-1.
124 Leed, No Man's Land, p 203.
125 Ibid p 188.
126 Winter, Death's Men, p 248.
There was a significant ongoing incidence of psychiatric illness, increasing throughout the 1920s.\textsuperscript{128} Leed writes, 'The pathologies generated by war continued to fill the wards... But just as often these pathologies... were worked out in offices, households, taverns and the political arena.'\textsuperscript{129}

There was also an increasing hostility directed towards veterans by civilians. Despite the impression that soldiers were given on home leave, many civilians were embittered by the war and, however unjustly, veterans were the target of this bitterness.\textsuperscript{130} They also became angry over the veteran 'non-workers', who were unable, or as some would see it unwilling, to work.\textsuperscript{131}

There can be no question that front line soldiers were changed drastically in their basic character by their experiences in the Great War.\textsuperscript{132} This is the ultimate alienation, a profound estrangement of fundamental personality which, unlike differing opinions or conscious resentment, cannot be reconciled, only muted by passing years. Many veterans considered themselves a 'breed apart'.\textsuperscript{133} Leed quotes Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, who was to become a \textit{Gruppenführer} of the S.A., 'Those people told us the war was over. That was a laugh. We ourselves are the war.'\textsuperscript{134}

Thus on a systemic level, a social level, an operational level, and on the individual psychological level for a huge cadre of veterans, the distinction between civilian and military had become blurred. All that remained was the advent of a strategic approach which was in fitting with these changes. By World War II the major belligerents had continental or global purposes which were extra-Clausewitzian. Great powers were attempting to become what would later be known as 'superpowers' by establishing a supposedly strategically invulnerable New Order, or Grand Area, or Co-prosperity Sphere (the British were trying to defend their empire, which amounts to the same thing but does not allow the utopian pretensions). In short, the strategies were all imperialistic, and inherently genocidal. Military strategies tended towards total destruction and forcing unconditional surrender. Germany, by definition, adopted a comprehensive programme of multiple genocides. Japan, in its racism, its colonialism, and in its hyper-exploitative approach, was genocidal.\textsuperscript{135} US and UK attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure were equally genocidal. All of these genocides, which account for most of the fatalities of World War II, were predicated on extending an advantage beyond any that could be gained by the satisfactory imposition of a defined set of policies on an enemy at the cessation of hostilities.

Raphaël Lemkin (who coined the term 'genocide') understood this aspect of Nazi genocide. He wrote:

The enemy nation within the control of Germany must be destroyed, disintegrated, or weakened in different degrees for decades to come. Thus the German people in the post-war period will be in a position to deal with other European peoples from the vantage point of biological superiority. Because the imposition of this policy of genocide is more destructive for a people than injuries suffered in the actual fighting, \textit{(The German genocide philosophy was conceived and put into action before the Germans received even a foretaste of the considerable dimensions of Allied aerial bombings of German territory.)} [my emph.] the German people will be stronger than the subjugated peoples after the war even if the German army is defeated. In this respect genocide is a new technique of occupation aimed at winning the peace even though the war itself is lost.\textsuperscript{136}

Note that, by implication, Lemkin is suggesting as an aside, that the Allied bombing strategy was in

\begin{itemize}
  \item[128] Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, pp 186-9.
  \item[129] Ibid p 187.
  \item[130] Winter, \textit{Death's Men}, pp 244-5.
  \item[131] Ibid p 247.
  \item[132] Ibid pp 189 (specifically speaking of battle experience), 243; Adams, \textit{The Great Adventure}, p 113; Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, pp 1-4.
  \item[134] Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, p 213.
  \item[136] Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p 81.
\end{itemize}
tune with the German genocide strategy, and it is the former which I will now explore as an
exemplar of World War II genocide in addition to discussing it as the most significant precedent of
some later genocides.

Once upon a time the artillery bombardment of a civilian population was seen as an horrific
atrocity, sometimes even among the very people whose military and political leaders were
responsible. For example, a British cabinet member resigned over the shelling of Alexandria, which
killed hundreds,\textsuperscript{137} while the killing of civilians in the Mexican War helped fuel a precocious
antiwar movement in the US.\textsuperscript{138} By the time that aerial bombardment was first used, however, both
reportage and sympathy had become more selective.

The bombing of Guernica by German and Italian forces provoked ‘international outrage’, became
immortalised by Picasso\textsuperscript{139} and is now a byword for atrocity\textsuperscript{140} often taken to be unprecedented. But
few reacted with outrage to British bombing campaigns in India and Iraq, where the first bombings
of civilians occurred in 1920. 100 tons of bombs were dropped during the 1920 rebellion. John
Newsinger writes, ‘Wing Commander Arthur Harris made the point that the Arabs and Kurds “now
know what real bombing means in casualties and damage. Within forty-five minutes a full—size
village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured”’.\textsuperscript{141} From then on
it was the British first, then the US who were the pre-eminant slaughterers of civilians in this
manner.

Given that ‘our side’ is responsible for the vast majority of such death and suffering it is impolitic to
give voice to the depth of horror suffered by those subject to such attacks, with exception made for
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Consider the following quote given by Joanna Bourke, an account of the
Blitz in London.

\begin{quote}
I remember racing towards the house, E pulling me and yelling. The oddest feeling in the air all around, as if the
whole air was falling apart, quite silently. And then suddenly I was on my face, just inside the kitchen door.
There seemed to be waves buffetting me, one after another, like bathing in a rough sea. I remember clutching
the floor, the carpet, to prevent myself being swept away. This smell of carpet in my nose and trying not to be swept
away, and I could hear Mrs R screaming. E was nowhere, the lights were gone, it was all dust, I didn’t even
wonder if he was all right . . . didn’t give him a thought.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

Seldom are those under far more extreme bombardment by US forces given such a voice, such
humanity, and not without reason. To fully humanise those subjected to, say, B-52 carpet bombing
would force the recognition that these are not so much weapons of war as tools of extermination.
This can be further established by examining the strategic logic behind bombing civilians and
civilian infrastructure.

Three early advocates of mass aerial bombardment were Giulio Douhet (Italy), Hugh Trenchard
(UK), and Billy Mitchell (US). Douhet and Trenchard argued against the distinction between
civilian and combatant, Mitchell was an advocate of incendiary bombing, and all three argued that
mass bombing of urban areas would shorten wars, preventing the horrors of drawn out trench
warfare.\textsuperscript{143} In this one can see the shadow of The Great War as easily as one can see it in German
genocide.

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\textsuperscript{138} Zinn, \textit{A People's History of the United States}, pp 153-8.

\textsuperscript{139} Andrew Forrest, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, London: Routledge, 2000, pp 72, 75.

\textsuperscript{140} Michael Humphrey, \textit{The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma}, London: Routledge,

\textsuperscript{141} Newsinger, \textit{The Blood Never Dried}, p 118.


\textsuperscript{143} Eric Markusen and David Kopf, \textit{The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the
In World War II, under Air Chief Marshall Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, the British conducted what was termed ‘terror bombing’ of civilians. The idea was that if you induced enough fear in the enemy population it would turn against the war. This had begun with a phase in 1940 of what Markusen and Kopf term the ‘erosion of mutual restraint’ between Germany and Britain. This culminated first in the Blitz, then in Britain choosing to prioritise industrial targets within residential areas.\(^\text{144}\) In the months after the end of the Blitz, Britain continued to expand targetting to, in Markusen and Kopf's words, ‘maximise collateral damage’.\(^\text{145}\) Of course, such deliberate targetting of civilians means that they were no more 'collateral damage' than the victims of the Blitz were. The bombings were costly in British lives and materiel, and were all but suspended between November 1941 and February 1942. On resumption the bombing was officially under the rationale of demoralising the German people through what was euphemistically referred to as 'dehousing'. What this actually meant was that killing civilians was itself the supposed means of demoralisation, hence 'terror bombing'.\(^\text{146}\) A great deal of forethought was given to ways in which to maximise destruction and mortality, such as using a mixture of incendiaries, delayed-action high-explosive (HE) and land mines in order to impede or kill firefights. This in itself could be considered genocidal in as much as it seeks to destroy part of the nation through physically killing them, but there should also be some question over how sincerely the British believed the demoralisation rationale – after all, it had failed at Guernica, the bombing of which only strengthened Basque resolve\(^\text{147}\) and, more to the point, it failed in the Blitz.

The US condemned ‘terror bombing’ as futile from the start. They conducted ‘strategic bombing’, by which I mean the narrower sense of the phrase whereby bombing attempts to degrade the enemy’s war-fighting capacity – namely by targetting war material production and key resources such as oil. They scaled priorities of targets on the basis of the impact on German war fighting capacity. According to James Carroll: ‘Scaling targets in this way, the Americans had neither strategic nor tactical interest in purely civilian targets.’\(^\text{148}\)

The US, however, changed its tune, but given the ongoing evidence of the strategic counterproductiveness of bombing civilians, the question must be why? Lewis Mumford wrote after the war that: 'By taking over this method... these democratic governments sanctioned the dehumanized techniques of fascism. This was Nazidom's firmest victory and democracy's most servile surrender.'\(^\text{149}\) Was there some sort of chain of infection, with genocide a disease incubated in The Great War and then spreading like influenza? I think there is a kernel of truth to this, but there are also more prosaic matters. After all, firestorms and extermination camps may have been innovations but genocide was not; and Japan, a state little touched by the horrors of World War I, had been rampaging through China in a genocidal manner halfway between a traditional colonial genocide and the technological genocide that was soon to be widespread.\(^\text{150}\) There is a more prosaic explanation for the US turn to genocide. Up until this point, the strategic plan for the post-War world had called for the retention of a Grand Area under German hegemony.\(^\text{151}\) That planning

\[^{144}\] Ibid, pp 153-4.
\[^{145}\] Ibid, p 156.
\[^{146}\] Ibid, pp 156-7.
\[^{147}\] Forrest, The Spanish Civil War, p 75.
\[^{149}\] Quoted in Markusen and Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing p 209.
\[^{150}\] Jones includes this intance as an exemplar of imperialist genocide: ‘The campaign featured air attacks that killed tens of thousands of civilians, and even more intensive atrocities at ground level. The occupation of the Chinese capital, Nanjing, in December 1937 became a global byword for war crimes. The gendercidual slaughter of as many as 200,000 Chinese men of “battle age” was accompanied by the rape of tens of thousands of children and women. Over the course of the Japanese occupation (1937–45), “nearly 2,600,000 unarmed Chinese civilians” were killed, together with half a million to one million prisoners of war.’ (Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, p 44).
changed as it became clear that the Soviets were winning against Germany, eventually transforming into an uneven global bipolar paradigm which was the basis for the 'Cold War'.

Thus the US began what was called ‘area bombing’ - a conflation of putatively strategic bombing and the bombing of civilians, notably using incendiary bombs to set whole cities alight, killing many thousands in a single raid. Their first attacks against civilians, in January 1944, were officially against strategic targets, but chose those located in densely populated areas just as the British had in late 1941. But as John Kenneth Galbraith tells the story, by 1944 Franklin Roosevelt was doubtful about the efficacy of air raids. He wanted a civilian review, and it was Galbraith along with George Ball and Paul Nitze who formed ‘the core of the operation.’ They found, in essence, that bombing (strategic, area or terror bombing) was an expensive waste of war materiel. Industry was easily decentralised and machine tools hard to damage with the ordnance of the time. ‘Strategic bombing was designed to destroy the industrial base of the enemy and the morale of its people. It did neither.’ In other words, it was actually counterproductive to any effort to win the war because it was horrendously expensive.

Furthermore, the US engaged in acts of civilian mass murder which no reference to strategic aims nor demoralisation could rationalise. Dresden was a demilitarised city which on February 13, 1945 had swelled to over twice its normal population of 650,000 with refugees choosing to shelter in a city which the Allies had no cause to bomb:

The first wave, consisting of nearly 250 British bombers carrying both high explosive and incendiary bombs, hit Dresden at 10:00 P.M. on February 13. Three hours later the second wave of more than 500 British bombers, carrying more than 650,000 incendiary bombs, struck again. Ten hours later, at about noon, 316 American bombers attacked, dropping nearly 500 tons of high-explosive and 300 tons of incendiary bombs. Also included in the American bomb loads were delayed action fuses designed to explode while rescue workers and firefighters were at work. Accompanying the American bombers were fighter planes that used machine guns to strafe masses of survivors trying to leave the burning city.

If it is difficult to see the strategic purpose of firebombing a city with no military significance, strafing the fleeing refugees from such a city should surely be understood as a war crime and an act of mass murder. It should be borne in mind that International Humanitarian Law was and is built on two 'cardinal principles' the first of which is 'the distinction between combatants... and non-combatants....' This principle predates and, for obvious reasons, is not altered by, the theories of Douhet et al. As Joanna Bourke notes, “Article 25 of the Hague Convention of 1907 clearly stipulated that ‘the attack by Bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages or buildings which are undefended is prohibited’ and a protocol issued by the British in 1938 and passed by the League of Nations extended Article 25 to air raids, stating that ‘the intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal. ... objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military targets and must be identifiable’

February 1945 also saw the initiation of Project Clarion which was, according to Markusen and Kopf, 'explicitly anticivilian'. "Thousands of American bombers and fighters.... roam[ed] the largely undefended skies over rural Germany searching for small towns and villages to strafe and bomb at low altitudes." These were the places to which the children of the industrial cities had been evacuated.

Why then, one might ask, did the US go to such lengths to take so many lives, especially once the

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152 Ibid, pp 45-6.
157 Bourke, The Second World War, p 164.
outcome of the war had become inevitable? This makes untenable Telford Taylor’s explanation that
‘Berlin, London and Tokyo were not bombed because their inhabitants were German, English or
Japanese, but because they were enemy strongholds. Accordingly, the killing ceased when the war
ended and there was no longer an enemy.’\cite{Telford} Indeed, as Markusen and Kopf point out, the victims of 'strategic bombing' were chosen on the basis of belonging to a group, just as the victims of the
Shoah, without reference to any individual actions or traits.\cite{Markusen}

Note that above Telford Taylor the chief US prosecutor at all but the first of thirteen Nuremberg
trials is excusing the actions of the Nazis, who also bombed civilians deliberately. He wrote that
'aerial bombardment had been used so extensively and ruthlessly on Allies as well as the Axis side
that neither at Nuremburg nor at Tokyo was the issue made a part of the trials.'\cite{Telford}
It was his predecessor, Robert Jackson, who famously said: 'We must never forget that the record on which we
depend these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these
defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.'\cite{Jackson}

Although this is commonly associated with the suggestion that the US, having set the precedent at Nuremburg, is itself guilty of
aggression, the phraseology - 'history will judge us tomorrow' is more suggestive that this concerns
acts which have already occurred. In any event, the Allies consciously avoided charging the Nazis
with the well established crime of waging war against civilians\cite{Telford} preferring instead to charge them
with the arguably ex post facto\cite{Telford} crime of aggression. As we have seen 'aggression' was said to
contain 'within itself the accumulated evil of the whole,' which is somewhat suggestive that the
Nazi were themselves responsible for Allied crimes.

Robert McNamara relates that Curtis LeMay said to him, 'If we’d lost the war, we’d all have been
prosecuted as war criminals.’ McNamara, reflecting on this in Errol Morris’s film Fog of War, said,
'I think he’s right.... But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?.'\cite{McNamara}

This begs the question of why the US would then go on to be so prolific in its use of air power against
civilians, given that it was counterproductive to war fighting and potentially would lead to war
crimes charges. In many respects it is unsurprising that the criminality of Allied mass murder was
largely elided, still less than no one attached the novel coinage of genocide to it. The Allies weren’t
just the victors, they were the victors in the most massive war in human history; they were victors
against the German Nazi regime, the most criminal and condemnable in human history, and other
Axis powers which were also vile in and of themselves. Nevertheless, Allied 'strategic' bombing
was genocide, but being unrepudiated (being largely unacknowledged as a war crime, let alone
genocide) it became normalised. It took on the cloak of an aspect of war, morally controversial
perhaps, but accepted as entirely military in nature.

Skipping ahead in time, however, it can be seen that the primary use of US airpower in major
conflicts was to remain genocidal rather than military. In the Second Indochina War, in its 'limited'
bombing campaign, the US even declared some parts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV) to be off limits for bombing, which allowed the military, including air defences, to escape

\cite{Telford} Quoted in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case

\cite{Markusen} Markusen and Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing, p 247.

quoted in Markusen and Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing, p 251.


\cite{Dinstein} As mentioned, non-combatant immunity is one of the 'two cardinal principles' of international humanitarian law
209).

\cite{Telford} At least so Telford Taylor admits (Terkel, The Good War, p 460) though the Tribunal itself argued that it was
established law under the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p 108).

\cite{Chomsky} Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations with Noam Chomsky on the Post-9/11 World,
bombardment while civilians, who could not be concentrated in such areas, suffered immense casualties. The Vietnamese in February 1967 reported 391 schools, over 80 churches and 30 pagodas, and 95 health institutions had been destroyed up to that point. One leprosarium was attacked 36 times in 1965 and 1966. Nor could the bombing campaign against North Vietnam be considered ‘limited’ by any standards other than those of the bombing of Laos and South Vietnam. The campaign ran for 3 years and dropped an average of one 500 pound bomb every 30 seconds. By the end 860,000 tons had been dropped, three times as much as was dropped on Europe, Asia and Africa in World War II. Given the obvious, and well predicted, failure of the bombing campaign to significantly reduce North Vietnam’s ability to prosecute war, US leaders came up with the rationale that the bombing was intended to induce the DRV to negotiate. In a memorandum to Lyndon Johnson, McGeorge Bundy wrote: ‘We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam.... At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all we could have done....’ Bundy also talks of showing ‘U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency....’ It is worth remembering that this ‘new norm’ in ‘counter-insurgency’ is not interdiction bombing of supply routes or any other thing that might actually impact an insurgency, it is ‘strategic’ bombing of the DRV, guaranteed to bring massive suffering to the civilian population. Nor can it be said that the rationale of forcing negotiations was anything but a pretext. Lyndon Johnson twice expressed a wish to negotiate, once offering ‘unconditional talks’, but these offers were not addressed to the DRV regime, but rather to US domestic audiences in speeches. Not surprisingly, Hanoi took these offers with a grain of salt, when they heard of them, and released a list of its aims, presumably hoping that the US would respond by saying that none of the DRV’s desires were negotiable. Instead the US government held up the list of points as proof that Hanoi did not want to negotiate, and when Hanoi tried to clarify that it was in fact willing to negotiate, it was ignored by the US government and media. In fact Hanoi had made several moves to try an institute negotiations which the State Department and even the hawkish Ray Cline (at the time, acting Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)) agreed were probably real.

In Laos and Cambodia, where bombing was even more intense, the US did not provide any such rationale for its behaviour. Instead they were ‘secret’, meaning that although they were widely known of they were never officially acknowledged, and thus went completely unreported by the US mainstream media. In this manner there were no explanations or debates about why the bombing was occurring. One could easily infer genocidal intent from these facts alone, but that is unnecessary. The fact is that, at great expense, the US performed highly coordinated and systematic acts which to bring about the physical destruction of part of the target group as well as attacking its economic base, social cohesion and cultural life. They did this using every available resource to its fullest capacity, and when there were much trumpeted ‘bombing pauses’ the freed resources were used to increase the intensity of bombing elsewhere. If this were done with ground forces using small arms then it would be impossible to call it anything but genocide, and the ‘controversy’ about it is entirely artificial. As R. J. Rummel put it: ‘Deliberately targeting civilians simply because they

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167 Cawthorne, Vietnam, pp 96-7.
happen to be under the command and control of an enemy Power is no better than lining them up and machine gunning them, a clear atrocity.\textsuperscript{173}

Along with genocide, these imperialistic strategies inclined belligerents towards the abandonment of another Clausewitzian norm, that of using military forces for military contestation in a clear friend/enemy paradigm. Consider that during World War II the US had surprisingly extensive commercial links to Germany and Axis occupied Europe, something which hurt its war effort and cost the lives of Allied military personnel, but which strengthened its peacetime position. From the narrow strategic perspective of the Anglo-US form of imperialism such behaviour is only problematic if you lose the war. Ford, along with General Motors, played a crucial role in the German war effort in World War II.\textsuperscript{174} Ford went far further than Krupp had in WWI, supplying not only materiel, but employing Germans and being, in short, a fully-fledged part of the German military-industrial complex. Ford Werke, the second largest supplier of trucks in Germany, grew considerably through the course of the war.\textsuperscript{175} Ford also produced for the Axis war effort in subsidiaries throughout occupied Europe, in Vichy France, and in North Africa.\textsuperscript{176} It is true that Ford contributed to innumerable Allied deaths, including those of many US personnel, but, as would become evident in later instances of defoliant and depleted uranium use, imperialist policy is not overly concerned with the loss of US lives, except to the extent that combat casualties have a negative impact on public opinion. Many within the US government were aghast at Ford's role in the German war machine,\textsuperscript{177} but Ford, and others, were not stopped. Ford cost US taxpayers dearly, but equally they profited from German taxpayers.

War profiteers have always had a material interest which might differ from that of their host state, and, quite justly, have considerable notoriety as a species which seeks to make profits at the expense of military efforts and the lives of personnel while all too often selling arms and supplies to the enemy. The US practice of allowing commercial links to its enemy to develop despite the material support afforded conformed to the spirit of the British Empire wherein the approach to dominance of strategic assets transcended any 'friend-enemy' relations. In World War II, however, the US had taken its first steps towards creating what David Keen calls a 'war system'.

Before detailing the concept of a 'war system', it is worth reviewing the extra-Clausewitzian imperatives, both old and new, which result in military violence being used for matters other than the defeat or destruction of an opposing military force. Lemkin's genocide, a practice which precedes the coinage by thousands of years, conforms to a logic which cannot be reduced to military concerns and is frequently militarily counterproductive in its application. Genocide and 'total war' (which may bring about genocide) do not conform to a defined policy or set of policies which give shape to strategy in Clausewitzian conflict. The rise of the military-industrial complex, and its interpenetration with governmental power led to a new form of war profiteering. Private profit was linked to a geostrategic imperative of dominance, maintaining disparity between states, but simultaneously to a need to maintain materially disparate hierarchies within states including the US itself – hence the concentration on military power and strategic assets rather than utilising, maintaining or extending the broad economic dominance enjoyed by the US after World War II.

Leaving aside the smaller scale imperial uses of military violence to effect demonstrative punishment or coercion, there are a number of very significant possible agenda which may be

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid, p 535.
\item Betton and Hench, “‘Any color as long as it’s black’”, p 535.
\end{itemize}
advanced by the extensive use of military violence. Genocide, for example, is almost always carried out by the military. According to Jones, 'many [scholars] would rank war as genocide’s greatest single enabling factor.' For antidevelopmental or econocidal purposes military force during wartime is the perfect tool. Under cover of war the military can inflict massive damage on economic assets and kill, maim or displace huge amounts of the workforce. If the antidevelopmental aim goes beyond the econocide of the nominated enemy, the military also sucks wealth (materials and labour) from the home state, or in the US case globally, to create the armaments which in large proportion are themselves destroyed in the process of destroying. This also facilitates a greater upward redistribution of wealth as the war 'costs', funded by the public, include a healthy percentage of profit for the military-industrial capitalists. In the same process, a hegemonic power may increase its military dominance through increased armament and taking advantage of opportunities for research and development. Political hegemony may be increased by the demonstration of the extent of violent power and the willingness to employ it. War also has a long history of benefit to those who would exert political control over the domestic population and silence voices of dissent.

All of the above motives for military conflict make the resolution of that conflict (whether in 'victory' or in 'defeat') more or less undesirable. One might ask the question that, assuming these motives do impel US policy, why then is the US not constantly at war? I suspect that the question might be posed with considerably less force than it might have been ten years ago, but it is a reasonable question. One answer is that the US is constantly at war. Firstly, there is the matter of proxy wars. Many of the above imperatives for conflict can be fulfilled through proxies. A full discussion of the issue of proxy wars would be far too consuming, however it should be noted that the majority of contemporary conflicts involve what should be described as a US proxy. The US sells 70% of the arms bought by developing and underdeveloped countries, and all of its arms sales come with conditions and an inbuilt technological dependence. In 2007, 20 of 27 wars were fought with at least one belligerent reliant on US arms. Secondly, there is the fact that the US is itself constantly at war. Under customary international law, the US has committed far too many 'acts of war' to be enumerated. The concept of an 'act of war' may have been legally superceded by the general prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter (which has led to a situation where no state acknowledges a legal 'state of war'), but for this purpose it is probably more pertinent to note that US personnel are constantly engaged in the use of armed force at least somewhere on the planet outside of US borders and have been for more than half a century.

This work, however, concerns major military engagements, and it is still a fair question to ask why the US is not constantly engaged in major conflicts. Answers might lie in the costs of war or in the powerful political forces which oppose war both inside and outside the US. However, the plainest and most obvious constraint on any US desire to fight wars is that, for obvious reasons, no one wants to fight a war against the most powerful military the world has ever seen. This fact is obscured by notions of political, religious and innate racial characteristics of violent fanaticism, abetted by the rhetoric of these enemies who always seek to deprecate US power jingoistically. The record shows that each prospective enemy of the US actually manoeuvres desperately to avoid full-scale confrontation. The US uses combinations of deception, slow escalation and entrapment to ensure that hostilities commence, and thereafter is often itself frantic in its own manoeuvres to ensure that resolution and peace are delayed as long as possible. It acts to ensure that it has an opposing force (albeit sometimes relatively nominal, as in Iraq) even to the extent of practically

180 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p 80.
manufacturing its enemy. This brings us back to David Keen's concept of a 'war system'.

David Keen introduces the idea of a war system in the following words:

To understand the ‘war on terror’, we need to look more closely at the notion of ‘war’. We may think we know what war is, but do we? Many contemporary civil wars can be better understood as systems than as contests. The normal assumption is that the aim is to ‘win’ - a position that assumes that there are ‘two sides’ with aims that are essentially military and set ‘at the top’. However, the aims in a war are likely to be numerous, with many of the most important actors being more interested in manipulating (and perhaps even prolonging) a declared war than they are in gaining a military victory. In contemporary civil wars in Africa and elsewhere, both government and rebel forces have repeatedly engaged in attacks on civilian populations that have predictably radicalised these populations and have predictably attracted support for the enemy. There have also been many instances of soldiers selling arms to ‘the other side’ as well as various other forms of co-operation between ostensible enemies, an example of the latter came in May 1997 when there was a joint military coup by Sierra Leonean soldiers and rebels who had ostensibly been fighting each other for most of the previous six years. Within a framework focused on ‘winning’, these behaviours seem incomprehensible or irrational (or perhaps appear to be ‘mistakes’). However, aims other than winning have often been important in civil wars. They include: carrying out abuses under the cover of war, enjoying a feeling of power, making money, and even creating or preserving some kind of ‘state of emergency’ so as to ward off democracy or provide cover for the suppression of political opposition. When it comes to war in other words, winning is not everything; it may be the taking part that counts. Indeed, as Orwell saw in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, certain kinds of regimes may thrive off energies and perpetual war. The irrationality of counterproductive tactics, in short, may be more apparent than real, and even an endless war may not be endless in the sense of lacking aims or functions.182

Keen identifies three main forms of 'predictably counterproductive'183 tactics employed in the War on Terror. They are 'killing civilians, letting the enemy escape, and trading with the enemy.'184 The point of these tactics is to maintain the situation of ongoing mass violence, to prevent any decision or resolution which would end the violence. In Iraq and Indochina, the US has gone far beyond these forms of tactics and has engaged in genocidal war systems. If there is, as mentioned, an affinity between war and genocide, the affinity between war systems and genocide is even stronger. My purpose in using the term ‘genocidal war system’ is to bring light to US actions that the concept of a war system cannot. The US does not simply act to create a static situation of endless conflict, but rather prolongs conflict to effect attacks on nations per se, not for the purpose of forcing a desired behaviour but for the purpose of destruction, in degree, of said nations. Keen's war system may explain much of US behaviour, but only the concept of genocide can explain the persistent and prolific targeting of civilian populations and the long-term destruction of infrastructure, resources and means of sustenance.

Genocide

Thus far I have not even defined genocide, but it is perhaps overdue. There are only two tenable sources for a definition of genocide, for reasons which will become clear in Chapter 3. Those sources are Raphaël Lemkin's work on the subject and the legal definition given in the United Nations Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).

Genocide is the intentional systematic destruction of a genus in whole or in part. I accept the UNCG’s list of proscribed acts which may constitute genocide,185 not because they are necessarily ‘exhaustive’ of all possible components of genocide, as intended,186 but because I do not believe a large scale genocide could occur without one or more of these elements.

183 Ibid, p 1.
184 Ibid, p 58.
185 Appendix (a) UNCG Article II.
In John Docker’s words, Lemkin ‘took great care to define genocide as composite and manifold.’\(^{187}\) And, as will be discussed, this is an inherent aspect of genocide. This is why the distinction drawn by Mark Levene between genocide, and a ‘genocidal process’ is a false one.\(^{188}\) Genocide is a genocidal process, it is not a discreet act. Genocide is not restricted by a given time-frame, but continues as long as there is a clear succession of definable perpetrators continuing acts of genocide against a genos, even if those acts change entirely.

What, then, is a genos? This can be gleaned from Lemkin's work as follows: Any collectivity that can be defined by a degree, however small, of distinct biological interconnectedness. Raphäel Lemkin considered that Nazi conceptions of ‘biological interrelations’ and the quest for ‘biological superiority’ were basic foundations for genocide.\(^{189}\) That is not to say that genocide results from some peculiar Nazi ideology of race. Lemkin himself used the term ‘biological structure’ as an argument for inventing a new term,\(^{190}\) and in the context of stating that biological structures needed protection.\(^{191}\) Indeed the very logic of his work, and its very genesis, shows that he apprehended that there was a strategic logic of genocide which, though very prominent and overt in the Nazi regime, was by no means exclusive to them, and biological interconnectedness is central to that logic.

Raphäel Lemkin did not have access to detailed scholarship about the nature of genocides such as a modern scholar might have. As such it is not surprising that he lacked the sort of vocabulary and apprehension that we might have today. Nor should it be surprising that there are often seeming uncertainties and vague aspects in his writing, but underlying this is a strong apprehensible logic that with a little interpretation in light of current knowledge provides the key to the strategic rationality of genocide - a matter which Lemkin clearly apprehended but could not fully delineate.

How then do ‘biological interrelations’ fit within a strategic framework? Unfortunately Lemkin and later scholars have been somewhat blinded by the dazzle of Nazi racial ideology and the chilling modernity of their extermination techniques. However, it has been found that nearly all genocides are planned and set in motion by small secretive governmental cabals,\(^{192}\) or at other times by equally closed groups which putatively do not command state power.\(^{193}\) Both 'insiders' and the public tend to object to genocidal policies to whatever extent they are allowed to understand them. As Noam Chomsky writes of Nazi Germany:

> ...despite Hitler’s personal appeal, direct support for his genocidal projects was never high. ...Norman Cohn observes that even among Nazi party members, in 1938 over 60% ‘expressed downright indignation at the outrages’ carried out against Jews, while 5 percent considered that “physical violence against Jews was justified because ‘terror must be met with terror’.” In the Fall of 1942, when the genocide was fully under way, some 5% of Nazi Party members approved the shipment of Jews to “labor camps,” while 70% registered indifference and the rest “showed signs of concern for the Jews.” Among the general population, support for the Holocaust would have surely been still less. The Nazi leaders required no popular enthusiasm in order to carry out what the Nazi press described as the 'defensive action against the Jewish world-criminals,' ...and to purify the society, and the world, by eliminating the 'bacteria, vermin and pests [that] cannot be tolerated.' For these tasks, the leadership needed little more than 'a mood of passive compliance,' apathy, the willingness to look the other way....\(^{194}\)

I will return the functional usage of racism in the Holocaust, which induced apathy in most and the willingness to kill in those selected to carry out mass murder, but it should be understood that in the


\(^{188}\) Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I*, p 47.

\(^{189}\) Lemkin, *Axis Rule...*, pp 80-1.

\(^{190}\) Ibid. p 80.


\(^{192}\) Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I*, p 110.

\(^{193}\) Ibid, p 160.

US context racism, dehumanisation and the constant devaluation of human life are primarily means for maintaining public apathy. The relevance to the Holocaust can be understood when it is revealed that the Nazi inner circle were not, as a whole, animated by heartfelt racial hatred (though many individuals may have been), but rather saw it as a tool. Gunnar Heinsohn makes the following revelations:

There can be no doubt that the annihilation of European Jewry was justified time and again in terms of racism by German perpetrators including Hitler himself. In public Hitler has employed every brand of anti-Semitism to carry out his genocidal agenda. He has sided with Christian Jew-haters, with jealous economic or intellectual competitors of Jews, with supposed victims of “international Jewish finance,” with Slavic nationalists, with Baltic anti-Bolsheviks, etc. All these alliances betray Hitler’s flexibility in carrying through his objective. Yet, what exactly was it? After all, personally he did not believe in racist anti-Semitism. This can, last but not least, be gleaned from a correspondence to Martin Bormann on February 3, 1945: ...

“Our Nordic racial consciousness is only aggressive toward the Jewish race. We use the term Jewish race merely for reasons of linguistic convenience, for in the real sense of the word, and from a genetic point of view there is no Jewish race. Present circumstances force upon us this characterization of the group of common race and intellect.... The Jewish race is above all a community of the spirit. ... Spiritual race is of a more solid and more durable kind than natural race. Wherever he goes, the Jew remains a Jew...

Hitler did not only understand that there was no Jewish race in a biological sense but he had the same insight regarding the Germans or any people. Again, he expressed this in private – even before 1933 – because he had no intention to forego the bloody help of the racists:

“A people in today’s political sense is no longer a racial unity, a pure racial community. The large migrations of world history, wars, periods of enemy occupation, but also natural mixing becoming ever more frequent through international trade, have caused everywhere, within the borders of a state, all existing races as well as mixtures of races to live together.”

He then strengthens the case by revealing that in Hitler’s early life he displayed a degree of admiration for Jews:

After anti-Semitic Vienna had been identified by many researchers as the seedbed of Hitler’s personal anti-Semitism they now had to learn that he actually sided with the Jewish oppressed. This was summarized by one of those scholars, Gordon A. Craig, in his review of the English translation of [Brigitte] Hamann’s book [Hitlers Wien]:

“Hamann tells us of a stormy discussion in 1910 about Empress Elizabeth's veneration for Heinrich Heine, in which Hitler defended the [German-Jewish] poet and regretted that there were no statues to him in Germany. In other discussions in the men’s hostel, he was reported to have praised Maria Theresa’s great reforming minister Joseph von Sonnenfels and Jewish musicians like Mendelssohn and Offenbach. He had Jewish friends with whom he discussed religious questions and the future of the Zionist movement and upon whom he could rely for loans and other help in his worst times. He always preferred to sell his watercolors to Jewish dealers, because he thought that they were more honest and gave him better prices. No reliable source has reported Hitler making any anti-Semitic remarks in his Vienna period; on the contrary, he was known to have expressed admiration for the courage with which the Jews had withstood a long history of persecution.”

Not only did Hitler not believe the racial ideology of hatred and superiority that he espoused, but he confided such to some who were close to him. The scapegoating of Jews allowed Hitler to cohere the entire Nazi base of support in the face of the fact that many expected economic and social change, in line with rhetoric, which was contrary to the many conservative aspects of the putatively revolutionary Party:

It was the Jew who helped hold Hitler's system together... The Jew allowed Hitler to ignore the long list of economic and social promises he had made to the SA, the lower party apparatus, and the lower middle classes. By steering the attention of these groups away from their more genuine grievances and toward the Jew, Hitler succeeded in blunting the edge of their revolutionary wrath.

196 Ibid, p 414.
Secondly, the Jewish population of Germany was disproportionately politically active and disproportionately beholden to political ideologies inimical to Nazism, even if it were stripped of its anti-Semitic content. One thing that Hitler consistently avowed was anti-Bolshevism, and one can only conclude that Hitler’s attacks on the putatively Jewish led international communist movement were not as a way of extending the scope of his quintessentially anti-Semitic attacks, but rather a way of harnessing the anti-Semitic scapegoating of the German public and his own party to his own fanatical anti-communist beliefs. When he joined, and soon took over leadership of, the then Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP, soon changed by adding Nationalsozialistische to become NSDAP or Nazi) it already had a strong anti-Semitic strain which clearly resonated with other right-wing platforms probably closer to Hitler’s heart. After all, if Hitler’s nationalistic version of social Darwinism was highly antithetical to the moral stance of Judaism, how much more would it be to an internationalist egalitarian movement? But it does not end there, because individual Jews were not only prominent as members and leaders of communist, socialist and anarchist organisations, others were also equally prominent as liberal ideologues and democrats. In short, Jews were, by-and-large, anti-fascistic.

This brings us to the third pressing matter - why would a particular collective have identifiable political characteristics, especially the highly assimilated German Jewish population? In writing of a ‘community of spirit’ Hitler in some respects paralleled Theodor Herzl’s earlier observation that both anti-Semitism and the very identity of being Jewish resisted assimilation and even atheism, which led him to believe in the existence of an incipient Jewish nation entirely separate from religious identity. Of course, our contemporary understanding tends to emphasise view the creation of the ‘Other’ as a functional reification by the hegemonic group - of particular utility in justifying systematic deprivation, but also of equal utility in creating a willingness to kill. Nevertheless, it is also true that there is an internal mechanism of identity and value transmission within any genos, it also creates networks which are a source of power or social capital outside of the perpetrators’ control. It is this mechanism, one of biological interconnectedness, which genocide seeks to extinguish.

Indeed, the answer to why a biological structure is the target of genocide stared Lemkin, and many others, right in the face. It was so close to apprehension that it was implicitly enshrined in the UNCG. The answer is, quite simply, that in the vast majority of cases, and certainly when considering any genos as a whole, biological interconnectedness corresponds inextricably with familial interconnectedness. This is why both Lemkin and the UNCG recognised the transfer of children to the perpetrator population as an act of genocide, and why the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission acknowledged that the forcible removal of Aboriginal children from their parents was an act of genocide. In terms of racial ideology this would make no sense whatsoever. 'Blood' is not changed by environment. It is not the biological nature which is destroyed, but the biological/familial connection - a step in eliminating the genos in its nature as a biological structure.

The extended and nuclear family units are the most basic and profound human collectivities. Utopians, have often desired the destruction of the family which was recognised as an insurmountable impediment to exerting the control necessary to create perfect order in society. The family is a barrier to assimilation and uniformity where it replicates the distinct identity of the genos. Once again, Theodor Herzl shows an affinity with this line of thought: ‘Assimilation, by

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198 This is the impression given to the reader by Philip Morgan, as just one example (Fascism in Europe, p 36).
which I understood not only external conformity in dress, habits, customs, and language, but also identity of feeling and manner – assimilation of Jews could be effected only by intermarriage. It is common (though not universal) that those with hegemonic power will be threatened or at least inconvenienced by the competing power structure of a genos. Where this is not true it is often the case that a distinct genos facilitates a divide-and-rule strategy of oligarchs over the lower class of the hegemonic genos. The former instance lends itself to the logic of assimilation and genocide. In the latter instance an imperial power may elevate or debase any given minority genos to promote division, but the ruling class of a majority dominated polity will engage in persecution, reification and in maintenance of the otherness of the target genos. No ruling class, however, is monolithic and hence partakes of both logics in varying degrees, which in effect means that there is no way of drawing a distinct line between chronic persecution and genocide.

With regard to external relations and imperial aggression, genocide is most relevant in its current form with regard to ‘nation-states’. When a polity is formed, especially in modern times, at varying speed a genos of greater or lesser fragility and significance will inevitably cohere, and much of the ‘state building’ efforts of newly decolonised states, for example, can be seen as endeavours to create a strong nation-state genos. As with Herzl’s observation with regard to assimilation, it is not sufficient that the population adopt a nominal national identity and wave the national flag on the national holiday; but rather it results from the mobility of the population within the borders of the polity. Mobility tends to create personal interconnection which leads the formation of familial bonds, where it is not consciously proscribed. The British, for example, took steps to prevent intermarriage in India, not because of concerns for racial purity, which would later come to predominate in the Victorian era, but because it increased both the ability and propensity to for British employees to act for themselves against the interests of their employers, something referred to as the ‘agency problem’.

The strategic imperative, therefore, precedes the creation of a racist ideology, and leads imperialism to become inherently genocidal. It is also important to note that the origins of anti-miscegenation sentiment in the United States were highly contingent and functional. Before the 19th century, where carnal connections were a source of common cause between the poor of both African and European descent, they were disapproved and illegal. Where they were a source of bonded labour, particularly where wealthy Europeans fathered mulattos, they were approved and licit. Tellingly, however, this was provided that the father did not acknowledge paternity, for which he would be subject to penalties. In other words they were encouraged to procreate, but not form family bonds. In each case this familial interconnection threatens to create not only a power structure and communication networks, but a mutual empathy and sense of identity which, where it takes root deeply, exceeds that generated by ideologies of nationhood.

Of course, the coherence of politically generated genos varies widely. Most of China, for example, has been politically unified for a very long time, but the Han nation, as such has only recently begun to develop to the depth which we would normally associate with nationhood. Over the centuries mobility in the vast polity has been largely confined to an upper echelon and thus there remain, even now, very different regional groups with distinct cultures and physiological tendencies as well as mutually incomprehensible languages, although, due to a shared history, it is easy for Chinese to identify what, or rather whom, is or is not and cannot be Han. In seeking to attack

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203 Ferguson, Empire, pp 203-4.
204 Ibid, p 25.
207 Ibid, pp 294-5. Han is also a racial conception – something which typically can never be reconciled with marginal realities.
such a polity, genocide is most likely to be an ineffectual way of dominating or degrading the whole. Instead it is more efficient to effectuate a ‘decapitation’ of political élites and military forces - something which has occurred many times in Chinese history. It is arguable, however, that a form of ‘top-down’ genocide was effectuated against the Chinese by an unprecedented powerful conglomeration of Western states and Japan who often openly espoused the destruction and partition of the Chinese state. In a variation on decapitation, instead of cutting off the head and replacing it, they repeatedly kicked it, bending China’s vulnerable ruling class to their will, often with extremely small but irresistible military forces such as the 20,000 from Japan, Russia, Britain, the US and France who in 1900 managed to invade from the coast and occupy Peking in a matter of 10 days.  

This degradation and domination of the ‘head’ had a devastating indirect (but in the circumstances inevitable and arguably intentional), effect on millions of Chinese, exacerbating, if not causing, civil wars such as the Taiping rebellion and aggravating the lethal effects of drought, particularly by forcing the Qing rulership to abandon maintenance of irrigation and transport canals. All told, tens of millions of Chinese deaths were caused directly or indirectly by foreign degradation and exploitation of the Qing power structure.

In another variation, decapitation of Incan and Aztec polities preceded genocides of the disparate peoples of these empires, which Adam Jones describes thus:

> A holocaust it indeed proved for the Indians enslaved on the plantations and in the silver-mines of the former Inca empire, where the Spanish instituted another genocidal regime of forced labor. Conditions in the mines – notably those in Mexico and at Potosí and Huancavelica in Upper Peru (Bolivia) – resulted in death rates matching or exceeding those of Hispaniola. According to David Stannard, Indians in the Bolivian mines had a life expectancy of three to four months, “about the same as that of someone working at slave labor in the synthetic rubber manufacturing plant at Auschwitz in the 1940s.”

There are many other aspects to genocide which will be exemplified later, but for now there remains only to explain a persistent, intrinsic and ancient logic which exists in all genocide - that is that within all genocides is an unavoidable germ of extermination. The reason is simple, if genocide seeks to destroy a genos in part in order to weaken a people for given ends, then it is to be expected that the people of that genos will resist and will, if able, strike back. This forms a feedback loop where the more drastic the genocide becomes the greater and more long-lasting the enmity generated. The target population and the perpetrator population become ‘existential enemies’. In reality practicalities and the pluralistic nature of individual interpretation defy this reduction, but there will always be an activist strain, particularly in the perpetrator population, for whom enmity will be an irreducible ‘fact’ which can only be answered by extermination. In Nazi Germany this strategic viewpoint of enmity was reinforced by Carl Schmitt, whose influence can also be detected in US foreign policy. It can be argued that the Nazis misused his ideas, and it is interesting to note both that he worked for the Nazi regime when it came to power and that he ceased working for the regime in 1936. That noted, however, the fact remains that his notions on enmity were couched

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211 Perhaps the most well known example of this logic at work, at least in pre-modern times, is the Roman decision to destroy Carthage. This came after Carthage showed signs of loosening a 50 year subjugation (B.H. Warmington, *Carthage,* London: Robert Hale, 1960. Excerpt in Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide,* pp 74-93.) Ultimately the source of enmity lay in Roman 'greed' and inability to 'resist the chance to intervene when the chance arose' leading to the First Punic War (Michael Crawford, "Early Rome and Italy," in John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray (eds), *The Oxford History of the Classical World,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p 405). This illustrates that an arguably genocidal logic (or at least something very akin) can be the result of an entirely non-genocidal conflict generating enmity on definable ethnic/cultural/linguistic/national lines.  
212 Mika Luoma-aho, "Geopolitics and grosspolities: From Carl Schmitt to E. H. Carr and James Burnham," in
in essentialist and fatalistic terms and it must be said that the strategic thinking of the Nazis, and indeed the US, simply follows his schema to the logical conclusion without reference to the moral opprobrium he attached to certain behaviours – small wonder given that he presented such undesirable actions as inevitable which tends to negate any moral stance. In fact his writing may have helped induce exactly the nihilism which in other contexts was his greatest abhorrence.\(^{213}\)

There can be no doubt that he gifted Nazi architects of genocide and, especially, Judeocide with a framework and vocabulary far more robust in impelling slaughter than mere racism based on prejudices, which might be fatally challenged in confronting a victim who is, say, a baby or a blond and blue-eyed war hero. As Omer Bartov puts it: ‘The Third Reich’s politics were thus propelled by the very dynamic outlined by Schmitt, eventually hurling it into a moral and existential abyss.’\(^{214}\) Schmitt carried the ancient logic of genocidal enmity much further, facilitating the reification of the absolute enemy as ‘inhuman’ in just the manner he later wrote against,\(^{215}\) and by providing moral absolution by constructing a framework wherein personal choice and responsibility are made to seem irrelevant.

It is the exterminatory logic of genocide, particularly with the modern propensity for reification, which makes genocides more potentially bloody than politicide or military warfare. Functional genocide presumes and attempts to pre-empt escalating resistance and retaliation. This may be contrasted with ‘politicide’ which, by nature, is most often going to attempt to take the direct line to ending resistance by pushing people away from the problematic group identity through terror. That is not to say, however, that a particular hierarchy of immorality attaches to these concepts. Where immorality is the issue, it should be quantified by the suffering and death brought about by intentional acts, not by the strategic paradigm which might prompt such acts.

A Note on the Holocaust/Shoah

It is worth, at this point, clarifying a further matter which is crucial to understanding the concept of genocide, the distinction between all of the genocides committed by the Germans of the Third Reich (which inspired the coinage of the term genocide), and the Judeocide. In my usage ‘Holocaust’ denotes all genocidal killings committed by the Nazis. The Judeocide I refer to as the Shoah. My reasoning is that despite the fact that Holocaust is frequently used as exclusively pertaining to Jews, there is a need for two separate terms. After all, the Holocaust was the most momentous and bloody campaign of genocidal extermination in human history and the vast bulk of its victims were not Jews. As Ward Churchill put it: ‘The true human costs of Nazi genocide came to 26 million or more, six million of whom were Jews, a million or more of whom were Gypsies, and the rest mostly Slavs. Only with these facts clearly in mind can we say that we have apprehended the full scope of the Holocaust...’\(^{216}\) There is also the fact that though special genocide laws were enacted against German Jews from the inception of the Third Reich, the extermination campaign beginning in 1941 was inextricably linked to the extermination of Slavs and Soviet POWs - whose mass murder in some respects created the model for subsequent killings. At least 60% of Soviet POWs died

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throughout the war, but more pertinent was the initial slaughter wherein 2.8 million were killed, mostly by starvation, in a mere 8 months and for whom extermination infrastructure, later to be employed on Jews, was developed before the decision was made to use the POWs as slave labour.

It is also of note that Lemkin did not draw a distinction as such between genocide against Jews and that against other people. In an unpublished manuscript he wrote, ‘The Nazi plan of Genocide was related to many peoples, races, and religions, and it is only because Hitler succeeded in wiping out six million Jews, that it became known predominantly as a Jewish case.’

As for the word ‘holocaust’ (which many claim to be reserved only for the Shoah): it had a non-religious usage long before its application to the Judeocide. It signified sudden loss, often associated with fire and usually, but not always, with multiple deaths. Obviously the word has become inextricably linked with the Shoah, but those who seek to deny its usage, for example with regard to the deaths of Maori brought about by colonialism, work from politically selective a priori tropes of exceptionalism rather than reasoned argument based on semantics or proportionality.

**Terminology**

Having outlined a general character for the concept of genocide, it is worth turning now to the subject of associated concepts, such as politicide. Some concepts are defined in exclusive opposition to genocide, but often the dividing lines are vague. Some terms, such as ‘ethnocide’ were coined to stand as distinct from genocide, but genocide is manifold and many such concepts may be potential components of genocide. In fact many may seldom if ever be in evidence outside of the context of genocide.

**Ethnocide (culturecide):**

Lemkin suggested ‘ethnocide’ as a synonym or alternative to genocide, however I use it in the sense deriving from post-War France, according to Chalk and Jonassohn, ‘to cover the destruction of a culture without killing its bearers....’

Ethnocide, as with gendercide and eliticide, is a potential component of genocide in as much as it may be part of the systematic destruction in whole or part of the genos. An intense acute attack on the culture of a collective is a certain indication of genocide. It has been, rather unfairly, suggested that Lemkin felt ‘that the murder of a poet is morally worse than the murder of a janitor, because the poet is the “brain” without which the “body” cannot function.’ But the murder of a poet, in such circumstances, is only part of a composite process of genocide may weaken, immiserate and enslave

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222 David B. MacDonald, "Daring to compare: the debate about a Maori "holocaust" in New Zealand," *Journal of Genocide Research* (2003), 5 (3),pp 383–403. Sadly MacDonald's prejudicial approach is evident from his very title "Daring to compare". He conflates 'holocaust' and 'genocide' in attempting to suggest that Maori are merely jumping on the bandwagon of Native American activism and scholarship, somehow failing to even mention the very long and well known history of Maori resistance and activism.
223 As will be discussed in the next chapter there is both Judeocide exceptionalism and the exceptionalism of multiple genocides which form a 'canon' of the acceptably evil events conducted by acceptably evil perpetrators.
untold thousands and bring untimely death to thousands more – a composite process which may be furthered more by the death of a public figure who is incorporated as a part of the group identity than by the death of someone who is, however crucial, not a known figure.

**Eliticide:**

Adam Jones describes eliticide briefly as ‘the destruction of the socioeconomic and intellectual élites of a target group...’ but it is instructive to note that in practice it is often community and union workers and religious leaders that are most prominent as victims. Eliticide may be hard to distinguish from politicide, but it is inherently genocidal or autogenocidal. It targets the entire coherence of a community by removing those that tie the community together.

**Gendercide:**

Gendercide is killing based on gender. Originally coined to denote systematic violence against females, has been broadened to mean the killing of persons selected on the basis of gender. As an act of genocide it typically involves the killing of men and sometimes boys, often accompanied by rapes of women and girls.

**Politicide** *(policide, politicide):*

Politicide is mass killing where the target group is selected on the basis of political or, in my usage, religious ideology. In practice genocide and politicide are frequently interlinked and in cases of mass killings on class or caste grounds may be both equally. Where politicide occurs there are often subsidiary acts of genocide. Perpetrators of genocide often believe, or are induced to believe, that they are combating criminality or political deviance. Some events are equally definable as politicide and as acts of genocide, such as Iraq’s Anfal campaigns where gendercidal acts of genocide occurred which also constituted a politicide. To my thinking, no given democide (mass killing) such as a politicide should be considered as an act of genocide unless the majority of victims are part of a genos and are demonstrably targeted out of proportion. This should not preclude instances, such as the Soviet genocide in Ukraine, where the chosen geographic bounds of a democide act to select a particular genos.

Notwithstanding the concurrence and affinity between politicide and genocide, they partake of a different logic. Both are methods for achieving given ends, but political belief can be quelled through terror and the deprivation of networks of ideological dissemination (which is why politicide is so often elitical). Lemkin was subject to political pressures that caused him to campaign against the inclusion of political groups in the UNCG (indeed he was far from principled in his campaigning), but the exclusion is nevertheless entirely consistent with the logic of his conception. As Gellately and Kiernan put it: 'Valid objections to the political manipulation of the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Genocide Convention do not undermine the conceptual case that the ultimate crime [sic] against humanity is that of exterminating groups whose members had no choice in that membership. This does not apply to political or even social units in the way it does to religious and especially racial groups.'

**Autogenocide:**


232 As will become clear, I do not accept this baseless construction of genocide as the 'ultimate crime'.

This term was coined by Ben Kiernan with reference to mass killings in Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The vast majority of victims of which were of the same dominant national group as those carrying out the killing, the latter being animated by a distinctly chauvinist nationalist ideology.

The affinity between genocide and autogenocide arises from the fact that each target a biological structure, but autogenocide, which might be the result of a drastic ideology of transformational renewal, tends to be dysfunctional because it attacks the coherence and strength of the very society from which the perpetrators originate. As such, intentionality is arguably not a meaningful characteristic of autogenocide.

Autogenocide is by nature dysfunctional and this brings me to a central distinction I make between functional and dysfunctional genocides. In this work I do not use the term functional to denote 'de facto', but rather to indicate that something serves a logical function. In short, that which is functional serves a strategic logic - for example an ideology of racial hatred which impels acquiescence or participation in genocide by a population led by those who view said genocide as a strategic means. This allows an important contrast with dysfunctional genocide wherein, say, racial ideology prompts genocide in circumstances which serve no strategic purpose and, inevitably, bring harm to the perpetrator population. Miscalculation is not the same as dysfunction, thus the most prominent instance of seeming dysfunction, the Nazi decision to divert war resources to accelerate the extermination of Jews in the face of defeat by the Red Army, might have been because of strategic priorities by leaders who, in the face of certain defeat, saw more to gain in a drastic reduction in the number of Europe’s remaining Jews than in inflicting a small fractional more damage on an already devastated Soviet Union.

In contrast to my usage is the ‘functionalist’ school which, in Mark Levene’s words ‘reject[s] any notion of a preconceived extermination plan, proposing instead that the issue of causation is embedded in the bureaucratic underpinnings and socio-economic configurations of the Nazi (and pre-Nazi) state apparatus.’ In fact functionalism posits dysfunction based on ‘bureaucratic irrationality’; an exculpatory trope which does not fit the facts, as will be shown, and which has much in common with the apologetic literature of inadvertance which abounds with regards to the many millions killed by the US in various genocides.

By focussing on a distinction between functional and dysfunctional (in light of intentionality) it is possible to dispense with unedifying debates over 'functionalism' and 'intentionalism' and, equally, over 'structure' and 'agency'. As Na’eez Mossadeq Ahmed points out, structure and agency are 'ontologically fused'. Agents work within extant structures, but structures are created by agents.
Ahmed cites Colin Hay to the effect that “[t]he key mechanism that clarifies the relationship between structure and agency is that actors are strategic – ’capable of devising and revising means to realise their intentions.’”\(^{241}\) Historical examples bear Hay and Ahmed out. This means that it is actually imperative to ignore conceptions of structure and agency, which can only serve to obfuscate, and instead concentrate on the nexus between intent, strategy and function – albeit with a clear understanding that dysfunction may also be accompanied by genocidal intent. I will explain further shortly.

### Economic Genocide

Economist and former Minister for Foreign Economic Relations in Russia, Sergei Glazyev makes the case that Russia is a victim of genocide in the following terms:

As a result of the social and economic policy carried out from the end of 1991 until August 1998, conditions have been created, which seriously hinder the normal reproduction of the social communities, comprising the great majority of the population of Russia. Statistical data about demographics and the standard of living provide vivid evidence of this.

Since 1992, Russia has experienced a steady tendency of depopulation, characterized by a 1.5-1.7-times excess of deaths over births. ...

... Russia’s overall demographic losses for those years... are estimated at 8 million people, of which approximately 3 million died prematurely and 5 million were not born.... The rate of annual population loss during the mid-1990s was more than double the rate of loss during the period of Stalinist repression and mass famine in the first half of the 1930s.\(^{242}\)

For Naomi Klein Russian accusations of genocide bring to mind André Gunder Frank’s letter to Milton Friedman, accusing him of ‘economic genocide’.\(^{243}\) How sustainable are Frank and Glazyev’s charges?

To understand, it is necessary to overcome our reticence to see agency in so-called ‘structural violence’. When ‘structural violence’ is mentioned it is usually contextualised as a stochastic occurrence, one, in short, which cannot have an element of intentionality. Stuart Stein distinguishes between ‘intentional and structured violence’.\(^{244}\) Levene treats ‘structural violence’ and genocide as mutually exclusive phenomena.\(^{245}\) In his own words, he excludes such possibilities from consideration as genocide in part because it would ‘lead to wrings being served against the world’s major multi-national corporations on the grounds of their responsibility for the annual death of millions in the third world as a result of the structural inequalities they cause.’\(^{246}\) Perhaps we should abolish all crimes for fear that they might lead to legal ramifications for the perpetrators? Adam Jones opposes the exclusion of structural violence from being considered as genocide, but on purely and explicitly moral grounds.\(^{247}\) In each of these it is as if ‘intentional’ genocide were the act of shooting someone through the head, while structural violence is a failure to give food to someone who is starving.

In contrast are these words by Tony Barta: “I do not intend to let 'intention' be removed from what [Günter Lewy] calls 'structural violence as a form of genocide.'”\(^{248}\) Why does Barta differ? Perhaps

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246 Ibid, p 38.  
because he is thinking of a particular example (colonial genocide in Australia) and knows that 'structural violence' can result from patently genocidal intention. The others base their views on unexamined generalities informed by excluyptory contextualisation created for the simple reason that the source of ideological hegemony (the 'ruling class' of the Western world) is also the perpetrator of the vast bulk of structural violence in the world.249

'Structures' or institutions do not arise without some form of human agency. If they are created with genocidal intent then the resulting structural violence is genocide. It is as simple as that. The question that will most often arise is whether structural violence arises from purely economic motives, or out of a demostrategic motive to destroy a genos in part, or both. In either of the latter two cases the structural violence is genocide. This is further explored below in the section on imperialism and genocide.

Economic genocide is an important matter in this work. In Korea, Indochina and Iraq economic genocide was an important component of manifold genocide, just as it was in Poland under German occupation. I will also argue that just as Lemkin perceived an over-riding propensity towards genocidal strategy in the Third Reich, the same is true of the US. The difference is that the German approach was more weighted towards the military and the direct use of violence, whereas the US approach is primarily to use its economic dominance. It is true that the US frequently does use its military, and many millions have died as a result, but even this is subsidiary to a system of economic genocide. US violence maintains a system of economic genocide both by directly imposing institutions on the target and by salutory demonstration to maintain compliance among others.

In Argentina, for example, politicide was used to impose genocidal economic structures. The politicide was remarkably akin to genocide, to the extent that it seems to have been actually modelled on past genocides. Two Spanish judges and one Argentine judge have ruled that the politicide was itself genocide - one citing a 1946 UN General Assembly resolution which condemned genocide under the formulation 'when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.'250 I would argue that the politicide was autogenocidal, but can only be considered genocidal to the extent which exogenous actors are responsible and from that perspective. The Argentine politicide/genocide/auto-genocide/economic/structural violence is described in Appendix F. The US can be seen to have been intricately involved, enough so to earn the label of perpetrators. The reason behind their crucial role in causing this genocide (which it was to the extent to which the US were culpable as perpetrators) lies in the post-World War II paradigm of dominance adopted by the US.

The logic of this dominance was articulated in World War II by US strategists who envisioned what they called a 'Grand Area Strategy'. This was intended to secure the 'limitation of any exercise of sovereignty' in 'an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States.'251 George Kennan himself revealed his belief that the main goal of US foreign policy was to maintain the 'position of disparity' between the US and other states, a project in which concerns for human rights and democracy were unaffordable.252 This was enacted through the pretext of the Cold War, wherein any desired intervention against the threat of independent development was justified, usually very flimsily, as countering the threat of Communism.

To return to Argentina, the problem here, as elsewhere in Latin America and the world, was not so

249 See Chapter 3.
252 'Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain a position of disparity... We should cease to talk about vague and... unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization.' 'Policy Planning Study 23', 1948. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, Berkeley: Odonian Press, 1992, pp 9-10.
much the appearance a populist nationalist and/or socialist leader, but simply the ongoing march of successful developmentalism, an almost inevitable result in a system of nation-states. Surpluses were not all extracted by the Western ‘centre’ and ‘semi-peripheral’ and ‘peripheral’ states were strengthening their economies which gave them a greater ability to resist economic imperialism.

By the 1950s, Argentina had the largest middle class on the continent, and next door Uruguay had a literacy rate of 95 percent and offered free health care for all citizens. Developmentalism was so staggeringly successful for a time that the Southern Cone of Latin America became a potent symbol for poor countries around the world: here was proof that with smart, practical policies, aggressively implemented, the class divide between the First and Third World could actually be closed.253

The answer to such a problem is to attack the economic health of the nation. In Lemkin’s terms this is an act of genocide: ‘The destruction of the foundations of the economic existence of a national group necessarily brings about a crippling of its development, even a retrogression. The lowering of the standards of living creates difficulties in fulfilling cultural-spiritual requirements. Furthermore, a daily fight literally for bread and for physical survival may handicap thinking in both general and national terms.’244 Such things are done for the sake of domination rather than material gain. To illustrate: The Ford Motor Company was deeply complicit in the Argentine politicide. They supplied the vehicles used in disappearances and allowed their factory to be used as an ‘armed camp’ for 100 soldiers complete with on-site torture chambers.255 But even though the politicide benefited them as unionists and outspoken workers were disappeared right from the factory floor, the inextricable economic genocide throughout Latin America served only to deprive them of markets through impoverishment. What is more, as Klein illustrates, the neoliberal ideology wherein such policies were somehow destined to improve economic conditions, despite all obvious evidence to the contrary, was understood by most of those behind such policy to be a mere pretence.256

Space does not allow a full exploration of economic genocide in Russia, however there is the issue of the fact that no politicial/genocidal violence was required to effect the same results and the issue of intentionality. With regard to the latter, Russian sociologist Alekandr Sinovyev wrote the following:

Humankind has entered an era when evolution no longer develops by its own freaks, but rather by conscious deliberate planning. In fact, planning has become the dominant factor in the range of factors conditioning history. Multitudes of people and huge resources have been involved in history; acting for the same end, they have enhanced the role of the subjective factor in history. This, coupled with the achievements in the research of social phenomena, processes and human behavior, has resulted in the situation, when the measure of control over history and the efficiency of trimming its course to plans have grown. On the pragmatic side, mass communications, manipulation technologies and means of solving problems on a large scale have become incredibly sophisticated. Immense intellectual powers and great resources have been put on to solving numerous problems, so that the percentage of unforeseen, unexpected historical developments has been drastically reduced as compared with predictable and planned ones. All the mentioned factors have combined to bring about a qualitative change in human evolution.257

This work will provide a great deal of evidence to back Sinovyev’s claim, and his comment that events were ‘diligently planned by certain forces in the West and artificially imposed on the Russians,’258 is highly applicable in Iraq and elsewhere. But this does not mean that the US, or

253 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, p 55.
244 Lemkin, Axis Rule..., p 85.
256See, for example, her description of Jeffrey Sachs's attempt to persuade conference attendees that simply trashing and looting economies was not a desirable free-market model. Ibid, pp 253-6.
258 Ibid.
anyone else, is omnipotent. Their plans are opposed in the same manner that military plans are opposed by what Clausewitz referred to as ‘friction’. This is where the eponymous Shock Doctrine of Klein’s book comes in, it creates a frictionless space and time, and her book is riddled throughout with forthright acknowledgements of that fact by the powerful of the West and their clients. That is how Russia, despite its huge resources and populousness, fell victim to the same sort of economic genocide that was imposed on Argentina through violence, its innate strength could not be brought to bear in resistance due to social upheaval.

For poor states, however, no such shock is needed. Among the attractions of genocide is that a heavily degraded genos is unable to oppose further attacks effectively. After the ‘debt crisis’ of the 1980s, the IMF has played the primary role as attacker. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the US created and controlled IMF were used to impose antidevelopmental policies on already poor countries. The focus has, in recent times, moved away from SAPs towards using financial tools to devalue and raid target economies, facilitated by IMF insistence on anti-inflationary monetary policies. A notable example of this was the ‘Asian Financial Crisis’.

Thus the ‘position of disparity’ has not only been maintained, but deepened with ongoing degradation for the poorest and shock tactics for those who manage to climb a few rungs of the ladder. This is not only economic disparity, it is comprehensive strategic disparity - ‘full-spectrum’ disparity. The price is paid in the suffering of billions, arguably the bulk of the planet’s population. And the point of it is not to enrich the metropolitan population, on the contrary that population loses a great deal, probably in wealth and most certainly in security and freedom, a point which will be explored further. Of course, I cannot demonstrate that antidevelopmental practices are always acts of economic genocide, they may not always be and the difference between maintaining stagnation and causing degradation is not a clear one. The real point is that there is an inherent affinity between the logic of genocide and the US mode of domination.

Intentionality

As mentioned, a common trope of genocide denial is the denial of intentionality, and emphasising structural factors over human agency is only one method of doing so. Nowhere has this form of denial become more developed and comprehensive than in the historiography of the Indochina war. Here is not a simply claim of ‘the deaths weren’t intentional’ but entire sophisticated competing historiographical schools of inadvertence. This is crucial because the only grounds given in genocide literature for excluding the US genocide in Indochina is the lack of intent. Markusen and Kopf outline Helen Fein's analysis (with some signs of skepticism) which manages to walk such a tightrope of selectivity that she feels able to conclude that the US did not commit genocide in Indochina, but that the Soviets did in Afghanistan:

...Fein argued that the deliberate massacre of civilians was the exception in the American case (e.g. the infamous My Lai massacre, whose perpetrators were brought to military trial and punished [in a footnote the authors explain that only William Calley was tried for the massacre and that he was pardoned by Richard Nixon]), whereas Soviet soldiers “engaged in repeated massacres of Afghans.”

Ignoring the fact that many massacres on the ground went unpunished by the US, Fein simply ignores all of the civilians massacred by air power and ground artillery. Exactly how someone like Fein would account for the millions of dead Indochinese civilians is unclear, indeed it does not seem to concern the vast majority of scholars writing on this subject, as if death on such a scale

could really be a mere accidental by-product of counterinsurgency warfare.

In Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in conjunction with numerous major and minor co-authors, takes as a departure point the a priori supposition that the war occurred due to mistakes and misunderstandings. It details the results of meetings between wartime US, DRV and NLF leaders, arranged in the 1990s. Attention has been drawn to a passage wherein Vo Nguyen Giap responds to McNamara's characterisation of the conflict, 'Maybe it was a tragedy for you, but for us the war was a noble sacrifice. We did not want to fight the United States, but you gave us no choice.' Christian Appy comments that this 'revealed a fundamental difference in their historical views.'\(^{263}\) I think that this too readily accepts that what McNamara espouses constitutes an 'historical view', which implies, at least, internal coherence as well as implying a meaningful degree of honesty. In another section of Argument Without End McNamara conceives (refering to the first 'Tonkin Gulf incident') that the DRV did not, as he believed at the time, intentionally commit an act of war against the US – he admits his miscalculation, his error.\(^{264}\) Ignoring, for the time, the many specific facts which McNamara must conveniently forget in order to make such a characterisation, it is worth putting this in the context of the general situation. McNamara is suggesting that he believed that a small impoverished state would attack the most powerful state on the globe; one with 25 times the population, and a Gross National Product many hundreds of times higher;\(^{265}\) and that they would do so at just the time that McNamara and his colleagues were looking for just such an occurrence to facilitate escalation.\(^{266}\) Some few may call McNamara a liar, but most accept McNamara's belief (even if some consider him deluded).\(^{267}\) Noam Chomsky suggests that McNamara's rather selective way of thinking (in which, he suggests, US success or failure is the only moral concern) is not unique to him, but rather symptomatic of a specific shared world-view which, by implication, has a productive value in an imperial system.\(^{268}\)

There are problems with accepting mistaken or deluded statements as having been given in earnest. One is that it is never completely possible to be certain that someone is not lying. A second is that, notwithstanding concepts of systematic ideological bias, accepting an earnestness of belief also accepts that in a given instance the calculus of decision making may be based on a wilfully distorted world-view in which certain facts are excluded. This is untrue. Known facts remain known at some level.\(^{269}\) If an individual succeeds, in some circumstance, in deluding themselves by suppressing facts of which they are fully appraised it may be of concern to a therapist, or sentencing judge, or someone interested exclusively in the psychological aspects of decision making, but for normal historical purposes the individual makes decisions consonant with the information which

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\(^{264}\) McNamara, et al., Argument Without End, pp 166-7. In this section it is actually written, 'The details of the complex tale need not concern us here, where our objective is to trace the two-sided escalation of the war,' [my emphasis]. Thus matters of historical fact are put squarely in their place as disposable and irrelevant where they might conflict with the pre-supposed narrative. The facts of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, as will be revealed, support only a conclusion of unilateral escalation.

\(^{265}\) Turley, The Second Indochina War, p 89.


\(^{267}\) Gibson writes of 'the assumption of an attack by the North Vietnamese' which he attributes to a more widely-held 'mechanistic anticommunism' (The Perfect War, p 89). Even Noam Chomsky accepts that McNamara is genuine in his beliefs. There is a passage in McNamara's In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, Toronto: Times Books, 1995, p xvi) 'We... acted according to what were the principles and traditions of this nation. ... Yet we were wrong, terribly wrong. ... I truly believe that we made an error not of values but of judgment and capabilities.' Chomsky responds, 'I assume he's telling the truth. The book has a ring of honesty about it.' (Class Warfare, p 200).

\(^{268}\) Ibid pp 200-5.

\(^{269}\) Unless unwillingly forgotten, which is not a likely factor in the decisions discussed herein.
they have. If they frame those decisions deceptively, even to themselves, it is presumably an act of moral self-justification. To put it plainly, McNamara did not in any meaningful way believe that the DRV had attacked the US because, on some level, he knew better, and he consciously and deliberately lied as well as acting to suppress the dissemination of information which would draw into question his lies.

On an institutional level a very similar rule applies. Ideology may distort a decision making process, but it must be reapplied to each piece of information by wilful human agency. An institutional system may be pathological, but it nevertheless functions on the data available to it, with any omissions or distortions only occurring through human action. In the case of the Second Indochina War, it is quite easy to establish that not only the intelligence, but the analyses available to US decision makers were as accurate as could reasonably be expected.\textsuperscript{270} The only exceptions to this were the result of deliberate and systematic distortions of intelligence. In fact the US had highly sophisticated intelligence and strategy formulation systems. They applied psychosocial and anthropological disciplines rigorously. The US produced large 'Psychological Operations' reports on each of the three Indochinese nations in the late 1950s which detailed the material, social, cultural and psychological milieu of each nation and how to exploit it (note that they produced one report for Vietnam despite their official position that there were two separate countries). However parochial the viewpoint may have been, the US was therefore working with complex and highly informed rather than ignorant and simple-minded premises.\textsuperscript{271} The US was also able to bring considerable anthropological acumen to bear when it came to working with the Hmong of Laos\textsuperscript{272} and the Montagnards of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{273}

With regard to Iraq, a great deal of the narrative relies crucially on claims of US ignorance and arrogance. Peter Galbraith, for instance, illustrates this by relating an anecdote in which it would seem that during a meeting, George W. Bush, evinced a complete lack of knowledge of the existence of the two predominant sects of Islam.\textsuperscript{274} As will be discussed, there are reasons to believe that Bush was deliberately feigning ignorance, but Galbraith intends this to be illustrative of a wider arrogance and ignorance. But this systemic ignorance is both partly feigned and partly the result of a deliberate degradation of intelligence and analytical capabilities. This is part of a very large and important story in which Indochina is merely a sideline, but in which the GWOT is the culmination of decades of evolving strategy. This will be described in detail later, but in broad outline it begins with the onset of the Cold War, an artifact which relied on falsification of intelligence for its creation and maintenance. Over time, suppressing and side-lining the most cogent analysis and the most apposite intelligence became routine for exactly the same reason quoted from Orwell in Appendix C: that actions taken in light of such knowledge 'can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties.'\textsuperscript{275} In other words, administrations must

\textsuperscript{270} Prados (The Hidden History of the Vietnam War) shows on many occasions that CIA intelligence was accurate and detailed except on two occasions where they succumbed to MACV pressure to accept false intelligence (NIE 58-1963 pp 32-3 and SNIE 14.3-1967, pp 125-6); this overall assessment, with the same caveats, is repeated in Harold P. Ford's CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968. (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.) and George Allen's None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001) lays the blame completely on those who chose to 'ignore' the CIA and adds that even when they went elsewhere they usually got the same unwelcome news (p 285). Schulzinger describes the CIA as 'having consistently proven to be accurate' (A Time for War, p 163).


\textsuperscript{272} Warner, Shooting at the Moon, p 108.

\textsuperscript{273} Prados, Hidden Histories, p 74.


\textsuperscript{275} Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,”.
ostentatiously reject the findings of the most robust projections (for example) lest it become obvious that they are actually seeking those outcomes. During the 1970s the US also developed a method of bypassing sober analysis by creating an alternative fictional analysis through a different agency. During the 1990s overall intelligence capabilities were severely degraded, particularly those of the CIA. Finally, the age of the GWOT saw a sudden proliferation of competing agencies, all acting under far more liberal methods of garnering and interpreting intelligence, such that there is little doubt that if it is made known that a certain finding is desirable, that finding will be forthcoming.

The Iraq invasion and its immediate aftermath saw many measures instituted which seem almost to have been inspired by the studies by the State Department and military which warned that those exact actions would bring about conflict, suffering and social disintegration. Of most note are the many studies showing that a failure to provide security would lead to an insurgency and the unanimous opinion of military experts that this would require many more troops than those required to defeat the Iraqi military. This culminated most famously in Gen. Eric Shinseki's testimony that 'something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers' would be required for an occupation, bringing a derisive response from Paul Wolfowitz that within a few months only 34,000 personnel would be needed, and that higher estimates were 'outlandish' and 'wildly off the mark'. This was only one of the many accurate predictions about events in Iraq which would be 'ignored' by the Bush administration.

In Indochina US decisions were also informed by sophisticated analyses and remarkably accurate forecasting of military matters. Ford writes of how a 'prescient' CIA received 'little receptivity', as early as 1962 they characterised the war as 'a slowly escalating stalemate' and predicted its future course with great accuracy. The CIA were not the only ones, George Ball predicted major troop commitments some four years in advance. By 1964, it appears that no-one of those formulating US policy 'talk[ed] about winning a victory' but '[e]ven as they advocated escalation, virtually all of them were predicting a war on the scale of Korea. Perhaps the best illustration of this was the Omega wargame, run by the RAND corporation in 1962. Omega predicted a growing US commitment, eventually as one participant put it 'bogg[ing] down 500,000 troops in the quagmire' causing 'great expenditure', 'great agitation and unrest in the American population' and driving 'the US Congress to the brink of revolt over the seemingly endless war.' In the 1962 Omega scenario, by 1972, the simulation's end, the communists had taken over most of Indochina. They had sustained very heavy casualties, but were otherwise intact. However General Curtis LeMay insisted that the simulation had underestimated the Air Force's ability to bomb the DRV into submission and in 1963 they ran a sequel, Omega II, which achieved virtually the same results as the first. In addition to ignoring their own people, the US ignored the 'prescient' Charles DeGaulle, who grew increasingly vocal in the matter-of-fact warnings and criticisms he made from 1961 onwards.

There are several principles which can profitably be applied to US behaviour with regard to the choices made and the information on which those choices were based. Firstly, I would suggest that if all calculations suggest that action \( x \) will lead to result \( y \), then the decision to pursue action \( x \)

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276 Lando, *Web of Deceit*, pp 244-6.
277 Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp 96-8.
278 'Preface' in CIA and Vietnam Policymakers.
indicates a desire to achieve result y.

Another principle, which I think applicable, is that if out of a range of options an actor continuously and steadfastly forecloses all possibilities but one, then regardless of any protestations to the contrary, that remaining option is intentionally chosen. It should be remembered, for example, that there is no documentary evidence Hitler having ordered the Endlösung – the 'Final Solution'. When the extermination plan was committed to paper at Wansee in January 1942 (and then only as minutes for a meeting, not as directives or policy or orders), it was in order to facilitate complete coordination of state resources in a process which had already begun. For some this suggests that this was a 'bottom up' process driven by the visceral anti-Semitism of the German people and later essentially rubber-stamped by their leaders (although the majority of scholars dispute this). The simplest way to dismiss such contentions is to look at Generalplan Ost. In its first draft it called for the 'resettlement' of 31 million people in the region between Germany and Russia, with 14 million to remain as slave labour. All Jews were to be 'resettled'. Subsequent drafts became more extreme as tens of millions of Russians were added to the list of those who must somehow disappear. The language remained either euphemistic (referencing 'expulsion', for example) or passive ('undoubtedly x million people will starve'). But as Gellately points out “calling for 'resettlement in Siberia' was in effect another of the many code words for mass murder,” and '[t]hese plans in effect, therefore, called for nothing less than serial genocide.' In addition Germany had a plan to extract 'surplus' food in the expectation that up to 30 million Soviets would starve to death. In other words, the German leadership ensured implicitly that German personnel would engage in mass-murder on a scale unheard of in history and yet were able to do so without any explicit orders to that effect. Thus the worst genocide in human history, arguably the worst crime in history, has generated both deniers, who are at the fringe, and a perfectly orthodox apologetic literature which denies intentionality. This was achieved by making one path inevitable without ever simply ordering that path to be taken.

Likewise, anyone seeking to understand the US escalation in Indochina should bear in mind the small worth of professed reluctance when dealing with the idea that the US at key points would choose incremental escalation as the lesser of two evils. The US may never have spelled out its total strategy of genocide, but unerringly it moved incrementally toward it while assiduously avoiding all of the actions that might lead to another resolution. The decisions involved are nearly always framed by scholars as being taken with complete dispassionate and chauvinistic (if not completely immoral) 'realism'. The immediate need to prevent an imminent Communist victory,
because of its domestic\textsuperscript{291} and international concerns,\textsuperscript{292} is weighed against the very pessimistic prognosis. But, given that ultimate 'victory' is not seriously entertained, the motives given tend to be ephemeral, contingent, shallow or insignificant where they are not demonstrably false. Against these very minor motives I would like to put forward two crucial considerations neglected by scholars: the moral and the legal. Few people would ever choose actions which they knew would bring agony, fear and death to even a single innocent, yet many decisions were taken in the full knowledge that they would cause such suffering on a massive scale. It was not, for instance, possible to order a bombing campaign against the DRV without the certain knowledge that children would suffer and die in substantial numbers. Furthermore, given that the only projected peace was through the Communist victory which they sought not to avoid but postpone, it cannot be said that these acts were done to prevent greater suffering in Indochina. There is also the legal concern. Johnson for one is said to have “predicted the future appearance of 'a brutal prosecutor’” in 1964.\textsuperscript{293} Also to be considered is the highly publicised Russell War Crimes Tribunal of 1967, a 'tribunal' created privately to investigate war crimes in Indochina, which revealed horrific details of civilian suffering;\textsuperscript{294} and the fact that the lead US prosecutor from Nuremberg, Telford Taylor, suggested that Westmoreland was prosecutable under the precedent of the case of General Yamashita.\textsuperscript{295} It seems to me that it is unlikely that anyone would choose to kill people and risk prosecution just to prevent 'the dissipation of Presidential influence.'\textsuperscript{296}

The conception of serial choices of the lesser of two evils effectively reverses reality. In fact, far from allowing an unwilling or myopic commitment, the incremental implementation of US intervention in Indochina actually necessitated an unwavering determination, a repeated rededication to the use of violence and an adamant and active opposition to ending the conflict. The fact that there were so many opportunities to make other choices should be taken as evidence that a large-scale conflict was acutely desired.

It is inevitable that any steeply hierarchical system, such as an empire, is likely to use the technique outlined above for two reasons. The first is that allows for deniability (an important corollary of which is that it allows a state to instruct personnel to do one thing while ensuring that they do another) and the second is that it works well where power is exercised primarily through veto rather than direct control. In the case of the Second Indochina War the US made many alternative paths impossible, often overthrowing the governments they had only just emplaced themselves in order to prevent negotiations. In both Indochina and Iraq, US leaders instructed personnel to engage in

\textsuperscript{291} The normally cited domestic concern is the worry of being labelled 'soft on communism' (Turley, The Second Indochina War, p 17; Schulzinger, A Time for War, pp 124, 132; Robert R. Owens, America Won the Vietnam War: How the Left Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, Xulon Press, 2004, p 98). Gelb manages to stretch this one concern into six different issues suggesting that additionally such charges would dissipate 'Presidential influence;' as well as 'alienating conservative leadership... thereby endangering President's legislative program;' and 'jeopardising election prospects;' not to mention "undercutting domestic support for a 'responsible' U.S. World role; and enlarging the prospects for a right-wing reaction – the nightmare of a McCarthyite garrison state," (Leslie Gelb, “How the System Worked", in Kimball (ed.), To Reason Why, p 155). As Loegvall points out, it is hardly possible that domestic concerns could have pushed Johnson into escalation as the most momentous decisions came after he had secured a landslide electoral victory, in large part due to his disingenuous suggestion that he would not escalate the conflict or make a more major commitment of US ground forces (Loegvall, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam” p 107).

\textsuperscript{292} The predominant international concern cited in this context is the need to maintain US credibility. Although this is mostly linked to the idea of reluctance, it actually has a certain life of its own and I categorise it as a quagmire theory in its own right which is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{293} Schulzinger, A Time for War, pp 154-5. It should be noted that for Schulzinger this is only one (very minor) further piece of evidence that Johnson did not want to go to war at all, but was forced to. I would offer the alternative explanation that fear of a 'brutal prosecutor' would be one good reason for him making such an elaborate pretence of not wanting to go to war.

\textsuperscript{294} Gibson, The Perfect War, pp 369-73.

\textsuperscript{295} Blum, Rogue State, p 71.

\textsuperscript{296} See above, n 436.
'nation building' and counterinsurgency while circumstances were arranged in such a manner that predictably and inevitably they acted to destroy nations and promote insurgency.

I would also suggest that a clever strategist, where possible, matches means and ends, thus making results more predictable. In a situation where there is a stated end and a given means are employed and continue to be employed despite continued demonstrable 'failure' and are then employed elsewhere under the same rationale with the same results – in such a situation it is possibly worth considering that the 'means' are themselves the end. In the case of the genocidal war systems, I will argue the means were widespread general destruction, employed on as many of the people and as much of the societal fabric or infrastructure as was physically and politically feasible. If those were the means, I will suggest, they were also the end. The results are predictable. The dead stay dead. As will be revealed, the US rejected the offered allegiance of the Viet Minh; the option neutralisation in Vietnam; neutrality in Laos and Cambodia; and the possibility of negotiations between antagonists in South Vietnam. In doing so they showed clearly that they preferred the certainty of raining destruction down on an enemy, to the uncertainty of dealing with a friend who would not conform to US strategic desires. Iraq, as we shall see, was always going to be bad news for US empire: increasingly populous, endowed with oil, rapidly developing, and a potential Arab hegemon and serious challenge to US dominance of Middle Eastern oil resources. Here too the US made very clear choices to facilitate genocide in preference to any form of alliance under US hegemony.

The evidence exists to show that US actions are informed and wilful. Obviously there are issues about who was really making the decisions on any given issue at any given time – not only has the US Congress denied its constitutionally mandated authority, but many within successive administrations were misled into making decisions at key points. In the case of the Second Indochina War the most important factor is the systematic falsification of the information on which successive administrations and the US Congress based their decisions. By the time of the Iraq occupation, falsification of intelligence (which had played a very prominent role in the lead up to the invasion) was now aimed at military leaders for the simple reason that, in practical terms, the US congress no longer exercised any power over events in Iraq. Those in 'proconsular' positions, such as US ambassadors in Saigon, have had an extraordinary amount of power. In the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) it was they who, with some limitations, broadly decided what the Government of the RVN (GVN) policy was to be. It any given stage the Ambassadors may have been acting on instructions given in private by, say, the President, but the fact is that they would be on the ground making the decisions of what was allowable policy for the GVN,\textsuperscript{297} while the US government at all other levels would fiercely deny any ability to constrain the policy of the 'independent' GVN.\textsuperscript{298} This reached an almost comical level of irony when in 1967 (as observed by Richard Holbrooke) Henry Cabot Lodge and his successor Ellsworth Bunker disingenuously used the mantra of 'non-intervention' to ensure that they, and not anyone in Washington (let alone the people of South

\textsuperscript{297} This is best demonstrated by the central role of Ambassadors Henry Cabot Lodge and Maxwell Taylor in the overthrowing of insufficiently compliant governments (Schulzinger, \textit{A Time for War}, pp 120, 122, 162; Moyar, \textit{Forsaken Triumph}, pp 239-43, 255-62, 272-75, 318-9, 345-6; Neale, \textit{A People's History of the Vietnam War}, pp 63-5; William S. Turley, \textit{The Second Indochina War}, Boulder: Westview, 1986, pp 51, 53-4; Prados, \textit{The Hidden History of the Vietnam War}, pp 26-7). Both of these ambassadors were exceedingly powerful. Taylor had been granted essentially proconsular power in that he controlled the conduct of the war directly and became the 'major power', deciding himself who was to be in the cabinet of the ostensibly independent GVN in late 1964 (Schulzinger, \textit{A Time for War}, p 164).

\textsuperscript{298} Their most reliable clients (Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky, who 'ruled' from 1965 to 1975) even made a theatrical show of independence, in one instance calling the US 'a band of crooks' (Cawthorne, \textit{Vietnam: A War Lost and Won}, p 137). I believe that Ngo Dinh Diem's 'independence' was (even if heartfelt) no less a deception, and part of what made him suitable for US purposes. Ultimately, as events were to prove, he had no independence and his actions, no matter what a show of protest may have emanated from Washington, had ultimately to conform completely to the exigencies of US strategy.
Vietnam), would determine the result of the 1967 elections in the RVN.  

With regard to occupied Iraq, where L. Paul Bremer III was commonly referred to as a proconsul, in fact he was clearly far less empowered. Quite evidently, from the speed of his initial decrees, he arrived with a set programme (of genocide) originating in Washington. He was empowered to dismantle many of the foundations of the Iraqi state, but as Thomas Ricks points out, he was actually given so little resources that his power was extremely limited – he could destroy, but he had no resources with which to build. It is worth contemplating that if he had possessed the independence of Lodge and Bunker, much more strenuous efforts would have been made to suppress any suggestion that he was some sort of proconsul, whereas Bremer's tenure very openly wore the trappings of such power. This seems to have been a deliberate act of misdirection.

The fact that power is not always to be found where it is officially vested makes it even more crucial that US actions themselves be the ultimate test for the validity of any imputed motive or strategy. These genocides have a consistent pattern fitting a coherent strategy, and I find it almost impossible to believe that no single powerful person or group would have desired those particular outcomes. However, even if such a person or group did not exist the US as an entity in itself can be said to have wilfully undertaken these actions due to the motives given because we know that given their foreknowledge of the outcomes of their actions, other imputed motives can be eliminated because they do not match what the US actually did.

The final reason for believing that US actions were fully intentional is the evidential weakness of the multiplicity of inadvertence theories that abound. I have written of this elsewhere at length with regard to the Second Indochina War. In this instance, the a priori assumption that not just the US but all of the US did not want war. The view is encapsulated neatly in the title of a 1968 book, Nobody Wanted War... written, like many such works, by a former US official who had been involved in the events on which he was writing. From this basis has formed a baroque convoluted body of theory dedicated to explaining the non-existent and studiously ignoring every piece of evidence that those controlling events in the US were absolutely spoiling for war. Central to all of this is the metaphor of the quagmire – something which sucks you in against your will.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote 'The Politics of Inadvertence' in 1966, blaming successive administrations for stumbling blindly into incrementally greater commitments: 'As past medicine fails, all we can apparently think to do is double the dose.' Schlesinger, an historian who had served in the Kennedy administration and described the war as 'a tragedy without villains', thus launched a whole school of thought which attributed US involvement to a series of incremental steps, each involving a decision-making process which focussed on immediate rather than long-term concerns. These 'Quagmire' theories suggest that the US took the steps that it did unaware of the long-term consequences. As we have seen, this is not true but there is a variant which suggests that even knowing the disastrous long-term consequences, US administrations repeatedly chose, at each turning point, what was from its perspective the lesser of two evils. This is what is referred to as 'stalemate' theory, because the US, usually believing it could not win, sought at each point merely to avert a Communist victory. Stalemate theory can accord very closely with the revealed process of decision making process within Washington, but it does not account for how those people in

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300 Ricks, Fiasco, p 205.
304 Quoted in Gibson, A Perfect War, p 5.
Washington came to be making decisions on the basis of false information.\textsuperscript{305} Despite protestations to the contrary,\textsuperscript{306} Stalemate theories suggest that the long-term results of US actions were unwanted and hence unwilled or, to put it another way, inadvertent. In terms of intentionality, stalemate theory is just another quagmire theory.

Quagmire theories tend to posit one or more given characteristics or motives that are the driving force for US actions — the obsession or predilection that caused them to unwittingly or unwillingly become involved in the Second Indochina War. I separate them into the following categories: the reluctance quagmire (which incorporates stalemate theory); the arrogance quagmire; and the credibility quagmire.

The reluctance quagmire involves a more or less well-informed reluctance, wherein, at a series of points in time, US leaders are forced to choose the lesser of two evils, which always just happens to be incremental escalation. In addition to the stalemate theorists mentioned above there are many who see this as a valid factor shaping US policy,\textsuperscript{307} especially with reference to Lyndon Johnson's decisions.\textsuperscript{308} The reluctance, however, might be more apparent than real. Johnson made a very vocal show of having his hand forced. He famously, after the fact, referred to the conflict as that 'bitch of a war.'\textsuperscript{309} In addition, he called it a 'god-awful mess', and himself as 'hooked like a catfish'\textsuperscript{310} and 'trapped.'\textsuperscript{311} He had a habit of thinking out loud with regard to the war, wondering "how he could maintain 'his posture as a man of peace'" and making it clear that all the options available to him were unpalatable.\textsuperscript{312} He would have frequent theatrical outbursts of indignation against hawkish advisers and, on one occasion, the constant changes of regime in the RVN (which, as we shall see, his own administration prompted).\textsuperscript{313}

Logevall describes Johnson's behaviour as a 'charade' undertaken because 'Johnson wanted history

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{305} The originators of this theory, Daniel Ellsberg and Leslie Gelb, were thoroughly involved in the US policy/strategy apparatus. Gelb (and co-author Richard Betts) published a detailed account of the working of the 'Stalemate Machine' in which it was stated that decisions were not inadvertent but 'deductive'; that decisions 'never strayed very far from from the center of opinion both within and outside the government'; and that 'virtually all important decisions were made without illusions about the odds for success.' Thus 'the foreign policy failed, but the domestic decisionmaking system worked.' (Leslie Gelb with Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1979, p 2). Note that they are suggesting that a generally pessimistic outlook among bureaucrats is the same as being well-informed (which it is not) and seem totally unconcerned about the constant, massive deceptions of the public.
\item \textsuperscript{307} Schulzinger, for example, informs us that for the White House 'doing more, doing less, or doing the same all entailed enormous risks,' and writes of the 'slide towards Americanisation' during which 'the Johnson administration struggled to limit the U.S. Role' (A Time for War, pp 125, 154).
\item \textsuperscript{308} Schulzinger says of one escalation: 'Seeing no other real choice, Johnson approved the military courses of action..., '(ibid, p 159); Edward Cuddy suggests that after Harry Truman's choice to support the French in the First Indochina War, the only President who had the choice of 'a clean break' was Dwight Eisenhower. He suggests that Johnson is merely 'the fall guy' because things happened to come to a head during his presidency ('Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War. Or Mr. Eisenhower's?' The Review of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 4. (Autumn, 2003), pp. 351-374.)
\item \textsuperscript{309} Cawthorne, Vietnam: A War Lost and Won, p 64.
\item \textsuperscript{310} Cuddy, 'Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War. Or Mr. Eisenhower's?' pp 360-1.
\item \textsuperscript{311} Logevall, 'Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam' p 100.
\item \textsuperscript{312} Schulzinger, A Time for War, pp 146, 166.
\item \textsuperscript{313} According to Schulzinger, 'The succession of military regimes drove Johnson nearly apoplectic. 'I don't want to hear any more of this coup shit,' he exploded to aides,' ibid, p 170. Johnson was not the only one to have the audacity to condemn the US brokered coups; Maxwell Taylor, who as US Ambassador to Saigon had first forced a change of Government on the US installed Nguyen Khanh, then had partaken in the destabilisation of Khanh's second government. When the utterly predictable coup resulted, Taylor is reported to have railed at the coup leaders 'we Americans [are] tired of coups,' (ibid, p 169).
\end{itemize}
to record that he agonised.\textsuperscript{314} But Johnson was not the only one. Not only was John Kennedy also in the habit of thinking out loud with regard to Indochina, but so was Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{315} Kennedy would frequently profess peace whilst in the midst of making arrangements for escalation.\textsuperscript{316} This conscious and consecutive manipulation of public and historical perception makes any expression of reluctance at any level of US government or military of extremely dubious evidential value.

This is important to bear in mind when thinking of US actions in Iraq, because with Iraq there are no such systemically oriented theories nor are there ever likely to be. The reason, quite simply, is that the Bush administration and its neoconservative members and allies have captured all of the attention. In the place of complex theories on the workings of US political power at the highest levels, there are complex 'analyses' of psychology and ideology. The more focused such discussions are, the more convoluted they become as the struggle to explain the contradictions of people such as Paul Wolfowitz. A typical and symptomatic conclusion is that reached by Thomas Ricks – that neoconservatives (and by extension the Bush administration) are victims to their own lies,\textsuperscript{317} and that people like Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith are somehow both very intelligent and very stupid.\textsuperscript{318}

This allows Ricks and others of his ilk to conclude that despite the fact that their actions cause death destruction and misery, what they really desire is the spread of peace democracy and freedom.\textsuperscript{319} For Ray Kiely the entire neoconservative movement 'is above all committed to market expansion through trade, investment and financial liberalisation, and to the universal (cosmopolitan) expansion of liberal democratic politics.'\textsuperscript{320} He seems to be unconcerned by the contradiction of an expressly antidemocratic movement (with regard to domestic politics) portraying themselves as fanatical devotees of international democratisation.\textsuperscript{321} Kiely is not suggesting that this liberal utopianism is a good thing by any means, but once again it would seem that with critics like these the Bush administration had little need for supporters.

In fact, so strong are the attractions of inadvertence to those analysing US actions that even those seeking to negate the concept end often end up embracing it. The stalemate theorists of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} IW were sucked into the historiographical quagmire of inadvertence. The originators of this theory, Daniel Ellsberg and Leslie Gelb, were thoroughly involved in the US policy/strategy apparatus. Gelb (and co-author Richard Betts) published a detailed account of the working of the 'Stalemate Machine' in which it was stated that decisions were not inadvertent but 'deductive'; that decisions 'never strayed very far from the center of opinion both within and outside the government'; and that 'virtually all important decisions were made without illusions about the odds for success.' Thus 'the foreign policy failed, but the domestic decisionmaking system worked.' Note that they are suggesting that a generally pessimistic outlook among bureaucrats is the same as being well-informed (which it is not) and seem totally unconcerned about the constant, massive deceptions of the public.\textsuperscript{322} Gabriel Kolko, though he espoused an imperialist view of a US determined to

\textsuperscript{314} Logevall, 'Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam' p 101.
\textsuperscript{315} Schulzinger, \textit{A Time for War}, pp 99, 111; Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, 'What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception.' \textit{The Journal of American History}, Vol. 79, No. 2. (Sep., 1992), p 584. These authors, I should point out, take the vocalisations and equivocating as a \textit{symptom} of reluctance: "The events that culminated in United States military intervention in Vietnam were marked by continuing disagreement and ambivalence on the part of American policy makers, who sought to arrive at outcomes falling between what Eisenhower at one point described as the 'unattainable' and the 'unacceptable.'"
\textsuperscript{316} Schulzinger, \textit{A Time for War}, p 111.
\textsuperscript{317} For example: 'Spooked by its own false conclusions about the threat [of WMD], the Bush administration had hurried its diplomacy, short-circuited its war planning, and assembled an agonisingly incompetent occupation.' Ricks, \textit{Fiasco}, p 3.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid: On Feith, pp 76-8, 128-9; on Wolfowitz, pp 128-9; on Rumsfeld, pp 128-9, 168-72.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid, p 10.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid, p 142.
\textsuperscript{322} Gelb, \textit{The Irony of Vietnam}, p 2.
neutralise the threat of a virus of successful nationalist economic development,\textsuperscript{323} also presented a vision of a quagmire. After having discussed the DRV in rather complimentary terms he wrote, ‘...that the United States should have become embroiled with such formidable adverseries was a natural outcome of the logic and objectives of its role,... it is apparent that there existed two immoveable forces, one of which had no conceivable option but to pursue the policy it had embarked on....’\textsuperscript{324} Thus he also suggests ‘a tragedy without villains’. Gibson railed against Schlesinger and Karrow for forgetting about cause and effect but in the final analysis, he suggests that US involvement was a mistake brought about by mental limitations.\textsuperscript{325} Logevall does a very good job of disproving the commonly advanced suggestions that Johnson was reluctantly forced into war, only to make a different suggestion to the same effect wherein the credibility at stake was Johnson's domestic credibility and, trapped though he was, the trap was ‘of his own making’\textsuperscript{326}

With regards to Iraq suggestions of stupidity, greed and fanaticism always act to deny the intentionality of genocide. Enhancing this apologism are the misuses of psychoanalytical approaches. For example, David Keen's book on the GWOT as a war system devotes comparatively little space to delineating his putative subject ('Hidden Functions of the War on Terror') and the bulk in espousing a psychopolitical thesis in which, yet again, those who prosecute the GWOT are victims of their own lies (in Keen's terms 'magical thinking').\textsuperscript{327} This is what Michael Parenti describes as 'depoliticising the political'. He explains: 'The psycholgistic approach often serves as a means of avoiding the realities of the political economy.'\textsuperscript{328}

The reader may have noticed that I am not averse to the insights that might be provided by the occasional application of a psychoanalytical insight, but in practice I am in agreement with Parenti. In practice, there is a line, and not a particularly fine line, where a writer crosses from analytical utility into obfuscatory utility. One cannot use psychoanalysis to divine the sources of strategy or policy. On the contrary, psychological insights serve best to highlight evidence of the manipulation – the evidence, in short, of the calculated or instinctual use of psychology to control masses or individuals. I would make a partial exception here for psychology/psychopolitics which deals directly with the situational nature of leadership and selection for leadership (for example, political ponerology or work on authoritarians and social dominators) with the caveat that these things may explain why political, corporate or military leaders can do things that are normally unthinkable, but not why they do them in a given instance. Thus, for example, Robert Altemeyer might demonstrate that those who are both authoritarians and social dominators ('double highs') might be extremely destructive and dangerous,\textsuperscript{329} and give good evidence that they are massively over-represented in US political circles,\textsuperscript{330} but none of this could explain why Cambodia was carpet bombed and not Australia. There are actual and concrete reasons for doing things that go beyond psychology.

The aforementioned dividing line between the illustrative and obfuscatory uses of psychoanalysis is crossed purely for reasons of an impulse towards apologism. To demonstrate this I will focus on the work of just one individual, Robert Jay Lifton. Lifton has written on the Shoah/Holocaust, US war in Indochina, and the GWOT. Further, since the advent of the GWOT, he has gained a high degree of currency and is quoted in many works critical of Bush administration policies. In his work The Nazi Doctors Lifton's work on the psychology, the situation, and the socialisation of Auschwitz doctors to the task of mass murder, there is no suggestion whatsoever that the psychology of those carrying out the killing is somehow causally linked to the creation of institutions of systematic

\textsuperscript{324} Kolko, Vietnam, p 76.
\textsuperscript{325} Gibson, A Perfect War, p 5.
\textsuperscript{326} Logevall, 'Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam', pp 109-110.
\textsuperscript{327} Keen, Endless War?, p 97 et passim.
\textsuperscript{328} Michael Parenti, History as Mystery, San Francisco: City Lights, 1999, p 241.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid, pp 203-4.
killing. On the contrary, it is the structuring of the institutions which turn the doctors into killers. Even the propaganda of anti-Semitism, propaganda which was explicitly oriented towards extermination, worked not to create a desire to kill, but an assent to participating in the Endlösung, the 'solution' to the problem that none doubted was real. So, even at this level of involvement, the essence, for most, is one of assent, consent and apathy as the product of a systematic system of indoctrination.\footnote{Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (1986), New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp 203-7 et passim.} This clearly suggests a 'top-down' architecture of mass-murder, but Lifton doesn't imply that one can extrapolate the psychology of the architects from the psychology of the Auschwitz doctors.

In contrast, when Lifton writes of the 'atrocity-producing situations' of the US presence in Indochina and Iraq, these are not intentional creations of US leaders, but a by-product of the 'kind of war we are waging....' An 'atrocity-producing situation' is one:

...structured psychologically and militarily, that ordinary people... can regularly commit atrocities. In Vietnam that structure included 'free-fire zones' (areas in which soldiers were encouraged to fire at virtually anyone); 'body counts' (with a breakdown in the distinction between combatants and civilians, and competition among commanders for the best statistics); and the emotional state of U.S. soldiers as they struggled with angry grief over buddies killed by invisible adversaries and with a desperate need to identify some enemy.\footnote{Robert Jay Lifton, “Conditions of Atrocity”, The Nation, 13 May 2004. Reprinted in Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier and Robert Jay Lifton (eds), Crimes of War: Iraq, New York: Nation Books, 2006. p 340.}

The US is rendered virtually passive, its atrocities a reaction to circumstances (albeit those of its own making): '[A] counterinsurgency war in a hostile setting... is particularly prone to sustained atrocity – all the more so when it becomes an occupation.'\footnote{Ibid, p 341.} Salient among the problems with this apologetic emphasis (and denial of intentionality) is that it is in fact extremely counterproductive to kill civilians in a counterinsurgency. Free-fire zones and body counts don't just pop up as an inevitable or stochastic situational element of counterinsurgency. Even the 'emotional state', the 'angry grief' and the 'desperate need to identify some enemy' are the predictable consequence of systematic, and 'counterproductive' choices by US leaders in both Indochina and Iraq, and equally in Korea. It was US strategy, far more than that of their enemies, which produced an unbreakable alienation from local populations combined with a sense of never having a safe rear area.

If we are to understand US actions, one must first submit to the inevitable fact that one cannot and never will know the motive forces at work on an ideological and psychological level within given individuals. Appendix F, focussing particularly on the Presidents Bush, shows that US high officials cultivate synthetic public personae and the the public entities bearing their names are in effect simulated and have effective artificial biographies. One cannot base any reliable analysis on putative aims and motives which were somehow frustrated and went awry. Nor, in the case of the US, can one identify a collective ideological or systemic inclination from the documentary evidence of the internal workings internal functioning of power. The fact is that all participants understand that the US is an open society wherein no such documentation can reliably be concealed, and thus the most effective actors adopt further levels of secrecy and, above all, dissimulation.

**Dissimulation, Deception and Secrecy**

Private power and governmental power are theoretically divisible, but in practice intermarried and it is the combination that should properly be referred to as state power. One thing that has become unmistakeably overt since the advent of the beginning of George W. Bush's first presidency is that those who decisively exercise power in the US possess both forms of state power. Each form of
power serves and bolsters the other. At one level there is the infamous 'revolving door' which circulates people between government and corporate employment. To take the example of the arms industry Frida Berrigan writes that:

...a May [2008] report titled 'Post-Government Employment of Former DoD Officials Needs Greater Transparency,' the GAO [Government Accountability Office] found that thousands of senior Pentagon officials take refuge in the corporate world. In fact, of the almost 2,500 former Pentagon officials analyzed, almost two thirds of them went on to senior positions at just seven companies – SAIC, Northrop Grumman, Booz Allen Hamilton, L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Raytheon. Except for the consulting firm Booz Allen, all seven are on the Pentagon’s list of top ten contractors. Together, they received more than $87 billion in contracts from the DoD in 2007. The GAO report asserts that ‘our results indicate that defense contractors may employ a substantial number of former DoD officials on assignments related to their former DoD agencies or direct responsibilities.’

Then there is also the lobbying industry, also a favourite employment option for officials and legislators. William Astore writes: ‘And when it comes to taking, according to Eric Lichtblau of the New York Times, ‘more than 125 former Congressional aides and lawmakers are now working for financial firms as part of a multimillion-dollar effort to shape, and often scale back, federal regulatory power.’ In other words, the regulators and their aides legislate the rules and then simply step through that infamous revolving door and pick up a handsome check on the other side. There are, in fact, at least 11,000 well-employed registered lobbyists in Washington today. A $3.4 billion 'industry' in 2009, lobbying is definitely a field to get into, even in bad times, and according to the Christian Science Monitor, ‘when the cost of grass-roots efforts and of strategic advisers are all counted, total spending on influencing policy in Washington approaches $9.6 billion a year.’

It is fair to assume that lobbyists realise a return on their investments, and this is equally true of political campaign contributions. Greg Palast estimates that George W. Bush received $447 million from corporate contributions of various forms for his 2000 election campaign and, as he goes on to eloquently detail, 'ya dance with them what brung ya.' Both subsequent presidential elections have set new records in campaign spending. As Jim Hightower commented to Greg Palast, 'They've eliminated the middleman. The corporations don't have to lobby the government anymore. They are the government.'

Clearly, it is now entirely normal for officials to have high private stakes, not a situation unprecedented in history, but all the more acute for the fact that each senior political figure is in essence the front for an entire enterprise – a team which, amongst other things, crafts the most effective public image and tailors 'messages' according to careful research. ‘Truth’ is not necessarily even a matter for consideration. But it is not merely individuals in the US regime who are steeped in dissimulation, there are entire institutions which are of completely concealed or deceptive purpose. The US has a very impressive record of keeping secrets, and secrecy, while not as pervasive as it was in the Soviet Union, is central to many facets of US policy. Of course we cannot know that which has been successfully been kept secret. Some idea of the potential scale of such things can be gathered from the Manhattan Project, which employed 250,000 people and involved building the largest building in the world. Tom Zoellner describes the running of the

337 Ibid, p 86.
338 See Appendix F.
project:

Most of the employees were never told that their jobs were connected to weapons. Those who knew of the presence of uranium were never supposed to call the stuff by its real name; official nonsense words—*tuballoy* and *yttrium*—were coined instead. Even senior managers had little idea of what was happening. This was a [Gen. Leslie] Groves hallmark: He was a compulsive hoarder of information, keeping most of his command chain divided into separate units forbidden to communicate with one another. “Every man should know everything he needs to know to do his job, and nothing else” was one of his maxims, and the culture of secrecy infected every corner of the Manhattan Project.\(^{340}\)

It was the Manhattan project that gifted the world the phrase, 'on a need to know basis,' and secrecy was so effective that the accepted story would have it that Vice President Harry Truman only found out of its existence when assuming the post of President.

The CIA was inaugurated and mandated as an intelligence gathering organisation, but from the outset the overwhelming bulk of its energies went on covert actions.\(^{341}\) However, they soon pioneered a new form of secrecy – the open secret. It is said that the US media have perfected the art of lying by only telling the truth once, and there is much that the US does as a state which is not exactly secret, but is not known or incorporated in mainstream discourse. It may be said to have begun with the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala. Unable to effect the overthrow with a truly covert operation, the CIA went ahead with bombing the country anyway.\(^{342}\) The net effect was that everyone in Latin America knew what had occurred, but the US media simply ignored the obvious US involvement because there was no official acknowledgement of such. The CIA topped everything off by beginning what was to be a long-standing habit of lying to the President about what had occurred.\(^{343}\) This phenomenon, already discussed with regard to torture, is not unique to the US. Another very prominent example would be Israel's nuclear arsenal which can be used as a very forthright threat, but is still officially denied which prevents the need for Israeli officials to explain and justify its existence. As with Orwell's observations on the uses of euphemistic language, the weapons can be justified but not in terms acceptable to the vast majority of people. The same applies to the construction of the current US empire under cover of the Cold War.

What evolved was a system not only of secrets and plausible denial, but one of implausible denial reliant on the media tendency to only report US actions that are publicly acknowledged, and the academic tendency to only acknowledge that which is openly stated in documents. The Cold War itself, or more particularly Cold War 'containment', can be seen as a gigantic manifold public relations exercise – a way of 'spinning' the fact that the US had unilaterally given itself *imperium* and the right to overtly or covertly use force in most countries of the globe by falsely proclaiming such acts to be a defence against aggression. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed argues, 'It was essential – as part and parcel of war propaganda – to manufacture a global threat that would provide justification for military interventions designed to expand the US empire. By fabricating a malignant global threat to the very existence of Western civilization, the great powers could legitimize the illegitimate use of force.'\(^{344}\) This is only one example of dissimulation in a world which has seen all states, in greater or lesser degree, increase the sophistication with which they effectively manage the perception of events and acts. The most prominent facet of this is what is known as 'public diplomacy.' This refers to the deliberate manipulation of public opinion commonly referred to as 'perception management,' but also described as the 'theatre of power.'\(^{345}\)

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342 Ibid, p 114.
343 Ibid, p 120.
Public diplomacy has evolved far beyond merely the work of public diplomats, to the extent that in NATO Review Lieutenant Colonel Steven Collins included the bombing of broadcasting stations as an act of public diplomacy.\textsuperscript{346} Collins differentiates between public diplomacy, PSYOPS (psychological operations), public information, and deception and covert action.\textsuperscript{347} But this separation is totally unsustainable, suggesting, for example that somehow public diplomacy, PSYOPS and 'public information' do not involve deception. Indeed, though PSYOPS may serve tactical purposes Mark Kilbane points out that they are also an increasingly used tool of public diplomacy.\textsuperscript{348} Public diplomacy, or perhaps what might more inclusively be termed propaganda, has become so multifaceted and pervasive that no public act or pronouncement by the US occurs without a fundamental calculated reference to propaganda value which alters not only not only the interpretation of actions, but determines the nature of those actions. It is worth giving shape here to the structure underlying the use of propaganda, a structure in which constructs such as the 'civilising mission', the Cold War, and the GWOT perform similar fundamental roles.

Nancy Snow, a senior fellow at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, points out that public diplomacy is inevitably linked to 'soft power'.\textsuperscript{349} For Tanner Mirlees, soft power is nothing more than a euphemism for cultural imperialism, an active, if not aggressive, use of propaganda.\textsuperscript{350} But while Mirlees is quite right to highlight the apologetic nature of the discourse and literature of soft power, the actual concept itself is far broader than simple cultural imperialism. Though definitions vary somewhat they have a strong correspondence to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 'hegemony', which functions primarily by consent, notwithstanding the use of violence through arms of the state (which is actually consented to in greater or lesser degree).\textsuperscript{351} In both cases, there is not merely an active component of, say, cultural imperialism, but also a passive component of internalised ideology – internalised by individuals who exert the power as much as by those who are victims of it. This automatically provides a framework of interpretation most notable for its tendency to create a belief of benevolent intentions on the part of those who effectively exercise soft power, regardless of how poorly this corresponds with their actions.

Soft power may be seen as a form of capital which can either be expended depletingly or reinvested to generate future dividends. In both cases the spending mechanism is propaganda. The most fundamental level of its usage is in creating a perceived character for the nation — namely, the populace, or predominant sector of the state in question. In other times this might have been framed in overtly racist terms, but now it is framed in racially informed cultural terms which amount to the same thing. This is the basis of 'exceptionalism' as Brewer describes, *The message that what is good for America is good for the world drew on the belief in American exceptionalism. This treasured myth claimed that the United States, as the world’s morally superior nation, had special responsibilities and privileges. Leaders declared that Americans had a duty not only to protect their valued system of democracy and capitalism, but to extend it to others*.\textsuperscript{352} It is also the basis of the sort of apologist critiqued by Mirlees, wherein US soft power arises because of their inherent 'benevolence' and should be extended by making people more aware of this benevolence.\textsuperscript{353}


\textsuperscript{347} Ibid, p 242.


\textsuperscript{353} Mirlees, “American Soft Power...”, pp 199-227.
Creating such a form of power is as simple as creating a positive self-image (which peoples do in any respect) and then turning it outwards – enforcing it on others, often through ethnocidal/genocidal processes that act to destroy the target populations’ own sense of positive identity. This process is often dominated by mechanisms of racism (or crypto-racist cultural tropes) leading to what Fanon described aptly as the 'epidermalisation', as opposed to 'internalization', of inferiority.  

The distinction of (positive) Us and (negative) Them is in its simplest and most traditional form where the juxtaposition of civilisation and barbarism is invoked. The most common practice is to blame one's own barbaric acts on the barbarous nature of the victims under a Manichaean paradigm. In a piece on systematic miseducation John Marciano points out that the period of the GWOT has seen a concerted effort to inculcate this sort of world view, with Thomas Friedman calling for 'moral clarity'; advocating that students read about the essential goodness that underlies US 'mistakes and blunders'. Friedman also advocates reading a book by Victor Davis Hanson that shows how the GWOT is a continuation of tolerance and western values of disinterested enquiry and an 'age-old fight against medieval foes who despise modernism, liberalism and freedom....'  

John Bellamy Foster makes note of the inversion that occurs in the discourse of barbarism, comparing the declaration of Business Week that a 'new age of barbarism is upon us' with Donald Rumsfeld's statement that '[a]t some point the Iraqis will get tired of getting killed.' Of course Rumsfeld is, in Foster's words, 'the voice of the new barbarism,' but Rumsfeld is not alone, nor is this barbarism in any real sense 'new'. Gareth Porter considers the reported words of 'a senior military official in Baghdad' who opined that 'maybe they [Iraqis] just need to have their civil war. In this part of the world it's almost a way of life.' In this Porter sees the same essential message as that underlying the notorious comment of Gen. William Westmoreland who said: 'The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient.'  

The Manichaean discourse of the GWOT is constructed to replicate that of the Cold War. This creation of essentialised identities is as thoroughly racist now as it has ever been. Examples of derogatory racism abound throughout this work, but it should also be borne in mind that the elevation of the essentialised Western or 'American' character is as racist as the denigration of other cultures, especially when flying in the face of such evidence as the prolific number of people who suffer and die horribly due to the actions of individuals from these putatively civilised cultures. The creation of the Cold War paradigm drew on tropes of civilisation and barbarism. In NSC-68 the 'fundamental purpose of the United States' is defined as 'freedom', while the 'fundamental design of the Kremlin' is defined as 'slavery.' Neither assertion is supported by any evidence or reasoning. This is typical of NSC-68 which similarly asserted that the USSR sought 'world domination' and, unlike the 'constrained' US, would never hesitate to use military force. Nor did US leaders scruple to use racism to reinforce the Manichaean paradigm asserting at this time that Russians were 'an Asiatic or Oriental people.'  

While the ideology of good vs. evil was being solidified, the key process was to manufacture and
exaggerate threats through promulgating an unending stream of lies and distortions. It is worth reiterating here that this was a highly functional exercise, not the pointless hysteria of a ‘witch hunt’. As Gabriel Kolko points out the ‘real or purported crises' helped maintain US hegemony domestically and internationally. I have already noted some of the bloody interventions, destroying national sovereignty and attempts at self-determination, facilitated by Cold War deception which thus corresponded exactly with Rebecca Solnit's characterisation of the GWOT as seeming ‘to inculcate terror at home and enact it abroad.’

It would be difficult to do justice to the scale and frequency of hyperbole underlying the Cold War. In order to militarise the US, people such as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and his ally Senator Arthur Vandenburg set out to, in Vandenburg's words, 'scare the hell out of the American people.' Subsequent highlights of distortion and deception include the 'bomber gap', a 'fantasy' which “was a later version of General Hoyt Vandenberg's hysterical warning in 1949 that 'almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders,'” at a time when 'the effective capacity of the Soviet air force had been zero....' The 'bomber gap' was invented at a time when the US had 1,735 bombers capable of hitting the USSR and returning, while the Soviets had about 175 long-range bombers which were either 'vulnerable' jets which were incapable of making a return journey, or 'highly vulnerable' slow turboprop aeroplanes. Hard on the heels of this was the 'missile gap' which was manufactured despite the fact that U-2 reconnaissance had clearly established the modest numbers involved in the Soviet ICBM programme. A missile gap did exist, of course – by 1962 the US had more than ten times as many ICBM's as the USSR. US exaggeration of Soviet nuclear capabilities began as soon as the USSR exploded its first nuclear device, a development which, according to James Carroll, was certainly guaranteed, if not prompted, by US intransigence. NSC-68, for example, predicted a stockpile of 200 bombs by mid-1954, which allowed the US to go from stockpiling 300 warheads in 1950 to over 18,000 in 1960.

When intelligence reports began to undermine the hysteria with observed facts, US leaders ensured that the intelligence reports themselves were distorted. In 1969 Richard Nixon, who wanted support for an antiballistic missile programme, forced DCI Richard Helms to delete key passages in the CIA's 1969 estimate of Soviet nuclear forces. This precedent led to 13 years of consistent exaggeration of Soviet strategic capabilities by the CIA. Bolstering the official hyperbole were think tanks, most notably the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which Paul Nitze formed in early 1950s to promote the sense of imminent peril. Despite the involvement of insiders like Nitze, such influential organisations were officially unofficial. But, as it had already been with the CFR, the line between government and private interest was perforated with the engagement of Team B in 1976. In the face of moves towards multilateralism and the easing of tensions, Team B was formed with a view to essentially rewriting the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Soviet Union. According to James Cypher:

The NIE is normally conducted by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which draws on CIA data to

365 Ibid, p 220.
370 Paul Nitze, “NSC 68”
371 Carroll, *House of War*, p 188.
determine the level and direction of Soviet arms outlays. ... The CPD charged that the NIE estimate of Soviet arms outlays was too low and that there should be an 'independent' analysis. Ford eventually concurred and a seven-member panel comprised of four CPD members (Nitz, Foy Kohler, William Van Cleave, and Richard Pipes) generated the now famous Team B report. Since the CPD's announced objective was to convince policymakers that 'the principal threat to our nation ... is the Soviet drive to dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup,' it is hardly surprising that the Team B report 'discovered' a sizable error in previous CIA estimates of Soviet outlays: the USSR was said to be spending 11–13 percent of its GNP, not 8 percent, on arms. Multiplying this 'error factor' times 10 (for the 10-year period 1970–80), Reagan's advisors... came up with the figure of $300 billion as the margin by which the Soviets had outspent the United States.\(^{374}\)

Team B was approved, to the dismay of many in the CIA, by DCI George Bush "with a cheery scribble: 'Let her fly!!'\(^{375}\) Roger Morris, formerly an aide to Henry Kissinger who resigned over US actions in Cambodia, gives the following description:

Team B's right-wingers, including Paul Wolfowitz, were chaired, aptly enough, by Harvard's Richard Pipes. He had been handpicked by Richard Perle via Senator Jackson and came, like most of the others, with 'little command of scientific [strategic weapons] matters,' as Gary Wills put it. The group would form what even hard-line CIA analyst Ray Cline called 'a kangaroo court of outside critics all picked from one point of view.'

Predictably, their 'findings' were a simplistic fantasy: The Soviet Union was intent on starting World War III and an American nuclear 'window of vulnerability' made such a Russian attack plausible. This scenario required, of course, an inconceivably perfect Soviet first strike as well as actions and reactions precise beyond any war-planner's wildest dreams.\(^{376}\)

Team B prolifically leaked its 'findings' to sympathetic reporters and columnists, who were thus able to report alarmist fantasies as from official sources.\(^{377}\) Team B would form the nucleus of a reconstituted CPD which, now more influential than ever, is credited with having turned the Carter presidency into an era of increased military spending and confrontation. Carter came to embrace CPD policies, despite what appeared to be an initial desire to relax tensions and promises to the electorate to reduce military spending.\(^{378}\) All he earned for his compliance was further condemnation from the right.\(^{379}\) If this seems puzzling, it is worth noting at this point that Donald Rumsfeld had in 1963 accused Paul Nitze of being 'soft' on communism and implying that he advocated disarmament.\(^{380}\) The point is that this is not strange, but rather it is effective tactical behaviour. Everyone would have been aware of the ludicrousness of Rumsfeld's accusations, but they did no harm to his career. In Chris Floyd's words: 'Rumsfeld was a made man; he would remain entrenched in the bowels of the military-industrial, and often at the center of government, from that time until today.' Rumsfeld had earned a place in the next Republican administration, and while at the White House he was to become an outspoken proponent of Team B.\(^{381}\) The point of attacking an obviously bellicose individual for being 'soft' is to change the terms of reference, shifting the goalposts, so to speak, until certain thoughts are unutterable in the public sphere and eventually become unthinkable. Attacking Carter may seem less like parody than attacking Nitze, but as president he formulated the Carter Doctrine, under which the US would use 'any means necessary, including military force' to ensure the continued supply of Persian Gulf oil.\(^{382}\) He

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379 Ibid, p 72.
created, to this end, the 'Rapid Deployment Force' that was to become CentCom.\textsuperscript{383} It was also Carter who in 1979 actually initiated the massive sustained military spending increase that is associated with Ronald Reagan's presidency.\textsuperscript{384} Even in rhetoric Carter became a staunch Cold War hardliner long before end of his term, though perhaps overshadowed by Ronald Reagan's talk of an 'Evil Empire' and the launching of the 'Second Cold War'.\textsuperscript{385}

It was, however, Reagan who reached the zenith of almost unimaginable and, frankly, comical exaggeration with comments such as his suggestion that US intervention against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua would prevent Soviet tanks 'rolling across the Rio Grande.' He portrayed "the contras as 'freedom fighters' who are the 'moral equivalent of our founding fathers,' the Nicaraguan government as a 'totalitarian dungeon,' and the United States as a 'shining city.'"\textsuperscript{386}

All of this was happening in a society in which the manipulation of public opinion was becoming ever more entrenched. In 1928, Edward Bernays, who invented 'public relations', wrote in \textit{Propaganda}: 'As civilization has become more complex, and as the need for invisible government has been increasingly demonstrated, the technical means have been invented and developed by which opinion may be regimented.'\textsuperscript{387} The US government and powerful interests deliberately established an influence over the news and entertainment media which has evolved into a species of indirect but fairly strict control. In 1988, Herman and Chomsky demonstrated with quantitative data that the US news media functioned as a propaganda system acting to effect thought control.\textsuperscript{388}

As Chomsky would later write: 'From a comparative perspective, the United States is unusual if not unique in its lack of restraints on freedom of expression. It is also unusual in the range and effectiveness of the methods employed to restrain freedom of thought. The two phenomena are related. Liberal democratic theorists have long observed that in a society where the voice of the people is heard, élite groups must ensure that that voice says the right things.'\textsuperscript{389} For Herman the 'propaganda model' (which details the mechanisms under which a 'free press' becomes an agent of propaganda) has become even more relevant since 1988.\textsuperscript{390}

Hence it is fair to conclude that at all levels the US state and its media practice a high level of deception and dissimulation. When producing any information, even that which is not intended for public distribution, it is the invariable practice where it is imperative deliberate misrepresentation and misdirection will be applied consciously or unconsciously by those who have internalised a framework in which only certain possibilities are admissible.

\section*{The US Empire and Genocide}

Empire and colonialism are as closely linked to genocide as war is. According to John Docker, 'Lemkin's concept of genocide links settler-colonies and genocide in a constitutive and inherent relationship.'\textsuperscript{391} I do not need to labour the point that in order to create a settler colony one must


\textsuperscript{383} Ibid. CentCom (Central Command) is part of a command system that divides the entire globe into military regions.

\textsuperscript{384} Hossein-zadeh, \textit{The Political Economy of US Militarism}, p 72.

\textsuperscript{385} Ibid, pp 72-3.

\textsuperscript{386} Kenneth Sharpe, "The Real Cause of Irangate," \textit{Foreign Policy}. Fall 1987, p 31.


\textsuperscript{388} Herman and Chomsky, \textit{Manufacturing Consent}.


commit genocide on any extant indigenous genos. However, thanks to the Western European habit of labelling such places as India 'colonies', colonialism has become largely synonymous with imperialism. Equally, Lemkin's eponymous exemplars of genocide under the Third Reich were far more varied than merely those instances aimed at creating lebensraum. Germany's interlocking genocides served three equally interlocking purposes – domination, annihilation, and replacement. Domination is the first purpose and must be pre-eminent because it is a pre-requisite for the other purposes. Lemkin's focus on Poland – the killing of intellectuals and leaders; the economic, social and cultural destruction – reveals how much the German genocide of Poles was aimed at domination through the weakening of the genos or '[i]he destruction of the national pattern....'\(^{392}\)

This is not military domination, it is the weakening of the civilian ability to resist.

The intermediate purpose I refer to as annihilation, this involves all of the techniques of domination plus those which Lemkin refers to as 'biological' and 'physical', \(^{393}\) designed to lower populations by killing, shortening life expectancy, or preventing births. It is not, however, necessary that the physical bodies are annihilated. Part of the deadly strategic allure of genocide is that annihilation is achieved with exactly the same means as domination, the partial or complete destruction of the genos. The German plan (remembering that the foundations, such as Generalplan Ost, were not exclusively Nazi in origin) called for the physical annihilation of some, but others were to be greatly depleted in population but not exterminated, and others were to be assimilated. The Poles, for example, were not to be exterminated, but reduced in numbers and national coherence to the point where they could safely be used as a helot-style slave population. Crucially, they were to be a minority. Those assimilated were, in effect, to be victims of the complete destruction of their genos. Though not slated for death, they were to have their separate identity completely erased.

The last purpose, replacement, is a process of ethnic, social, political, cultural and linguistic reproduction. This is accompanied simultaneously with the creation of centralised institutions of power and economic structures wherein the 'centre' dominates the 'periphery'. These are definitional elements of empire or, depending on one's usage, imperialism. In Oxford University Press's Empire: A Very Short Introduction, Stephen Howe notes all of these elements before going on to mention the frequency of mass migrations and genocidal mass murders in these circumstances. \(^{394}\) In the German case, the approach was to create a great deal of uniformity. The end result was to be an autarkic empire with minimal centripetal forces, to be achieved by imposing a singular genos with only small remnants of disempowered demoralised indigenous inhabitants. They wished to achieve what the Han had achieved in China over the space of thousands of years, but they tried to do so in a single generation.

The US empire has not ever been so drastic nor so blatant. The Germans were covert in conducting their greatest acts of mass murder, but their imperial ambitions (in which genocide was intrinsic) were made amply clear to all. Nevertheless, US imperial ambitions are arguably greater, being global in extent. Nor is there anything particularly ambiguous about, for example, this excerpt from the Pentagon's Joint Vision 2020, a document released in 2000, before the GWOT or the Bush Doctrine:

\[ \ldots \text{[G]iven the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.}^{395} \]

Germans, naturally, were at pains to portray all of their motives as defensive in nature, but when

\(^{392}\) Lemkin, Axis Rule, p 83.

\(^{393}\) Ibid, pp 83-4.


defence requires 'lebensraum' those on the outside tend to be sceptical. 'Interests and obligations', on the other hand, sounds sufficiently vague. The concept of defending 'interests' is at least as old as the Roman empire and in this traditional usage neither the location of such 'interests' in the sovereign territory of others, nor even the ownership of those interests by others is any necessary impediment to an imperial power 'defending' them. One can make the argument that any imposition of power, no matter how far-flung, is defensive if one is willing to be highly speculative about the future. What really belies such arguments is the fact that such expansionism brings its own vulnerabilities. As with Japanese militarism in the early 20th Century, to which US imperialism is often compared, given that two defensive options exist, the choice of 'defending' by attacking is, in fact, simple aggression.

While the imperialism of the Third Reich, however, is as clear as that of the settler colonial movements, which it was effectively emulating, in fact genocide is implicit in most of what we would consider imperial modes of domination. Military means are really only useful for imposing one's will (in Clausewitzian fashion) on a ruler or ruling class, not on a people. One can replace the ruling class, or even insert oneself above the ruling class, but if the mode of domination requires actions liable to bring about serious resistance from the people themselves, then genocidal means must be used to impose the imperial will. Obviously this applies where extermination or ethnic cleansing are desired, but it also applies where the desire is to severely reduce the material circumstances of a people, to destroy a deep-seated sense of identity, to deny fundamental aspirations, or to acquire control of that which a people regards as rightful patrimony.

To illustrate, allow me to step back in time. While some choose to define genocide as a purely modern phenomenon, most scholars recognise that this presents insurmountable definitional difficulties because of the very striking persistence back through the past of those actions which we recognise as genocidal in modern times. Indeed there is a persistent sense, going right back to Lemkin, that genocide is somehow very modern and very primitive. The reason for this is that between the 'primitive' and the modern there are numerous styles of political culture which have no potential for strategic gain from committing genocide.

To explain, consider warfare among early (pre-state) agrarians and pastoralists. Warfare in these cultures is not universal, but it is far from uncommon. Compared with the forager ('hunter-gatherer') forerunners they had larger political formations which, for the sake of convenience, I will refer to as tribes. There was also more potential for conflict caused by the intensification of resource usage and increases in population. In these situations (and for foragers before) warfare tended to become genocide on a very frequent basis. Massacring entire tribes was not unheard of, and gendercide (particularly the standard pattern of killing all military age males and enslaving others) was very common. The reasons why this is so should be obvious: the people of the tribe are the primary source of economic and military power. Extermination means that there can be no future competition or threat. More economically, killing the 'battle-age' males may crucially weaken a tribe for generations. Bear in mind that this is not the killing of combatants, this is different, the killing of males in their prime physical years regardless of their combatant status or potential. The killing of such males is an attack on the entire community. In patriarchal societies, the basic social and economic unit, the family, cannot function without males of such an age and killing them en masse forecloses the possibilities of remarriage, adoption, fostering or other methods of consolidating coherent family units. Mass rapes and mass captivities likewise destroy the fundamental strength and coherence of the tribal genos.

I am not suggesting here that all inter-tribal warfare is necessarily genocidal, merely that it is common for there to be a strategic inclination towards genocide which might (or might not) be

396 Gat, War in Human Civilisation, p 15 et passim.
acted upon. In a very real sense, armed conflict may have been conducted by only some of a tribe, but often the conflict really pitted entire tribes against each other, not just those who committed the actual acts of violence. In contrast, for agrarian civilisations this is highly unlikely to be the case. I do not wish to over-simplify the many variations of civilised polity that existed before the modern age, but for convenience I will use a model most in contrast with foraging, pastoral and non-state agrarian societies. Such a society has a much greater division of labour under a rigid class or caste structure. The rulers are part of one or both of two elevated castes, the military caste and that caste which creates and promulgates ideology (a priestly caste). The masses do not hold political decision making power; they are not involved in military matters; and ideology is not produced by them but handed to them from on high. In fighting a war with such a society, once the military is defeated it is possible to conquer and hold the society by simply emplacing oneself at the top. The average person might have a comparatively vague opposition to rule by foreigners or worshippers of another deity, and it is common for conquerors to provoke resistance, but there is no inherent material stake which would make strong resistance unavoidable. Those killed, usurped, exiled or debased by the act of conquest might seem very distant to the peasant majority. These are the sort of societies that Machiavelli considered hard to conquer and easy to hold, citing the example of Alexander's takeover of the entire Persian Empire.398

It is easy to see then, why genocide, though far from unknown, is less frequent in such civilisations than seems to have been the case in tribal warfare. There are obvious exceptions, the Assyrians being particularly salient as systematic practioners of forced transmigration, but throughout history until the modern era there have been incredibly large numbers of wars, and comparatively few genocides. Uncivilised agrarians were often conquered without any attempt to destroy their identity, though demonstrative genocide might be perpetrated against those who resist too effectively. Whether a conquered people were state or tribe based, a deep seated will to resist coming from the genos identity would be highly exceptional. Even the Egyptians adjusted pretty easily to Ptolemeic rule, and they had been a single very defined polity for thousands of years.

Moreover, when a state (in any age) commits genocide, it is inevitably imperialistic in nature. A tribe committing genocide is seeking a long-term strategic advantage by destroying or weakening another tribe, and it is almost inevitably seeking superior access to resources. But while it might take slaves and lay claim to areas containing resources, it is neither subjugating a people nor annexing a distinct bordered territory. When a state commits genocide it seeks to establish dominance over a people, whether as subjects or tributaries, or it is trying to annex territory for exploitation or colonisation, or both.

The advent of modernity, and coalescence of nation-states in the West, increased the incidence of genocide in two ways. The first is in the tendency of nation-states to commit genocide against minorities. Mark Levene indicates a 'paradigm shift' which he traces to the Vendée in 1793. What began as a war between Republican France and Royalists incited by a foreign power quickly became genocidal. The military aspect ended quickly, the commander, General Westermann, known as 'the butcher of Vendée', wrote thus of the culminating massacre of insurgents:

The Vendée is no more ... I have buried it in the woods and marshes of Savenay ... According to your orders, I have trampled their children beneath our horses' feet; I have massacred their women, so they will no longer give birth to brigands.399 I do not have a single prisoner to reproach me. I have exterminated them all. The roads are sown with corpses. At Savenay, brigands are arriving all the time claiming to surrender, and we are shooting them non-stop ... Mercy is not a revolutionary sentiment.400

398 Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince, c. 1513, Chapter 4.
399 Note that where now one would use the term 'terrorists' instead of 'brigands' the term had only just been coined at that time and it was those Jacobins who ordered the genocide who termed themselves 'terrorists' (Charles P. Webl, Terror, Terrorism, and the Human Condition, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p 8.)
This was only the beginning. Explicitly anihilatory orders were given and modern systematic techniques and technologies were put to the task of the mass murder of civilians.\(^{401}\) However, though substantial and important, that is as far as the historical significance goes. There is considerable controversy over whether these events constituted a genocide at all. Generally there is a split between genocide scholars, for whom it did, and historians of the period, for whom it did not. The objections of the historians have some substance, but not sufficient to discard the term genocide. For example, many in the Vendée were Republicans, it is true, but as Jones points out they too were at risk of becoming victims of the genocide.\(^{402}\) This is actually highly symptomatic of genocide, echoed to an even greater extent in South Vietnam, for example, where, in what purported to be an ideological politico-military struggle, not only did non-combatant status provide no assurance of not being killed by US forces, but one's political beliefs (the supposed dividing line between friend and enemy) were largely irrelevant. As will be shown the same obtained in Korea, and the reader may be well aware that many Iraqi collaborators have died at the hands of Coalition forces.

Though it was genocide, I would categorise the Vendean genocide as being problematic. Not only were Vendéan loyalties divided, but the atrocities were initiated by the Royalist rebels. Furthermore, the way the genocide ended is telling. The killing was finally ended when the French authorities instituted religious toleration and reigned in their own troops whose atrocities had become the main source of continued resistance.\(^{403}\) This tells us that this genocide was highly politicidal in nature. It was contingent.

In labelling the Vendéan genocide an 'archetype', Levene is following two tendencies which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, are very common to genocide scholars but which act to systematically distort the academic discourse of genocide. The first is to emphasise a conceptualisation of genocide as being perpetrated by states against segments of their own populations defined as being outside of the nation. The second is to make 'archetypes' of these invariably problematic genocides (problematic in the sense that there are real grounds for disputing their nature as genocides) by focussing on non-essential symptoms which constitute a style of genocide. Thus, the genocide in the Vendée was an 'archetype' because of the modernity of its methodology of killing. Not only is this type of distinction of dubious worth in and of itself, it is also an extremely subjective one. Moderns do things in a modern manner. If the model is the Third Reich's use of bureaucracy and infrastructure for the purposes of extermination, it is easy to find or not find comparative behaviours according to one's purposes and predilections.

This is all discussed in detail next chapter, but I raise it now because of the second, far more significant intensification of genocide which began in the early modern era. At this time imperialism became far more prone to genocide and the results could be genocides on a scale of death, suffering and longevity which utterly dwarf the Vendéan genocide. In Europe, the same sense of shared identity which would come to provide the foundations of the nation-state combined with religious intolerance and the first inklings of racism. It is these imperial genocides which have truly wracked the world from the \textit{Conquista} to this day. The \textit{Conquista} is discussed hereafter, but one novel aspect is worth mentioning here. Against defenceless peoples in the Caribean and against the populations of the Incan and Aztec empires, the Conquistadors faced little resistance. Mere handfuls could overthrow empires and subjugate entire peoples. But the Conquistadors would not, indeed could not, merely accept new subjects into the empire in the manner that prior empires had. There was a serious debate about whether these new peoples had souls and were thus even human. In proto-racist terms abuse was justified by their inherent laziness, wickedness, stupidity. The range

\(^{401}\) Ibid, pp 158-61.
of opinion was between whether they were animals or merely subhumans, and they were treated accordingly. This was not unprecedented, one might think again of the example of Assyria or that of Sparta's helots, but the extent of it was to grow as other Western imperial powers took on the same characteristics.

Western imperialists deliberately cultivated an unbreachable segregation based on racial and national terms. Thanks to the geographical reach of the new empires, status could now be colour-coded for ease of discrimination. The racial hierarchies were immutable and extreme. They overrode other values such that the identity, and the attendant status, could not be traversed regardless of prowess, wealth or lineage. The essentialised 'otherness' of subject peoples meant that, compradors notwithstanding, there was no prospect of harmonising the interests of the subject peoples and the imperial project. Using genocide to achieve and maintain dominance became a norm of imperialism even in the absence of settler colonial ambitions. This can be contrasted with the Roman Empire wherein, by 300CE, all subjects were Roman citizens regardless of ethnicity, or China which incorporated many peoples with differing languages and cultures.

This unbreachable alienation of foreign subjects combined with the geographical distances involved to ensure that subject peoples were an exploitable resource, but that imperial élites were not bound to ensure their welfare as a local ruler might be. Imperial approaches became antidevelopmental, wreaking destruction on the social, cultural and economic coherence of subject peoples causing, in some cases, many millions of deaths. This is the situation which continue to this day, and it is worth tracing the evolution of British imperialism which was to become both a model and an inheritance for the US empire.

It should first be recognised that the imperial élites may be less interested in the welfare of the subjects of the home country than the élites of a non-imperial polity, often resulting in the immiseration of their own people. In Britain the growth of a new form of imperialism was deeply tied in to the disenfranchisement of British commoners which began with the enclosure movement. Peers, and later gentry, were able to convert conditional landholdings, where commoners had traditional usage rights, to outright ownership. As Karl Polanyi wrote: 'Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor. The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had regarded as theirs and their heirs'. Of course anyone could buy private property. A peasant who somehow struck it rich could buy a large tract of land and in that respect would have equal rights to those of a peer. However, by 1873 the average peer owned roughly 67,000 times as much land as the average cottager. The enclosures also contributed to urbanisation and to proletarianisation of both rural and urban labour. With independent access to resources abrogated, the new landless proletarians were a dependent class. The bondage of serfdom was long gone, but dependence for survival brought about a new form of bondage – not to a given lord or piece of land, but to the ruling class as a whole. Liberal economic theory (which does not recognise power relationships, only markets, and wherein the necessities of survival are no different to any other commodity) offered labour possibilities of elevation which remained purely theoretical. Of men leaving over £200,000 on dying between 1924-6, only 18% were born to fathers who left less than £1000, and the vast majority of such 'self-made men' were sons of less affluent businessmen. There was no

407 Hence the desire to deregulate the grain market by repealing the Corn Law. See, Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, pp 144-5.
realistic escape from working-class status until after World War II.409 At the same time, the plight of Britain's proletariat was less than half of the story.

The industrial revolution occurred at a far from coincidental period of imperial expansion. While the industrial proletariat and 'capitalism' exerted a fascination on Marx, they were only, and could only ever be, the tip of an iceberg of a quite differently ordered society. Even the Marxist Rosa Luxemburg wrote that 'capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organisations existing side by side with it.'410 She referred here to many things, including the continued importance of commodities produced in a non-capitalist system. More importantly she referred to the essential production of not only raw materials but also commodities outside of Britain, responding not to the mechanics of the capitalist system, nor to 'market forces,' but rather to the direct application of imperial coercion. She noted that 'when the War of Secession interfered with the import of American cotton, causing the notorious 'cotton famine' in the Lancashire district, new and immense cotton plantations sprang up in Egypt almost at once, as if by magic.'411

The British ruling class were now at the top of an imperial system. At the bottom were subjects of formal and informal empire. The informal empire was remarkably extensive, including many places where the British had never exerted formal control, and a number of places that were formally subjects of other imperial powers. Colonised labour was usually slavery in various open or disguised forms,412 indeed entire economies were effectively enslaved by economic dependence.413 The very imposition of monetised market economies, and the suffering thus brought about, on colonies was not, as Polanyi noted, 'economic in essence,'414 but 'veiled forms of pressure' which he compared to the effects of later enclosures in Britain.415

One might derive the belief, from this evolution of British ruling class power, that the purpose of the empire was the enrichment of those few. Seeing, however, that imperial activities were deleterious to the whole, J. A. Hobson concluded that only certain interests were served by imperialism: "Seeing that the Imperialism of the last three decades is clearly condemned as a business policy, in that at enormous expense it has procured a small, bad, unsafe increase of markets, and has jeopardised the entire wealth of the nation in rousing the strong resentment of other nations, we may ask, 'How is the British nation induced to embark upon such unsound business?' The only possible answer is that the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain."416

Hobson's imperialism is directly linked to economic liberalism. Polanyi's The Great Transformation details how the advent of laissez faire policies, in particular the repeal of the Corn Law, caused a massive decline in the British economy.417 As Engdahl points out: "Repeal opened the door to a flood of cheap products in agriculture, which created ruin among not only English but also other nations' farmers. ... In effect, repeal of Corn Laws protectionism opened the floodgates throughout the British empire to a 'cheap labor policy.' The only ones to benefit, following an initial surge of cheap food prices in England, were the giant international London trading houses, and the merchant banks which financed them."418 Those profiting were not those pursuing industrial

409 Ibid, p 144.
411 Ibid, p 337.
413 See, for example, the discussion of 19th century informal imperial practices below.
414 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p 300.
416 Hobson, Imperialism, p 46.
417 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, passim.
418 Engdahl, A Century of War, pp 10-11.
development, but those whose entire ethos was 'buy cheap; sell dear' – a dictum which was 'raised to the level of national economic strategy'. Britain was forced to abandon strict laissez faire because it engendered a drastic economic decline, but forced other states to adopt it. Indeed, not only Britain but other Western nations embarked on policies of hypocritical protectionism when social stability or oligarchic profits were threatened while promoting or enforcing free-trade on weaker states or when only the poor of their own nations were further impoverished. Liberalism, in short, was nothing other than the continuation of mercantilist economic warfare with the addition of a new important tool – a hypocritically applied 'ideology' of free-trade.

In the meantime, British capital flowed in prodigious amounts into especially Argentina, Brazil and the United States, to form bonds of financial dependence in many ways more effective than formal colonial titles. In Argentina this was "in order to finance, build, then run their national rail and transport infrastructure, a role usually encouraged by generous concessions from the host government. English capital also went to develop the local country's steamship lines and their ports. So were the economies of Argentina and other English 'client states' effectively made into economic captives, with terms of trade and finance dictated from the City of London, by British merchant houses and trade finance banks. These client states of England thereby found that they had surrendered control over their essential economic sovereignty far more efficiently than if British troops had occupied Buenos Aires to enforce tax collection in support of the British Empire."

The flip-side of this extension of power was that British industry was starved of capital. From 1880 to 1914 Germany outstripped the British in technological development and overtook it in many key areas of industrial output. Nor did the recipients of British capital fare well. Far from being the great gift to the world that Niall Ferguson claims, the resultant infrastructure was for the benefit of British traders, and the resultant 'free movement of goods, capital and labour,' which he praises meant that in times of want the flow of commodities to Britain was unimpeded even while, in the case of India, millions starved to death:

The worsening depression in world trade [1876] had been spreading misery and igniting discontent throughout cotton-exporting districts of the Deccan, where in any case forest enclosures and the displacement of grass by cotton had greatly reduced local food security. The traditional system of household and village grain reserves regulated by complex networks of patrimonial obligation had been largely supplanted since the Mutiny by merchant inventories and the cash nexus. Although rice and wheat production in the rest of India (which now included bonanzas of coarse rice from the recently conquered Irrawaddy delta) had been above average for the past three years, much of the surplus had been exported to England. Londoners were in effect eating India's bread. 'It seems an anomaly' wrote a troubled observer, 'that, with her famines on hand, India is able to supply food for other parts of the world.'

There were other 'anomalies.' The newly constructed railroads, lauded as institutional safeguards against famine, were instead used by merchants to ship grain inventories from outlying drought-stricken districts to central depots for hoarding (as well as protection from rioters). Likewise the telegraph ensured that price hikes were coordinated in a thousand towns at once, regardless of local supply trends. Moreover British antipathy to price control invited anyone who had the money to join in the frenzy of grain speculation.

... The earlier optimism of mid-Victorian observers - Karl Marx as well as Lord Salisbury - about the velocity of economic transformation in India, especially the railroad revolution, had failed to adequately discount for the fiscal impact of such 'modernization.' The taxes that financed the railroads had also crushed the ryots. Their inability to purchase subsistence was further compounded by the depreciation of the rupee due to the new international Gold Standard (which India had not adopted), which steeply raised the cost of imports.' Thanks to the price explosion, the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts like Thanjavur in Tamil

419 Ibid, p 11.
424 Ferguson, Empire, p xxii.
The famine that came in 1878-80 resulted in an estimated minimum of 7.1 million deaths (without even counting the increased disease mortality in subsequent years), and mortality was considerably greater in those areas served by rail infrastructure.\textsuperscript{426}

The inflow of capital did induce economic activity, but in the informal empire the debt incurred, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, 'led to a debt crisis very similar to that of the 1980s.'\textsuperscript{427} According to Engdahl: "During the 1880's, Argentina's new railroads brought her goods, especially beef and wheat, to its ports for export. Exports doubled and her external debts, mainly to London banks, increased 700%. The country was a debt vassal of the British Empire; 'imperialism on the cheap', as one commentator dubbed it. It was manifestly not the intent of British policy to develop strong sovereign industrial economies from these client-state relationships. Rather, it was to make the minimum investment necessary to exert control, while ensuring that other rival powers did not gain coveted raw materials or other treasures of economic power.'\textsuperscript{428} Note that, once again, power is central to policy, while profit, though not insubstantial for banking interests, seems to be a subsidiary concern.

A Hobsonian interpretation of US, or British, imperialism clearly does not suffice. Economics had become international warfare wherein the richer nations adopted the selective use of \textit{laissez faire} with 'as a weapon against sovereign national economic policy of rival powers.'\textsuperscript{429} With regard to US imperialism, Michael Hudson is adamant on this point: 'One must do more than merely read John Hobson and V. I. Lenin to perceive the dynamics of U.S. diplomacy over the past eight decades.... One lesson of U.S. experience is that the national diplomacy embodied in what now is called the Washington Consensus is not simply an extension of business drives. It has been shaped by overriding concerns for world power (euphemised as national security) and economic advantage as perceived by American strategists quite apart from the profit motives of private investors.'\textsuperscript{430} For Hudson US imperialism is 'the exploitation of governments by a single government, that of the United States, via the central banks and multilateral control institutions of intergovernmental capital rather than via the activities of private corporations seeking profits.'\textsuperscript{431} Hudson's view of US imperialism is certainly more robust than a Hobsonian or Marxist view, but it too does not quite suffice. It is clear that at least some private interests play a role in determining US policy that needs to be explicated.

Engdahl writes of 'three pillars of the British empire.' These were strategic sectors which the British sought to dominate absolutely. The pillars were finance; naval power and shipping; and access to strategic raw materials.\textsuperscript{432} This evolving system, which has been directly passed to the US empire, is akin to a multi-levelled hydraulic empire approach.\textsuperscript{433} In such a system a zero-sum calculus is created and 'strategic denial' plays as important a role as acquisition. Indeed, where finite resources are involved there are circumstances where strategic denial may be more important than acquisition as those resources are devalued if acquired in large quantities. This was true of gold for the British empire in 19th century,\textsuperscript{434} and, as will be seen, it is true of oil for the US empire today.

\textsuperscript{425} Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausts}, pp 26-7.
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid, pp 110-1.
\textsuperscript{428} Engdahl, \textit{A Century of War}, p 15.
\textsuperscript{429} Ibid, p 13.
\textsuperscript{430} Hudson, \textit{Super Imperialism}, p 15.
\textsuperscript{431} Ibid, p 37.
\textsuperscript{432} Engdahl, \textit{A Century of War}, p 8.
\textsuperscript{433} A 'hydraulic empire' or 'hydraulic despotism' is one in which the control of a single essential resource (the prime instance being water, hence the name) allows absolute domination.
\textsuperscript{434} Engdahl, \textit{A Century of War}, p 8.
The 'three pillars' were maintained by a 'covert marriage of private commercial power with government.'\textsuperscript{435} The British have long incorporated private interests into the functions of the state. They used privateers to fight the Spanish,\textsuperscript{436} the East India Company fought a war with the Dutch,\textsuperscript{437} and conquered a large part of India, and ran it with their own government, but as a sort of corporate vassal to the British crown.\textsuperscript{438} At the same time Britain parlayed its weak position into strategic superiority by concentrating on building naval pre-eminence.\textsuperscript{439} In the end, India became too important and lucrative and fell under direct rule, but a precedent for semi-privatised imperialism was well established. For Engdahl this was most clearly embodied in the creation of the Security Intelligence Service:

Unlike the empires of France or other nations, Britain modelled its post-Waterloo empire on an extremely sophisticated marriage between top bankers and financiers of the City of London, Government cabinet ministers, heads of key industrial companies deemed strategic to the national interest, and the heads of the espionage services.

Rather than the traditional service to provide data from agents of espionage in foreign capitals, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service head was himself part of a secret, freemasonic-like network which wove together the immense powers of British banking, shipping, large industry, and government. Because it was secret, it wielded immense power over credulous or unsuspecting foreign economies.\textsuperscript{440}

Hobson, when defining the 'certain sectional interests' who benefit from imperialism at the expense of all others, singled out 'the shipbuilding, boiler-making, and gun and ammunition making trades'\textsuperscript{441} (which is to say the British empire's 'military-industrial complex'), and the finance sector.\textsuperscript{442} What should stand out starkly, but which has somehow been overlooked, is that these are not merely beneficiaries of imperialism, these are arms of the empire, no less significant and crucial in the Anglo-US imperial system than the government and its military. They were the fundamental basis of Britain's economic and military coercive power. The same is true of the traders benefiting from imperial coercion; they are beneficiaries, but as discussed above, they are an indispensable part of creating economic dependency working fist-in-glove with the bankers and gunboats.

The situation of these strategic interests is similar to that of banks. A key privilege, providing in some respects a model for corporatist privilege, is that afforded to banks. Britain chose to legitimise the practice initiated by goldsmiths of lending more money than had been deposited with them.\textsuperscript{443} To put it simply, banks were able to create their own money. Lending and earning interest from money you don't actually have is not a privilege extended to the rest of us, but there is a further aspect of privilege in that creating money in this manner is inflationary and thus the fundamental basis of profits for banks is a form of taxation on the entire population. Banks make their profits by devaluing everyone's money, which is fine if you own appreciating and/or interest earning assets, but at times, particularly those of hardship, it becomes simply another privileged manner in which the rich take the wealth of the poor. The notable precedent set by banking privileges is that, of necessity, they must be regulated. Thus there is a 'fractional reserve' system, preventing banks from lending infinite amounts of money and destroying its value altogether.\textsuperscript{444} Of

\textsuperscript{435} Ibid, p 16.
\textsuperscript{437} Ferguson, Empire, p 21.
\textsuperscript{438} Ibid, p 29.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid, p 33.
\textsuperscript{440} Engdahl, A Century of War, pp 15-6.
\textsuperscript{441} Hobson, Imperialism, p 49.
\textsuperscript{442} Ibid, p 56.
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid. It is perhaps unsurprising that, in fact, fractional reserve banking began in China over a thousand years
interest here are the inevitable ramifications, in that while it is in the banks' own interest to be regulated, they have an unavoidable interest in exerting influence to maximise the profitability of the regulatory environment. The impact that the finance industry has had on governments can barely be overstated, but the dynamic is complicated. The distinction between state and private interest became blurred and fluid in a manner which has extended to other strategic sectors, but it is still necessary that state interest is not entirely subsumed to private interest, however closely they might be entwined.

Hobson is right in that ultimately public wealth is taken and by various means turned into private profit for these 'sectional interests'. To do so it behoves these private interests to exercise power and influence to ensure a maximum return, but also to avoid killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Individual representatives of these interests join the government, while others in government more concerned for the extension imperial power are inclined to ensure that these strategic interests get what they want. This is what Hossein-zadeh labels a 'convergence of interests.'445 There is also a conflation of private and public spheres. A given individual, such as banker and founding head of the SIS Sir Jocelyn Hambro or any number of officials in recent US administrations, may be on both sides of the equation.

By 1914, other countries had adopted the British model. According to Gabriel Kolko, the US and Germany had the most tight 'strategic industry' systems before World War I, wherein a handful of big corporations controlled key industries. 'Numerous class formations' in various states found 'the synthesis of state and private power during 1914-18 quite acceptable...'. The war profits accrued were massive.446 This is, of course, an important precursor to the corporatism of the Third Reich.

While the US and Germany were busily growing their industrial capacities, Britain used financial hegemony to extend the empire. I have already written of the mechanics of this with regard to Argentina, but a more revealing sequence occurred in Egypt. In 1874, after having been 'an interest milk-cow' for European capital for 20 years,447 Egypt was nearing bankruptcy. This was largely due to the fact that it had paid for 72% (£11.5 million) of the construction costs of the Suez Canal and received none of the returns.448 The very existence of the canal was a strategic boon for Britain, but the opportunity presented itself for further gain. Borrowing £4 million from the Rothschilds, Britain purchased 44% of Canal Company shares from the Khedive, a snip that had a market value of £6 million after 2 years and was worth £24 million by 1898. The Khedive agreed to pay 5% of share values each year in lieu of dividends.449 Private capital also saw its chance, with the Rothschilds and others making predatory loans to the stricken country. Ensuring the flow of debt repayments gave the British and French the pretext for installing their own citizens as Ministers of Finance and Public Works.450

Contributing to the bankruptcy was a drop in cotton prices – as Luxemburg noted, Egypt was almost magically transformed into a cotton producer when Britain needed it,451 but US cotton had returned to the market. Egypt defaulted on repayments in 1876 and all control of revenue was handed to the British and French.452 Drought struck and the Nile's level was so low that over one-third of the crop area could not be irrigated.453 British and French creditors chose this moment to tighten credit. 78.5% of Egyptian revenue went to bondholders, and torture was routinely used in

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447 Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*, p 103.
449 Ferguson, *Empire*, p 231.
451 See above.
452 Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*, p 103.
453 Ibid.
the collection of taxes. From this one can easily infer that the job of the French Minister for 
Public Works was to ensure that no public works were actually undertaken.

At the same time, Egyptian peasants themselves were also highly indebted and their European 
creditors were given the right to take their property. ‘Under extreme European pressure, regiments 
of tax collectors, with moneylenders following them ‘like a vulture after a cow,’ imposed a reign of 
terror throughout the Nile Valley. Peasants who hid cattle or resisted the confiscation of their 
property were brutally flogged in front of their neighbors.’

In 1879 the Khedive dismissed the Anglo-French government. He was promptly replaced by his 
more pliant son, but the Egyptian military responded by taking over under the leadership of Urabi 
Pasha. It was feared that Urabi intended to end European economic dominance. The British 
dispached warships to Alexandria in May of 1882. In July, nationalist riots in Alexandria (with a 
large well-armed European population) left around 250 Egyptians dead. About 50 Europeans were 
killed, among their number 3 British seamen. The British responded by shelling Alexandria, killing 
hundreds more. A land force surprised Urabi’s larger army near Tel-el-Kebir and destroyed it. 57 
British were killed and anywhere between 2000 and 10,000 Egyptians. The stock market responded 
positively and, among others, Prime Minister Gladstone made a handsome profit. Politically, 
Gladstone also profited from a wave of patriotic fervour while he and Queen Victoria hoped that 
Urabi ‘could be hung without any inclemency.’ Egypt remained nominally sovereign, but British 
troops occupied it for the next 40 years.

These events in Egypt foreshadow much that typifies US imperialism. The mix of public and 
private imperialist agents, of strategic and material concerns, of economic and military means; the 
use of debt to acquire economic sovereignty; the ‘disaster capitalism’ (which Klein defines as 
‘orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the 
treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities....’), the profit-making of high officials; the 
insecurities of globalised commodity markets; the long military occupation of a state without the 
acknowledgement of formal dominance. This segment of history even seems to suggest that private 
or governmental agents may have acted as ‘economic hit men,’ if that is, indeed, a useful term.

However, there was one more crucial element needed to complete the imperial model passed on to 
the US, that of oil. The British love affair with oil arose naturally from their desire to maintain 
aval dominance. By 1860 the British had by far the world’s largest navy, unbeatable ‘ironclads,’ 
and fully 1/3 of all merchant tonnage. By 1905, however, the British government accepted that 
maintaining naval superiority required switching to petroleum fuelled vessels, but Britain had no oil. In that very year, thanks in part to the work of Sidney Reilly ‘Ace of Spies’, Britain was able to 
obtain an 60 year exclusive concession for oil exploitation in virtually the entirety of Iran.

Without any oil resources itself, Britain set out to dominate world oil. By 1912 Britain controlled 
12% of oil resources; by 1919 it was the indisputable world leader in oil resources; by 1925 it

455 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, pp 103-4.
456 Ferguson, Empire, p 232.
458 Ibid, pp 94-5.
459 Ferguson, Empire, p 233.
461 Described as ‘highly paid professionals who cheat countries around the globe out of trillions of dollars. ... They 
play a game as old as empire, but one that has taken on new and terrifying dimensions during this time of 
462 Ferguson, Empire, p 165.
463 Engdahl, A Century of War, p 30.
controlled the majority of known oil resources. This was achieved with a typical public-private approach, but though there were profits to be made, the strategic importance ensured that imperial power was the foremost priority:

[Chairman of Mexican Eagle Petroleum, Weetman] Pearson worked for British Secret Intelligence, as did all other major British oil groups. In 1926, he sold his Mexican Eagle interests to Deterding's Royal Dutch Shell group. Pearson became Lord Cowdray, and his Mexican oil fortune was established in a protected trust, the Pearson Group, which as remains today one of the most influential corporate groups in Britain. It owns the publishing enterprises of the London Economist and the Financial Times, and a significant share of the influential London-New York-Paris merchant bank, Lazard Freres.

In global pursuit of major oil reserves, the policy of the British Foreign Office, Secret Intelligence services, and British oil interests, were intermeshed in a secret and highly effective manner, as no other country's, were at this time, with the possible exception of Bolshevik Russia.

By the early 1920s the British Government controlled a formidable arsenal of apparently private companies which in reality served the direct interests of Her Majesty's Government to dominate and ultimately control all the identified major regions believed to contain significant petroleum deposits.

The duplicity and ruthlessness of the British in acquiring these oil resources was almost without measure. World War I was a great opportunity for the advancement of this programme, and the British committed over 1,400,00 troops to the East under the pretext of strengthening Russia: “This was not quite the reality however. Following 1918, England continued to maintain almost one million soldiers stationed throughout the Middle East. The Persian Gulf had become an 'English Lake' by 1919. The angry French feebly protested that, while millions of their forces bled on the Western Front, Britain took advantage of the stalemate to win victories against the weaker Turkish Empire. France had lost almost 1,500,000 soldiers...." In the aftermath they betrayed not one, but every individual interested state or people with whom they had reached agreements over the Middle East.

The British oil-grab put them in conflict with the US. From 1910 they battled over Mexico, frequently with British proxy forces in fighting directly against US marines. In the mid-1920s the oil wars ended with the formation of an Anglo-US cartel known as the 'Seven Sisters':

Their secret pact was formalized as the 'As Is Agreement of 1928,' or the 'Achnacarry Agreement.' British and American oil majors agreed to accept the existing market divisions and shares, to set a secret world cartel price, and end the destructive competition and price wars of the last decade. The respective governments merely ratified this private accord the same year in what became the 'Red Line Agreement.' Since this time, with minor interruption, the Anglo-American grip over the world's oil reserves has been hegemonic.

Though co-operation had been common between the US and UK before this time, and conflict of a sort was not unknown thereafter, the mid-1920s saw the formation of a UK-US condominium which continues to this day. Although the British had gained the greatest control over oil resources, it became the junior partner because of high levels of intergovernmental debt. Post-war inter-Ally debt stood at $28 billion in 1923. Britain was owed large sums by France and in reparation from Germany, but its debt to the US was so great that threatened British independence. While British intransigence ensured that Germany could never honour its imposed reparations obligations, US intransigence meant that Britain could never trade her way out of debt.

The US had taken up the practice of using debt to gain the ability to exercise imperial power, much

465 Ibid, p 75.
466 Ibid, pp 72-3.
467 Ibid, pp 50-1.
468 See below.
469 Engdahl, A Century of War, pp 71-2.
470 Ibid, p 87.
471 Hudson, Super Imperialism, p 41.
like the informal imperialism of the British, but with the US Treasury itself as one of the creditors. The system was, and is, one in which astronomical debts are rolled-over by new loans in given in order to pay interest, thus the principle increases and becomes ever more impossible to repay. The creditor state (the US) is able to use its economic power and the threat of cessation of credit to dictate economic policy which allows both the extraction of surpluses and the imposition of antidevelopmental policies which ensure that the debtor remains dependent on the continued extension of credit. Debt is never forgiven. The effective bankruptcy of a state is an opportunity to increase their indebtedness by extending loans to them which are often, disturbingly, referred to as 'aid'. Latterly, fiscal crisis is also used to push through neoliberal policies which are known to be ineffectual in solving the crises, although care is taken to maintain the pretence that these policies are somehow a means of ameliorating or curing the crises.473 This allows for the piratical raiding of stricken states by Western, and particularly US capital. As Klein explains, no country has ever adopted these policies without being forced to by serious crisis: “Want to save your country? Sell it off. [Harvard economist Dani] Rodrik even conceded that privatization and free trade – two central pieces of the structural adjustment package – had no direct link with creating stability. To argue otherwise, according to Rodrik, was ‘bad economics.’474

In the meantime the 'aid' (debt relief in the form of increased debt) never actually makes an appearance in the desperate debtor country, but goes instead directly to New York and London financiers. The 1980s debt crisis saw developing country indebtedness grow from $839 billion in 1982 to nearly $1300 billion in 1987. In conjunction, these states are forced to devalue their currencies to 'spur exports'.475 This immediately proportionately multiplies the debt burden on debtor governments as their revenues are rendered ever more insufficient, forcing austerity measures which include the abandonment of proper infrastructure maintenance, let alone any developmental programmes (just as it did in Egypt over 100 years before) ensuring that the debt cycle intensifies without an end in sight.

Debtor countries thus become slave states with their sovereignty suborned to the economic dictates of the empire. The experience of the newly industrialised economies of East Asia before and after the 1996-7 crisis shows firstly that even before the crisis direct foreign investment only aided development when matched with proactive developmental policies by the state.476 The liberalisation policies imposed under duress by the IMF as the crisis developed ensured that the flood of opportunistic raiding capital tended towards asset stripping and short-term profits:

It was dubbed “the world's biggest going-out-of-business sale,” by The New York Times, and a “business buying bazaar” by BusinessWeek. In fact, it was a preview of the kind of disaster capitalism that would become the market norm after September 11: a terrible tragedy was exploited to allow foreign firms to storm Asia. They were there not to build their own businesses and compete but to snap up the entire apparatus, workforce, customer base and brand value built over decades by Korean companies, often to break them apart, downsize them or shut them completely in order to eliminate competition for their imports.

The Korean titan Samsung, for instance, was broken up and sold for parts: Volvo got its heavy industry division, SC Johnson & Son its pharmaceutical arm, General Electric its lighting division. A few years later, Daewoo's once-mighty car division, which the company had valued at $6 billion, was sold off to GM for just $400 million—a steal worthy of Russia's shock therapy. But this time, unlike what happened in Russia, local firms were getting wiped out by the multinationals.477

This is an extreme example, but it illustrates quite accurately what capital does when freed from constraints. Similar to Polanyi before him, Ajit Singh cites financial liberalisation as 'causally

473 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, p 165.
474 Ibid, p 167.
475 Engdahl, A Century of War, p 218.
linked' with the 'uninspiring [economic] performance' of industrialised economies themselves concluding that for developing economies 'further financial liberalization will hinder rather than help industrialization and long-term economic growth'. Jomo writes that liberalisation threatens the necessary 'virtuous cycle' of human development and economic growth. It should also be noted that liberalisation under the aegis of the WTO (not to mention the World Bank, IMF and US government) is very selectively applied, just as was 19th century laissez faire. Liberalisation is enforced where it benefits the West, but WTO rules and strengthened intellectual property rights are protectionist with regards to technology transfer, allowing transnational corporations to charge monopoly rents and 'further frustrating late industrialization efforts.

What should be noted here is not that some private concerns realise a quick dirty profit, but that when the opportunity of a crisis presents itself, both the fiscal austerity and liberalisation policies imposed coercively are antidevelopmental in effect. The East Asian crisis saw a massive degradation of economic capacities. In 1998 alone, for example, the Indonesian economy contracted by 15.5 percent in per capita terms. There was an accompanying jump in poverty from 11.3 per cent in 1996 to 19.9 per cent in 1998.

In literature dealing with liberal and neoliberal policies, antidevelopmental effects appear over and over again, but they are ascribed either to a profit motive or to ideologically spawned mistakes. This is true even in works dealing with multiple examples such as Klein's Shock Doctrine, which posits a Hobsonian corporatist system of profit making, while even Mike Davis allows that British imperial depredations in India may have been 'Smithian in intention'. But the same antidevelopmental practices occur in the literature of US foreign interventions where, in addition to the above, they are ascribed to Cold War irrationality or outright stupidity. The very same practices occur in the literature of genocide, beginning with Lemkin's Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, but, consistent with the nature of academic genocide discourse discussed hereafter, the strategic purposes of such behaviour are effaced and the picture produced is of ideologically driven 'double-plus bad' authoritarian racists who are in every respect the antithesis of 'liberal' Western democracies.

To get a sense of the pattern behind antidevelopmental practices it is worth listing some of the individual instances wherein a hegemonic power has systematically degraded 'the foundations of the economic existence of a national group' (in Lemkin's words). In the 19th century the British

479 Ibid p 162.
482 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, p 269 et passim; Engdahl, A Century of War, pp 216-7 et passim.
484 Ibid, p 41.
486 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausats, p 339.
488 Lemkin, Axis Rule...., p 85.
489 Ibid.
imposed antidevelopmental policies on Egypt,\textsuperscript{490} India,\textsuperscript{491} China,\textsuperscript{492} Brazil,\textsuperscript{493} and, more generally, everywhere they could coerce conformance to laisser-faire principles.\textsuperscript{494} In 20\textsuperscript{th} century wars, the US destroyed the economic foundations of life for much of the Philippines at the turn of the century,\textsuperscript{495} in Japan in 1945,\textsuperscript{496} in South Korea,\textsuperscript{497} in North Korea,\textsuperscript{498} in Cambodia,\textsuperscript{499} in Laos,\textsuperscript{500} in South Vietnam,\textsuperscript{501} in North Vietnam,\textsuperscript{502} in Serbia,\textsuperscript{503} and, not least, in Iraq;\textsuperscript{504} the Germans did against Jews and Slavs;\textsuperscript{505} the South Africans in using their ‘Total Strategy’ against their neighbours\textsuperscript{506} (which, according to the UN, killed at least 1.5 million people),\textsuperscript{507} the Israelis in Lebanon and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{508} Client regimes installed and supported by the US have pursued antidevelopmental policies (at least initially) in the Philippines,\textsuperscript{509} Iran,\textsuperscript{510} Guatemala,\textsuperscript{511} Chile.\textsuperscript{512}

This list could go on, covering every single non-European US client state with three important exceptions – South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Jomo explains this in these terms, ‘the Americans were anxious for [these states] to “succeed” economically in order to be showcased… Hence the Americans were quite happy to tolerate trade, finance, investment and intellectual property and other policies violating laisser-faire market or neo-liberal economic norms.\textsuperscript{513} Policies which would have earned any Latin American government accusations of communism and a short, sharp coup were actually instigated by the US in order to build strong economies. I should add that Naomi Klein’s \textit{Shock Doctrine} documents at least 25 states in which antidevelopmental policies have been imposed in the wake of upheaval or disaster.\textsuperscript{514} In addition, it should be remembered that the US penchant for corrupt client regimes\textsuperscript{515} is also antidevelopmental. Currently most proceeds of corruption do not go to ostentatious luxury for Third World fat cats, but into Western financial institutions. Raymond Baker has extensively documented the extent and nature of corruption and concludes that it alone renders economic development impossible for countries of the global

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\bibitem{490} Newsinger, \textit{The Blood Never Dried}, p 86.
\bibitem{491} Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausts}, p 323 et passim; Luxemburg, \textit{The Accumulation of Capital}, p 355.
\bibitem{492} Mike Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausts}, p 372.
\bibitem{493} Ibid, pp 377-80.
\bibitem{494} Polanyi, \textit{The Great Transformation}, p 226.
\bibitem{495} Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausts}, pp 198-9.
\bibitem{496} See Chapter 4.
\bibitem{498} Cumings, \textit{Korea’s Place in the Sun}, pp 295-6.
\bibitem{500} Gibson, \textit{The Perfect War}, pp 390-2.
\bibitem{501} Young, \textit{The Vietnam Wars}, p 85.
\bibitem{502} Gibson, \textit{The Perfect War}, pp 372-5.
\bibitem{503} Chomsky, \textit{Hegemony or Survival}, pp 54-6.
\bibitem{504} As will be discussed at length in later chapters.
\bibitem{505} Lemin, \textit{Axis Rule….}, pp 85-6.
\bibitem{510} Ahmed, \textit{Behind the War on Terror}, p 36.
\bibitem{511} Jones, \textit{Genocide}, p 77.
\bibitem{512} Klein, \textit{The Shock Doctrine}, p 79-80.
\bibitem{514} Chile, Argentina, Thailand, the US, the UK, Indonesia, South Africa, Bolivia, Brazil, Iraq, Poland, Russia, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Honduras, the Maldives, Ecuador, El Salvador (by implication), Guatemala, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Palestine, Nicaragua (Klein, \textit{The Shock Doctrine}, passim).
\bibitem{515} See chapter 5.
\end{thebibliography}
'South'. 516

All of the above – an incomplete list – refers only to discrete lengths of time because only the literature of economic dependency deals with antidevelopmental subjugation as an imperial system in itself and it does so without reference to such things as war or Klein’s ‘disaster capitalism’. Any instance here is, almost without exception, preceded and followed by other antidevelopmental efforts by the hegemonic power. A coup may be preceded by economic warfare and destablisation and, when the regime drifts towards economic nationalism and dependence, followed by one or more further coups. A war may be preceded, for instance, by antidevelopmental colonial policies, and followed by sanctions or less overt economic warfare. It might be objected that all of the instances of war used merely go to show that economic destruction is inherent in modern war. This may be true, but it begs the question of the nature and purpose of such wars. As will be shown hereafter, it is frequently the case that wars are fought to wreak economic destruction rather than economic destruction being wrought to fight wars. It should be noted that the wars mentioned above range from ‘total war’, to limited conventional war, to counterinsurgency. They involve very different circumstances and the military rationales given are nearly as numerous as the different conflicts, often being used interchangeably. 517

The foregoing in this section is sufficient in itself to conclude that US imperialism has a structure based around exercising dominance and the extraction of surpluses through the use of debt and the maintenance of a state of dependence. The military and economic power accrued is used to perpetuate the accrual of that very power. It seems like a self-contained imperial system, but though it is the most bulky part of the US imperial structure it is far from all of it. The debt trap is not sustainable in itself, and furthermore, counts little towards explaining US motives in committing genocides. Further matters require explanation. The US and UK have, at times, practised drastic antidevelopmental policies within their own states, seemingly in order to maintain or deepen social hierarchy by increasing the gap between rich and poor. Indeed, British and US imperial practices seem to suggest that interstate and interclass relations are, from an imperialist’s perspective, an undifferentiated struggle for ever greater dominance. The need to slow or reverse economic development domestically led the US (just as it did in Britain a century before) to apply the brakes to global development with considerable success. The system that arose linked the US dollar to oil allowing (with unveiled threats and actual uses of massive military force) the maintenance of financial hegemony despite the loss of creditor status. The dollar was thus able to remain the reserve currency and creditor nations, most importantly oil producing nations, were forced by various means to pay a form of tribute by investing in US treasury bonds or other non-controlling investments, and in many cases to spend obscene amounts of money on US military hardware. This is described in greater detail in Appendix J.

To tackle first the basic continuity between imperialist approaches to interstate and interclass domination. Enclosure, liberalisation and proletarianisation created dependence among British workers which facilitated the immiseration and yet greater dependence inherent in a liberal ‘cheap labour policy’. 518 The working class laboured far longer hours. Admittedly their monetary income increased as a whole, 519 but proletarianisation, urbanisation, enclosure, rural unemployment and underemployment, and the decline of piecework all combined to deprive the poor of access to material resources and commodities previously available through informal economic practices. 520 It is impossible to measure the gains against the losses, but the poverty of the British poor was justly

517 Some of this will be seen below in discussions of World War II, Korea, Indochina and Iraq. See also above.
518 See above.
519 Rubinstein, Wealth and Inequality in Britain, p 57.
520 Meaning not only access to commons and barter, but also the exchange of labour for part payment in food and shelter.
notorious throughout the 19th century and probably only exceeded in Western European states by Spain (whose own imperial activities had immiserated the peasant majority through inflation long before) and Portugal (an economic dependency of Great Britain). Even Ferguson is forced to admit that the only poor Britons who gained from the empire were those who emigrated to the colonies (although he thinks it significant that those left behind, though mired in poverty, could vicariously partake in the 'excitement' of imperialism).

Coevally, similar changes were afoot throughout the informal and formal British empire. In India, for example, traditional forms of mutual assistance and land tenure were dissolved. Commons were enclosed; class antagonisms were created, making co-operative hydraulic and development works impossible; peasants became highly indebted to a new non-productive class of rack-renters, usurers and brokers; interest rates were very high which immiserated the Indian peasantry but also further starved Britain of necessary capital; terms of trade worsened immensely for agricultural products and fiscal autonomy was destroyed by forced subjection to the Gold Standard leading to yet greater degradation of economic infrastructure. Land ownership was concentrated with the British consciously ensuring that a certain number of smallholders would be unable to meet tax obligations each year. In short, the Indian economy was violently and suddenly monetised and globalised, and this was done in the full knowledge that it was 'inimical to development'. As has been mentioned, when droughts struck, millions died as a direct result of these changes. Far from derailing the programmes of monetisation and globalisation (with the inevitable concentration of ownership and economic degradation) droughts were an occasion for predatory 'disaster capitalism', or rather 'disaster imperialism'. This was not only true of India, but of the British in Southern Africa, the Italians in the Horn of Africa, the Germans in China, and the US in the Philippines.

One might robustly claim that this form of imperialism is in fact a case of using genocide to establish and maintain dominance and that this is why deaths on such a massive scale inevitably result. The imperial (or neocolonial) world order which results is often said to be one of 'structural violence'. Ahmed cogently argues that it is in fact a case of 'structural genocide' and that there is no dearth of intentionality. Even if one disagrees with a broad categorisation of genocide, there is certainly a great deal of scope for arguing individual cases, particularly those which bring about dramatic mass deaths. As the foregoing demonstrates the 'structural violence' is not some byproduct of 'capitalist' exploitation but is rather the end-product of a genocidal mode of imperial domination which, if Ahmed is correct, is itself a continuation of domination through genocide. The British were either not contented with or unable to dominate India in the manner of, say, the Mughals who merely inserted themselves at the top. India was far in advance of Britain economically:

> When the sans culottes stormed the Bastille, the largest manufacturing districts in the world were still the

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523 Ferguson, *Empire*, p 255. He goes on to describe numerous popular culture, mainstream media and propaganda examples of exciting imperialist ideology without the least seeming awareness that the organs of such indoctrination were all owned by the class and often the individuals that actually *did* make lots of money from the empire (pp 255-9).
524 Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausets*, p 326.
526 Ibid, p 289.
527 Ibid, p 304.
528 Ibid, p 290.
531 Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausets*, p 12.
532 Ahmed, “Structural Violence as Genocide”. 
Yangzi Delta and Bengal, with Lingan (modern Guangdong and Guangxi) and coastal Madras not far behind. India alone produced one-quarter of world manufactures, and while its pre-capitalist agrarian labour productivity was probably less than the Japanese-Chinese level, its commercial capital surpassed that of the Chinese.

As Prasannan Parthasarathi has recently shown, the stereotype of the Indian laborer as a half-starved wretch in a loincloth collapses in the face of new data about comparative standards of living. "Indeed, there is compelling evidence that South Indian labourers had higher earnings than their British counterparts in the eighteenth century and lived lives of greater financial security."533 Because the productivity of land was higher in South India, weavers and other artisans enjoyed better diets than average Europeans. More importantly their unemployment rates tended to be lower because they possessed superior rights of contract and exercised more economic power. But even outcaste agricultural labourers in Madras earned more in real terms than English farm laborers.534

In order to dominate the Indian subcontinent, the British attacked the very foundations of the societies there, particularly the economic foundations. When millions began to die as a result there was a public outcry but no real concern within policy circles. Over decades of chronic famine, British officials were steadfast in maintaining deadly policies while the British public came increasing to a racially informed view that periodic mass death was somehow a normal part of Indian life.

As we have seen, where formal power did not exist (as in Brazil, Argentina or China), the British and others used different means to achieve the same end. Thus it should be no surprise at all to find that imperial military interventions also took on an inevitably genocidal character, aimed not at inflicting military defeat but at the destruction of the economic, social and cultural foundations of society. It should also be unsurprising that, as will be seen in Chapter 4, racism became a key tool in bringing personnel to undertake genocidal actions and in ensuring that no effective public opposition would cohere. Further, where some may find it difficult to perceive genocide in the actions of bureaucrats, legislators, tax-collectors, judges, policeman bankers, and speculators, it is surely rather obvious when the force of arms is employed in mass murder and militarily unjustifiable destruction of civilian targets. In the next chapter, however, I will show how a complicated discourse has arisen to conceal the central fact of the nature of modern imperial interventions largely by ensuring that the appropriate term (there is none other than 'genocide') is never applied, or is dismissed out of hand when employed as being a subjective moral judgement implying a certain political stance.

533 Prasannan Parthasarathi, "Rethinking Wages and Competitiveness in Eighteenth-Century Britain and South India," Past and Present 158 (Feb. 1998), pp. 52-7 and 105-6, in Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p 292.
534 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p 292.
Chapter 3 – The Academic and Political Discourse of 'Genocide'

Certain words are so highly politicised in their usage that, in Orwellian fashion, they are stripped of all meaning and become merely signals designed to provoke in impassioned unreasoning involuntary response. In this fashion 'democracy' means 'double-plus good' and the Party members respond with cheers and tears of joy. Equally, ‘terrorism’ means ‘double-plus bad’ provoking among Party members a ‘hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer....’ Genocide plays a starring role in an entire discourse shaped in such a way as to not only excuse but to facilitate the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Stripped of any actual meaning but given the significance of being the 'ultimate crime' it becomes a tool by which powerful Western states are able to threaten or carry out attacks against weaker states – attacks which are in themselves criminal and which in some instances are actually genocidal. The emotive misuse of the term genocide has become a powerful political tool. As Jeremy Scahill reveals after accusations of genocide by Arabs against black Africans, “even at antiwar rallies, scores of protesters held signs reading, 'Out of Iraq, into Darfur.'” Scahill adds that, '[a] quick survey of Sudan's vast natural resources dispels any notion that U.S./corporate desires to move into Sudan derive from purely humanitarian motives.'

Whether an entirely fictitious 'genocide', such as that in Darfur, or a real but misrepresented genocide, the power of a word which can turn antiwar activists into advocates of criminal military aggression is hard to overstate. Let me re-emphasise that this occurs when the word 'genocide' is stripped of its actual meaning and becomes a way of preventing thought, a signifier of double-plus badness which provokes unthinking reaction. The Orwellian 'genocide' is a key component of an international system of soft-power and hard-power hegemony which by turns utilises, distorts or defies 'international law', creating both selective impunity for the strongest states and their clients, and a means of persecution or threat thereof for leaders and states which exhibit undesirable independence. Not only is this the case, but little effort is made to conceal the fact. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was supposed to end the era of unavoidably selective ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, according to the Rome Statute under which the ICC was created, the ICC was to 'put an end to impunity.' But the 'end of impunity' does not extend to the United States or its leaders, who not only commit major acts of genocide, but, as we shall see, have committed and continue to commit a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity that in scale and number far outweigh those for which those indicted by the ICC or its ad hoc predecessors (the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda – ICTY and ICTR) have been charged. As Edward Herman and David Peterson write:

In an amazing 'end of impunity' set of coincidences, it turns out that all fourteen of the ICC's indictments through mid-2009 had been issued against black Africans..., while carefully excluding Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda's Paul Kagame, perhaps the most prolific tandem of killers to rule on the African continent during the current era, but highly valued clients of the West. Indeed, Kagame especially is an adored

535 In Orwell's allegory the 'Party' represented the 'educated' sector of society - people such as the central character Winston Smith, who worked as a journalist.
538 Unfortunately space does not allow a full exploration of the conflict in Darfur and the systematic Western propaganda exploitation of that admittedly bitter but non-genocidal civil strife. Nor, unfortunately, is there any way to reduce events that would give any meaningful shape to events in Darfur, nor indeed to the clearly deliberate misrepresentations and outright lies of Western interests. I have chosen to use the discourse surrounding events in Rwanda (Appendix H) to give some sense of the manner in which Western governmental and corporate forces create propaganda around the issue of genocide.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any African more clearly indictable than Paul Kagame, as can be seen in Appendix H. The fact of the massive inconsistency between the promoted image of Kagame as hero and the reality of mass-murderer is not some aberration. It does derive partly from circumstance, but in large part it simply reflects the degree of control over the ideological environment effected by the propaganda institutions of the West, or more specifically the US public relations industry. The more criminal Kagame is, the more it behaves his Western allies to create an image of someone above reproach. In the reverse process – the vilification of those who are an impediment to Western interests – the same hyperbolic approach applies. Many have been compared with Hitler, to the point where the currency has been somewhat devalued, and now the chosen accusation is more often that of *genocidaire*.

Concern with the political misuse of the term genocide is behind Edward Herman and David Peterson's book *The Politics of Genocide*. It follows a framework established by Herman in conjunction with Noam Chomsky over 30 years ago when accounting for the Western propaganda treatment of 'bloodbaths.' For Herman and Peterson misuse of 'genocide' has meant that 'the crime of the twentieth century for which the word was originally coined appears debased....' In a similarly themed book Michael Mandel also claims that there is 'debasement'. Both works decry the increasingly widespread rejection of the consideration of the crime of interstate aggression, established at Nurembug as 'the supreme international crime.' It is officially excluded from consideration by the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch equally refused to comment on the legality or criminality of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Aggression has gone from being the 'supreme crime' to something which no significant body will even take a stance on, because that would be to take a political stance of judgement, as if this were not also the case when taking a stance on other crimes and human rights abuses. In contrast, according to the BBC, '[g]enocide is understood by most to be the gravest crime against humanity it is possible to commit.' This very article, however, is part of the discourse which seeks to create that purely moral definition, while throwing doubt on any legal or technical definition, often on the grounds that they do not carry within them a sufficient moral weight. Thus, true to Orwell's vision, any definable characteristic is effaced and replaced with 'double-plus bad'. As Herman and Chomsky wrote: 'We can even read who are the U.S. friends and enemies from the media's use of the word.' Once a word is reduced in meaning to a simple signifier of moral condemnation it becomes the Pavlovian bell. Orwell's 1984 allegory, quoted above, is entirely apt, but let me reiterate that it is not about some Fascist or Nazi style mass-meeting. It refers very specifically to the intellectual life of the intellectual classes of the Anglophone world, using the analogy of the fanaticism of a mass rally to make a very pointed comment about the internalised fanaticism of the supposedly sophisticated intelligentsia. The point of such outrage is that it prevents thought. The result, as will be shown, is that even in the specialist literature of genocide scholarship, let alone the broader academic world, it is commonplace to condemn the very acts of analysis or comparison.

540 Ibid.
541 Ibid, p 103.
543 See below.
544 Herman and Peterson, *The Politics Of Genocide*, p 21. It should be noted that this is normal practice for these organisations, applying equally to Amnesty International's report on the 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. The point is, however, that Amnesty's failure to condemn Iraqi aggression had precisely no impact in terms of exculpation of Iraqi crimes.
As Hitler analogies and Munich analogies wear out from overuse, 'genocide' has become the keystone accusation in a new discourse of 'humanitarian intervention'. A 'Rwanda analogy' on the dangers of inaction has replaced the 'Munich analogy' on appeasement. Of course, some historians will point out that, against the wills of their own peoples, the US and UK governments did a great deal more than to merely 'appease' Hitler,\(^{547}\) and similarly it is not US inaction, but rather the fact that the Clinton administration enforced inaction on others which became their most noted contribution to slaughter which occurred in Rwanda.\(^{548}\) So having prevented others from intervening to stop one of the greatest slaughters in history, the US begins an elaborate hand-wringing exercise in order to give itself license to intervene wherever else it likes. The resulting discourse of 'humanitarian intervention' and 'responsibility to protect' (or 'R2P')\(^{549}\) is a direct attack on norms of state sovereignty which offer some protection for weak states against strong states. It is also, as Michael Mandel points out, a long-standing excuse for acts of aggression:

‘Humanitarian intervention’ by military force finds no place in the Charter of the United Nations, because for the generation who wrote the Charter the ‘scourge’ was war \textit{between} states, the violation of national sovereignty that was Nuremberg’s ‘supreme crime,’ the one committed by Nazi Germany that left 50 million dead in its wake. The UN Charter put all its emphasis on outlawing that, whatever the motives. The exception of self-defense against an armed attack proved the rule. The Charter absolutely rejected the use of force in relations between states, enjoining them to settle their disputes ‘by peaceful means’ and to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’ (Articles 2.2 and 2.4). It sought to monopolize the use of force (except for temporary self-defense) in the Security Council. Section 2(7) even forbade intervention by the United Nations itself, let alone individual member states, save for exceptions specifically laid down in Chapter VII with respect to threats to international peace and security and self-defense.

The notion of a ‘humanitarian war’ would have rang in the ears of the drafters of the UN Charter as nothing short of Hitlerian, because it was precisely the justification used by Hitler himself for the invasion of Poland just six years earlier....

In fact it is nauseating how frequently states \textit{claim} to fight wars for higher values and how rarely the case can be made out.\(^{550}\)

Inter-state conflict remains the far greatest cause of violent death in the world. There is an obvious

\(^{547}\) One rather unrelenting summary, which omits the usual polite disclaimers, reads: ‘...one wonders what the other powers were doing while Hitler was rearming. And the answer is that they – Britain, the USSR, and the United States – did all they could to facilitate his task. They provided the Nazis with resources, military know-how, patents, money, and weapons – in very large quantities. Why? To set the Nazis up, lead them on, and finally destroy them, and take Germany into the bargain at war’s end. Throughout the 1930s, the United States acted as a mere supplier to the Nazis in the shadow of Britain, who produced the entire show. This show had to end with Britain’s participation in a worldwide conflict as the leader of the coalition of Allied forces against Nazi Germany. But the Hitlrites had to be duped into going to war against Russia with the guarantee that Britain, and thus America, would remain neutral: Hitler would not want to repeat the errors of World War I. Therefore Britain had to ‘double’ herself, so to speak, into a pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi faction – both of which, of course, were components of one and the same facery. The complex and rather grotesque whole of Britain’s foreign policy in the 1930s was indeed the result of these ghastly theatrical diversions with which the Hitlrites were made to believe that at any time the colorful Nazi-phile camp would overthrow the hawks of the War Party, led by Winston Churchill, and sign a separate peace with the Third Reich. The secret goal of this unbelievable mummery was to drive Hitler away from the Mediterranean in 1941, and into the Soviet marshes, which the British would in fact allow him to ‘cleanse’ for three years, until the time would arrive to hem the Nazis in and finally crush them.’ Guido Giacomo Preparata, \textit{ Conjuring Hitler: How Britain and America Made the Third Reich} , London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005, p 204. Preparata goes into detail over the next 50 pages or so including considerable detail regarding the complex masquerade which was played out by the British. For Preparata Britain’s rulers were ‘monolithic’, and indeed he reveals a very surprisingly complex and co-ordinated deception of public diplomacy lasting for a decade.

\(^{548}\) See Appendix H.

\(^{549}\) I don’t want to overdo the references to 1984, but it is worth mentioning that if the point of the contractions so beloved by Orwell’s Party was to rename institutions in ways which were both slick and at the same time effaced meaning, then ‘R2P’ may well be the ultimate exemplar.

danger that, adding to this, the received version of 'genocide' can facilitate acts of aggression under
a new international 'norm' of 'R2P'. It is not enough, however, to merely designate 'genocide' as
another 'double-plus bad', though it must remain devoid of meaning, it must also be given
notations. In fact those connotations must be made so strong that it is instantly apparent who is
a guilty genocidaire and one need not bother with all of the small details such as facts. The
maximum utility of the word 'genocide' for, say, a US imperialist, would be achieved by
dissociating the word from inter-state acts of war, from the use of expensive military technology,
and from the developed world altogether; the associations should instead be with people of colour,
poor countries, against their own citizens, using small arms rather than, for example, cluster
bombs or depleted uranium. By an amazing coincidence, that is exactly the sort of imagery which
is becoming ever more commonplace in both the mainstream and the academic discourse of
genocide, based in large part on a the totally inapt and unsupportable elevation to paradigmatic
status of a more or less mythologised 'Rwanda Genocide'.

It is quite understandable, therefore, that those legal and political scholars who oppose US
imperialism tend to emphasise the need to actually take some form of legal action against those who
are guilty of the 'supreme' crime of international aggression. It is equally understandable that some
might reject the very use of the term 'genocide'. Noam Chomsky, for example, has said: “Genocide
is a term that I myself don’t use even in cases where it might well be appropriate. … I just think the
term is way overused. Hitler carried out genocide. That’s true. It was in the case of the Nazis a
determined and explicit effort to essentially wipe out populations that they wanted to disappear
from the face of the earth. That’s genocide. … I just am reluctant to use the term. I don’t think it’s
an appropriate one. … It has whatever meaning you decide to give it. … It depends what your
criteria are for calling something genocide.”\(^{551}\) Chomsky is, in fact, wrong in every detail on which
he bases that judgement, but understandably so. Who, after all, wants to split hairs over the exact
nature of the Nazi Judeocide, for example? The fact is, however, that 'genocide' is a term which,
despite the close association, exists entirely independently of the mass killings of Jews and Roma
during World War II, and it did from its inception. It is also a legally defined term subject to a
growing body of jurisprudence.

It is undoubtedly unfortunate, although hardly surprising, that genocide is given such weight by
international institutions while aggression remains entirely ignored. However valuable the work of
ICTY and ICTR in deciding the legal details of genocide and other crimes, the international 'justice'
system in which they and the ICC operate is one which is far more likely to facilitate genocide than
to prevent it. Whatever the legal situation, however, aggression is a far less useful term than
genocide when it comes to analysis. Aggression tells us nothing about itself, genocide tells us not
only about itself, but it is also the key to understanding the very acts of aggression that most
concern Herman, Mandel, Chomsky, and many others.

There is a basic split – one which was fundamental to Raphäel Lemkin's original concept of
genocide – the division between military war and another form of war called genocide. Military
war conforms to the conception implicit in many works of theory and perhaps best encapsulated by
Carl von Clausewitz. A state uses its own capacity for enacting and resisting organised violence to
attempt to degrade or destroy an opposing state's capacity for enacting and resisting organised
violence. The idea is that once military dominance is established to the required level, it is possible
to enforce one's will – to force the rulers of the opposing state to conform to the policy ends which
caused one to take up arms in the first place. Of course it's all much more complicated than that
once a war is actually under way. Genocide, on the other hand, is war against people – against a
population rather than a state's ability to use force. It may be undertaken by any arm of the state,
from the legal and medical professions to police or disavowable paramilitary forces. Most often,
however, it is undertaken by the armed forces of a state. Unlike military war, where conditions and

\(^{551}\) Chomsky, *Class Warfare*, pp 211-2.
opposing forces may confound, change or obviate policy aims, genocide is simple. The means are the ends.

The Distortions.
The process of destroying the meaning of a word (which might be termed ‘verbocide’) is composite and manifold, but not exactly co-ordinated. Individual writers on individual topics have much to express which is valid and may even challenge the orthodox occlusion of meaning. However, in the space allowed to me, I must be brief and brutal, painting in very broad strokes (with only one tar brush, at that). That does not mean, however, that these criticisms are in any way gratuitous - there is systematic and purposive nature to all of these varied distortions. There are many elements brought together, some of which are quite understandable, if mistaken, others are hard to even understand, let alone excuse. Two key distortions have already been touched upon. The first is the tendency to define genocide by a moral character rather than to apply analytical criteria. A corollary of this is the use of chauvinistic moral criteria in choosing to discern or not discern intentionality – materially advanced Western liberal democracies cannot commit genocide because they cannot ever intend to commit genocide due to the absence of the primitive animosities which animate less materially endowed societies. The second, which flies in the face of very prominent historical evidence, is the attempt to create a sense that genocide is primarily undertaken by states against their own internal minorities. Another, far more excusable, mistake is the concentration on dramatic explosions of violence epitomised by the case of Rwanda. Perhaps it is counter-intuitive, but the very chaos and instability surrounding such cases actually makes them somewhat problematic with regards to intentionality. In contrast, a long slow genocide undertaken by a stable state entity that is inevitably well appraised of the lethal effects (such as the 'sanctions period' in Iraq) presents no such problems with regard to intentionality.

Lest it be thought that I am a lone hypercritical misanthrope attacking well-meaning, learned and astute people out of spite, I should point out that even within the field of genocide scholarship, there is a great deal of quite extreme criticism, not just of individuals, but of the whole collective. In the Journal of Genocide Research alone it may be read that ‘much of the scholarly writing on the connotations and history of the word “H/holocaust” is perniciously misleading or perniciously incorrect;'552 and that the field is characterised by ‘conceptual disarray and theoretical aridity.’553 Those studying genocide cannot even agree on what they are studying, and so there is an ‘interminable definitional debate’554 which prompts considerable self-flagellation. In the words of the Journal’s editor, Henry R. Huttenbach, ‘The absence of an approved basic definition has resulted in a form of near-intellectual chaos, almost reducing genocide to a term of convenience, serving each scholar’s biases for or against recognizing an event as a genocide.’555 But, with the exception of the first quote given, this is all rather meaningless, there is no sense that these critical genocide scholars might dare to step back and examine the field as a whole.556 They criticise without seeking the common origins of the many flaws they perceive.

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552 Petrie, "The secular word HOLOCAUST", p 31.
553 Stein, "Conceptions and terms", p 171.
556 Although Christopher Powell does present an intriguing and, I think, viable alternative. But that in essence is only giving in to the constant invalid refrain that genocide presents some insoluble definitional conundrum. He proposes that a genos should, for the purposes of genocide, be defined as 'self-reproducing dynamic network of practical social relations.’ Certainly this is a better fit for our current understanding of the nature of human society, but it could be applied to, say, Amway salespeople, and in every profoundly interlinked collective will actually correspond to a biological structure as suggested above.
The most outstanding feature of genocide scholarship seems to be an epidemic of sheer obtuseness, particularly when it comes to dismissing both Lemkin’s and the UNCG’s definitions of genocide. This is particularly frustrating because the ‘theoretical aridity’ of the field could be rectified by a moderately astute reading of Lemkin’s few published works, while those who have accessed his unpublished materials can seemingly find even more that deepens the understanding of genocide, but only if they actually try. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that some, such as John Docker and Ward Churchill, accept Lemkin’s conception as a starting point and, in the former instance, explore it quite deeply, which brings a consistency and, above all, clarity not displayed by other writers. Others, however, simply ignore or misrepresent his ideas, tending to ignore Lemkin altogether, even as they cite him. For example, Daniel Feierstein, somehow manages to avoid noticing that by definition the victim of genocide is the *genos*, which Lemkin made amply clear, and thus to rail against the unjust specificity of the UNCG. Comparing it to homicide, he writes: ‘A homicide will always be a homicide, regardless of the person who is killed,’ adding, ‘[a] crime is never defined based on the victim who suffers it...’ And so it falls to me to point out that nature of the victim of homicide is defined by the name homicide – killing a hedgehog or a pot plant is not homicide. In a similar vein, Huttenbach adds to the confusion which, as was shown above, vexes him. He devotes an editorial to asking the bizarre question of why Lemkin did not choose to use existing terms connoting mass murder, something which apparently is beyond his ability to answer and remains a ‘gnawing question’. Of course he might have read in Lemkin the following words: ‘Would mass murder be an adequate name for such a phenomenon? We think not, since it does not connote the motivation of the crime...’ and elsewhere that, ‘[t]he intent of the offenders is to destroy or degrade an entire national, religious or racial group by attacking the individual members of that group.’ Lemkin is not denying, somehow, that mass murder is a crime in itself, but rather pointing out that it is one among many means to commit what he considers a different crime. Huttenbach’s editorial leaves one with the gnawing question of why such a person edits a journal about genocide without perceiving any great utility in the term itself.

Mark Levene is equally rough on Lemkin. He asks the question of whether the Nazi genocide of Jews began in 1933. One might think that he would celebrate the fact under Lemkin’s conception genocide could be apparent years before mass extermination began, especially as Levene endorses Chalk and Jonassohn’s contention that, ‘the major reason for doing comparative research on genocides is the hope of preventing them in the future’. Instead, however, he criticises Lemkin for not anticipating and subscribing to his own novel distinction between ‘genocidal process’ and genocide and for creating a ‘misconceived conflation’ of the two. So how does he distinguish between the two? Genocide is a ‘specific sequence of mass killing’ which:

> ...seems to this author that this is the only way genocide can be distinguished as *sui generis*, the fact that genocide usually arises out of an extremely long and laboured gestation and, indeed, is itself only at the extreme end of a continuum of repressive state strategies including marginalisation, forced assimilation, deportation and even massacre – all of which might share the latent if not explicit aim of ‘getting rid’ of the perceived ‘problem’ population – confirms that the problem of giving clear definition to its beginning, middle and end – in other words its exact shape – remains a stark one.

It is an oxymoron to suggest that on the one hand genocide is *sui generis* and on the other that it

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559 Feierstein, "Political violence in Argentina and its genocidal characteristics,", p 156.
562 Lemkin, "Genocide - A Modern Crime", p 43.
565 Ibid, p 47.
566 Ibid, p 50.
exists on a continuum. Levene essentially says as much, admitting a ‘certain unsatisfactory, even contradictory, messiness to the exact parameters of our subject’.567 What is of interest here is that he has abandoned a clear and definable, but to him unacceptable, concept of genocide for one that cannot be given bounds which are not contingent. Of course, that could be quite handy in selectively including and excluding genocides on politically informed grounds.

Levene also criticises Lemkin for including the ethnocide of Luxembourgers as an exemplar,568 while somehow neglecting to mention, or perhaps notice, that Lemkin’s whole purpose in coining the term genocide was as a way of drawing links between Nazi policies of extermination and those of ethnocide. Lemkin wrote: ‘Jews were to be completely annihilated. The Poles, the Slovenes, the Czechs, the Russians, and all other inferior Slav peoples were to be kept on the lowest social levels. Those felt to be related by blood, the Dutch, the Norwegian, the Alsatians, etc., were to have the alternatives of entering the German community by espousing “Germanism” or of sharing the fate of the inferior peoples.’569 His very point in including Luxembourg and similar examples seems to have been to highlight the fact that genocide was something distinct from mass murder; otherwise there would hardly be a need to coin the term.

Staying with Levene, he writes:

Starting then from Lemkin’s premise that genocide is a type of warfare but one which would appear to involve the (unlawful) actions of a sovereign state waging war against a non-sovereign national or other group, the obvious contrast would be with sovereign states who go to war with other sovereign states, this type of conflict being considered ‘normative’ and acceptable, at least in a Clausewitzian sense.570

I would argue that Levene is wrong in his characterisation of war, but, more to the point, his characterisation of Lemkin’s conception is completely fictitious. Lemkin wrote: ‘Genocide is the antithesis of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine, which may be regarded as implicit in the Hague Regulations. This doctrine holds that war is directed against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians. In its modern application in civilized society, the doctrine means that war is conducted against states and armed forces and not against populations.’571 He is not suggesting that this is somehow excludes the situation where ‘sovereign states ... go to war with other sovereign states.’ Indeed, he continues, ‘the Germans prepared, waged, and continued a war not merely against states and their armies but against peoples.’572 The difference is that, unlike a Clausewitzian conception of war as a means to force conformity to a distinct policy on an enemy, genocide does not end with surrender or the decapitation of the ‘sovereign’, and the prosecutor of genocidal war does not direct all of their energies into that pursuit, but instead targets the population. It is very important, however, for Levene to circumscribe what might be considered to constitute genocide. His basic premise is that genocide is a ‘systematic dysfunction’573 arising in nation-states. He excludes without reason any possibility that genocide might be conducted by one sovereign state against the people of another. In his second volume he writes:

The primary thrust of Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State is to propose that the origins and continued momentum towards the potentiality for genocide in the modern world has been intrinsically bound up with the strivings – albeit convoluted and often frustrated – of societies towards some form of national, territorially grounded coherence. Which rather raises the question of why the final section of this volume should be devoted to the subject of empires.574

In fact it would be hard to imagine a volume devoted to The Rise of the West and the Coming of

567 Ibid, p 51.
569 Lemkin, “Genocide - A Modern Crime”, p 40; see also Axis Rule, pp 81-2.
570 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I, p 56.
571 Axis Rule, p 81.
573 Ibid, p 205.
574 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume II, p 215.
Genocide, which somehow avoided mentioning imperial/colonial genocide. The real question is why imperial genocide is excluded from his first volume, which is, after all, by nature of a conclusion based on the sum of Levene’s weighty knowledge of genocides. If he should transcend and even contradict his own reductions in later volumes, it is hardly to be considered to his credit. In fact the Holocaust or even the Shoah do not fit within Levene’s scheme. The majority of Jewish victims were not German citizens. The bulk of genocidal killings occurred in the lawfully sovereign territory of the Soviet Union. If occupied Europe was a polity, then, notwithstanding German territorial ambitions as yet unrealised, it was most assuredly an empire. If not, then the Nazis were carrying out genocides of the peoples of sovereign countries, regardless of their ethnicity. Levene admits neither possibility, and thus his prime supposed exemplar of genocide, the Shoah, is actually excluded from his analysis.

But Levene is by no means alone. The Shoah is regularly constructed as being conducted against an internal enemy of the Third Reich, the final insult to Raphaël Lemkin, a Pole who was also a Jew. Most who write about genocide have incorporated the concept that genocide is an attack on an internal enemy. It is seldom stated but is implicit in every choice of example or observation of characteristics supposedly typifying or defining genocide. Equally it is not stated outright in most definitions, but each displays signs of the presupposition in greater or lesser degree - usually by emphasising the ‘State’ or other singular authority as perpetrator and sometimes by stressing the defenceless or subsidiary nature of the target population. A typical example, probably because it has influenced others, is that of Chalk and Jonassohn: ‘Genocide is a from of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.’ I will return to the problematic nature of such definitions as a whole, but staying with the subject of restricting genocide to internal enemies, the tendency becomes clearest when examining the numerous typologies of genocide.

I would argue that the exercise of dividing up genocides into a priori types is in itself a completely fruitless one, except in as much as it inevitably adds to the repertoire of deniers, apologists and obfuscators. Scott Strauss identifies six typologies of genocide. (Interestingly he omits Ward Churchill’s differentiation of ‘degrees’ of genocide.) Of the six detailed only one does not base itself on an imputed motive — that of Leo Kuper, dating back to 1984, which bases itself on the victim group and excludes genocidal war. Israel Charny’s typology is only partially based on motive and admits both ‘genocide in the course of aggressive war’ and ‘war crimes against humanity’ allowing the consideration of Nazi and Japanese genocidal warfare as well as Allied bombing. Of the rest, each is based purely on ‘perpetrator objective’. This is problematic in itself because perpetrators will always be varied in motive, and it may be self-deceptive to ascribe one particular objective a greater significance, particularly when each of these typologies is restrictive rather than listing every possible motive that could impel an act of genocide. Of these four

575 Apart from Levene, it is also implicit in Catherine Barnes restriction to the 'type of regime tries to establish itself as an absolutist form of authority in its domain and—at a minimum—tries to limit the potential for other independent political or social organizations that could challenge it.' ("The functional utility of genocide: towards a framework for understanding the connection between genocide and regime consolidation, expansion and maintenance," Journal of Genocide Research (2005), 7(3), September , p 318.)

576 Scott Strauss has compiled a table of definitions using definitional quotes from the sources. In keeping with the tendency to contemptuously dismiss Raphaël Lemkin, however, the originating definition of genocide is reduced in toto to the words: 'Destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group' (Strauss, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: a conceptual analysis of genocide”, Journal of Genocide Research (2001), 3(3), pp 350-5.)

577 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, p 23.


579 Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide, p 434. On paper Churchill's degrees seem almost commonsensical, but I can't help but feel that they are somewhat of a sop for orthodox sensibilities (making it more palatable to admit the occurrence of genocide) and that in any given practical example such divisions can only increase the confusion and denial of intent.
typologies, only that of Chalk and Jonassohn does not effectively exclude genocide against an external target group in modern times. 580

Restricting genocide to a particular presupposed type of target group works closely with the same tendency towards perpetrators. Catherine Barnes has already been mentioned in this context, but similarly Levon Chorbajian restricts perpetrators to ‘authoritarian states’. 581 More common, however, is the attempt to exclude ‘liberal’ regimes from even being considered as potential perpetrators. Credit here should be extended to Mark Levene who writes: ‘being able to identify a state regime as a particular political type, does not of its own advance description, conceptualisation or explanation of our phenomenon. Genocide is not something fixed in the make-up of regimes.’ 582 He criticises R.J. Rummel for, ‘what seems an almost wilful myopia about mass murders committed directly or indirectly by liberal democratic regimes....’ 583 This works as a kind of prejudicial exoneration of those regimes deemed ‘liberal’, which is in itself a highly politicised term with very selective usage. Sadly, however, Levene performs exactly the same trick of exculpation for the ‘avant-garde’ nation-states, whose genocides, according to him, lie exclusively in their imperial pasts. For Levene it is those seeking to replicate their modernisation as nation-states (namely the poorer states) who commit genocide. According to this analysis, established modern states do not have a reason for committing genocide, which just happens to exclude the exact same ‘liberal’ regimes which he criticises others for excluding. 584

Another means by which scholars create restrictions is by focussing on ideology and specific and dramatic psychosocial factors as the origin of genocide. The process is tautological: genocide is brought about by extremism and genocide is certain evidence of extremism. Part of the problem is that extremism, like so much else, is in the eye of the beholder. As both an example and a counter-example, Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine, presents many individuals who could easily be described as neoliberal or Friedmanite extremist ideologues who are also, as it happens, perpetrators of genocide (see Appendix F). For Klein it is not the individual ideology per se that brings about genocide, but its extremist form: ‘Usually it is extreme religious and racially based idea systems that demand the wiping out of entire peoples and cultures in order to fulfill a purified vision of the world.’ 585 But to ascribe motive power to extremism is to presuppose sincerity. It has already been shown that Hitler was probably not sincere in his anti-Semitism, at least not consciously. Equally, Rwanda’s Juvenal Habyarimana, who had many Tutsi friends and had appointed many as colleagues, increased racial tension as a way of using the threat of massacres as a bargaining chip with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 587 This was as tragic as it was ruthless, because the equally, or more, ruthless RPF knew that their only path to power lay over a mountain of corpses of their fellow Tutsi - showing that the chauvinist Tutsi ideology which many of their number openly espoused was equally contingent.

581 Ibid, p 353.
582 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I, p 41.
583 Ibid, p 54. He repeats the charge of myopia on p 170.
584 Ibid, pp 178-82.
585 Klein, The Shock Doctrine.
586 Ibid, p 19. She is not doctrinaire on this point throughout the book, tending to imply or state outright that material acquisitiveness is the true motive behind an instrumental ideology. As I will argue, however, behind even the material motive is a more fundamental strategic imperative of dominance which is why the greed documented in her book is channeled into such destructive forms.
588 Ibid, p 64.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the leaders who initiate genocide, it is also well established that those tasked with carrying out genocide are not primarily motivated by ideology. Here, I feel it is worth digressing somewhat from a direct critique, to establish the exact role of ideology in genocidal killing. To take the Holocaust as an example, we have already seen that despite being primed with anti-Semitic hatred most Germans did not support exterminatory genocide. There were even anti-Semitic rescuers who saved Jewish lives throughout Europe.\(^590\) Christopher Browning’s account of a massacre committed by Reserve Police Battalion 101, who were given the unusual option of not participating, shows that any racial animus among perpetrators was not detectable in later recounting, and seemingly far insufficient to make any openly relish the idea of killing Jews.\(^591\) On the bureaucratic level we have the celebrated example of Adolph Eichmann, who, lacking any significant degree of conscious anti-Semitism, has come to symbolise the dangers of unthinking authoritarianism.\(^592\) Robert Jay Lifton reveals that for SS doctors at Auschwitz, confronted with actually carrying out in reality what had only been the ‘propaganda verbiage’ of extermination, there was a shock and ‘resistance to taking in the dark side of Nazi actuality’. Anti-Semitism, however, did play a large role in adjusting the doctors to their task.\(^593\) In Rwanda, racial feeling, which may have often been more to do with mistrust turning to fear than with hatred, informed perpetrator choices, but there were other pragmatic factors which were of more immediate concern.\(^594\)

In these cases, and in most cases where someone takes a human life, there is a psychological need to reconstruct the killing as a righteous act. As Dave Grossman writes of soldiers committing massacres:

> The soldier who does kill must overcome that part of him that says that he is a murderer of women and children, a foul beast who has done the unforgivable. He must deny the guilt within him, and he must assure himself that the world is not mad, that his victims are less than animals, that they are evil vermin, and that what his nation and his leaders have told him to do is right.

> He must believe that not only is this atrocity right, but it is proof that he is morally, socially, and culturally superior to those whom he has killed. It is the ultimate act of denial of their humanity. It is the ultimate act of affirmation of his superiority. And the killer must violently suppress any dissonant thought that he has done anything wrong. Further, he must violently attack anyone or anything that would threaten his beliefs. His mental health is totally invested in believing that what he has done is good and right.

> It is the blood of his victims that binds and empowers him to even greater heights of killing and slaughter.\(^595\)

Thus the ‘propaganda verbiage’ of hate becomes very real and necessary, but only in the immediate face of the act of killing or in its enduring aftermath. With respect to Rwanda, Luke Fletcher ends by asking, ‘Could hatred, far from causing the genocide, have been generated by it?’\(^596\) Ben Lieberman describes a similar process amongst formerly friendly neighbours in Bosnia-Hercegovina, whose embrace of nationalist ideologies in the face of violence he feels is ‘case of cognitive dissonance.’\(^597\) As suggested above, cognitive dissonance is always an inevitable result of the drastic Manichaean narrowness of hateful racial ideology being confronted by the reality of


\(^596\) Fletcher, “Turning interahamwe”, p 42.

taking a human life, but, as Grossman suggests suppressing ‘dissonant thought’ actually impels further killing. As Grossman goes on to say, this is also true at the leadership level, and is one path to a sort of moral inversion wherein the more horrific one's behaviour the more morally exalted one feels for having the strength to commit atrocities in the service of a higher good.

We cannot know the exact role that heartfelt racial/national ideology plays in setting the small groups of architects behind genocides. In cases of dysfunction, the leadership is not effectively in control. In functional cases genocide serves a strategic logic, but that does not mean that it is an inevitable choice. Ideology may, consciously or subconsciously, shape the decision to embrace the logic of genocide, but equally tropes of blood sacrifice or other ideological notions that are not inherently hateful of a particular group may be formative. Abnormal psychology, too, may play a role. The need to reinforce the righteousness of killing is not confined to instances of killing women and children. For example, the fact that Nazi leadership had many veterans of WWI, many of whom would have been induced to essentially glorify killing by their own acts of killing, was just as relevant to the Final Solution (and the euthanasia programme that preceded it) as it was to the decision to launch WWII. As Yehuda Bauer wrote: 'The killing, mutilation and gas poisoning of millions of soldiers on both sides had broken taboo and decisively blunted moral sensitivities. Auschwitz cannot be explained without reference to World War I.'

Ideology may serve as a motive for the individual killer, but it seems to perform a more important role as an empowering part of the apparatus of genocide. It is a part of infrastructure (no different in some respects from registration papers or crematoria) and broadcasts of hate propaganda are a means of building the infrastructure. When the architects of genocide pass registration laws, or build crematoria, or promulgate ideological hatred, then the genocide has already begun - the intent shows in the anticipation of future events. In the cases of genocidal war systems (such as Korea, Indochina and Iraq) the genocide infrastructure shows itself in the ways in which military personnel are systematically predisposed towards using violence against the entire population, including their economic, social, cultural and psychological sustenance. These means vary from the basic uses of fear and racism; to more elaborate matters of military tactics, strategy or doctrine; to the choices of military hardware.

The degree of sincere ideological motive of the architect clique may be largely unknowable, and liable to vary within each such group, but what is constant is the functional logic of genocide that lies at its heart in Lemkin’s original conception. It is constant and also comparatively neutral and more difficult to conceal. What constitutes a genocidal ideology is somewhat open to interpretation, and even though there is a gain to be had in inciting hatred by those who would engineer genocide, this can be achieved through euphemistic language which scholars may selectively penetrate or ignore. This is done according to the tautologically inspired rule of applying such scrutiny only to the approved canonical genocides. For example, much is made of the meaning behind the euphemisms of Rwanda’s Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines^600 none pursue the same links to racial/religious hatred in the language of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) seen, for example, on Fox television.

This brings me to the next category of exclusion, that of intentionality. Here selectivity creates a virtual get-out-of-jail-free card for ‘liberal’ regimes. Here, what seems to be a racial hierarchy of doubt is given preferentially to those considered worthy of it. Despite, for example, the fact that the Nazis were arguably unequalled in genocidal killing, there is an entire school of thought devoted to

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598 See also Appendix E.
questioning their intentionality, as has been mentioned. In Cambodia, despite the implausibility of fierce Khmer nationalists actually intending to destroy their own nation in whole or part, intent is considered amply demonstrated by the fanaticism and bloody rhetoric of the ruling clique of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime - what Adam Jones describes as a ‘genocidal ideology’. If this were applied to the case of genocide against, say, the Cham minority; the people of the ‘Eastern Zone’ or even the massacres of Vietnamese conducted in the border regions, then it would be valid. But Jones applies the ‘genocidal ideology’ to a highly dysfunctional autogonocide in a regime where central control of events was, to say the least, questionable. As Edward Kissi explains:

Scholars who study the Cambodian revolution continue to debate the extent to which the killings in revolutionary Cambodia could be characterized as genocide. Michael Vickery, David Chandler, and Serge Thion argue that the Khmer Rouge leadership never intended to use its revolution as a mechanism for destroying particular groups of people. David Chandler, for instance, insists that comparing Pol Pot to Hitler has 'little explanatory power' beyond making him 'a household word, synonymous with genocide ... and everyone’s worst fears of communism.' Chandler considers the deaths in revolutionary Cambodia as the unintended consequence of a social revolution in which 'lower ranking cadres and officials fearful of reprisals ... made unworkable demands on the people under them.' Serge Thion has argued that the Khmer Rouge leadership never had the power and control required for the commission of the atrocities of which they are accused. Anthony Barnett and Ben Kiernan disagree. They contend that revolutionary Cambodia was tightly controlled by the Khmer Rouge leadership. In Kiernan’s view, the Khmer Rouge leadership achieved ‘successful top-down domination’ and accumulated ‘unprecedented’ power.

In fairness to Jones he, like myself, accepts that the commission of genocidal acts is demonstrative of ‘constructive intent’. Where we differ is that Jones, and others, see constructive intent as a form of intent sufficient in itself for the necessary component of intentionality within genocide, but seems unconcerned if the acts themselves are not of a genocidal nature. For example, along with the orthodox inclusion of the DK autogonocide, he accepts that the ‘contested case’ of the Atlantic slave trade was genocide. I do not, and I think it is worth explaining the distinction. By way illustration it is worth comparing the Atlantic slave trade with genocide in Potosí where 8 million people were worked to death there in order to extract silver. But the very enslavement of these people, as well as their systematic and predictable destruction, was a part of a genocide involving ethnocide and repeated massacres. As Levene puts it this involved: ‘the wholesale destruction of their political structures and autonomous power so that, suitably subjugated, their populations could be put to enforced work, in effect enslaved, in order to enrich their new Castilian masters.’ The Atlantic slave trade per se did not involve destroying the genos (although such may have occurred in Africa in the course of capturing slaves). Instead, slaves, severed from interconnection with their originating genos, were managed by keeping them in a more or less atomised state. It was for this very reason that they were preferred to indigenous slaves – they had nothing to run away to. The slave trade was, in short, structurally different from genocide.

To return to Levene’s comment above, it should be noted that his seemingly perfect description of a genocide is not intended as such. According to Levene, this is merely ‘hyper-exploitation’ because it lacks exterminatory intent. He writes, ‘this was not a policy or strategy geared towards killing the natives or their replacements outright but extracting as much labour out of them as possible....’ This statement is quite simply wrong. These people were intentionally worked to death. There is

603 Ibid, p 22.
606 Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume II*, p 13. Levene is suggesting that this is not a case of genocide, which I will return to.
no recognition given by Levene that up to 8 million people in Hispaniola were exterminated by the same empire using the same institutions, even though he acknowledges their extinction as a result of contact with Europeans. Instead he merely writes, ‘There are conditions in which extermination may also emerge out of hyper-exploitation, most obviously when native peoples revolt against their oppressors, leading to the latter’s retributive over-kill.’

Levene implies that the existence of another motive (greed) precludes genocidal intent. This is in fitting with a common stance that genocide is an aim in itself rather than a method of achieving certain ends. As Jones puts it: ’The goals of genocide are held to be the destruction/eradication of the victim group and/or its culture, but beyond this, the element of motive is surprisingly little stressed.’ This allows the existence of a given motive, say security or greed, to be used as a strategy of denial of genocidal intent. For example, Chalk and Jonassohn prejudicially exclude aerial bombardment of civilians because the intent is to destroy the ‘enemy’—i.e. they work on the presumption that there is a military logic to it and therefore it cannot be genocide. Akio Kimura points to the usage of the intentionality issue by deniers of the Armenian holocaust and refers to ‘the ambivalence between the interest in human intention and the doubts about the access to it.’ There is no sound reason for preferring a given individual’s stated intent to exterminate over any number of persons unstated or even subconscious intent. Who exactly can speak or write the words that show intent? Does it need to be a sovereign or high official, or can it be any involved person? Also, as Sergei Glazyev puts it, genocidal intent, ‘may be cloaked with quite respectable slogans about reforms for the good of society, to attain freedom and social justice. Many de facto parties to the crimes may “not notice” the real consequences of their actions, genuinely believing that they are heroes and benefactors of mankind.’

The fact is that the occurrence of genocide is certain enough evidence of intent in itself. The only problem, which is of little consequence for analysis, is that it is not easy to ascribe to any given individual. In this I both concur and dissent from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) decision in the Akayesu case. Stuart Stein explains:

> The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, relaxed the stringency hitherto associated with the requirement that there be evidence of specific intent to destroy “in whole or in part,” the groups specified in the 1948 Convention, noting that “it is possible to infer the genocidal intention that presided over the commission of a particular act, inter alia, from all acts or utterances of the accused, or from the general context in which other culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same group.” This argument, which was elaborated earlier by Bassiouni (1993), was precisely the point made by Jean Paul Sartre on America’s conduct of the Vietnam War, to the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, 1968, namely, that “genocidal intent is implicit in the facts,” eliminating thereby the necessity of demonstrating specific intent.

The Akayesu judgement does not stop genocide scholars, and others, from using intentionality as yet another grounds for restricting what may be considered genocide. But they also attempt to prejudice analysis by giving genocide a moral status as the ‘ultimate crime’. As David Moshman writes:

> Genocide is routinely taken to be “the absolute crime, the gravest form of crime against humanity” (Temon,

609 Jones, Genocide, p 71.
612 Jones, Genocide, p 20.
613 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, pp 24-5.
615 Glazyev, Genocide, p 5.
616 Stein, “Conceptions and terms”, pp 192-3.
Even Robert Gallately and Ben Kiernan weigh in, ignoring the precedent of Nuremberg and stating that: ‘Legally, genocide is the most serious crime.’619 This moral weight contributes to a tendency to define genocide as ‘self-evident’ or ‘sui generis.’ As has already been touched upon, Adam Jones includes any mass killing which he considers to be sufficiently horrific, but at least he can be said to be fairly inclusive. More typical are Chalk and Jonassohn, who, having made various specious exclusions, insist that the Kampuchea autogenocide must be included because: ‘The world cannot afford to ignore this form of genocide simply because most of its victims were not selected as members of racial, religious or ethnic groups. The definition of genocide must be broad enough to encompass the case of the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea.’621

This sort of attitude exists in a mutually reinforcing loop with the ‘interminable definitional debate’. Moshman calls for a ‘formal conception of genocide’. While I can only agree, the fact is that such a conception already exists, possibly ineradicably, in the UNCG and in the body of legal precedent developing around it. But, as Uwe Makino describes the scholarly view of the UNCG, ‘[w]hilst opinions amongst researchers concerning the UN concept of genocide may differ widely, on one point there is consensus: its uselessness.’622 But rather than attempting to apply definable or quantifiable and transparent restrictions, some scholars take the approach that adding adjectives will somehow clarify matters: ‘A final question is whether genocide should have a numerical threshold. Genocide is committed against a collectivity and therefore occurs on a mass scale. But what constitutes “mass”? Charny, Bauer, Chorbajian, and Harff and Gurr, respectively, claim that genocide involves the killing of “substantial numbers,” “large numbers,” a “large … percentage,” and “a substantial portion” of a group’s population.’623

Writers like Chalk and Jonassohn denounce the UNCG as ‘of little use to scholars’ due to ‘lack of rigor.’624 But what of their own definition (quoted above)? To them genocide is ‘a form of one-sided killing and they use this to justify the exclusion of modern genocidal war. In genocide ‘the victim group has no organized military machinery that might be opposed to that of the perpetrator.’625 Does this mean we should exclude those Jews killed in the partisan warfare who are conventionally accepted as victims of the Shoah?626 What about those killed in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising? What level of opposition should be considered? What about the case of Nagasaki, for

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620 These are moral judgements, not legal ones. Genocide may, quite rightly, be described as an ‘aggravated crime against humanity’.

621 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, p 407.


624 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, p 10.


626 Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide, p 47.
instance, where an all but formally defeated state with no effective air defences had thousands of civilians incinerated in a matter of seconds? Do civilians ever really have a means of opposition? Do even soldiers necessarily have some significant means of opposing aerial and ground artillery? Should we discount the Rwandan genocide of Tutsi, especially considering that the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was superior in military might to the opposing Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)?

Above all, what purpose is served by introducing this subjective conditionality that has no relevance to the original conception of genocide as the intentional destruction of a genos in whole or in part? I think the answer lies purely in the fact that it allows the exclusion of WWII Allied and subsequent bombing of civilians which has become invariably genocidal.

As for other scholarly definitions, they are similarly impossible to apply even-handedly. I would go so far as to say that they all lack rigour. This allows some to simply shrug their shoulders and ‘concede’ that genocide can only be seen as sui generis. Stein, for example writes, ‘[i]t is apparent that the concept genocide cannot be rescued for use as a viable category type describing a delimited cluster of defined behaviours....’ while Powell concludes, ‘[t]he term “genocide” is an evaluative concept. It refers to a complex phenomenon, one that can be described coherently in a variety of ways.’

What he actually means is that the canon of politically acceptable genocides is used to create tautological descriptions of the constitutive elements of genocide. But he is wrong to ascribe coherence to these approaches, in fact inconsistencies abound and individual cases may be severely distorted and misrepresented to fit a convenient mould. The best exemplar of this is the discourse of genocide in Rwanda, described in Appendix H. Here very complex events with very few historical resonances are systematically reduced to a cartoonish form fitting preconceived criteria and then trumpeted as one of the ‘classic’ genocides.

Appendix H is by no means a full account of just how problematic the Tutsi genocide/Rwandan genocide’ is as a paradigmatic exemplar of genocide, less still of the role of Western complicity and of hegemonic distortion of unwanted truth. My point is that, for all of their seeming ignorance, genocide scholars know enough to know that the events of 1994 in Rwanda do not warrant inclusion as one of the three main genocides of the 20th century, yet somehow none challenges that. Like some symbolic symptom of their mythologising, all make the compulsory reference to the racial slur inyenzi (cockroaches) but somehow neglect to mention that this was the name adopted by Tutsi guerillas for themselves in the 1960s. That summarises their approach quite well. They try to shape the events into something as closely resembling the Shoah as possible by elision and miscontextualisation while attacking those who overstep the line as deniers. Jones even as much as accuses François Mitterrand of genocide denial:

The president (François Mitterrand) of the same French state that prosecuted Robert Faurisson not only actively supported Rwanda’s génocidaires – before, during, and after the 1994 catastrophe – but when asked later about the genocide, responded: “The genocide or the genocides? I don’t know what one should say!” As Gérard Prunier notes, “this public accolade for the so-called ‘theory of the double genocide’ [i.e., by Tutsis against France’s Hutu allies, as well as by Hutus against Tutsis] was an absolute shame.” It advanced a key thesis of genocide deniers: that the violence was mutual or defensive in nature.

But though Jones equates Mitterrand’s failure to unequivocally toe the line with denial, he himself makes the observation that in the former Yugoslavia genocidal acts were ‘implemented in systematic fashion – primarily, but not only, by Serb military and paramilitary forces.’ In contrast, the mythical ‘Rwandan holocaust’ must be defended stridently, not so much because the construction of the genocidal mass-murder of Tutsi is tenuous (I think there is considerable uncertainty about that issue) but because even if the central events of the myth are all portrayed

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627 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, p 75.
628 Stein, “Conceptions and terms”, p 171.
630 Jones, Genocide, p 357.
631 Ibid, p 216.
accurately, the events surrounding them cannot be mentioned. Why? Because the RPF were acting as agents of the US and they ‘provoked’ one genocide and committed another, bringing death to anything between 450,000 and 1.5 million people. Along with Uganda they committed 3 acts of aggression, described at Nuremberg as ‘the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’

Those acts of aggression have brought about 6 to 10 million deaths, or possibly even more. This makes it even more imperative that we view the RPF as heroic leaders of a victimised people - the ‘Jews of Africa’. Again, why? Because if it is admitted that Museveni and Kagame are war criminals then we are brought one step closer to having to admit that Albright, Clinton, Bush and Blair (to name a few) are guilty of crimes far beyond the scale of which Jean-Paul Akayesu or any génocidaire executed in Rwanda have been convicted.

The discourse of the ‘Rwanda holocaust’ suffers from exactly the same selective failure to ask or answer the obvious questions that afflicts the scholarly discourse about US genocides. As Orwell has his character Syme (who ‘sees too clearly and speaks too plainly’) say: ‘Orthodoxy means not thinking – not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness.’

Chapter 4 – Race and the US at War in Asia.

Racism is a blunt tool, it does not distinguish between one particular political orientation and another. It also does not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. This chapter uses the Philippines War and the Pacific War to illustrate the functioning of racism in US wars in the first half of the 20th century. In *War Without Mercy*, John Dower, at one point, links the racist aspects of both wars together and with the colonial wars against the 'Injuns'. Fighting in the Philippines was 'Injun warfare' (a trope which would reappear in Indochina) while the Filipinos were 'treacherous goos- goos', an epithet which would become 'gooks' – the racist slur of choice in two further wars. As Ben Kiernan indicates, racism played a fundamental role in the Armenian genocide, the Shoah and the DK autogenocide, but it is also central to the major US genocides.

Officially World War II propaganda in the US was meant to emphasise that it was evil regimes that were being fought against, not peoples. In practice, however, while Germans were portrayed as victims of the Nazi regime, the Japanese people became 'The Jap', a singular, rather inhuman creature whose monolithic obeisance was constantly reiterated. Mentions of Japanese people as victims of, or opposition to, their government were censored. This prepared people for what was to become a war against the entirety of Japanese society in which civilians were deliberately killed in very large numbers.

The Philippines War

When the US annexed the Philippines at the end of 1898, and during the vicious military suppression campaign that followed they deployed infantilising tropes. President McKinley referred to bringing Christian civilisation to 'little brown brothers' to justify the takeover of a strategically important country. In terms which inescapably reminiscent of the rhetoric of the occupation of Iraq, he asked himself, ‘Can we leave these people, who, by the fortunes of war and our own acts, are helpless and without government, to chaos and anarchy, after we have destroyed the only government they have had?’ He answered, 'Having destroyed their government, it is the duty of the American people to provide for a better one.' The president dismissed as unpatriotic any suggestion that the American people were incapable of creating a new government for others.

He told a group of Methodist ministers the following with regard to his decision to acquire the Philippines:

> I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way -- I don't know how it was, but it came: 1) That we could not give them back to Spain -- that would be cowardly and dishonorable. 2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany, our commercial rivals in the Orient -- that would be bad business and discreditable. 3) That we could not leave them to themselves -- they were unfit for self-government -- and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and 4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed and went to sleep.

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638 Ibid, p 19.
William Blum remarks on this quote: “William McKinley's idea of doing the very best by the Filipinos was to employ the United States Army to kill them in the tens of thousands, burn down their villages, subject them to torture, and lay the foundation for and economic exploitation which was proudly referred to at the time as 'imperialism' by leading American statesmen and newspapers.” As Howard Zinn points out: 'The Filipinos did not get the same message from God,' and many rose up in resistance to US rule. General Arthur MacArthur, who was soon to become military governor of the Philippines, admitted in 1899, 'I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads.'

The government referred to here was formed by Emilio Aguinaldo, who had led an anti-Spanish insurrection which took control of virtually the entire country before US forces arrived. However, as Susan Brewer explains:

Then U.S. army troops arrived, carrying instructions that they were not to share authority in the islands with the Filipinos. General Thomas M. Anderson sent Aguinaldo a message: “General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices.”

Recognizing the Filipino people as the real threat, the American command worked out a deal with the Spaniards to stage a mock battle of Manila on August 13, 1898. They would shoot at each other and then Spain would surrender before the Philippine Army of Liberation could take part.

The cruel repression thereafter meted out by the US on those whose welfare it claimed to hold dear revealed the facility of racism exemplified by Kipling when, in 'White Man's Burden' wrote of 'new-caught sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child.' This poem, penned to encourage the US to annex the Philippines, was a milestone in racism. As one work on racism puts it: 'His trope artfully combined a Darwinian emphasis on the competitive fitness of the white man with the suggestion of a pseudopaternalistic mission to uplift or improve the natives... But, a paternalism which, however repugnant and hypocritical, was accepted broadly as being altruistic, transformed easily into hateful and violent racism. In the process a narrative was formed where aggressor became victim, bitten by the savage Oriental when reaching out with the hand of loving guidance.

Racism fuelled the atrocities of the troops in the Philippines. According to Zinn, “A volunteer from the state of Washington wrote: 'Our fighting blood was up, and we all wanted to kill 'niggers.' This shooting human beings beats rabbit hunting all to pieces.” But when Albert Beveridge spoke in the Senate, he did not recognize the viciousness of US personnel: 'It has been charged that our conduct of the war has been cruel. Senators, it has been the reverse. . . . Senators must remember that we are not dealing with Americans or Europeans. We are dealing with Orientals.' In other words, the violence and cruelty was because of the Oriental nature of the victim, not the nature of the perpetrator.

As John Bellamy Foster recounts, at least 250,000 Filipinos were killed, mostly civilians. Villages were burned with their populations interned in concentration camps. There were, “mass hangings and bayonetings of suspects, systematic rapings of women and girls, and torture. ... General Frederick Funston did not hesitate to announce that he had personally strung up a group of thirty-five Filipino civilians suspected of supporting the Filipino revolutionaries. Major Edwin Glenn saw

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641 Blum, Killing Hope, p 39.
642 Ibid.
643 Zinn, A People's History of the United States, p 306.
644 Foster, Naked Imperialism, p 125.
645 Brewer, Why America Fights, p 25.
no reason to deny the charge that he had made a group of forty-seven Filipino prisoners kneel and 'repent of their sins' before bayoneting and clubbing them to death. General Jacob Smith ordered his troops to 'kill and burn,' to target 'everything over ten,' and to turn the island of Samar into 'a howling wilderness.'

Foster goes on to note that according to official US statistics 15 times as many Filipinos were killed as were wounded, this was due mainly to the frequency of summary executions. At the end of 1900 General MacArthur declared rebels to be 'war traitors against the United States' who 'if captured are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war.'

Initial resistance to US forces was conventional, but could not withstand the superior fire-power of the US: "In the very first battle, Admiral Dewey steamed up the Pasig River and fired 500-pound shells into the Filipino trenches. Dead Filipinos were piled so high that the Americans used their bodies for breastworks. A British witness said: 'This is not war; it is simply massacre and murderous butchery.'" The Filipinos turned to guerilla warfare. The US declared itself victorious in 1902, but resistance continued for many more years, even arguably until 1935 when Moro resistance ended.

The US prevailed against the guerillas, but was it primarily against the guerillas that they were fighting? The US had lost only 4200 killed by 1902. US forces had killed over 250,000, an impressive kill ratio of over 50:1, but most of their victims were civilians. Moreover, this massively understates the number of people who died as a result of US actions:

The Americans... exceeded even the cruelest Spanish precedents in manipulating disease and hunger as weapons against an Insurgent but weakened population. Beginning with the outbreak of war in February 1899, military authorities closed all the ports, disrupting the vital inter-island trade in foodstuffs and preventing the migration of hungry laborers to food-surplus areas. Then, as drought began to turn into Famine in 1900, they authorized the systematic destruction of rice stores and livestock in areas that continued to support guerilla resistance. As historians would later point out, the ensuing campaign of terror against the rural population, backed up by a pass system and population "reconcentration," prefigured US strategy in Vietnam during the 1960s. "All palay rice, and storehouses clearly for use by enemy soldiers," writes De Bevoise, "were to be destroyed. That plan would have caused hardship for the people even had it been implemented as intended, since guerrillas and civilians often depended on the same rice stockpiles, but the food-denial program got out of hand. Increasingly unsure who was enemy and who was friend, American soldiers on patrol did not agonize over such distinctions. They shot and burned indiscriminately engaging in an orgy of destruction throughout the Philippines."

As peasants began to die of hunger in the fall of 1900, American officers openly acknowledged in correspondence that starvation had become official military strategy. ...De Bevoise concludes, "it appears that the American war contributed directly and indirectly to the loss of more than a million persons from a base population of about seven million."

The reality of the suffering inflicted by the US was kept from the US public. Brewer describes how McKinley ‘set a number of precedents for 'perception management.' ... The president called Filipino resistance an 'insurrection' and described the war as a humanitarian mission. He pioneered the management of news coverage in his effort to persuade Americans that a war to control an overseas colony did not violate their democratic principles. Note the deceptive term 'insurrection' which, like 'insurgency', means an uprising against an established order not resistance to the imposition of a new order.

While the US government ensured that news from the Philippines was censored, and promulgated distorted reports of success by the military, expansionists, led by McKinley, used a comprehensive

649 Foster, Naked Imperialism, pp 124-5.
650 Ibid, p 128.
651 Zinn, A People's History of the United States, p 309.
652 Foster, Naked Imperialism, p 126.
653 Brewer, Why America Fights , p 43.
656 Brewer, Why America Fights , pp 9-10.
campaign to sell the war to the US public. Along with the racist tropes of the 'White Man's Burden' they held out a prospect of material enrichment which was equally deceptive. According to Zinn, even some trade unions were persuaded by promises of exploitable resources and new markets for surplus goods. ‘On the other hand, when the Leather Workers' Journal wrote that an increase in wages at home would solve the problem of surplus by creating more purchasing power inside the country, the Carpenters' Journal asked: ‘How much better off are the workingmen of England through all its colonial possessions?’ The National Labor Tribune, publication of the Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, agreed that the Philippines were rich with resources, but added: ‘The same can be said of this country, but if anybody were to ask you if you owned a coal mine, a sugar plantation, or railroad you would have to say no . . . all those things are in the hands of the trusts controlled by a few. . . ’\textsuperscript{657} Even the moneyed élites of the US had prominent anti-imperialists in their ranks, inspired not only by principle but by the often certain knowledge that their own interests would be harmed by the acquisition of the Philippines, without even taking into account the impact of the expenditure of US treasury funds.\textsuperscript{658} Indeed, it proved that the Philippines did not bring any promised 'economic bonanza', and remained a drain on US resources.\textsuperscript{659}

The Philippines War has been seen as a precursor, first for the Second Indochina War and then for the occupation of Iraq – which arguably displays more correspondences. Admittedly one of the major features of the Philippines War, the confinement of the rural population to 'reconcentration' camps is absent from Iraq where the largely urban population is already concentrated and dependent. However, the political situation, the propaganda used to create support for war, the use of torture, the killing of civilians, and the destruction of access to basic human necessities are all reminiscent of the Philippines War. Howard Zinn, for example, emphasised the deceptions used to sell war on the US public.\textsuperscript{660} Kurt Vonnegut compared 'Shock and Awe' to the Moro massacre in 1906 when 900 men, women and children were all killed by US troops who suffered only 15 fatalities, leading Mark Twain to bitterly declare, 'This is incomparably the greatest victory that was ever achieved by the Christian soldiers of the United States.'\textsuperscript{661}

More interesting than the critics of the Iraq occupation, are those who support US imperialism in terms of the 'White Man's Burden'. It was the salutary mention, fittingly by British journalists in The Economist and on BBC television, that prompted Foster to revisit what actually occurred in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{662} He quotes from Max Boot's 2002 'glorification of U.S. imperialist wars' titled The Savage Wars of Peace (the title comes from Kipling's 'White Man's Burden'), 'by the standards of the day, the conduct of U.S. soldiers was better than average for colonial wars.' Boot's book ends by decrying the failure of the US to effect regime change in Iraq in 1991.\textsuperscript{663} But while the 'White Man's Burden' is explicitly racial, and thus surprising to see revived, the underlying logic (and, implicitly, the racial element) is present in other concepts and practices including the 'civilising mission', 'mandate rule', 'nation building' and the 'pottery barn rule.' These will be discussed further, but it should be noted here that just because the white race is not mentioned, it does not mean that it is not an essential part of the thinking behind a proposal or its positive reception. For example when, also in 2002, the National Review editor proposed for Iraq an 'enlightened paternalism... premised on the idea that Arabs have failed miserably at self-government and need to start anew.... The goal [would be]... a pro-Western and reasonably successful regime, somewhat between the

\textsuperscript{657} Zinn, A People's History of the United States, p 310.
\textsuperscript{658} Brewer, Why America Fights , p 28.
\textsuperscript{662} Foster, Naked Imperialism, p 121.
\textsuperscript{663} Ibid, pp 128-9.
Shah of Iran and the current government of Turkey.\footnote{664}

It is not the case, however, that the US behaved a particular way in the Philippines, Indochina and Iraq that was somehow peculiar to those conflicts. Many of the US actions in these places have precedents so consistent as to be considered doctrinal, evident particularly in the long US engagement with the Western Hemisphere.

**The War Against Japan**

On the surface the war against Japan differs in that there seems to be a credible threat to the US – or, at least, some sort of near-parity between forces. It is perhaps this sense of real endangerment, along with the fact that Japan struck first at the US, which unleashed a latent racism of extraordinary depth and virulence. But this sense of threat was illusory, notwithstanding the brutal, protracted and hard-fought nature of the Pacific War. As one historian points out 'the Japanese possessed what can best be termed a pygmy economy. Steel and coal production, at most, amounted to only one-thirteenth that of the United States; munitions production was never more than 10 percent.'\footnote{665}

Japan's reason for going to war with the US bore some similarity with Iraq's reason for invading Kuwait which will be discussed further. US and British policy had forced 'roll-back' of Japanese possessions and influence from a zenith achieved at the end of World War One.\footnote{666} From 1940 the US applied vigorous sanctions affecting strategic raw materials.\footnote{667} This affected not only the military but the sustainability of its industry as a whole. Alvin Coox describes what seems to have been the consensus view among Japanese policy makers at the time: "Unless the United States changed its policy, Japan was 'put into a desperate situation, where it must resort to the ultimate step – war – to defend itself and assure its preservation.' Even if Japan yielded and abandoned a portion of its national policy for the sake of a transient peace, America-its military posture reinforced-was bound to demand even more concessions. Eventually Japan would 'lie prostrate at the feet of the United States.'\footnote{668}

The anti-imperialist conservative Patrick Buchanan summarises the lead up to war as revealed in the recently released memoirs of Herbert Hoover which historian George Nash has edited whilst including a wealth of supporting documentation:

Inside the government was a powerful faction led by Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye that desperately did not want a war with the United States.

The "pro-Anglo-Saxon" camp included the navy, whose officers had fought alongside the U.S. and Royal navies in World War I, while the war party was centered on the army, Gen. Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, a bitter anti-American.

On July 18, 1941, Konoye ousted Matsuoka, replacing him with the "pro-Anglo-Saxon" Adm. Teijiro Toyoda.

The U.S. response: On July 25, we froze all Japanese assets in the United States, ending all exports and imports, and denying Japan the oil upon which the nation and empire depended.

Stunned, Konoye still pursued his peace policy by winning secret support from the navy and army to meet FDR on the U.S. side of the Pacific to hear and respond to U.S. demands.

U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew implored Washington not to ignore Konoye’s offer, that the prince had convinced him an agreement could be reached on Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and South and Central

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667 Coox, "The Pacific War", p 326.
668 Ibid, p 329.
China. Out of fear of Mao’s armies and Stalin’s Russia, Tokyo wanted to hold a buffer in North China.

On Aug. 28, Japan’s ambassador in Washington presented FDR a personal letter from Konoye imploring him to meet.

Tokyo begged us to keep Konoye’s offer secret, as the revelation of a Japanese prime minister’s offering to cross the Pacific to talk to an American president could imperil his government.

On Sept. 3, the Konoye letter was leaked to the Herald-Tribune.

On Sept. 6, Konoye met again at a three-hour dinner with Grew to tell him Japan now agreed with the four principles the Americans were demanding as the basis for peace. No response.

On Sept. 29, Grew sent what Hoover describes as a “prayer” to the president not to let this chance for peace pass by.

On Sept. 30, Grew wrote Washington, “Konoye’s warship is ready waiting to take him to Honolulu, Alaska, or anywhere designated by the president.”

No response. On Oct. 16, Konoye’s cabinet fell.

In November, the U.S. intercepted two new offers from Tokyo: a Plan A for an end to the China war and occupation of Indochina and, if that were rejected, a Plan B, a modus vivendi where neither side would make any new move. When presented, these, too, were rejected out of hand.

At a Nov. 25 meeting of FDR’s war council, Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s notes speak of the prevailing consensus: “The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into … firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”

“We can wipe the Japanese off the map in three months,” wrote Navy Secretary Frank Knox.

As Grew had predicted, Japan, a “hara-kiri nation,” proved more likely to fling herself into national suicide for honor than to allow herself to be humiliated.669

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a daring success on one level, but in the broadest view it was a very bad mistake. One Japanese admiral declared, 'President Roosevelt should have pinned medals on us.'670 The Japanese were realistic enough that they recognised that any sort of outright victory over the US was impossible. They relied on initial victories which would cause the US to come to terms rather than bear the cost in lives and the economic costs. Even on those terms, Prime Minister Tojo Hideki put the chances of success at only 50/50.671 As Cox writes, 'The Hawaii operation was spawned by desperation, and annihilation by the foe was a distinct possibility.'672 But the very desire for a negotiated solution reveals that the US was likely to be strategically inclined to fight a protracted all-out war which, in time, could only end in its comprehensive victory. The attack on Pearl Harbor inevitably strengthened forces in the US which either did not care about the costs, or considered them worth the eventual reward – in other words, those individuals and interests who, whether for strategic or venal reasons desired a comprehensive conflict. The immediate effect of the attack was to galvanise the US populace – its masses and its élites – with notions of vengeance and the rhetoric of extermination.673 As John Dower remarks, the Japanese leaders 'misled by disdaining stereotypes of Americans as decadent and egocentric, gave virtually no thought to the psychological consequences of their decision to attack the U.S. fleet.'674

Dower's book deals with racism on both sides of the conflict. In the US, the Japanese were regularly depicted as slavering apes or vicious little monkeys,675 or sometimes as vermin that

671 Ibid, 330.
672 Ibid, 36.
673 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 36.
674 Ibid, p 181.
675 Ibid, p 81.
needed to be exterminated such as insects and rodents.676 The violent racism of the public discourse in the US was quite astonishing in light of how little it is now remarked upon when discussing US actions. At the end of 1944 polls suggested that fully 13 percent of the US public wanted to exterminate every single Japanese person.677

Fighting in the Pacific was incredibly bitter and both sides engaged in atrocities. No one can doubt that the Japanese military, taken as a whole, committed many, many atrocities throughout WWII. All the more astonishing, then, that indications are that, when taken in isolation, Allied troops in the Pacific committed more atrocities than the Japanese. One cannot quantify the incidence of torture, but in terms of the most common atrocity of wartime, killing prisoners, surrendering enemies or those disabled by wounds, it is clear that the US far exceeded the normal levels caused by the brutality of war. According to Coox, in the taking of Attu, 'The body count totaled 2,351, but only 28 prisoners were taken, a ratio repeated throughout the Pacific War.'678 It is true that the Japanese were sometimes ordered to fight to the death, but according to a US study 84 percent of prisoners had, not unreasonably, expected death and/or torture on capture and that this was the primary reason for reluctance to surrender.679 Dower writes that ‘neither Allied fighting men nor their commanders wanted many POWs. This was not official policy, but over wide reaches of the Asian battleground it was everyday practice. The Marine battle cry on Tarawa made no bones about this: 'Kill the Jap bastards! Take no prisoners!'”680 Troops referred to themselves as 'rodent exterminators.'681 When prisoners were taken they were often massacred, perhaps leaving a few for intelligence purposes.682 In addition to torturing and killing prisoners there was very widespread mutilation of corpses and the taking of 'trophy' body-parts. This became so normal that Life featured a full page photo of ‘an attractive blonde posing with a Japanese skull she had been sent by her fiancé...,’683 whilst it became routine for customs in Hawaii to ask if there were bones in luggage.684 It was also common to extract gold teeth, sometimes from living Japanese.685

There are two psychological factors behind US atrocities which are applicable, not only in this conflict, but also those in Korea, in Indochina, in Iraq, and elsewhere. These are racism and fear. Fear is a comparatively simpler matter. Repeated exposure to fear simply brutalises people. As one Pacific War veteran told Studs Terkel when describing the descent into savagery, 'I was afraid so much, day after day, that I got tired of being scared.'686 The relevance here can be seen from the fact that at this time the Germans were systematically using fear to motivate troops in the genocidal campaign on the Western front.687 In World War II, the US took a significant step down the same path, officially being more permissive of fear (traditionally discouraged in the military), but as Grossman points out, going a little bit further than mere permissiveness: ‘Indeed, during World War II, in a widely distributed pamphlet entitled Army Life, the U.S. Army told its soldiers: 'YOU'LL BE SCARED. Sure you'll be scared. Before you go into battle you'll be frightened at the uncertainty, at the thought of being killed.' A statistician would call that biasing the sample.”688 In future conflicts fear – a racially informed fear in which distinctions between combatant and civilian were deliberately effaced – was to be systematically inculcated in US military personnel in the face of far

676 Ibid, p 91.
677 Jones, Genocide, p 54.
678 Coox, "The Pacific War", p 353.
679 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 68.
680 Ibid.
681 Bourke, The Second World War, p 96.
682 Dower, War Without Mercy, pp 70-1.
686 Terkel, The Good War, p 61.
687 Jones, Genocide, p 267.
less actual danger than that faced in the Pacific War.

US military personnel were subject to a far more intensely racist environment both in their interpersonal relations, what would now be referred to as the military 'culture', and from the very important top-down example set by commanders. US commanders were often extreme in their exterminatory rhetoric. For example Admiral William F. Halsey, whose motto was, 'Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs,' congratulated the troops in these words: ‘The sincere admiration of the entire Third Fleet is yours for the hill blasting, cave smashing extermination of 11,000 slant-eyed gophers.' Troops were exhorted to believe that the subhuman and bestial nature of the Japanese left no room for any other response than 'kill or be killed.' As early as 1943 a US Army poll indicated that about half of all soldiers believed that peace could only be achieved by killing all Japanese.

As Dave Grossman points out, 'distance' of one or more types facilitates killing. Physical distance greatly facilitates slaughter by aerial bombardment, and as Markusen and Kopf relate, even flying at a lower altitude could have a pronounced effect on bomber crews who went “brought very close to the infernos that they had created. There were times when the nauseating stench of burning flesh was trapped in the bomb bays and carried over a thousand miles back to their air bases... Wilbur Morrison recorded that after the incendiary attack on Tokyo, ‘when the crews returned to their bases, they handed in their reports with hands that shook, with shock and horror still reflected in their eyes....”

There is also psychological distance and racial dehumanisation is the most extreme form producing what Grossman refers to as 'cultural distance.' Dower is in accord: 'The dehumanisation of the Other contributed immeasurably to the psychological distancing that facilitates killing....' As Dower illustrates many times over, there was a very distinct and consistent difference in the official and media discourses regarding the German and Japanese people. On the one hand, the US was fighting the evil of the Nazis, on the other they were fighting the evil of the Japanese. Only the Japanese were a racial enemy, an absolute enemy in the sense employed by Schmitt – one which transcends the political dimension and becomes existential. Thus, in Dow's words, “the Hearst newspapers declared the war in Asia totally different from that in Europe, for Japan was a 'racial menace' as well as a cultural and religious one, and if it proved victorious in the Pacific there would be 'perpetual war between Oriental ideals and Occidental.' In other words the war was seen in terms of a Clash of Civilisations.

Evidently, then, racism was functional, but in which sense? In the sense that racism was in itself a self-replicating component of a self-replicating functional system (in this case, Western hegemony written by the ideology of white supremacy)? Certainly the fact that such racism was not deployed against the more threatening enemy, the Germans, shows that there is some truth to this. But it is also true that racism was functional in the sense that there was purposive use of racism to further strategic ends. Extant prejudice was deliberately stoked and channelled, it did not simply create a climate enabling violence without human volition. The US ran a very focussed propaganda campaign, but it was one that made extensive use of polling and even what we might now call 'focus groups' of people with influence in the community. In other words, propagandists worked

689 Ibid, p 36.
690 Bourke, The Second World War, p 96.
691 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 53.
695 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 11.
696 Ojakangas, “A terrifying world without an exterior”, p 205.
697 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 7.
698 Brewer, Why America Fights , p 103.

One racist trope worth noting here is the concept that Orientals value life, including their own, less than Occidentals do. This has been applied equally to East Asians and Arabs. The Japanese, according to a serviceman's magazine, 'isn't afraid to die. In fact he seems to like to die.' Much the same thing was said about Iraqis to the British parliament in 1930 by Chief of Air Staff Hugh Trenchard, who assured them that tribesmen 'love fighting for fighting's sake' and 'have no objection to being killed.'

It would be wrong to suggest that there is evidence that racism affects policymakers in the same manner that it affects troops. As has already been discussed, modern racism originated as a tool to maintain social stratification. In the Pacific War racism was systematically exploited to generate the will to kill in military personnel, and the public and military propaganda campaigns showed a degree of calculation that made the question of heartfelt racism on the part of any given office holder, bureaucrat or commander all but irrelevant. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the sudden switch in message after Japan's defeat, wherein the slaver ing beast became, instantaneously, a petulant wayward infant; changed overnight from an object of terror and loathing to one of humour and even paternal condescension. Dower writes of one illustration of the 'malleability of wartime stereotypes,' that 'the simian caricature was transformed into an irritated but already domesticated and even charming pet.'

The US air campaign in Japan killed about 600,000 civilians before nuclear weapons were used. This was, if one can put such immense suffering into any meaningful context, considerably less than the number of civilians who died at Japanese hands. However, there are two aspects of gratuitousness which make these deaths, and those suffered through atomic bombing, unquestionably genocidal. The first is that all but a tiny proportion of the civilian deaths occurred after it was clear to both sides that Japan had lost the war. The US was aware as early as 1941 that the defeat of Axis was inevitable given time. Cox writes, 'After the devastating loss of Saipan, [July 9, 1944] army war direction officers reached the conclusion that the war was lost and that hostilities must quickly be ended, particularly because Germany's days seemed numbered.' The majority of US fatalities in the Pacific occurred after this point and almost all of the civilian deaths occurred after March of 1945.

By this stage of the war US leaders were aware that the Japanese were seeking to surrender, and must have known that they could be brought to terms that the US (as would later become apparent) found acceptable. Although I leave the details of the matter of surrender to later, it is important to bear this in mind when dealing with the second factor which demonstrates the genocidal nature of the saturation bombing campaign against Japan. That begins with the fact that the US can not have had any reasonable surety that the mass killings of Japanese civilians would save the life of even one US individual. Indeed the previously discussed study of the effects of strategic bombing on

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700 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 89.
701 Lando, Web of Deceit, p 17.
702 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 302.
703 Ibid p 186.
704 Bourke, The Second World War, p 177.
706 Cox, "The Pacific War", p 363.
707 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 300.
708 Ibid, p 298.
Germany would suggest that such a use of resources would be counterproductive. Admittedly conditions were different in Japan, but that cuts both ways. On the one hand, it was a little easier to destroy Japanese war materiel production capacities. On the other hand, Japanese forces and even civilian society were very difficult to supply. By early 1945 the Japanese had less than one million tons of shipping left, not enough for the transport needs of even the main home islands. Diversion of resources from interdiction and direct attack on military targets can only have been counterproductive given that (as will be discussed) US leaders knew that they could avoid an armed invasion of Japan with only acceptable concessions to the conditionality of surrender. The US only began a bombing campaign against Japanese railways as the war ended. As J.K. Galbraith put it, based on his findings, 'Japanese industry did not have the same recovery capacity as the Germans.... Yet the fire bombing of Japanese cities was not a decisive factor in the war. The war in Asia was won by hard, slow progress up from the South and across the Pacific.

Indeed, the gratuitousness of the firebombing campaign is easy to infer even from the summary of the US Government's own Strategic Bombing Survey: 'Japan had been critically wounded by military defeat, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country;' and 'Even though the urban area attacks and attacks on specific industrial plants contributed a substantial percentage to the over-all decline in Japan's economy, in many segments of that economy their effects were duplicative. Most of the oil refineries were out of oil, the alumina plants out of bauxite, the steel mills lacking in ore and coke, and the munitions plants low in steel and aluminum. Japan's economy was in large measure being destroyed twice over, once by cutting off of imports, and secondly by air attack. A further tightening of Japan's shipping situation, so as to eliminate remaining imports from Korea and coastwise and inter-island shipping, coupled with an attack on Japan's extremely vulnerable railroad network, would have extended and cumulated the effects of the shipping attack already made.'

Recall here that the deliberate destruction of 'the basic economic and social fabric of the country' is exactly the sort of behaviour characterised by Lemkin as genocide. But this language is distinctly sanitised, leaving out the important consideration of the deliberate maximisation of civilian deaths.

It is worth examining the nature of aerial bombardment as it evolved during World War II because the weapon used here was not the conventional high explosive, nor even the incendiary bomb as such, but rather the fire storm, which should really be viewed as an unconventional weapon of mass destruction, more akin in its effect to the use of atomic weapons than to previous aerial bombardments.

As mentioned, the bombing of Guernica was greatly abhorred by the Allies, but the US also was consistently condemnatory of the Japanese practice of bombing Chinese cities. The Department of State condemned the practice in September of 1937 and in March and June of 1938. On the latter occasion the wording included mention of the 'slaughter of civilian populations....' 'Roosevelt himself also condemned the practice in October of 1937, and in June 1938 a resolution was introduced to the Senate condemning this 'crime against humanity.' But if the indiscriminate dropping of individual bombs on a civilian population is 'slaughter' then the all-consuming inescapable effects of a firestorm in an urban centre must surely belong in another category.

710 *United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War).*
714 For example in his division of modes of genocide – Lemkin, *Axis Rule.....*, pp 82-8.
altogether, closer to that of nuclear annihilation or extermination camps.

The firestorm effect was discovered by accident in the bombing of Hamburg, although the destruction it wrought was intended and desired. The Royal Air Force (RAF), working with US Army Air Force (USAAF) support mixed high-explosive and incendiary bombs in a very dense pattern with the intention of overwhelming firefighting forces so that uncontrollable fires would continue destruction beyond that wrought directly.716 This might nowadays be referred to as a 'force-multiplier,' or more accurately a 'tonnage multiplier.' It worked exactly as intended, but the physical effect was not one of individual fires spreading uncontrollably, igniting one building after another, it was that of a sea of fire, a single exterminating incinerator over two kilometers in diameter. In an event that was to be repeated many times before the war's end, masses were burned, asphyxiated or boiled to death. The effects are perhaps best known in the Anglophone world from Kurt Vonnegut's laconic descriptions of the aftermath of the Dresden firestorm when, as a POW, he helped clear the 'corpse mines', which was what bomb shelters had become.717 As James Carroll writes, the Hamburg firestorm saw the open initiation of a new way of war. “Methods that would be condemned out of hand if carried out by armies on the ground were becoming routine from the air. After Hamburg, civilian casualties would no longer be seen as 'collateral'; they were essential.” The RAF dropped the pretense that its bombing of civilians was a means of 'dehousing workers' and the US began to embrace the same logic and methods.718 When Japanese cities were fire-bombed, two years after the Hamburg firestorm, the facts were well understood and there was some considerable eagerness to see how well such fire-bombing would work in the far more flammable cities of Japan.719 In Tokyo in March 1945 they managed to create something that “dwarfed even the firestorms that consumed Hamburg and Dresden – a so-called sweep conflagration.”720 Although eventual death tolls of civilians were similar in Germany and Japan, in Japan the slaughter of civilians was far more systematic and focussed, using less than one eighth of the tonnage dropped on Germany.721 The size of targeted cities became ever smaller, the destruction ever more comprehensive, until by August they were firebombing cities of less than 50,000.722 As Dower reports, “one of General Douglas MacArthur's key aides, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, frankly described the U.S. air raids against Japan as 'one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history.'"723

Before Hiroshima, “a communication sent to all AAF officers flying missions daily against Japanese cities, defined what the overall goal had become: 'We intend to seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he or she is, in the greatest possible numbers, in the shortest possible time. For us there are no civilians in Japan [my emphasis]."724 Curtis LeMay later retrospectively echoed this logic, 'There are no innocent civilians. It is their government and you are fighting a people, you are not fighting an armed force anymore.'725 To be clear about this, they are stating, as if for a fact, that all of the people of a nation – including the newborn infants, the schoolchildren, the invalids, the elderly – are in some manner military targets. By any reckoning that is a lie. Any actions based on this rationale were war crimes in that they deliberately and exclusively targeted a group clearly defined as non-combatants. The attempt to redefine non-combatants can only be an aggravating

716 Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, p 21.
718 Carroll, House of War, p 81.
719 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 40.
720 Markusen and Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing, p 178.
723 Dower, War Without Mercy, p 41.
724 Carroll, House of War, p 99.
725 Ibid.
matter in that it reveals a clear degree of premeditated intent. Nor can it be said that this is an isolated result of the brutality, and totality, of World War II. William Westmoreland, in 1969, baldly claimed that absolutely no civilians had ever been killed by the US in designated free-fire zones, because no-one in a free-fire zone was a civilian, by definition.\textsuperscript{726}

One might be tempted to see this as military illogic – a blindness caused by the attractions of maximising the destructive potential of a finite amount of firepower which overlooked the fact that such a use of firepower only wastefully and incidentally contributed in reaching the sort of desirable military outcome sought under a Clausewitzian paradigm. There is, however, a strategic logic behind such acts, although not a military one. This logic would lead one to seek to weaken an entire population, not to achieve a given end or ends, nor envisaging a particular limitation in time, but with an open-ended commitment to achieving and deepening dominance through enfeebling the whole population, creating a potentially inescapable dependence or effective defencelessness. In other words, to quote a description of an ultimately very similar situation, 'the damage they do to the regime [or, in this case, Japan's military] is collateral damage in a war against society.' That is how a writer in 1999 described the sanctions regime in Iraq.\textsuperscript{727} Under Lemkin's conception the term for this sort of logic is genocide, and it is the only extant term that gives meaning to such actions. In legal terms the firebombing would clearly fit under the terms of the UNCG as genocide and I do not think that intentionality could be denied – given the repetition, the calculation and certain foreknowledge of the effects, the absence of any sound military rationale, and the explicit admissions of the deliberate and systematic killing of civilians en masse.

\textsuperscript{726} Gibson, \textit{The Perfect War}, p 135.

Chapter 5 – Korean War or Korean Genocide?

Korea has a long stable history of political unity dating from 668 CE until it was divided in 1945.728 As impressive as that is, the Koreans go further, tracing the origins of their nation to the 3rd millennium BCE,729 and their written history (albeit initially written by Chinese) precedes political unity by a millennium.730 Relations with neighbours Japan and China have varied considerably over the centuries, but it is fair to say that, as with many other Asian polities a national identity cohered sharply in reaction to the inescapable presence of China. Before there even was a Korea, there was an established tradition of heroic resistance to foreign incursion,731 and another, seen by some as portentous, of drawing foreign powers into internecine conflict.732 The 16th and 17th centuries saw Korea fight off major Japanese and Manchu invasions.733 By the time Western interests turned their eyes towards Korea, there was a general hostility towards all foreigners, which probably had its first inklings in the Mongol invasions of the 13th century.734 The attitude of what is referred to as the 'Hermit Kingdom' is summarised by Cumings as: 'We have nothing. We need nothing. Please go away.'735

Western liberal imperialists did not, and do not, recognise anyone's right to be left alone. Kanghwa Island, near Incheon, became a magnet for foreign gunboats. The French landed in 1866 and were pushed back. A heavily armed US schooner in that same year sailed up the Taedong river towards Pyongyang, opening fire on the angry crowd which gathered on the banks only to be grounded by the tide, the crew massacred. Five years later this provided the pretext for a US attack on Kanghwa. 650 Koreans were killed in what was referred as the 'Little War with the Heathen'.736 Japan, like the Western powers, also sent gunboats to Kanghwa.737 In the end it was the US that succeeded first in 'opening' the Hermit Kingdom. Britain, France and the US imposed conditions, such as extraterritoriality for their citizens (meaning they weren't subject to Korean law when in Korea), which violated Korean sovereignty. In Cumings's words: 'Korea was now fully hooked into the system of unequal treaties....'738

Cumings makes the following comparison between liberal imperialism and the long-standing tributary relationship between Korea and China, a summary which works equally well for contemporary neocolonialism:

The Sino-Korean tributary system was one of inconsequential hierarchy and real independence, if not equality. The Western system that Korea encountered, however, was one of fictive equality and real subordination. It was the British who did the most to propel the doctrine of sovereign equality around the world, confounding and undermining their imperial practice with an abstract, idealist theory that transferred notions about the free market to international politics.... [A]s Karl Polanyi put it, 'in the liberal theory, Great Britain was merely another atom in the universe... and ranked precisely on the same footing as Denmark and Guatemala.'739

It was Japan, however, that came to dominate, albeit in a very Western mode of domination, based on 'unequal treaties' and economic 'advisers'.740 Japan felt that to even keep pace with the West, it

729 E.g. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 23.
731 Ibid, p 33.
732 Ibid, p 34.
734 Ibid, p 89.
735 Ibid, p 87.
739 Ibid, p 95-6.
had to dominate Korea.  

Its initial inroads were made in pursuing the same policy as the British in exploiting late 19th century droughts to subvert Korean sovereignty, establishing the ability to force Korea to export food during subsequent droughts, causing devastating suffering. From the 1880s onwards Japan aspired to complete domination of Korea. This led to war with China in 1894-5, and Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan. Russia was the next obstacle, rebuffing a Japanese offer of accommodation over Manchuria and Korea due to what is generally held to be racist arrogance. The 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war, fought mostly over Manchuria, ended in Japanese victory. The door was open to complete Japanese domination, and in 1910 Korea was annexed. Western powers extended their blessing in exchange for Japanese recognition of their own colonial privileges.

The Japanese occupation of Korea was brutal and it was hated. Gavan McCormack poses the question of whether it could be considered genocide:

In the Korean context, Japanese colonialist policy was undoubtedly designed to destroy “Korea” as a “national group” by assimilating it within Japan. However, such measures by other twentieth-century colonialist regimes have not elsewhere been held genocidal. There has been, so to speak, a colonialist exemption, and if that exemption is to be now closed, both logic and morality demand that it be closed against all colonialist powers, not just Japan. In the overall context of the century, the use of the term “genocide” carrying as it does extreme legal and moral opprobrium, to describe acts committed by imperial Japan but not to describe any acts committed by the Western powers must be problematic. If Japan was genocidal in China or elsewhere in Asia, what then shall we say of the French in Algeria or Indochina, the Americans in Korea and Indochina and the Gulf, the Russians in Chechnya?

For obvious reasons I do not believe that there should be or is a 'colonialist exemption'. People do not exempt Germany for colonialist genocide in Southern Africa nor in Eastern Europe which was an equally colonial enterprise. What they exempt is the acts of the Western powers who were victors in WWII which and thus have to be circumspect when (accurately) accusing Italy and Japan of genocides which bear such a close resemblance to the unmentionable instances. McCormack is suggesting that the norm of a politicised discourse is a definitional norm because one simply cannot apply 'extreme legal and moral opprobrium' to the actions of Western imperialists, notwithstanding the immense death and suffering brought about. Once again 'genocide' loses all meaning and becomes simply another term for 'evil' reserved for those who are official enemies.

Prior to annexation the Japanese faced considerable guerilla resistance, but this was all but wiped out by 1910. When the annexation did take place:

At least half a million Koreans took part in demonstrations in March and April, with disturbances in more than six hundred different places. In one of the most notorious episodes, Japanese gendarmes locked protesters inside a church and burned it to the ground. In the end Japanese officials counted 553 killed and over 12,000 arrested, but Korean nationalist sources put the totals at 7,500 killed and 45,000 arrested.

Once annexation had taken place there was a decade of particularly oppressive rule:

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742 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p 92.
744 Iriye, “Japan's Drive to Great Power Status”, p 759.
745 Ibid, p 767.
748 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 145.
751 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 146.
752 Ibid, p 145.
The military rule period culminated in a mass mobilisation of protest in 1919 and a particularly bloody repression, but one which provoked international outrage and a backlash in Japan itself. After this period the level of oppression gradually and unevenly diminished – 'if neither the depth nor the tempo of colonial reform went far in meeting the Koreans' legitimate demands, the more overtly arbitrary and oppressive aspects of Japanese administration were at least muted throughout the empire during this decade, and the effort to construct modern economic facilities and institutions in the colonies continued apace.' The Koreans were not to be 'assimilated' as McCormack suggests, but rather incorporated, as Koreans, under Japanese hegemony, and Japan became viewed as a 'respectable colonial power' which tells us something about the standards of the time. If anything the promise of assimilation into a 'Greater Japanese Race' was a false one akin to British promises to coloured people that they too could essentially become British though they would never be accepted as such. Even now 'Koreans' who have lived in Japan for multiple generations are denied citizenship and “Japanese families still pore over genealogies to make sure their daughters' fiancés have no 'Korean blood.' There were however, significant efforts to degrade Korean culture (and emplace aspects of Japanese culture) which amply fulfil Lemkin's cultural criteria for genocide.

The Japanese brought considerable economic infrastructure, industrial development and education. They acted in the developmentalist manner often falsely attributed to Western imperialists more inclined to extraction of raw materials and the destruction of local economies. Even this, however, was of little or no immediate benefit to the mass of Koreans whose national economy was enslaved to the needs of Japan. Indeed, it seems inevitable that this colonial developmentalism had nothing to do with paternalistic ideologies of empire (although the Japanese did have their own equivalent of the White Man's Burden) and everything to do with strategic considerations. One of two strategic approaches in Japanese thought was the 'northern advance' strategy which held sway in the Army. This would see the Japanese project power into North East Asia, ostensibly as a defence against Russian/Soviet threats. The obvious role for the Korean peninsula in such a scenario was as a form of beachhead with a developed industrial and transport infrastructure along with a native population capable of operating such.

World War II saw an elevation of some loyal Koreans by the manpower hungry Japan to positions...

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754 Ibid, p 234.
756 Ibid.
759 'Northern advance and southern advance were somewhat more ambiguous terms. The first was generally understood to mean a policy of continental expansion from the Korean peninsula through Manchuria into China proper; the second was understood to mean expansion from Taiwan into south China and Southeast Asia. Army-first meant that the army would carry the main burden of expansion, whereas navy-first implied that the navy would. There was a tendency for greater Japanism [which sought to make Japan a Great Power] to go hand in hand with northern advance, which in turn implied continental expansion and an army-first policy. Little Japanism tended to be associated with the southern advance and navy-first positions.' Hata, “Continental expansion, 1905-1941”, p 271.
of bureaucratic power and to commissions within the military.\textsuperscript{760} Simultaneously there was a surge of active resistance with Koreans making up the largest single ethnic group among the guerrillas resisting the Japanese in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{761} Anti-Japanese activity was to become the key source of legitimacy in the post-war era based on perceived dedication, sacrifice and efficacy. As Keith Pratt puts it the Koreans populated their world with heroes and villains and up until June 1950 (and to a large extent thereafter) the only significant factor in terms of leadership (notwithstanding differences in ideology) was whether one had been a resistor (hero) or a collaborator (villain).\textsuperscript{762} This greatly favoured Kim Il Sung, who was particularly effective as an anti-Japanese guerilla leader and whom the Japanese had inadvertently boosted by media features pitting him against Korean quislings such Kim Sok-won [later an important General in the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROKA)] who was part of the 'Special Kim Detachment' of the Japanese Army.\textsuperscript{763}

The communists were aware of Kim's standing and 'just before the Manchurian guerrillas returned to Korea, the top leaders such as Kim Il Sung, Kim Chaek, Choe Hyon, Kim II, and Choe Yong-gon agreed among themselves to promote Kim Il Sung as the maximum figure, for reasons that included his wider reputation and his personal force. By some indexes the others outranked him; Kim Chaek and Choe Hyon stood higher than Kim in Chinese communist hierarchy.'\textsuperscript{764} Kim wasn't in the same completely unrivalled position that Ho Chi Minh was consolidating in Vietnam, but he was a clear front runner and was both charismatic and politically able. Years of bitter violent struggle alongside disparate inchoate guerillas 'left Kim Il Sung with a conviction: unity above all else, and by whatever means necessary....'\textsuperscript{765} That is to say, Korean unity, not proletarian and/or peasant unity.

Something of the significance of Kim's success as a guerilla can be gleaned from the fact that the ROK insisted that the DPRK leader was an imposter, a criminal who had taken the famous guerilla's name. This lie was adhered to and believed by South Koreans until 1989.\textsuperscript{766} Indeed, it was not only Kim who sported such nationalist credentials in the DPRK regime. The DPRK would become what Cumings refers to as a 'guerilla state' with positions of authority occupied by those who had fought the Japanese and had 'impeccable credentials' of suffering and loss.\textsuperscript{767}

The DPRK regime came about due to the Soviet occupation of North Korea. The day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the US unilaterally declared a division of Korea along the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel and an intention to occupy the southern part.\textsuperscript{768} From the Soviet perspective this meant ceding control of Seoul to the US. It meant that the greatest concentration of communists, in the South, would be under US occupation while the greatest concentration of Christians would be under Soviet occupation. It meant dividing the agricultural South from a North which was not, and is still not, able to even securely feed its population. Yet the Soviets acceded with great willingness. To understand why this occurred in such a manner and to understand subsequent US/USSR actions is quite straightforward. All of these events make perfect sense if one abandons notions of the relevance not only of ideology, but of culture and, for that matter, of leader's personalities. If it helps, one might abandon the baggage that is attached when discussing state acts by envisaging instead competing criminal syndicates engaged in a constant dialectic of conflict, accommodation and co-operation in various areas of interest.

The Soviets stood to gain access to ice free ports. This was more tangible than anything the US might want, but fundamentally less important. Hence Stalin was quite prepared to cede the entire

\textsuperscript{760} Cumings, \textit{Korea's Place in the Sun}, p 176.
\textsuperscript{761} Ibid, p 160.
\textsuperscript{762} Pratt, \textit{Everlasting Flower}, pp 235-40.
\textsuperscript{764} Cumings, \textit{Korea's Place in the Sun}, p 195.
\textsuperscript{765} Cumings, \textit{The Korean War}, p 55.
\textsuperscript{766} Ibid, p 46.
\textsuperscript{767} Ibid, p 56.
\textsuperscript{768} Ibid, p 104.
peninsula to the US rather than risk the consequences of their defeat after the Chinese entered the war in force.\textsuperscript{769} The USSR was faced with a problem in that they stood to gain precisely nothing, in all likelihood, from a unified Korea under a Kim II Sung. Though Kim's faction of communist guerillas had been based in the Soviet Union for a time, he was fiercely nationalist and, for good reasons, had no great love or trust for Stalin's regime (even though Stalin was officially the 'Great Leader' to all Communists).\textsuperscript{770} Further, all Korean Communist factions had, to a greater or lesser extent, very strong bonds with the CCP and PLA in China, whose potentially dangerous independence was soon to loom much larger in Soviet calculations than access to Korean ports. Thus the Soviets stood to gain far more from a constrained and dependent Communist regime ruling a fragile half-state than it would gain with an officially ideologically aligned, but fully independent, Communist regime ruling over a potentially strong state of unified Korea. As William Stueck comments, '...for the present a divided peninsula served Soviet interests better than a unified one....'\textsuperscript{771} Where I would differ from Stueck is in his clear implication that a unified Korea would ever be likely to serve 'Soviet interests' in the Cold War paradigm of imperialism.

The US Occupation and its Imperial Context

As has been touched on, the US strategic approach underwent metamorphosis during World War II. Germany was no longer to be at the centre of a Grand Area, while Russia was. Further, of the four Grand Areas, the three not under Soviet control were to be a Western condominium under US hegemony. One of the many things that the Korean War allowed the US to achieve was the stimulation of the Japanese economy desired because it was to be the centre of one of the Grand Areas.\textsuperscript{772}

The strategic logic of the Grand Area strategy was that of securing strategic resources, the same type of logic which had led the Japanese into open-ended imperial aggression. The 'Grand Area Strategy' was not about opposing communism, it was about US domination. It was intended to secure the 'limitation of any exercise of sovereignty' in 'an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States.'\textsuperscript{773} This strategy came from planning conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) prior to the US entry into the war. Seeing the potential disruption to trade of the nascent World War, the council concluded that "as a minimum, the American 'national interests' involved the free access to markets and raw materials in the British Empire, the Far East, and the entire Western hemisphere."\textsuperscript{774} Their recommendation, therefore, was for 'complete re-armament', but as Hossein-zadeh points out they were soon thinking beyond the defeat of the Axis powers:

Although the Grand Area was designed as a war-time economic and military framework in reaction to Germany’s expansionist policies, the United States also simultaneously made tentative plans for beyond the war: to expand the Grand Area to include continental Europe once the Axis Alliance was defeated, thereby making the Grand Area global: The Grand Area, as the United States-led non-German bloc was called during 1941, was only an interim measure to deal with the emergency situation of 1940 and early 1941. The preferred ideal was even more grandiose – one world economy dominated by the United States. The Economic and Financial Group [of the Council] said in June 1941, 'the Grand Area is not regarded by the Group as more desirable than a world economy, nor as an entirely satisfactory substitute.'\textsuperscript{775}

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770 Ibid, p 57.
773 The Council on Foreign Relations, quoted in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, p 15.
775 Ibid, pp 45-6.
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The creation of a bipolar system favoured both sides, facilitating the construction of a Soviet empire as well as that of US empire. This would certainly explain the contradiction between Stalin's rhetoric and behaviour. Many see Stalin as having been obeisant to superior Western strength: "To accommodate the United States and other Western powers in the hope of peaceful coexistence, Stalin often advised, and sometimes ordered, the pro-Moscow communist/leftist parties in Europe and elsewhere in the world to refrain from revolutionary policies that might jeopardize the hoped-for chances of coexistence. The Soviet leader 'scoffed at communism in Germany,' writes historian [D.F.] Fleming, 'urged the Italian Reds to make peace with the monarchy, did his best to induce Mao Tsetung to come to terms with the Kuomintang and angrily demanded of Tito that he back the monarchy, thus fulfilling his (Stalin's) bargain with Churchill.' But Stalin also threw the first punch in the war of words which was a key element of the Cold War – if only as a disingenuous theatrical display. Indeed, both Stalin and Churchill preceded US officials in both declaring implacable enmity for implicit or explicit ideological reasons in February and March of 1946. But Churchill spoke at the behest of US officials, and out of the public arena, also in February, was written George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' where he concurred that the Soviet Union was by its very nature an enemy. Of course, the Soviet Union had been severely battered by World War II and was not naturally as wealthy and powerful as the US so Kennan could not actually make any claims that such enmity constituted a military threat. He concluded, 'it is not entirely a military threat, I doubt that it can be effectively met entirely by military means.' Nevertheless he made the danger posed seem high and Dean Acheson commented that 'his predictions and warning could not have been better.' Acheson's emphasis should be seen in context of his later comment that he felt it necessary "to bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' with the Communist threat." He described this process in the following terms, recalling an address in 1947: 'In the past eighteen months, I said, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough there might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel... the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France....' Such hyperbole, as Chomsky points out, was patently disingenuous as Acheson was in a position to know that his threats were completely implausible. Fear of the Soviet threat began to make an impact in the US news media in 1948, at a time when Soviet society, in particular the Red Army, was on the verge of total collapse.

The other key part of the containment paradigm under which the US was to operate was established by the passage of NSC-68 through Congress. In Mark Moyar's words President Harry Truman 'was reluctant to embrace NSC-68, but events – especially the Korean War – led him to accept its main tenets by the middle of 1950.' Brian Bogart has this to say: 'Along with then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and without any expertise in Russian history or Soviet affairs, Nitze convinced – some say coerced – Truman into recognizing the Soviet Union as an evil and imminent threat, and into signing NSC-68 and launching the Cold War. After NSC-68 was signed, it needed the approval of Congress. Post-Cold War documents suggest that the Korean War was triggered by Americans and South Koreans for this purpose.' The Soviet Union was officially designated as an

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779 Ibid.
782 Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, p 426 n 53.
inextricably essential enemy, eternally hostile and aggressive, who could never be negotiated with unless they completely renounced their ideology and embraced Western norms and systems of governance.784 This established the preeminence of the military as the key economic consideration for US governments. It also enshrined a policy of the perpetual maintenance of US military supremacy.785 In other words the US was to be put in a endless state of wartime economic functioning. The espoused ideological opposition to communism was merely a tool to facilitate a highly militarised interventionist global hegemony. Ironically, or perhaps revealingly, Kennan's famous 'X' article (an article published in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym 'X' which many consider the ideological basis of containment) about Soviet power made much the same observation of the instrumental motives behind the Soviet Union's show of adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology. 786

The fact is that the US aimed to create, almost at a stroke, the largest empire in human history, trading on unprecedented economic and military predominance to create permanent dominion. Where all other major industrial areas of the world had been destroyed or crippled by the war, US industry had grown rapidly, accounting for fully half of the entire world's manufacturing capacity

by the war's end, and growing to 60% by 1950.787 They had retained all of their gold reserves which had reached 75% of the world's total reserves in the 1930s thanks to the dogged pursuance of debts incurred in the previous World War.788 They had broken their own previous record as the largest creditor state in history. 789 The US had an unparalleled degree of political capital, the cruelties of Axis occupation making it widely seen as a liberator. Less tainted than other allies by imperialist practices, colonial people's viewed it as genuinely adherent to the Atlantic Charter's promise to 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.... 790

The US was able to use such advantages to further its dominance by creating supranational economic institutions – the Bretton Woods institutions of the 'World Bank' and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – which it could effectively control. The US directly appoints the president of the World Bank, while both it and the IMF were created with voting powers assigned almost exclusively on the basis of who put the most money in. The US thus bought over one third of the votes of the World Bank at the outset, and had a similar percentage of IMF votes. 791 (Since that time voting rights have become even more skewed in favour of powerful states and the Bretton Woods institutions have been transformed into a tool for allowing those powerful states to exercise effective economic sovereignty becoming, in Naomi Klein's words, 'the primary vehicles for the advancement of the corporatist crusade.') 792

The US also played a large role in deciding the constitution of the United Nations. In effect the United Nations became a tool of US foreign policy. As Noam Chomsky explains:

The dominant élite [US] view with regard to the UN was well expressed in 1992 by Francis Fukuyama, who

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785 Fakiolas, "Kennan's long telegram and NSC-68", pp 421-3.
786 Robert L. Hutchings, 'X + 9/11: everything I needed to know about fighting terrorism I learned from George F. Kennan', Foreign Policy, 143 (July-August 2004), p 70.
788 Hudson, Super Imperialism, p 23.
789 Ibid., p 16.
791 The Bretton Woods Agreements, 31 July 1945, Article V, Section 3; Article XI, Section 3; Article XX, Section 4. Retrieved 10 January 2010 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad047.asp.
792 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, p 163.
had served in the Reagan-Bush State Department: the UN is 'perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism and indeed may be the primary mechanism through which that unilateralism will be exercised in the future.' His prediction proved accurate, presumably because it was based on consistent practice going back to the early days of the UN. At that time, the state of the world guaranteed that the UN would be virtually an instrument of US power. The institution was greatly admired, though élite distaste for it increased notably in subsequent years. The shift of attitude roughly traced the course of decolonization, which opened a small window for the tyranny of the majority', that is, for concerns emanating from outside the centers of concentrated power that the business press calls the 'de facto world government' of 'the masters of the universe.'

When the UN fails to serve as 'an instrument of American unilateralism' on issues of élite concern, it is dismissed. One of many illustrations is the record of vetoes. Since the 1960s the US has been far in the lead in vetoing Security Council resolutions on a wide range of issues, even those calling on states to observe international law. Britain is second, France and Russia far behind. Even that record is skewed by the fact that Washington's enormous power often compels the weakening of resolutions to which it objects, or keeps crucial matters off the agenda entirely Washington's wars in Indochina, to cite one example that was of more than a little concern to the world.790

Thus the Korean War served as a necessary catalyst to achieving the crucial militarised component of US dominance. Cumings joins those who focus more broadly on US imperialism (Chomsky, Kolko, Hossein-Zadeh, Bacevich, Johnson and many more) in iterating the centrality of the Korean War in transforming US society, creating the 'military-industrial complex' and facilitating global domination, because it allowed NSC-68 to be enacted and validated, however deceptively. Cumings also emphasises the late-1949 NSC-48 which established a 'Monroe Doctrine'-like right of intervention to prevent sovereign entities from, among other things, 'general industrialisation' which might come at the cost of 'comparative advantage'.794 Thus the Korean War was not merely a catalyst for the establishment of domestic and international institutions of empire, it was a prime exemplar of the manner in which military force was to be used to enforce imperial hegemony. To understand why genocide was employed, it is necessary to again examine precedents adopted by the US from the British empire.

The use, in NSC-48, of the term 'comparative advantage' is telling. Taken from the classical economist David Ricardo, it is, consciously or unconsciously, a dishonest way of referring to Kennan's 'pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain a position of disparity.'795 Thus the continuity of imperial practices with those of the British, who also utilised Ricardo as an excuse for preventing development among dependencies. Ricardian liberalism played the role that the Friedmanite neoliberalism and monetarism of the Washington Consensus plays today – that of 'useful foolishness' to use Hudson's words.796 In arrogating to itself such a wide imperium, the US had a problem. Billions of people were in the process of achieving independence from formal colonial control, how then would the US ensure that their resources remained at its disposal as was called for in Grand Area planning? In order to do that one must maintain the dependency that attends colonial economic relations. In the early 19th century Britain had already started extending such relations without formal control as has already been described. To do so, they employed Ricardo and Adam Smith. Korean economist Ha Joon Chang quotes Friedrich List in 1840 who wrote:

> It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt and of all his successors in the British Government administrations.

Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the

793 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, pp 29-30.
794 Cumings, The Korean War, pp 211-4 et passim.
795 See Chapter 1.
796 Hudson, Super Imperialism, p 32.
benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.797

There was a further problem for the US explained by Michael Hudson:

...[T]he U.S. balance of payments had reached a surplus level unattained by any other nation in history. It had an embarrassment of riches, and now required a payments deficit to promote foreign export markets and world currency stability. Foreigners could not buy American exports without a means of payment, and private creditors were not eager to extend further loans to countries that were not creditworthy. The Korean War seemed to resolve this set of problems by shifting the U.S. balance of payments into deficit. Confrontation with Communism became a catalyst for U.S. military and aid programs abroad. Congress was much more willing to provide countries with dollars via anti-Communist or national defense programs than by outright gifts or loans, and after the Korean War America’s military spending in the NATO and SEATO countries seemed to be a relatively bloodless form of international monetary support. In country after country, military spending and aid programs provided a reflux of some of the foreign gold that the United States had absorbed during the late 1940s.798

Obviously, this was not a sustainable solution – in fact it was the 2nd Indochina War which half-forced and half-facilitated a more long-term solution. (That solution, which is referred to by Hudson as 'superimperialism', was to become another cause of genocide and its main component, 'petrodollar recycling' is outlined in Appendix J.) Unsustainable though the Korean War era system may have been, there is a certain elegance to combining in one single programme a massive change (the creation of the Cold War) which militarised society and provided both the weaponry and ideological pretext for intervention in maintaining a newly minted empire while yet addressing the unwelcome effects of the desired economic predominance by providing currency but in such a way that, since it came in the form of military aid, could be used to deepen dependency whilst not providing any means for unwelcome economic development.

To understand how such a system might work it is necessary to examine some exemplars of US 'neocolonial' practices. For clients the US may often choose the established latifundistas,799 of traditional imperialism. Galeano describes the modern role of the latifundia: 'Subordinated to foreign needs and often financed from abroad... the present-day latifundio [is] one of the bottlenecks that choke economic development and condemn the masses to poverty and a marginal existence in Latin America today. ... [I]t merely needs to pay ridiculously low or in-kind wages, or to obtain labor for nothing in return for the laborer's use of a minute piece of land.800

Simultaneously, however, the US has shown a preference for two other forms of client oligarchy – kleptocracy and militarised authoritarianism. These are not exclusive categories, with many regimes embodying all three.

The US love of kleptocrats can be seen in their choice of whom to elevate when overthrowing or attempting to overthrow various governments. US invasions of Nicaragua, Cuba and Haiti led to the instalation of Batista, the Duvaliers, and the Somozas – all notorious for corruption and brutality.801 Mobutu Sese Seko, who came to power 'in a military coup designed by the United States,802 would steal an estimated $5 billion in his US supported time as dictator.803 The Contras were mainly, according to one NSC staffer, 'liars motivated by greed and the desire for power, and charged that the war had become a business for them. They attacked bridges, electric generators,
but also state-owned agricultural co-operatives, rural health clinics, villages and non-combatants.\textsuperscript{804} Manuel Noriega was known for certain to be dealing drugs from 1971, but remained on the US payroll and continued to get diplomatic support until 1986. By this stage he was no longer involved in the drug trade.\textsuperscript{805}

This is very far from a complete list of corrupt US clients, and is not because, as is often construed, the US was completely amoral with regard to its choice of clients, not caring if they were brutal and venal. The orthodox criticism is that the US only cared for leaders that were friendly to US commercial interests and (during the Cold War) were steadfastly anticommunist, without any reference to their venality or brutal treatment of their own people. This attitude is supposedly exemplified by Franklin Roosevelt's comment about Somoza: 'He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch.'\textsuperscript{806} Far from being neutral on the question of venality, there is an obvious strategic imperative which explains why, despite some political cost, the US has preferred to extend patronage to those it knows to be corrupt, namely that the corrupt and the greedy will put the interests of their paymasters ahead of those of their own people.

A similar logic to the preference for venality also applied to a preference for brutal authoritarianism. The US developed a particular facility for creating military dependence by fostering a military elite reliant on US military aid and faced with a hostile populace, often accompanied by varying degrees of insurgent activity or civil war which bore the hallmarks of war systems.\textsuperscript{807} In Iran, for example, the CIA's first coup, considered at the time 'its greatest single triumph,'\textsuperscript{808} installed the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahleivi in a position of supreme power. The CIA 'wove itself into Iran's political culture.'\textsuperscript{809} They created SAVAK, a notorious 'intelligence' agency, trained in torture by the CIA\textsuperscript{810} and supported by the CIA and DIA in a domestic and international dissident assassination programme.\textsuperscript{811} Repression was at its peak between 1970 and 1976 resulting in 10,000 deaths.\textsuperscript{812} By 1976 Amnesty International's secretary general commented that Iran had 'the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture that is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse record of human rights than Iran.'\textsuperscript{813} Nafeez Ahmed cites the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) who detail an extensive police state of intense surveillance and informant networks and torture 'passed on to it' by US, UK and Israeli intelligence. Ahmed quotes the FAS on methods including 'electric shock, whipping, beating, inserting broken glass and pouring boiling water into the rectum, tying weights to the testicles, and the extraction of teeth and nails.'\textsuperscript{814} Racism allows commentators such as Tim Weiner to blithely exculpate the CIA of fundamental guilt: 'The CIA wanted SAVAK to serve as its eyes and ears against the Soviets. The shah wanted a secret police to protect his power.'\textsuperscript{815} After all, what could civilised Westerners teach Orientals about torture? But something of the real US attitude to such repression can be seen in the official reaction to the unrest developing in the late 1970s. Aside from US officials

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\item \textsuperscript{804} Ibid, p 166.
\item \textsuperscript{805} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, pp 306-8.
\item \textsuperscript{807} The essence of a war system is that no decision should be reached.
\item \textsuperscript{808} Weiner, \textit{Legacy of Ashes}, p 105.
\item \textsuperscript{809} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{810} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 72.
\item \textsuperscript{812} Gareau, \textit{State Terrorism and the United States}, p 173.
\item \textsuperscript{813} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 72.
\item \textsuperscript{815} Tim Weiner, \textit{Legacy of Ashes}, p 105.
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consistently urging and praising military responses to protest action, including inevitable massacres,\(^{816}\) the US ambassador objected strongly to a reduction in repression. In June 1978 he reported his finding, 'the Shah's new directives to his security forces, such as instructions to desist from torture... are disorienting.'\(^{817}\) The funny thing about this was that it occurred after the US had forced the Shah into the liberalisation that set loose the forces that were to rip his regime apart.\(^{818}\) This may seem puzzling, but it made more sense for the US to push Iran into the easily vilified 'enemy' hands of an Islamic theocracy than to try to maintain control over a Shah determined to develop his populous oil-rich country independently.

Hard on the heels of Operation Ajax, which overthrew Iran's government, was Operation Success in Guatemala. According to Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, the US operation was the 'principle cause' of the overthrow of the Arbenz government\(^{819}\) – not a communist government but in the words of Ambassador 'Pistol-packing' Jack Puerifoy, who had worked closely with the CIA, 'if the president is not a communist, he will certainly do until one comes along.'\(^{820}\) What followed was a 35 year 'dirty war'. Although there were guerillas, according to Frederick Gareau the findings of two truth commissions make it clear that this was a case of 'government repression and terror rather than guerilla warfare.'\(^{821}\) The UN estimates that over 200,000 were killed. 93% of tortures, disappearances and executions were committed by government forces; 3% by guerilla's and 4% described as 'private'. 'In a majority of the massacres committed by the state, especially by the army, the counterinsurgency strategy led to multiple acts of savagery such as the killing of defenceless children, often by beating them against walls...; impaling the victims; amputating their limbs; burning them alive; extracting their viscera while still alive and in the presence of others... and opening the wombs of pregnant women.' A favoured way of torturing to death was to stab someone then throw them into a pit where they would be burnt to death.\(^{822}\) As Adam Jones notes: "Finally, the Commission's report took the important step of labeling the Guatemalan government's campaign as genocidal. All Maya had been designated as supporters of communism and terrorism, the report noted, leading to 'aggressive, racist and extremely cruel... violations that resulted in the massive extermination of defenseless Mayan communities.'\(^{823}\)

In 1963 when the President, General Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes who was nearing the end of a 6 year term, allowed the return of a popular reformist exile who the US felt likely to become the next president, the US instigated a coup to bring Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia to power. Peralta inaugurated his presidency by having eight political and union leaders murdered by means of driving over them in rock-laden trucks.\(^{824}\) By this time Guatemala was experiencing protest action in cities and a small guerilla movement in the country, incorporating remnants of a nationalist military uprising crushed in 1960, largely by the CIA's aerial bombardment.\(^{825}\) The US pushed for a military response.\(^{826}\) From 1960 military assistance began a steady climb, peaking in 1963 at the time of the coup but continued at a high level thereafter.\(^{827}\) In 1966 the US began taking more of an

\(^{816}\) Ahmed, *Behind the War on Terror*, pp 43-5.

\(^{817}\) Ibid, p 45.


\(^{822}\) Ibid, pp 45-7.

\(^{823}\) Jones, *Genocide*, p 77.

\(^{824}\) Blum, *Killing Hope*, p 231.

\(^{825}\) Ibid, p 148.

\(^{826}\) Ibid, p 230.

\(^{827}\) Ibarra, "The culture of terror and Cold War in Guatemala", p 199.
active role.\textsuperscript{828} From this point, and through the seventies, death squads increased in number, coinciding with an increase in US personnel – reaching 1000 Green Berets in addition to advisors,\textsuperscript{829} in a country with an army of only 5000.\textsuperscript{830} The Green Berets gave instruction on 'interrogation', while US pilots dropped napalm on those unfortunate enough to be in a '\textit{zona libre}' – a free-fire zone.\textsuperscript{831}

The 'war' was conducted primarily against noncombatants, involving mainly massacres of Mayans and 'forced disappearances' or tortures and executions of those considered politically suspect. This is true to such an extent that none of the accounts I have read of the 'war' actually mentions combat or the deaths of guerillas.\textsuperscript{832} The initial guerilla movement was 'all but wiped-out' by 1968,\textsuperscript{833} but a stronger movement arose in 1970s.\textsuperscript{834} As with Argentina's 'dirty war' the guerillas became the rationale for a war against the civilian population.\textsuperscript{835} The atrocities, in turn, must surely have fuelled the insurgency. As Greg Grandin remarks, 'Guatemala was one of the first Latin American countries to develop both a socialist insurgency \textit{and} an anticommunist counterinsurgency. Practices the United States rehearsed in Guatemala would be applied throughout Latin America in the coming decades.\textsuperscript{836}

Guatemala went through the transition to 'façade democracy' of the kind that was to become notorious under the regime of José Napoléon Duarte in El Salvador. As Julio Godoy wrote in \textit{The Nation} in 1990: 'In Guatemala and El Salvador the electoral alternative that emerged during the 1980s as a response to the 1979 Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua, and to the guerilla warfare at home, is hypocritical and empty of democratic content. Under the electoral façade – the civilian regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador are just a public relations game, aimed at the international community – almighty armies rule these countries, with a discretionary degree of public presence.'\textsuperscript{837} In Guatemala this transition saw 'a passing from the open terror that distinguished old dictatorships to the clandestine terror that was the most popular resource amongst the military dictatorship.'\textsuperscript{838} 'Clandestine terror' and military dictatorship disguised in 'façade democracy' was far bloodier than 'open terror' with the greatest single period of genocidal mass murder occurring in the early 1980s. As Jones relates: 'In just six years, some 440 Indian villages were obliterated and some 200,000 Indians massacred, often after torture, in scenes fully comparable to the early phase of Spanish colonization half a millennium earlier. The genocide proceeded with the enthusiastic support of the Reagan administration in the US, which reinstated aid to the Guatemalan military and security forces when it took power in 1981.'\textsuperscript{839}

On the surface events in Iran and Guatemala suggest that US neocolonialism follows a materialist pattern, with events being driven by the profit motive. In Iran events were triggered by a threat to the extremely lucrative agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corporation. In 1950 'the AIOC earned some £200 million profit from its Iranian operations, but only paid the Iranian

\textsuperscript{828} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 232.
\textsuperscript{829} Ibarra, "The culture of terror and Cold War in Guatemala", p 201.
\textsuperscript{830} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 232.
\textsuperscript{831} Ibid, p 233.
\textsuperscript{832} Admittedly this is due to their focus on genocide or human rights abuses, but it is indicative of how, as with the Argentine 'dirty war' actual combat was a secondary consideration (see Chapter 3).
\textsuperscript{833} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 235. According to Blum this was the indirect result of the terrorism directed against the rural population.
\textsuperscript{834} Jones, \textit{Genocide}, p 77.
\textsuperscript{835} See Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{838} Ibarra, "The culture of terror and Cold War in Guatemala,", p 201.
\textsuperscript{839} Jones, \textit{Genocide}, p 77.
government £16 million in royalties, profit share and taxes. ... In fact, the British government, a Labour government, was receiving substantially more in taxes from the AIOC’s Iranian operations than the Iranian government itself. And this was a company in which the British government held a 51 percent interest. The injustice was compounded by the fact that Iranian oil cost more in Iran than it did in Britain with the Royal Navy in particular, receiving substantial discounts. The Iranians could buy oil from the Soviet Union at a cheaper price than they could buy it from the AIOC. 

Popular opposition to the renewal of the agreements set in train events which ended with the nationalisation of Iran's oil industry. In response the UK enlisted US co-operation in a very comprehensive and meticulous plan for destabilisation and overthrow of the Iranian government, beginning with two years of very severe economic warfare which dragged Iran to the edge of a precipice. Planning began in Nicosia, involving both the CIA and the Security Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6) but was finalised by the SIS. The CIA’s involvement was in direct contravention of US policy, which supported Mossadeq, and Frank Wisner, head of covert operations, commented that at times the ‘CIA makes policy by default.’

The ‘London Draft’ of ‘Operation Ajax’ clearly drew on more than a century of British experience in informal imperialist manipulation. It must have been quite an education for the CIA as it became the standard model for many future overthrow operations. The irony is that almost none of it went according to plan. The propaganda and economic warfare programmes were very successful but all of the clever manoeuvres planned for the actual coup fell flat. The US succeeded in the end by throwing money at the problem, hiring goons to riot, attack Tudeh (communist) gatherings, and even to conduct false-flag riots disguised as Tudeh. The US bribed Mullahs and used a combination of threats and bribery on officials. The US had learnt from the British, but had invented their own style of using massive injections of cash and profligate violence which was not clandestine, but was loosely deniable.

Though not intended for public consumption, the draft Ajax plan typified the duplicity and Orwellianism of Cold War documents. It opened: 'The policy of both the U.S. and UK governments requires replacement of Mossadeq as the alternative to certain economic collapse in Iran and the eventual loss of the area to the Soviet orbit. Only through a planned and controlled replacement can the integrity and independence of the country be ensured.' Of course, the circumstances which were cited as justification were entirely and deliberately the result of the British led economic warfare programme, but, in case the point had been missed, it continued later: 'Both governments consider the oil issue of secondary importance at this time, since the major is the resolve for both governments to maintain the independence of Iran.'

842 Engdahl, A Century of War, p 111.
845 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p 95.
847 Ibid, p 103.
848 Ibid, p 95.
850 Ibid, p 95.
851 Ibid, passim.
852 It was not available to the public until 2000.
854 Ibid, p 5.
In Guatemala the profit motive is even further to the fore. As mentioned, Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles, planners of both Iran and Guatemala coups, had links to the United Fruit Company (UFC). The reformist Arbenz government expropriated uncultivated UFC land for the purposes of land reform and paid only the $525,000 at which the UFC had valued the land for tax purposes. The UFC wanted $16 million.\textsuperscript{855} In the final analysis, however, maintaining a situation of economic dependence is not only a means by which surpluses can be extracted to the benefit of commercial interests, the neglected fact is that it is also a mode of domination, and the ongoing decades of US intervention in Guatemala cannot be explained by an immediate concern for the profits of the UFC, no matter how well connected. The overthrow of the Arbenz government ended reformist, redistributive and developmentalist programmes.\textsuperscript{856} The cost of the ensuing 'war', in both the destruction of property and the diversion of economic resources, was estimated to have reached 121 percent of gross domestic product by 1990.\textsuperscript{857} The burden of this fell on the poor, and more particularly on the Mayan majority, ensuring the continuance of the crushing genocidal poverty alluded to by Eduardo Galeano.\textsuperscript{858} The inevitable stratification leads to a situation where the interests of landowning oligarchs, like those of the military, are tied firmly to those of the imperial power, not those of Guatemala. Likewise, a corrupt comprador class, not necessarily separate from the military and landowners, receives the benefit of US 'aid' by acting as local intermediaries.\textsuperscript{859}

Thus one can see that there truly was an elegance to the militarised imperial system invented by the US, the system implemented in the ROK. Client leaders such as Syngman Rhee needed the military aid furnished to them in order to suppress populations made restive by the very economic policies forced on them by the US. They were not only economic dependencies, but military dependencies, not dependent to guard against foreign aggression but to guard against their own people. At the same time, in Hobsonian fashion, the military aid involved funnelled public monies from the US (taken as tax from the citizenry) into the hands of military industrialists who constituted a strategic asset. When things weren't going the right way, as with Guatemala, the produce of the military-industrial complex would be brought to bear in order to inflict genocide and thus weaken the nation-state sufficiently to impose or re-impose dependence. In less drastic cases, the US might use other strategic capabilities, particularly covert and financial, which while not perhaps constituting genocide \textit{per se} are certainly undertaken in the spirit of genocide.

Moreover, the Korean War was not merely crucial in creating the military and ideological institutions of imperial dominance, it was more specifically crucial in constituting one of the Grand Areas centred on a reconstructed industrially powerful Japan.\textsuperscript{860} They recreated almost exactly Japan's imperial East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere after having sacrificed so much to destroy it, but this time it was a securely subordinated dependency of the US.

As I have already detailed, however, perpetual weakness can only be imposed on those who were already weak, and those who have access to independent power, such as the Shah, cannot be relied on to remain faithful. Korea already had sophisticated industry and infrastructure and an educated population. Since the former were owned by Japan, nationalisation would be cost-free and was nigh inevitable. As Harry Truman's friend Edwin Pauley, would report to him in 1946: 'Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power and light, as well as all of the major industries and natural resources. Therefore, if these are suddenly found to be owned by The People's Committee (The Communist Party) they will have acquired them without any

\textsuperscript{855} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, p 75.
\textsuperscript{856} Gareau, \textit{State Terrorism and the United States}, p 43.
\textsuperscript{857} Ibid, p 47.
\textsuperscript{858} See Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{859} Godoy, "Return to Guatemala", p 309.
struggle of any kind or any work in developing them. This is one of the reasons why the U.S.
should not waive its title or claim to Japanese external assets located in Korea until a democratic
(capitalistic) form of Government is assured.  

Being dominated by nationalist sentiment Korea made a poor candidate as a dependency of the
West or even, as has been discussed, of the USSR. Further, with the political landscape being
dominated by those on the left who had most effectively resisted the Japanese, the chances of a
unified Korean regime arising which would go along with privatisation, foreign ownership of
industry, and trade liberalisation were about nil. Added to this was the situation in China, where the
sustainability of the feeble, corrupt, fascist Guomindang (GMD) must surely have been doubted
by some in US policy circles.

The US occupation of South Korea began ominously. Famously the soon to be commander of the
US occupation, General Hodge, was widely, if inaccurately, reported as referring to the Koreans as
'the same breed of cat as the Japanese.' Ironically Hodge actually opined that Koreans viewed
collaborator police as the 'same breed of cat' as Japanese police, but the apocryphal version
would, as it turned out, be far more truly reflective of Hodge's future actions than his actual words.
Despite a State Department determination that Korea was a 'pacific' victim of Japan's
imperialism, Hodge, reflecting other opinions in Washington, declared prior to the arrival of US
occupation forces that Korea was 'an enemy of the United States . . . subject to the provisions and
the terms of the surrender.' The US acted to maintain the Japanese occupation of Korea, not
disarming the Japanese and thrice advancing the arrival of US forces at the behest of the Japanese in
Korea. When Hodge announced the retention of the Japanese regime soon after arriving on
September 8, the uproar was so great that General MacArthur in Tokyo intervened to replace the
Japanese Governor-General and Chief of Police with US personnel after Japanese MPs shot dead
two Korean protesters on September 10.

In August, before US forces arrived, many People's Committees sprang up in the south. This led
to the declaration in Seoul of a Korean People's Republic on September 6 distinct from that
declared in the north. This KPR was left-wing in orientation but did draw in centrist and right-
wing leaders and had a broad popular base (though many conservatives refused invitations to
join). The key figure of this movement was Yo Un-hyong whose 'political views were a mixture
of Christianity, Wilsonian democracy, and socialism.' He was popular with Koreans and many from
the US. Other founder members of People's Committees included Kim Dae Jung, the very non-
Communist Catholic who would later become ROK president (his participation in a People's
Committee being one of the grounds under which he was condemned to death by the military
government in 1980). Hodge, however, refused to recognise or deal with the southern KPR. In
December of 1945 he declared war of the People's Committees and on communism, in which

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862 William Stueck and Boram Yi, ‘‘An Alliance Forged in Blood: The American Occupation of Korea, the Korean
863 *FRUS*, 1945, Volume 6, p 1135.
865 Stueck and Yi, ‘‘An Alliance Forged in Blood’’, p 183.
866 Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p 189.
867 Stueck and Yi, ‘‘An Alliance Forged in Blood’’, p 186.
870 Ibid, p 108.
872 Stueck and Yi, ‘‘An Alliance Forged in Blood’’, p 181.
873 Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p 191.
category he included 'leftists, anticolonial resisters, populists and advocates of land reform...'.

It should be remembered that years of Japanese rule had exacerbated the already stark inequality of Korean society, the rural masses of the south, their plight greatly worsened by war, were in 1945 in not merely a miserable state, but a desperate one.877 The only people who opposed land reform and the redistribution of Japanese property were a very narrow group mainly consisting of wealthy collaborators who feared that the taking of Japanese property would lead to further redistribution, and poorer collaborators such as those who had served in the police forces.878 A report to Washington from September 15, 1945 reads:

The most encouraging single factor in the political situation is the presence in Seoul of several hundred conservatives among the older and better educated Koreans. Although many of them have served the Japanese, that stigma ought eventually to disappear. Such persons favor the return of the Provisional Government and although they may not constitute a majority they are probably the largest single group.

But as Cumings points out they were very clearly intervening on behalf of the smallest group, not the largest.879

Syngman Rhee was picked as presumptive leader of South Korea by some in the US, and flown in on MacArthur's personal aeroplane on October 16. This was done against US State Department objections.880 Rhee in many respects can be seen as a model of the sort of 'nationalist' leader that the US would later install in Vietnam and Afghanistan and would attempt to install in Iraq. One can compile a list of remarkably similar characteristics that could, with little alteration, be applied to Ahmed Chalabi, Ngo Dinh Diem or Hamid Karzai:

1) US residency – Rhee had lived most of his long life in exile, primarily (nearly 40 years) in the US. He was educated in the US. In fact, October 1945 was the first time he had set foot in Korea for 26 years.881

2) Intelligence ties – Rhee was transported to Korea by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who wished to pre-empt the return of other exile leaders and to circumvent the State Department.882 He was accompanied by an 'advisor' named M. Preston Goodfellow, a former newspaper owner and editor who had been deputy director of the OSS.883 Goodfellow was retained on active service as an adviser to Rhee.884

3) Limited political base – Rhee had headed the exile Korean Provisional Government from 1919 until 1925 when he was impeached and expelled from the KPG for embezzling funds.885 From then on he 'haunted and irritated Foggy Bottom',886 alienating the State Department by falsely claiming leadership of the ineffectual KPG.887 Some (for example Carter Malkasian)888 claim that somehow Rhee's WWII era anti-Japanese rhetoric made him popular in Korea. Somewhat more realistically Stueck writes: 'Despite his absence in the United States, he was widely known in Korea and highly respected, in part because of his

876 Cumings, The Korean War, p 110.
879 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, pp 193-4.
881 Ibid.
882 Cumings, The Korean War, p 58.
885 Stueck, The Korean War, p 15.
886 Cumings, The Korean War, p 106.
887 Ibid, p 58.
advanced age... which in Korea’s patriarchal society was considered a source of wisdom.\textsuperscript{889} What this meant, though, was that he was suitable as a figurehead, so much so that even the left-wing dominated KPR named him as Chairman without his knowledge.\textsuperscript{890} He was also that thing most beloved of all empires for thousands of years – part of a distinct minority. He was a Christian, a Protestant even, and, as in Vietnam, Christians were more inclined than others to adopt the anti-Communist cause as evidenced by the flight south of Christians in both countries.

4) Nationalist veneer – I use the word veneer in part because there are some who see Rhee's entire career as a power and money grab.\textsuperscript{891} Indeed, there is not one thing that I know of that Rhee did which could not be interpreted as being about the advancement and enrichment of Syngman Rhee. Remember that his vocal anti-Japanese stance first gained him power (and access to funds) in the KPG and then was part of his incessant attempts to establish his non-existent leadership in US eyes. His subsequent anti-Communist stance was equally the only way of maintaining the US support which was his only real source of power. As mentioned, corrupt individuals are also beloved of US imperialists and corruption militates against nationalism. Rhee had a style of corporatist clientalist corruption akin to the 'crony capitalism' of Ferdinand Marcos. By 1960 his government's corruption (coinciding with election rigging) had 'reached unbearable levels' and protest was so widespread that he was forced to resign.\textsuperscript{892}

5) Brutal authoritarianism – This has already been discussed as a propensity, like corruption, in the US empire's choice of clients. Rhee's regime and successor dictatorships were highly repressive. Rhee himself presided over the killing of far more of his own people than the brutal regime of the DPRK, as will be discussed. Cumings avers that: 'American policy, of course, never set out to create one of the worst police states in Asia.'\textsuperscript{893} This is a bold but baseless assertion. Naturally there are unlikely to be any documents in which officials put forward the suggestion or imperative to create a brutal police state, but if this was a matter of policy then one would hardly expect to find such a document anyway. The available evidence is that the US cleaved to him when his record of political violence was amply clear and that there is an established pattern of preference for repressive rulers. This applies to the military dictators who would later rule Korea, under whom the CIA created Korean CIA (KCIA) became a watchword for torture and murder by the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{894}

6) Disapporobation of US analysts – As mentioned the US State Department had little love for Rhee. This puzzling commonality is part of a broader trend much evidenced in Indochina

\textsuperscript{889} Stueck, The Korean War, pp 20-1.  
\textsuperscript{890} Ibid, p 20.  
\textsuperscript{893} Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 209.  
\textsuperscript{894} Press reports began to surface in the early 1970s. The 'revelations' were not news to people in the ROK, but culminated in an Amnesty International report in 1975 with testimony such as: 'I was taken to KCIA headquarters, my hands tied together and I was tied to a chair. I was not allowed to have any sleep. At night they would drag me to the basement where they would beat me with a long heavy stick, and jump on me. By morning I would not be able to walk, I would be forced to crawl back upstairs. They were trying to make me confess that I was a spy. This kind of treatment went on for several days, and for a time I was unable to use my legs. Even so, they continued to tie me onto a chair every day for five days. Of course my legs were terribly swollen. Finally I put my thumbprint on the confession they had prepared. At my trial I denied what I had confessed under torture. On cloudy days now I have a lot of pain in my body.' (Amnesty International, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea: 27 March – 9 April 1975 (2nd Printing), London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977, p 37.) It should be understood that the exposure of these practices of torture did not bring them to an end.
and Iraq – that of actual policy being in direct opposition to the recommendations of top analysts. Rhee was also an early example of a client opposed by CIA analysts. As early as March 1948 a CIA report read: 'The Korean leadership is provided by that numerically small class which virtually monopolizes the native wealth and education of the country... Since this class could not have acquired and maintained its favored position under Japanese rule without a certain minimum of collaboration, it has experienced difficulty in finding acceptable candidates for political office and has been forced to support imported expatriate politicians such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. These, while they have no pro-Japanese taint, are essentially demagogues bent on autocratic rule.' It was noted that the unpopular regime was 'ruthlessly brutal', made up of 'extreme rightists' who retained 'substantially the old Japanese machinery' which effected 'a high degree of control over virtually all phases of the life of the people. This seeming incoherence of contradictory views can actually be interpreted as evidence of the strength of coherence in imperial policies which continue in a systematic fashion with very little reference to the stated policies of those who theoretically should be shaping actual policy.

Thus, early in the occupation the US had thrown it's weight behind a small grouping of collaborator oligarchs to which they had added Syngman Rhee and the KPG. What this grouping had going for it was control of the police forces and of gangs of murderous fascist-style street gangs – the most notorious of whom were made up of exiles from the north. Opposing them were the southern Communist Pak Hon-yong and the aforementioned Yo Un-hyong. The latter had plenty of charisma and political appeal, but neither youth gangs or police support 'both essentials for leadership in the increasingly violent climate of South Korean politics.' Those who weren't of the right-wing also had to contend with repression by the US occupation forces who soon became so unpopular that after a mere three months of occupation even Hodge reported that '[t]he word pro-American is being added to pro-Jap, national traitor and collaborator.' Cumings explains that '[t]he American occupation chose to bolster the status quo and resist a thorough reform of colonial legacies, it immediately ran into monumental opposition from the mass Of South Koreans. Most of the first year of the occupation, 1945-46, was given over to suppression of many people's committees that had emerged in the provinces. This provoked a massive rebellion that spread over four provinces in the fall of 1946... The US response was brutal, and involved the first of a 7 year long 'series of massacres' that would take hundreds of thousands of lives.

The right-wing, however, was seriously split, particularly between Rhee and KPG leader Kim Ku. After a 1946 election which extended only a very limited franchise to male property owners and in which '[p]artisan police activity ensured that Rhee’s forces would win a sizable majority... Rhee's faction took control of an 'Interim Legislative Assembly'. Rhee and Kim Ku, however, were still at each other's throats. Each aimed to establish themselves as autocrat and in 1947 the CIA warned that the authoritarianism of the right-wing would drive moderates into the left-wing camp, which it duly did.

A further election in May 1948 was opposed by leftists, centrists and many on the right because it was a clear step towards the permanent division of Korea. According to Stueck: 'Ultimately, their

896 Stueck, The Korean War, p 23.
897 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p 45.
898 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 198.
899 Ibid, p 192.
901 Stueck, The Korean War, p 23.
902 Ibid.
903 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 211, n. 36.
failure to participate, together with the highly partisan activities of police and youth groups, enabled Rhee and his allies to win handily. 600 people were killed in the months leading up to the election and once more major and bloody guerilla revolts broke out.

On the island of Cheju (Jeju), completely cut off from any DPRK involvement, rebellion occurred in response to the violent repression of a political demonstration in March of 1948. The response which involved US personnel, ROKA, and right-wing paramilitaries brought over from the mainland, was one of incredible brutality. Cheju had a population of 300,000 and at the peak of the rebellion had only 30,000 'guerillas'. In fact the armed core of real 'guerillas' who had small arms numbered only 500 the rest were peasants armed with farm implements and sharpened bamboo resisting the widespread destruction of villages (20,000 homes were destroyed) and the murders and massacres of those individuals or communities deemed to be supporters of the rebellion. The normal enumeration of civilian deaths on Cheju is given as 'more than 30,000'. 33,000 was the amount admitted to by the ROK official news agency itself.

In You ROKA troops who refused to deploy to Cheju formed the basis of another rebellion, again brutally suppressed with US involvement and supervision. This unorganized rebellion of the ROK army's Fourteenth Regiment in You was soon suppressed under the direction of the KMAG, but the operation was also accompanied by widespread violence by rightists against innocent civilians, as was the case in Cheju. The rebels executed hundreds of police, officials and landlords, but even after the rebellion was quelled rightist revenge was brutal. A US source reported that 'loyal troops were shooting people who they had the slightest suspicion... of giving cooperation to the communist uprising'.

About 1000 You rebels fled to the mountains and formed the nucleus of a more organised guerilla movement. A CIA estimate put guerilla numbers at 3500-6000 in early 1949, but many were armed only with clubs and bamboo spears. Those small arms that were used seemed entirely of Japanese or US origin with no Soviet weapons ever being captured. The methods of repression remained similar under the continued leadership of James Hausman, who styled himself 'father of the Korean Army'. The US had made it clear to Rhee through Goodfellow that continued US support was contingent on brutal repression of guerilla activity.

Ostensibly US occupation forces left in June 1949, but there was a continuity of 'advisers' who were 'constantly shadowing their Korean counterparts and urging them to greater efforts. The guerilla movement was effectively crushed by early 1950, but with links now established to the

904 Stueck, The Korean War, p 27.
905 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 36.
906 Cumings, The Korean War, p 121.
907 Ibid, p 123.
908 Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 528.
909 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 36.
910 Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 528.
911 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 38.
912 Cumings, The Korean War, p 121.
913 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 41.
914 Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 528.
915 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 40.
916 Ibid, p 43.
917 Ibid, p 47.
918 Cumings, The Korean War, p 134.
920 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 48.
DPRK, US analysts believed there was a likelihood of further 'subversion'.\textsuperscript{921} Moreover even without communist activity there was no long-term consolidation of even the ROK as a state and of the division of Korea, let alone of the Rhee regime which remained as unpopular as ever. Rhee ran the country with a fairly isolated clique, his 'kitchen cabinet' being made up primarily of people from the US and Koreans who had, like him, spent lengthy times as residents of the US.\textsuperscript{922} On 30 May 1950, less than a month before what is conventionally termed the outbreak of the Korean War, a comparatively 'free' election proved utterly disastrous for Rhee. By this stage his regime was already in what Cumings describes as 'total disarray'\textsuperscript{923} and the election resulted in only 49 seats out of 210 for the coalition which supported Rhee.\textsuperscript{924} Indeed, despite restricted suffrage favouring the more wealthy only 31 of 210 incumbents were returned. 126 independents were elected and Rhee's own KNP only had 24 candidates of 154 elected.\textsuperscript{925} The National Assembly was now dominated by moderates, many associated with the now deceased Yo Un-hyong.\textsuperscript{926} (Yo had been assassinated in 1947 having become known as 'the most shot at man in South Korea'\textsuperscript{927} and having been refused, despite multiple requests, any protection by the US authorities.\textsuperscript{928})

During the period from World War II to 1950 major US actions had consistently worked to create a lasting division of Korea. For example, when in 1947 a 'Joint Commission' was reconvened to consult with Korean groups over 'unification', the US submitted a list of groups which must be consulted which included at least one entirely fictional union of 1 million members and whose total membership was calculated at about 70 million, 8 times the population of South Korea.\textsuperscript{929} The USSR, whose strategic interests coincided to a degree, certainly seemed more supportive of moves towards unification. This may, however, have been mostly a matter of empty gestures required in order assuage their somewhat independent clients. It was the continued Soviet insistence that no party who did not agree to a period of trusteeship could be consulted by the aforementioned Joint Commission which combined with the actions of the US and its clients to create an unbreakable impasse.\textsuperscript{930} It was also the Soviet Union which had already taken one of the most fateful steps of all. When cholera broke out in the US zone in 1946 the Soviets blocked the shipment of desperately needed chlorine south.\textsuperscript{931} This was the groundwork for the economic separation of two fundamentally interdependent parts of a single country. This was more profound, certainly, than the political division which would hardly have been sustainable if economic intercourse remained. It left a North Korea/DPRK with only 14% arable land and a relatively dense population which has not been able to reliably supply its own people with food.\textsuperscript{932} It left the agricultural South Korea/ROK stuck in a state of 'underdevelopment', medieval land tenure conditions, and considerable grave poverty which a contemporary journalist described as 'primitive misery... squalor and poverty and degradation.'\textsuperscript{933}

\textsuperscript{921} Stueck, The Korean War, p 30.
\textsuperscript{922} Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p 214.
\textsuperscript{923} Cumings, The Korean War, p 145.
\textsuperscript{925} Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p 196.
\textsuperscript{926} Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 64.
\textsuperscript{927} Ibid, p 24.
\textsuperscript{929} Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p 39.
\textsuperscript{930} Stueck, The Korean War, p 24.
\textsuperscript{931} Millett, The War for Korea, p 50.
\textsuperscript{932} John Feffer, “Mother Earth's Triple Whammy: Are We All North Koreans Now?”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 17 June 2008. Retrieved 20 June 2008 from http://www.fpif.org/articles/mother_earths_triple_whammy_are_we_all_north_koreans_now.
Who Started It?

We now come to the vexed issue of the events of 25 June 1950, or as the North Koreans would have it the 23rd of June when, according to them, the ROK initiated major hostilities.\textsuperscript{934} One defensible stance is that it is a nonsense to state that the war broke out on that day. Not only had guerrilla conflict and mass-murder already claimed over 100,000 lives south of the 38th parallel, but there was ongoing extensive border fighting which was particularly intense in 1949. It was mostly, but not solely, the ROK which was the initiator of hostilities.\textsuperscript{935} As Stueck writes: "Who started the firing in the predawn hours of this dreary morning remains in doubt. The Ongjin region had long been the setting for border skirmishes between North and South Korean troops, and often the South had initiated the combat. The evidence for this day in June is ambiguous, even contradictory."\textsuperscript{936} Peter Lowe concludes that it is 'impossible to determine' who attacked first.\textsuperscript{937}

The conundrum of the outbreak of major hostilities tends to suggest that simple solutions of either a 'South attacks North' or 'North attacks South' scenario do not fit the unusual circumstances. Quite apart from the fact that as Cumings points out with regard to the question of aggression this amounts to 'Korea invades Korea',\textsuperscript{938} there are Stueck's 'ambiguous, even contradictory' factors. As will be described, both sides had plans for military unification and were building forces towards that end, but neither was actually prepared for the sudden outbreak of a major war when it did happen. I would go so far as to suggest that the unusual circumstances themselves tend to necessitate a more complex answer than simply one side attacked the other.

In this work, of course, the point of interest is the US role in the outbreak major hostilities. Those who concern themselves with this question often characterise US actions as a 'failure of deterrence' or 'failing to deter' or virtually invariant phrases.\textsuperscript{939} One writer in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, (not where one would normally expect the advocacy of more robust militarism) wrote: "By strongly implying that it would not defend Korea... the United States had invited attack,"\textsuperscript{940} It is also in the canon of failed deterrence as standing alongside the 'failure to deter' Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{941} The problem with this is that it relies on an assumption which seems to be contradicted by the evidence, the assumption that the entity called the US actually did not want a war. One can compare this thesis with a counter-thesis thus: 1) the 'failed deterrence' thesis in which a monolithic US undertook insufficient actions to prevent war; 2) the 'successful provocation' thesis in which individuals from the US (including those in the Rhee regime) successfully caused the outbreak of major hostilities at a time which was entirely propitious for the US in strategic terms. An intriguing potential corollary to the latter is that, whether through coordinated collusion or merely coincident interests, this seems to have occurred with crucial support from the USSR.

It is interesting to note here that if the US failed to deter the DPRK, then the logical implication is that it must have been the DPRK which attacked first on 25 June 1950. Thus Stueck, who is unable to directly confirm DPRK initiation of hostilities, is able to write at great length about a 'failure of deterrence' which constantly reinforces this non-fact as being factual in the reader's mind. When

\textsuperscript{934} Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 71.
\textsuperscript{935} Ibid, p 54.
\textsuperscript{936} Stueck, The Korean War, p 10.
\textsuperscript{937} Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p 178.
\textsuperscript{938} Cumings, The Korean War, p 22.
\textsuperscript{939} William Stueck, for example, is the leading proponent of this view. See: Stueck and Yi, 'An Alliance Forged in Blood...', p 204; Stueck; The Korean War, p 29; Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War, p 78; Stueck, "The United States and the Origins of the Korean War: The Failure of Deterrence", in International Journal of Korean Studies, 24:2, Fall 2010, pp 1-18; for others who echo this see Kim, 'Who Initiated...', p 42, and below.
dealing with only 'failure of deterrence' DPRK initiation is assumed\(^{942}\) and when the issue of deterring the ROK discussed it is to suggest that success in deterring the ROK was partly behind the failure to deter the DPRK.\(^{943}\) In the unlikely event that evidence came to light that the ROK did launch an offensive on 23 June then all of this 'failed deterrence' discourse would be revealed as rather silly propaganda akin to the Germans suggesting that they had failed to deter Polish aggression in 1939.

There are, however, those who claim that we can in fact conclude that it was the DPRK which initiated major hostilities, and I will weigh such claims shortly. Before I do, however, I should emphasise two points. The first is that, despite what some would contend, the only evidence we have is circumstantial, and furthermore is violently contradictory. The second is that the purpose of enquiry is still the significance of US actions, and in fact the confusion and contradictions of the issue at hand are merely an entrée, albeit a complicated one, into the comparison of the theses of 'failed deterrence' and 'successful'.

In 1981 and 1990 Bruce Cumings released the two seminal volumes of his work *The Origins of the Korean War*. I have been unable to acquire this work, however some have interpreted it as pointing to a US/ROK initiation or deliberate provocation of the Korean War.\(^{944}\) Another viewpoint is that: "In contrast to many historians..., who maintained that by his remarks, Acheson unintentionally gave North Korea the green light to invade South Korea, Cumings argues that Acheson knew precisely what he was doing and that the speech had little to do with why North Korea invaded South Korea. 'The Press Club Speech,' he remarks, 'was ... consistent with his conception of Korean containment in 1947, and with his world view: and so was the intervention in June 1950' (p. 423).\(^{*945}\) Marilyn Young writes that Cumings largely rejects the relevance of 'who started it' but outlines three hypotheses in what seem to be roughly ordered as least to most likely: an unprovoked ROK attack; an unprovoked DPRK attack; or a successfully provoked DPRK attack which young describes as 'the preferred Achesonian stance: the offence demonstrably defensive.\(^{946}\)

I mention this work of Cumings at this point because the traction that this work might have gained was interrupted to some extent in 1993 (not long in academic terms after the publication of the more relevant second volume of *The Origins of the Korean War*) by the publication of a book seized on by many as the definitive proof of an unprovoked DPRK attack: *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*\(^{947}\) is a diplomatic history of Sino-Soviet relations and, despite its name, only the final two chapters (about 35% of the main body) deal with the Korean war directly – the first dealing with the DPRK build-up to military reunification, the second with China's entry into the war.

It is difficult to decide how much space to devote to a critique of *Uncertain Partners*, but I think I must confine myself to a symptomatic exemplar. For reasons which are not at all apparent to me, several pages are devoted to describing two meetings that never occurred. The reason given?

> We do so partly to suggest the kinds of information that appear to have been exchanged between Moscow and Pyongyang in these months (on which the archives do have significant documents) and partly to indicate how pseudohistory can become widely implicated in efforts to explain the origins of one of history's tragedies.\(^{948}\)

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\(^{942}\) Stueck, “The United States and the Origins of the Korean War...”, pp 1-2 et passim.

\(^{943}\) Kim, 'Who Initiated...?', pp 42-3.


\(^{946}\) Young, “Sights of and Unseen War”, p 500.


\(^{948}\) Ibid, p 137.
Their actual interest in the role of 'pseudohistory' ends right there never to be mentioned again. Instead the narrative of these meetings is simply incorporated (with a couple of reminders that these were fictional meetings) into the general flow of the chapter. One might wonder why they did not instead utilise the 'significant documents' as their sources, but these are neither cited here, nor are they to be found among the 82 documents appended. In fact none of these documents deals with the subject of Korea before one dated 28 June 1950.\footnote{Ibid, p 270.} Indeed throughout the chapter there was only one point made which seemed at first to support the conclusion that the DPRK attacked on 25 June, mention made of the 'fact' that Mao was 'in no doubt' that Kim Il Sung had launched the war.\footnote{Ibid, p 159.} The supporting citation, however, merely quotes a Chinese official noting the Korean Workers Party's determination to 'wage a revolutionary war of liberation'.\footnote{Ibid, p 334, n 140.} Intent, however, is not the issue, as will be shown.

The gist of this chapter of Uncertain Partners (either with or without the inclusion of clearly unreliable sources) is that Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung had developed a co-ordinated plan of attack. This proves little, however, because Rhee also planned a military reunification, and made no secret of the fact. He seems to have originally envisioned invading at some time early in 1950, saying on 7 October 1949 that it would be only '3 days to Pyonyang, while defence minister Shin Sung-Mo, after 25 October meeting with MacArthur, stated that the ROKA was 'ready to drive into North Korea. If we had had our own way we would have started already...'.\footnote{Dean Acheson's Press Club speech on 12 January 1950 explicitly rejected an US force being used to protect the ROK, putting Rhee's plans on hold, but invasion plans were revived after Rhee met with MacArthur in February.} Truman and Acheson had both effectively stated early in 1950 that the US would not defend Korea militarily (even MacArthur had said as much in March 1949),\footnote{Ibid, p 25.} and, on 2 May 1950, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, said that a communist take-over of Korea and Taiwan was inevitable: 'the US would not go to fight for Korea'.\footnote{Ibid, p 40.} However, Rhee must have either been given contrary assurances in private or have correctly read between the lines of these statements which were shown by subsequent events to be complete falsehoods. On 11 January the ROK ambassador to the US sent the following to Rhee:

I give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position...President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes.\footnote{Stueck, The Korean War, p 30.} Around March 1950 the DPRK achieved distinct military superiority over the ROK\footnote{Kim, 'Who Initiated...?', p 39.} and thus US involvement became essential. Aware that the US could not support an attack north, the focus in the ROK became an effort to "provolve an 'unprovoked assault'".\footnote{Kim, 'Who Initiated...?', p 42.}

In the DPRK, meanwhile, preparations for military unification had begun in earnest in late April


\footnote{Ibid, p 41.}

\footnote{Cumings, The Korean War, p 144.}
with major arms shipments from the USSR.\textsuperscript{959} This followed Stalin's assent to conduct an offensive.\textsuperscript{960} Here's where things get a little contradictory, because the Soviets sent a group of advisers to Pyongyang, supposedly as a response to Kim Il Sung's determination to conquer the whole peninsula, but it seems that it was the Soviet advisers who took the initiative in making this happen. In \textit{Uncertain Partners} a lengthy testimony from KPA Operations Director Yu Sung Chul states that the Soviet advisers took an operations plan ('[e]very army, of course, has an operations plan') and unilaterally rewrote it entirely. The Soviets considered it too 'defensive'. The original operations plan was for a counteroffensive, but the new Soviet plan was entitled the 'Preemptive Strike Operations Plan', though the DPRK leadership insisted immediately that it only be referred to as the 'counterattack' plan.\textsuperscript{961} Goncharov et al. maintain that Kim Il Sung was the driving force behind the offensive, suggesting effectively that Kim was the tail wagging the Soviet dog\textsuperscript{962} despite also claiming that the DPRK was a 'wholly dependent... Soviet satellite'.\textsuperscript{963} The story of the operations plan, however, suggests instead that this was Stalin's war, not Kim's, just as was claimed by the US government at the time.\textsuperscript{964}

Kathryn Weathersby deals with this issue and this is how she concludes:

From 1945 to early 1950, Moscow’s aim was not to gain control over the Korean peninsula. Instead, the Soviet Union sought to protect its strategic and economic interests through the traditional Tsarist approach of maintaining a balance of power in Korea. However, in the context of the postwar Soviet-American involvement on the peninsula, such a balance could only be maintained by prolonging the division of the country, retaining effective control over the northern half.

The North Korean attempt to reunify the country through a military campaign clearly represented a sharp departure from the basic Soviet policy toward Korea. The initiative for this departure came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. In the spring of 1950 Stalin approved Kim’s reunification plan and provided the necessary military support, but only after repeated appeals from Kim and only after having been persuaded that the United States would not intervene in the conflict. Conclusive evidence of Stalin’s reasons for finally supporting the North Korean reunification plan has not yet been released, but it appears that Stalin’s motive may well have been to tie the Chinese communists more firmly to the USSR, to prevent a rapprochement between the PRC and the United States. If this interpretation is correct, it means that it was Soviet weakness that drove Stalin to support the attack on South Korea, not the unrestrained expansionism imagined by the authors of NSC-68.\textsuperscript{965}

Indeed, Weathersby reveals that from the latter stages of World War II the Soviet Union was utterly consistent in recognising that it was best served by a divided Korea and that unification would risk that advent of a hostile entity in a threatening position: “Given the impossibility of establishing a ‘friendly’ government for the entire country, Moscow sought to protect Soviet security by maintaining a compliant government in power in the northern half of the country and shoring up the military strength of that client state.”\textsuperscript{966} The situation was mirrored on the US side, as has been suggested.

The obvious question here is why, if the USSR considered its interests best served by a divided Korea, did it force an aggressive ‘preemptive strike’ plan on the DPRK and begin immediately making substantial arms shipments beyond those required for defence? In the situation there was ample scope for temporising and prevarication. But Soviet concerns also seem to have revolved around the situation of China and Taiwan, and here too the interests coincided to a great degree with those of the US. Here, I am sad to say, the picture gets even more confused.

\textsuperscript{959} Goncharov et al., \textit{Uncertain Partners}, p 147.
\textsuperscript{960} Ibid, p 144.
\textsuperscript{961} Ibid, p 150.
\textsuperscript{962} Ibid, pp 132-3 et passim.
\textsuperscript{963} Ibid, p 131.
\textsuperscript{965} Ibid, p 36.
\textsuperscript{966} Ibid, p 27.
I return again to the narrative of *Uncertain Partners* wherein the contradictions of the circumstances are unwittingly laid bare by the authors. Their understanding is that Kim Il Sung was single-mindedly driven to unify Korea by force, and that the plan was assented to by Stalin and Mao. The Chinese were focussed on finishing their civil war by eliminating the final GMD stronghold in Taiwan, but at the same time faced an urgent need to improve the desperate domestic economic situation which they believed necessitated massive demobilisations of troops. The Chinese were convinced that a DPRK offensive would bring about the direct involvement of the US and allow the US to prevent their final offensive against the GMD, while many feared that it would allow the US to attack the PRC itself. According to the authors 'a race had begun between Kim and Mao. Each rushed to fire the first volley, an act that could doom the other's plans.' The problem here is that it is difficult to see how a PRC conquest of Taiwan would have negatively affected DPRK plans. There was no claim on any side that there was such a state as Taiwan, this was a civil conflict between two formations which each claimed to be the legitimate government of China. On 5 January 1950, Truman had acknowledged Taiwan as being part of China and pledged not to intervene in the civil war, while Acheson's 12 January Press Club speech omitted not just Korea but Taiwan from the perimeter which the US claimed as its right to defend. The US people, by and large, viewed the Taiwan issue as part of a civil war, not any business of the US. Moreover, the PRC did not act very much like it was in a 'race'. To be certain it wished to take Taiwan as soon as possible, but it had every reason to do so without any consideration of possible events in Korea. The other major offshore island, Hainan, had been taken in April 1950 and in that month PLA forces began to amass for the invasion Taiwan, but demobilisations were also an ongoing priority. Early in June the invasion of Taiwan was postponed until the summer of 1951. On June 15 Mao ordered a previously planned demobilisation of 1,500,000 troops to commence. On June 23, less than 48 hours from the putative outbreak of the Korean War, orders were made out to transfer 3–4 corps out of the northeast sector. It is true that the Chinese had transferred 40,000 Koreans from the PLA to the KPA beginning at the end of 1949, and these battle-hardened troops probably gave the KPA more of an advantage over the ROKA by June 25 than the increased arms supply from the USSR, which had commenced only two months prior. But, the Chinese may have expected these personnel to be used defensively or to create a deterrent, after all it makes little sense for them to have knowingly provided crucial support for an offensive which they quite correctly predicted would be a disastrous setback for themeselves.

From the US and USSR perspective, however, the defeat of the GMD in Taiwan was not a pleasing prospect. Stalin appears to have firstly hoped that the US would prevent the PRC conquest of Taiwan and secondly he hoped that China and the US would be drawn further into enmity. Weathersby recounts: 'A Russian scholar who has seen the relevant documents has recounted to me that Stalin calculated that even though the United States might not defend the ROK, once it lost South Korea it would not then allow itself to suffer the additional loss of Taiwan. The United States would move in to protect Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), thereby preventing a rapprochement between the US and the PRC. Mao would thus be forced to continue to turn to the Soviet Union for economic and military aid.'

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967 Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p 154.
968 Ibid, p 147.
969 Kim, 'Who Initiated...?', p 35.
972 Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p 152.
976 Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea...”, p 35.
So the US and USSR interests regarding the dispositions of Korea and Taiwan were identical. Additionally one might argue that it was in the US interest that China remain for the time being a comparatively weak state tied to the USSR, rather than an independent left-wing non-aligned state. What then would be the optimal outcome for both imperial powers? That somehow, against all odds, Korea would be overcome by a major war but not unified, leaving two weakened dependencies divided much as they were in 1945; that the US be given a serviceable pretext/distraction allowing it to intercede in the final stages of China's civil war; and, perhaps more than anything else, that China, so ripe with potential, be prevented from demobilisation and an end to nearly a century of destruction and instead be drawn into even greater enfeebling conflict. No outside observer would have picked this as the likely outcome, but this is exactly what happened.

All accounts agree that 3 a.m. 25 June 1950 Kim Il Sung announced to his cabinet that the ROKA had launched an offensive and that in 1 hour the KPA would launch its planned counterattack. Whether there was or was not an ROKA provocation, the one thing that can be said with certainty is that either Kim was fooled, or he fooled himself. The planned campaign to unify Korea is widely understood to have been intended to have been enacted at a later date, possibly in early August when it was expected that Rhee would refuse to comply with a DPRK proposal of nationwide elections. 

Gye-Dong Kim points to the following indications of unpreparedness: 1) the mobilisation plan was not put in place, only 6 full divisions were ready when plans called for 13 to 15; 2) 'the North Koreans were not sufficiently well equipped at the time' having mostly Japanese weapons of pre-1945 manufacture. I would add that given that the DPRK's military build-up was proceeding faster than that of the ROK, premature action, whether offensive or counter-offensive, must have been powerfully motivated.

The explanation given by Gye-Dong Kim is that the offensive/counter-offensive was launched at this unpropitious time because Kim sought to take advantage of the unpopularity and instability of the Rhee regime. The Soviet, Chinese and defector sources used by the likes of Goncharov et al., are consistent in claiming that when touting his plans for a military unification Kim would evince a conviction that 200,000 guerillas would rise up to defeat the Rhee regime. In the most widely known account, given by Khrushchev, Kim claimed that he wished to 'touch the south with the tip of a bayonet' which would spark internal explosion. One way of looking at things, therefore, is that Kim, an autocrat with unquestioned authority, was possessed of a long-standing idée fixe, an obsessive and (in the circumstances) irrational belief that demonstrative military action on the part of the KPA would spark a southern revolution. Another way of looking at it is that Kim was an experienced and successful guerilla leader who was surrounded by and incredible wealth of knowledge gained by fighting the Japanese and the GMD for decades. Along with those of Moscow faction, the Yenan faction and Kim Il Sung's faction, these included indigenous fighters such as the southerner Pak Hon-yong, who was the foreign minister. The leaders of Cumings's 'guerilla state' also had some experience, in China, of conventional and mixed warfare and were advised by Soviets from an army which had fought its way from Stalingrad to Berlin.

Guerilla activity in the south was at this time hugely diminished. According to 'small bands of fifteen to thirty still operated in various areas but were generally quiet.' The political situation in the south may have provided the opportunity for reconstituting a more formidable guerrilla
movement, but such things take time.\^985 It seems very unlikely that the DPRK leadership really believed that 200,000 guerrillas would arise spontaneously which is what a defector claimed to have been stated by Pak Hon-yong to a secret conference on 11 May 1950.\^986 In fact, Goncharov et al. claim that it was the failure of the guerrilla movement which prompted the DPRK to begin planning a major military effort,\^987 as do Stueck,\^988 and Kim.\^989 If the DPRK really was pinning its hopes on a southern uprising, it also seems rather odd that those guerrillas that remained were not informed or prepared in any way.\^990

A salient matter which I have not yet mentioned is an aspect of the 'counterattack' plan. This plan, which, as will be recalled, was written by Soviet advisers without consultation, stopped at Seoul. That is to say that the planning did not extend any further than the capture of Seoul which lies only about 50 kilometers from the 38th parallel.\^991 The war was supposed to 'only last a few days' according to Yu Sung Chul and others. Continuing after the capture of Seoul required a completely new offensive plan (again authored by the Soviets) and a complete reorganisation of the KPA into two distinct corps which were lacking in communications leaving, according to one defector, 'divisions, corps and armies... disconnected' to the extent that '[e]ach unit moved on its own and each had its own plan.'\^992 Gye-Dong Kim's explanation is that the actual plan was to seize Seoul as a prelude to opening negotiations. He cites a 20 June 1950 decree by the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly in the DPRK which contained demands which could be read as a basis for negotiations.\^993 Given that the 'counterattack' plan was drafted in early April, and that it replaced another that was too 'defensive', this must in fact have been the basis of planning from the beginning. This contradicts a great deal of the tenor and detail of the narrative of the planning phase constructed from various sources by Kim himself (along with Stueck, Weathersby, Goncharov et al.). The fact is that whether attack or counter-attack, there a many questions arising about the KPA's actions on 25 June, but to even attempt answers I must first turn to the events occuring on the other side of the 38th parallel, and in Taiwan, Japan and the US.

Direct evidence is slim that the ROKA launched an attack somewhere between 10 pm on 23 June (the time claimed by the DPRK and PRC to this day)\^994 and 4 am on 25 June (when all parties agree the KPA guns opened fire, though not in any account along the whole front). The ROKA 17th regiment claimed to have captured Haeju by 11 am of 26 June.\^995 As William Blum points out, this feat would have been impossible if the KPA really were launching a co-ordinated all-out attack.\^996 This unit was commanded by a committed right-wing ideologue,\^997 and its actions may have fitted a scenario of a unilateral attack without a broader mobilisation designed to provoke an 'unprovoked' response from the DPRK. This may or may not have been accompanied by over 24 hours of preliminary artillery barrage as claimed by the DPRK. There is also the possibility, however, that the capture of Haeju was simply a lie. The ROK government later retracted its claim to have

\^985 Mao can be used as an authority on the 'gradual' nature of the process in which critical developments are said to occur 'eventually' (Mao Tse-tung, *Guerrilla Warfare*, (Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, trans) Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18, Washington D.C.: United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, 1989, passim).

\^986 Kim, 'Who Initiated...', p 37.

\^987 Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p 136.


\^989 Kim, 'Who Initiated...', p 36.

\^990 Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p 155.

\^991 Kim, 'Who Initiated...', p 38.

\^992 Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p 155.

\^993 Kim, 'Who Initiated...', p 38.

\^994 Halliday and Cumings, *Korea*, p 71.

\^995 Ibid.

\^996 Blum, *Killing Hope*, p 46.

\^997 Halliday and Cumings, *Korea*, p 71.
captured Haeju and claimed that it was all an exaggeration by a military officer.998

One town south of the 38th parallel was prepared for fighting to break out on the 25th.999 However, in more general terms, the ROKA was even less prepared than was the KPA for the outbreak of major hostilities. A UN inspection on 23 June found the ROKA unprepared for war and they began writing a report detailing as much on the 24th which, by the 26th, had become a report claiming an unprovoked attack by the DPRK. Of course, this is rather astonishingly suspicious timing and, as Halliday and Cumings point out, their sources were purely ROK and US officials,1000 but subsequent events show that the ROKA really was unprepared for the KPA onslaught even though we can quite confidently say that the KPA itself was not bringing its full potential force to bear.

What does this all mean? Well, if the thesis tested with regard to DPRK, USSR and PRC actions can confidently say that the KPA itself was not bringing its full potential force to bear. Halliday and Cumings point out, their sources were purely ROK and US officials, their events show that the ROKA really was unprepared for the KPA onslaught even though we can quite clearly say that the KPA itself was not bringing its full potential force to bear.

I will set the tone here with a lengthy quote, with lengthier subquotes, from Peter Dale Scott. This is what he culs from Cumings's Origins of the Korean War:

The historian Bruce Cumings, in a volume of 957 pages, has recalled the curious behavior in previous weeks of high levels in Washington:

The CIA predicts, on June 14, a capability for invasion [of South Korea] at any time. No one disputes that. Five days later, it predicts an impending invasion. . . . Now, Corson ... says that the June 14 report leaked out to "informed circles," and thus "it was feared that administration critics in Congress might publicly raise the issue. In consequence, a White House decision of sorts was made to brief Congress that all was well in Korea." . . . Would it not be the expectation that Congress would be told that all was not well in Korea? That is, unless a surprised and outraged Congress is one's goal.

In his exhaustive analysis of the war's origins, Cumings sees this U.S. deception by high level officials as a response to manipulated events, which in turn were the response to the threat of an imminent expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist KMT1001 from Taiwan, together with a peaceful reunification of Korea. . . .

By late June, [U.S. Secretary of State Dean] Acheson and Truman were the only high officials still balking at a defense of the ROC [the "Republic of China," the KMT Chinese Nationalist remnant on Taiwan]. . . . Sir John Pratt, an Englishman with four decades of experience in the China consular service and the Far Eastern Office, wrote the following in 1951: "The Peking Government planned to liberate Formosa on July 15 and, in the middle of June, news reached the State Department that the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea was disintegrating. The politicians on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel were preparing a plan to throw Syngman Rhee out of office and set up a unified government for all Korea." . . . Thus the only way out, for Chiang [Kai-shek, the KMT leader], was for Rhee to attack the North, which ultimately made Acheson yield and defend Nationalist China [on Taiwan].

Meanwhile, in South Korea,

an Australian embassy representative sent in daily reports in late June, saying that "patrols were going in from the South to the North, endeavouring to attract the North back in pursuit. Plimsoll warned that this could lead to war and it was clear that there was some degree of American involvement as well." [According to former Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam,]1002 "The evidence was sufficiently strong for the Australian Prime Minister to authorize a cable to Washington urging that no encouragement be given to the South Korean government."

998 Blum, Killing Hope, p 46.
999 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 73.
1000 Ibid, p 76.
1001 KMT, deriving from Kuomintang, is an alternative acronym to GMD, which derives from the differing transliteration Guomindang.
1002 Whitlam was not, of course, Prime Minister at the time. He is referring to the acts of a predecessor.
Cumings also notes the warning in late April from an American diplomat, Robert Strong, that "desperate measures may be attempted by [the Chinese] Nationalist Government to involve [U.S.] in [a] shooting war as [a] means of saving its own skin." In chapters too complex to summarize here, he chronicles the intrigues of a number of Chiang's backers, including the China Lobby in Washington, General Claire Chennault and his then nearly defunct airline CAT (later Air America), former OSS chief General William Donovan, and in Japan General MacArthur and his intelligence chief Charles Willoughby. He notes the visit of two of Chiang's generals to Seoul, one of them on a U.S. military plane from MacArthur's headquarters. And he concludes that 'Chiang may have found … on the Korean peninsula, the provocation of a war that saved his regime [on Taiwan] for two more decades: '

Anyone who has read this text closely to this point, and does not believe that Willoughby, Chiang, [General] Wu Tieg Cheng [Chiang's emissary to Seoul], Yi Pŏm-sŏk, [Syngman] Rhee, Kim Sŏk-won, Tiger Kim, and their ilk were capable of a conspiracy to provoke a war, cannot be convinced by any evidence.

He adds that anti-conspiratorialist Americans 'are prey to what might be called the fallacy of insufficient cynicism'

(Yi Pom-sok, Kim Sok-won and Tiger Kim were all involved in the 17th regiment which may, or may not, have captured Haeju on or before 26 June.)

Indeed, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity centred around the ROK which seems suspiciously timed in retrospect. I can add one more prominent diplomatic event to those mentioned above. The event that looms (and loomed) large in DPRK propaganda was the visit of John Foster Dulles in mid-June 1950. In particular, a photograph of Dulles with the ROK defence minister and military officers peering across the 38th parallel has been used as the iconic visual signifier of aggressive intent. Lowe writes that 'the murky' talks leave room for 'legitimate speculation', adding later that: 'Mystery surrounds the precise motives for Dulles's visit to Seoul. On 6 April 1950, John Foster Dulles was reappointed as an adviser to the State Department. The Republican hard-liner had been chosen reluctantly by Democrat Truman administration as a salve to 'the explosion of McCarthyism'. In a broadcast dated 14 May 1950 he suggested that the US needed to "develop better techniques' because the Soviets 'could win everything by the Cold War they could win in a hot war.'

I. F. Stone in his 1952 classic The Hidden History of the Korean War wrote:

Chiang Kai-shek and Rhee...feared that peace would be the end of them. Dulles feared that peace would fatally interfere with the plan to rebuild the old Axis powers for a new anti-Soviet crusade...the dominant trend in American political, economic and military thinking was fear of peace. General Van Fleet summed it all up in speaking to a visiting Filipino delegation in January, 1952: 'Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea and interfered with the plan to rebuild the old Axis powers for a new anti-Soviet crusade...the dominant trend in American political, economic and military thinking was fear of peace. General Van Fleet summed it all up in speaking to a visiting Filipino delegation in January, 1952: 'Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea...either here or someplace in the world.' In this simple-minded confession lies the key to the hidden history of the Korean War.

On the 18th Dulles addressed the ROK national assembly, pledging US support 'both moral and material'. The next morning Rhee requested an unscheduled interview with Dulles. According to the official US State Department history:

Mr Dulles went to considerable lengths to explain that formal pacts, allegiances or treaties were not necessary prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal [my emph.] member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of other members of the free world against the forces of communism.

This is, of course, quite a testament in itself to the power that the nascent Cold War paradigm, Dulles, a mere adviser to the Secretary of State, felt he could openly demand loyalty (and one may pause here to think what it could mean to be 'a loyal member of the free world') in exchange for protection.

Dulles was in Tokyo on 25 June, able to communicate directly with MacArthur as events unfolded. He was thus able to advocate an immediate aggressive response. What evidence, then, exists that the US actively sought to bring about war. If one hypothesises that the desirable way to bring about war would be to make the ROK an attractive target for a DPRK offensive, there are certainly considerable factors which accord with such a course of action.

To begin with, there are the 'failures of deterrence' embodied in US officials declarations that they would not intervene militarily if either the ROK or Taiwan were attacked. On 5 January 1950, at a press conference, Truman stated: 'The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.'

On 12 January Dean Acheson gave his speech to the Press Club: “Beyond Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, the United States could not guarantee areas in the Western Pacific 'against military attack.' The people in such areas must rely initially on their own efforts to defend themselves, but then on 'the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by . . . [those] who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression'." Mention of the United Nations is interesting because the USSR had a veto over UNSC resolutions and yet, as will be seen, failed to use it under rather strange circumstances, thus allowing the US to intervene directly but under a UN mandate.

As has already been mentioned, in May Senator Tom Connally was even more explicit that 'the US would not go to fight for Korea'. Yet the US committed forces to fight in Korea and to intervene to save Taiwan with extreme alacrity. In fact, in Japan the response seems to have started some days before 25 June when 'many vehicles were taken out of store facilities and... American military activities increased.' After less than 48 hours the US had decided on committing troops. Halliday and Cumings state that the 'United Nations was used to ratify American decisions,' quoting an official JCS study: 'Having resolved upon armed intervention for itself, the US government the next day sought the approval and the assistance of the United Nations.' On 27 June, Truman announced that the US 7th Fleet was in the Taiwan strait. On that same day the US began aerial and naval bombardments which included targets above the 38th parallel. On 28 June the 24th US Infantry Division had landed and took command of all ground forces in Korea.

A threat is when party a informs party b that if b undertakes action set x then a will undertake action set y which will cause a negative impact on b. If a does not actually intend to undertake action set y then this is commonly referred to as a bluff. It is intended to deter b from doing x. If a leads b to believe that it will not undertake y and then does so this, is the opposite of a bluff. In practical terms it is a form of inducement. Most commentators suggest that probably neither Stalin nor Kim II Sung took US implications of non-intervention seriously, but it is absolutely clear that if the

1012 Ibid, p 186.
1014 Stueck, The Korean War, p 30.
1015 Drife, “Japan's Involvement in the Korean War”, p 121.
1016 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp 74-5.
DPRK had anticipated the actual US reaction that eventuated they would not have ventured in force below the 38th parallel.

There is another manner by which the ROK was made a more tempting target than might have otherwise been the case, and that is the restrictions placed on its military build-up. The ROKA was even more poorly equipped than the KPA on 25 June 1950. The following table is taken from a Russian history of the war.\textsuperscript{1019}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>KPA Forces (1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 2nd, and 12th ID, 105th TBr, 17th IndAR)</th>
<th>South Korean forces (1st, 7th, 6th, 8th, and Capital ID, IndCavRegt, two IndInfBn, three IndArtyBn)</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.3 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns and Mortars</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1.1 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks and SP Guns</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5.9 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.2 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1 : 2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The KPA had 172 combat aircraft, but only 32 trained pilots,\textsuperscript{1020} another factor suggesting a mysteriously premature action on 25 June.)

The failure to provide tanks, aircraft and self-propelled artillery is entirely consistent with deterring any ROK offensives, but the ROKA lacked more defensive armaments also. The most noted factor is the lack of usable anti-tank weapons, something which must assuredly be of more use in detering KPA offensive action than it would be in facilitating ROKA offensive action.\textsuperscript{1021}

There are hints then that the DPRK may have been deceived into thinking that the time was ripe for a push south when in fact this was most advantageous to their enemies. I have already mentioned the ways in which the USSR, US, GMD and Rhee regime benefitted from an outbreak of war at this time, but it is worth elaborating further on the benefits to the US.

To begin with, there is the matter of NSC-68 and the rearment of the US. The outbreak of the Korean War is held to have been crucial in bringing about the implementation of NSC-68. The importance of this document is amply demonstrated by the fact that its fundamental structuring of the US political economy has lasted now for over 60 years, more than 2 decades longer than the 'Communist threat' it was putatively created to address. Chris Floyd describes it as 'the document that more than any other engineered the militarisation of America'.\textsuperscript{1022} David Fautua writes: 'Truman finally approved NSC 68 as a national security policy on 30 September 1950. By 31 May 1951, the military budget swelled to $48,000,000,000, nearly quadrupling the prewar authorization

\textsuperscript{1019} Ibid, p 59.
\textsuperscript{1020} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1022} Floyd, “The Slander that Launched...”
of $13.5 billion].

Winston Churchill considered that the entire importance of the Korean War was that it led to US rearmament. Not only that, but the outbreak of the Korean War prompted the rearmament of NATO turning it into 'an effective alliance', and prompting an increase of 3 million personnel. By 1953 the US had achieved and enormous 'strategic assymetry' in its favour over the Soviet Union to an extent 'approaching absolute strategic dominance'.

Nor was it only the Rhee regime that was looking unsustainable on 25 June. Jiang Jieshi's grip on power had become so tenuous that the US covert officers were themselves planning a coup against him. This, however, was a move of desperation, the GMD were widely considered to be a lost cause. The US had led the effort to prevent the PRC from being recognised the legitimate Chinese state in the UN but the sheer ridiculousness of leaving the GMD in place as 'China' while the PRC constituted the entire mainland had brought about a tide of international opinion which was getting hard to resist. If the PRC gained UN membership there would be absolutely no way that the US could intervene in its civil war without attracting condemnation as an aggressor. It should be noted too that, unlike Korea, Taiwan was considered to have considerable military strategic significance: "An unsinkable aircraft carrier' positioned 100 miles off the China coast, as General MacArthur characterized it, Taiwan was regarded by military leaders as more important than South Korea." Of course, it would be inconsistent of me not to point out that such strictly military strategic matters are less significant than broader economic, geographical and demographic strategic concerns of imperial hegemony, but nevertheless this sort of 'power projection' asset has a key role such considerations as well as in its own right.

UNSCR Resolutions 82 to 85 are all titled 'Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea'. UNSCR 82, which was passed on the 25 June no less, 'notes with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea' and 'determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace." Two days later UNSCR 83 recommended that 'members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack....' UNSCR 84 (7 July) arrogated unified command of UN forces to the US. There was no hurry, of course, because no other troops would arrive for a month or so, and at all stages of the war US troop numbers far outnumbered the combined numbers of other UN forces. In all practical senses this was a unilateral US intervention, but one occurring under a UN banner, an interesting eventualty when one reflects on Acheson's words of January the 12th.

In fact the US was only able to obtain such timely UN facilitation due to a couple of rather felicitously timed events. The aforementioned UN report revealing, largely on the say-so of US and ROK personnel, that the ROK was not engaging in offensive actions, had actually been commenced

1026 Stueck, The Korean War, p 5.
1027 Porter, Perils of Dominance, p 5.
1028 Halliday and Cunings, Korea, p 67.
1029 Stueck, The Korean War, p 45.
1030 Kim, "Who Initiated...", p 34.
1031 Stueck, "The United States and the Origins...", p 9.
1035 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 17.
on the 24th and a draft was available by the 26th. Halliday and Cumings summarise the circumstances of the writing process:

UNCOK members woke up in Seoul on Sunday morning to a war, wrote a report based on the limited observations of two people and whatever the Koreans and Americans chose to tell them, and then were in the care of the American military for the next three days. They left all their archives behind in Seoul, making it impossible to verify the information that UNCOK had at its disposal.1036

The other fortuitous circumstance is the absence of the USSR from the UNSC. 'In mid-January the Soviets walked out of the UN Security Council, allegedly to protest its failure to seat Communist China but probably actually to freeze the Mao regime out of the international organization...' Had the USSR been sitting it would have seemed very odd had it not vetoed UNSCR's 82 to 85. As it is, the Soviet ambassador was perfectly capable of attending just the sessions in question to exercise a veto but did not do so on direct instructions from Stalin himself.1037 Goncharov et al. speculate that allowing UN cover obviated the risk that a subsequent formal declaration of war between the US and China would draw the USSR into World War III due to its treaty obligations. 1039

The US did not need to start such a war, but whether Stalin feared that they wished to or not, he was once again going above-and-beyond the call of prudent enmity and providing crucial support for the US in its attacks on those who were the Soviet Union's supposed allies by dint of ideology, and (in this case) formal ties.

The question still remains then, why did the KPA advance south of the 38th in force at a time so propitious to the US, so seemingly crucial to the survival of Rhee and Jiang, so disadvantageous to the PRC, and so premature with regard to its own preparations? The anomaly does not disappear if one assumes that there was in fact an ROKA offensive against Haeju, or anywhere else. It would seem that some unknown factor caused the DPRK to send its forces south. A logical suspicion would be that the DPRK leadership were victims of a ruse, and exploring this option may clarify matters. Imagine, for example, that the USSR had fed false intelligence to the DPRK suggesting that the ROKA was on the verge of mutiny or ready to disintegrate with only the slightest push. This is almost exactly what the US did with its unruly quasi-client Saddam Hussein when it supplied false intelligence to his regime in 1980, as Barry Lando explains:

To encourage Saddam to attack, the United States passed on intelligence reports exaggerating the political turmoil in Iran. All Saddam had to do was to dispatch his troops across the border and the regime would collapse. According to Howard Teicher, who served on the White House National Security Council, 'the reports passed on to Baghdad depicted Iran's military in chaos, riven by purges and lack of replacement parts for its American-made weapons. The inference was that Iran could be speedily overcome.'

'We were clearly stuffing his head with nonsense, to make conditions look better than they were,' commented Richard Sale, who covered the intelligence community for United Press International at the time. 'The information was deliberately fabricated to encourage him to go in.'1040

Such a deception would resolve the enigma of the DPRK attack, and an equivalent ruse would not be beyond the capabilities of the US and/or ROK. Another matter that is both suggestive and offers a shard of illumination is the sudden change of plan by the KPA on reaching Seoul. Whatever they had planned on reaching Seoul, by its fall on the 28th it was apparently obsolete and, as outlined above, a new plan to take the entire peninsula had to be hastily created. This would suggest that whatever misapprehension the DPRK laboured under was belied very rapidly after the 25th. Given what we understand of the DPRK plan it seems to me most likely that it was the sudden intervention of the US which was the unwelcome surprise. The weight of evidence suggests that the DPRK sought to seize the pretext of some ROKA action to launch a quick offensive with the optimal aim

1036 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 76.
1037 Stueck, The Korean War, pp 34-5.
1038 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 161.
1040 Lando, Web of Deceit, pp 52-3.
of seizing Seoul. This is how Bruce Cumings describes what some documents related to such planning reveal:

Kim Il Sung’s basic conception of a Korean War, originated at least by August 1949: namely, attack the cul de sac of Ongjin (which no sane blitzkrieg commander would do precisely because it is a cul de sac), move eastward and grab Kaesong, and then see what happens. At a minimum this would establish a much more secure defense of P’yôngyang, which was quite vulnerable from Ongjin and Kaesong. At maximum, it might open Seoul to his forces. That is, if the southern army collapses, move on to Seoul and occupy it in a few days.\textsuperscript{1041}

In other words the plan to attack Ongjin reinforces that fact that this was intended to be a short offensive leading to negotiations from a position of superiority or, at worst, consolidated territorial gains. This would explain why full preparation and mobilisation was considered less important than seizing a pretext. The DPRK, if this were the case, must have been very confident that the US would not intervene. The ROK, abandoned by the US and riven by internal discontent and political instability, could be forced to negotiate terms which would lead to eventual political union. If negotiations fail to bring this about, or even while they are ongoing, the DPRK would retain its territorial gains and facilitate the relaunch of a revolutionary guerrilla war in the south which would assure eventual victory. Instead, once it was clear that the US was going to bring as much force to bear as it could as quickly as it could, the DPRK had no choice but to commit the KPA to a blitzkrieg assault, a race to the tip of the peninsula before the US could commit enough forces to prevent such a conquest. This would also explain why, following the sudden change of plan, the KPA was forced, despite being well aware of the dangers posed, to stretch its improvised lines of communication in an attempt to decide the issue before it was too late.

This is all somewhat speculative, but bear in mind that it is the only apparent way of resolving the contradictions and anomalies that appear in our current understanding of these events. The reader may wonder why I have devoted so much effort to exploring the events culminating on 25 June 1950 when I cannot provide absolute answers as to what happened. What the reader is required to understand is that the balance of probability is firmly on the side of US foreknowledge of these events and, indeed, that it acted in some manner to bring them about. There are far too many putatively coincidental circumstances which favoured the US, and they are far too closely timed to avoid serious suspicion. The means, motive and opportunity are there. The surprise evinced by the US is belied by that haste of its commitment of forces and such postures end by looking more like conscious efforts at establishing alibis. Consider this passage from Cumings:

> With all this bubbling activity, the last weekend in June 1950 nonetheless dawned on a torpid, somnolent, and very empty Washington. Harry Truman was back home in Independence. Acheson was at his Sandy Spring country farm, Rusk was in New York, Kennan had disappeared to a remote summer cottage without so much as a telephone, Paul Nitze was salmon fishing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were occupied elsewhere, and even the United Nations representative, Warren Austin, was not at his post.\textsuperscript{1042}

Knowing that there is a strong likelihood of a US role in instigating the 'Korean War' is important in what follows.

**War or Genocide?**

The period which begins on 25 June 1950 and ends 27 July 1953 is conventionally termed 'The Korean War.' A war of three years, as with wars in general, is almost inevitably going to be described in narrative terms and there are good reasons for this. Peoples' lives were utterly dominated by major discreet events with distinct chronological placements – significant military actions; a front which swept south then north then south in the initial stage and then a completely

\textsuperscript{1041} Bruce Cumings, “Cummings and Weatherby – An Exchange”, *Cold War International History Bulletin*, 6/7, 7 July 2011, p 121.

\textsuperscript{1042} Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p 260.
different stage with virtually no such movement; notable political events; notable massacres; notable bombing raids. The Korean people were living through the 'interesting times' referred to in the apocryphal Chinese curse – times when the narrative of 'major' historical events is actually the most important factor in shaping the lives of the masses.

A narrative has a beginning, a middle and an end. The beginning describes a status quo. The middle is a series of transformative events which follow an initiation event which disturbs the status quo. The end is the establishment of a new status quo. This is all convention, of course, and it is understood that the beginning and end points are static only in terms relative to the defined boundaries of the middle – boundaries of both chronology and of type when including or excluding transformative events. What then should one expect from a narrative of war? More to the point, what would one expect the end to look like? Innumerable examples of war narratives end (by any reckoning) in a manner which accords with Clausewitz's description of the nature of war. From the Punic Wars to the World Wars, they end with one side imposing its political will on the other, at least to some extent. Before World War II, stalemates were broken when one side gained the advantage. Only very small wars would actually end with a stalemate in place. The Korean War simply does not fit that aspect of the war narrative. The very simple trick of looking at the end of the narrative, one can already discern that the events of 25/06/1950 to 27/07/1953 are more likely to conform to a narrative wherein the 'middle' is characterised by genocide rather than war.

In politico-military-strategic terms the end results of the Korean War are insignificant in terms of the scale of military action. There was no regime change. There wasn't even a change in the balance of power on the peninsula except a growth of deterrence. If anything the war acted to stop change at this level, to halt transformative events and re impose a more stable form of the status quo ante as if to defy the rules of narrative. On another level, however, the transformation was profound and shocking. Around 10 percent of Koreans, or slightly more, were dead. In the DPRK about 2 million civilians and 500,000 military had died according to Halliday and Cumings.\footnote{Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 200.} That is more than one of every four human beings exterminated in a three year span. Others give lower figures, but still produce shocking mortality rates such as 1 in 5, though there is the ever-present confusion of specifying only 'casualties' without distinguishing killed and wounded. One estimate is that one ninth of North Korean civilians (1,000,000 people) were killed in air raids alone.\footnote{Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, London: Routledge, 2001, p 2.} Additionally, according to Stueck, '[i]n property, North Korea put its losses at $1.7 billion, South Korea at $2 billion, the equivalent of its gross national product for 1949. North Korea lost some 8,700 industrial plants, South Korea twice that number. Each area saw 600,000 homes destroyed.'\footnote{Stueck, The Korean War, p 361.} The urban destruction in the DPRK was unparalleled before or since, 'at least 50 percent of eighteen out of the North's twenty-two major cities were obliterated. A partial table looks this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongjin</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamhung</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungnam</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sariwon</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinanju</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{Cumings, The Korean War, p 160.}
Within months the US had run out of military targets and in less than a year they were running out of significant civilian targets and began bombing the countryside.  

The US also bombed south of the 38th parallel, when the KPA occupied areas or when there was guerilla activity. Hundreds of thousands were also massacred, almost exclusively by US and right-wing formations. Millett observes that 'it is no accident that Koreans often compare themselves to Jews, Poles, and Irish.' In the ROK there is even a word, han, which may specifically denote the repressed and accumulated grief and rage that was produced in those who loved ones were killed by the regime but who avoided even mentioning the departed, let alone grieving their loss, for fear of being killed themselves. If this level of trauma is present in the ROK, one can only imagine the level of psychic devastation in the DPRK.

From the point of view of narrative, then, it would seem from the end point of the narrative arc that the middle, the crucial transformational events which are the stuff of traditional history, would be more likely to take the form of genocide than that of war. It's not quite that simple though. It cannot be denied that there was a real war going on. What one can say is that in the narrative of war US actions often seem to be difficult to explicate, especially if its role in peace negotiations is incorporated. Claims of US naivety, idealism, stupidity and arrogance are all deployed to explain US actions, along with analyses of domestic political matters and inter-élite conflict. This sort of approach is no different from that used with respect to Indochina, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many sites of lesser US involvement which would include most of the very long list of US interventions. In contrast a narrative of genocide requires no such explications. Indeed, it is almost eerie that events unfold as if smoothly following a predetermined plan of genocide, notwithstanding that prosecuting genocide does not require the precision of prosecuting war and is thus not subject to uncertainty and reversal in the same manner.

Before narrating the events of the front line, it is worth describing the genocidal character of US actions in rear areas, which is ultimately a more fundamental defining characteristic of what occurred than the battles at the front. As Cho writes:

Targeting a civilian population would be a strategy that the U.S. military “perfected” during the Korean War, leaving three million people, or 10 percent of the population, dead. The horrors that began to unravel on the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950, were already reminiscent of a future of U.S. military domination in Asia, flashing forward to images of napalmed children running through the streets....

It is worth contextualising US and ROK atrocities by making a comparison with Communist atrocities. Firstly, it is worth noting that the Chinese are not linked to massacres. Their treatment of POWs was far from what one would hope, and yet far better than that meted out by all other belligerents. During 1951 the Chinese even took over custody of nearly all Western prisoners due to concerns over their treatment at Korean hands and were mostly at pains to treat them reasonably (in fairly grim circumstances) and protect them from the vengeance of Korean citizens. The Chinese example alone should be enough to belie completely any apologetic discourse which seeks to suggest that the sort of atrocities committed by the US were some innate by-product of the type of war fought.

North Korean atrocities differed from those of the US and ROK in three ways. Firstly there is the matter of scale. Cumings estimates that KPA atrocities were about one sixth of the around 100,000 dying at the hands of ROK security forces and right-wing paramilitaries. It may be that Cumings

1047 Coker, Humane Warfare, p 80.
1048 Millett, The War for Korea, p 4.
1049 Grace M. Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p 82
1050 Cho, Haunting the Diaspora, p 75.
1051 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 180.
is being conservative with both numbers here, but if we assume from this a figure of 17,000 victims of Communist atrocities then it becomes more like one tenth or twentieth if one accounts in addition for US massacres and ROK massacres in captured or recaptured territories. If one factors in the civilians who died under US aerial bombardment the figure becomes less than 2%.

Secondly, there is the matter of authorisation. As Dong Choon Kim writes: 'North Korea's Kim II Sung strongly emphasized the prohibition against civilian killings, which seemed quite natural because the [KPA], as a revolutionary army, had to win the hearts and minds of the South Korean people.' Kim II Sung also condemned revenge killings which were rife at the village level with reciprocal atrocities occurring as territory changed hands. Furthermore, though the killing of POWs on or soon after capture was common, KPA officers at all levels strove constantly to end these murders. The authorised atrocities were restricted to the murder of political prisoners after a show of formal legal proceedings. On an individual level this is no less an atrocity than the same act carried out without the pretense of a trial, perhaps more so especially if confessions are produced through torture. It does, however, greatly restrict the scale of murder to a more individual rather than mass event. It also restricts the nature of the victims. Children, for example, would not be subject to this violence, nor generally would the apolitical.

This brings us to the third factor, the matter of discrimination. Communist atrocities particularly targeted specific individuals. This was true of both authorised and unauthorised atrocities. Even surrendering soldiers and POWs are specifically 'enemy combatants' who, by their nature, are or have been involved in conflict. The agency of, say, an infantryman may be virtually non-existent (outside of the fantasies promoted by recruiters), but that makes them pawns, not bystanders. There is no inherent moral difference between murdering a soldier and murdering a civilian, but there is a distinct difference. It is almost inevitable that military personnel are viewed as enemies, but enmity towards civilians, if defined in 'national, ethnic, racial or religious' terms, is at the very least a prerequisite for genocide. Arguably it might be said that any mass killings and/or major destruction under this condition is definable as genocide in line with Lemkin's definition of genocide as being 'against populations'.

Leaving aside the POW issue, given the conditions under which the Communists committed atrocities, it seems reasonable to accept Cumings' implicit figure of roughly 17,000 civilians killed. This means that the US and ROK forces under US command killed more than 50 times as many civilians as the Communists. That is a substantive difference, not only in moral terms. Behind this massive disparity of death is a mountain of corpses. Explanations are given which rely on the atomisation of various forms of massacre, an artificial separation of methods and circumstances of mass slaughter – panic at the advance of the KPA; fanatical anticomunism; racism; superior firepower; and the US 'airpower fetish'. The disparity of death, however, gives lie to this because at every turn the Communists opposed the mass killing of civilians while, as will be shown; each instance of US/ROK mass murder was the result of policy. The disparate levels of atrocity mean exactly what they should suggest at first glance – one side was fighting a war, the other was committing a genocide.

1053 The figures on which this is based are discussed below.
1054 Kim, "Forgotten war, forgotten massacres...", p 537.
1055 Cumings, The Korean War, p 186.
1056 Kim, "Forgotten war, forgotten massacres...", p 529.
1057 Cumings, The Korean War, p 187.
1059 See Appendix 1.
1060 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p 80.
1061 Figures for civilian deaths at US and ROK hands are given below. I have not encountered any suggestion that other United Nations forces committed atrocities on a scale which would change the proportions by inclusion or exclusion from the total.
To begin with the UN side of the frontline, the most well known massacre carried out by US personnel was that of No Gun Ri. This occurred from 26 July to 29 July 1950, that is to say over the space of about 3 days. The massacre began when refugees fleeing across a bridge were strafed and mortared. This much is not disputed. Controversy arose over the circumstances soon after the massacre rose to prominence in 1999. A narrative was promulgated throughout most of the US media that 'the incident took place because the military was ill-trained and ill-equipped during the early stages of the war' with the result that 'the No Gun Ri story became sanitized as just another anecdotal war story that asks to be forgotten.' In fact it is well documented that US personnel had on numerous occasions been directly ordered to open fire on refugees. According to the BBC: 'Declassified military documents recently found in the US National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.' On 26 July, the day the massacre began, a letter from the US Ambassador to the ROK detailed to the State Department the US Army's plan to open fire on refugees if they did not heed warning shots. However, warning shots do not seem to have played a role in these events. According to the ROK Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRCK) in 2007:

On July 25th, 1950, Korean villagers were forced by U.S. soldiers to evacuate their homes and move south. The next day, July 26, the villagers continued south along the road. When the villagers reached the vicinity of No Gun Ri, the soldiers stopped them at a roadblock and ordered the group onto the railroad tracks, where the soldiers searched them and their personal belongings. Although the soldiers found no prohibited items (such as weapons or other military contraband), the soldiers ordered an air attack upon the villagers via radio communications with U.S. aircraft. Shortly afterwards, planes flew over and dropped bombs and fired machine guns, killing approximately one hundred villagers on the railroad tracks.

That is the context, which became a centre of controversy (albeit specious controversy) which in turn managed to leave most people with the impression of some sort of panicked response by US personnel who were not coping. The reader may well be wondering how this could possibly address all of the issues involved in a 3 day long massacre, a period longer than panic or unpreparedness could possibly account for.

After the initial attack, the refugees fled into a culvert and a tunnel beneath the bridge. US forces set up machine guns at either end of the culvert and tunnel. For over three entire days the machine gunners killed those who tried to leave, killing, according to the TRCK, an additional 300:

"There was a lieutenant screaming like a madman, fire on everything, kill 'em all,' recalls 7th Cavalry veteran Joe Jackman. 'I didn't know if they were soldiers or what. Kids, there was kids out there, it didn't matter what it was, eight to 80, blind, crippled or crazy, they shot 'em all.' Soldiers with small arms would, as time passed, approach the culvert to pick off any survivors. A survivor, 12 at the time, said: 'The American soldiers played with our lives like boys playing with

1068 Ibid, p 590.
1069 Ibid.
1070 Williams, “Kill ’em All....”
flies. Bruce Cumings believes that there was a concerted effort to ensure that there were no surviving witnesses.

We know these events occurred because of eye-witness statements, both those of survivors and those of 35 veterans who corroborate these events. Further corroborations exist in the bullet holes that remain to be seen, though plastered over, in the culvert and the tunnel to this day. Eye-witness testimony is the central evidence of these occurrences. Even the journal Archival Science is forced to concede that documents are supplementary, corroborating details rather than constituting an account. This is true for all the massacres that occurred south of the 38th parallel. The orders that set the machinery of death in motion may be documented, but the events were not. The substance of eye-witness testimony, however, has been borne out by the mass graves to which witnesses were often able to lead investigators.

No Gun Ri was not isolated. Over 60 further such massacres at US hands have been reported:

For example, on 11 July 1950, the US Air Force bombed the peaceful Iri railway station located far south of the combat line and killed about 300 civilians, including South Korean government officials. US warplanes also bombed and strafed gathered inhabitants or refugees in Masan, Haman, Sachon, Pohang, Andong, Yechon, Gumii, Danyang and other regions. Roughly 50 to 400 civilians were killed at each site and several times of that number were severely wounded. 

In dozens of villages across southern South Korea, US planes engaged in repeated low-level strafing runs of the 'people in white,' In the southeast seaside city of Pohang in August of 1950, US naval artillery bombarded the calm villages and killed more than 400 civilians. In addition, another fifty-four separate cases of attacks equivalent to No Gun Ri are logged with South Korean authorities but have not yet been investigated.

The one salient point that is repeated most often by veteran pilots is that they were told to target the 'people in white.' White clothing was the normal and traditional Korean attire, the most common form of dress among the rural majority. But No Gun Ri is symptomatic of more than just the systematic targeting of refugees, it also shows the gratuitous violence of individual soldiers fuelled by racism. Hungarian reporter Tibor Meray described US personnel shooting Koreans for sport at the time and stated that neither the KPA nor the ROKA could compare to US forces in brutality. In Vietnam years later, a veteran of the Korean War told Philip Caputo: 'I saw men sight their rifles in by shooting at Korean farmers. Before you leave here, sir, you’re going to learn that one of the most brutal things in the world is your average nineteen-year-old American boy.

The racist violence of US personnel had begun during the occupation. Here it is worth contrasting again. Soviet troops had entered Korea as conquerors, war weary, barefoot, and brutalised. They stole, they raped and they killed. After dark they had to travel in groups of no less than three to avoid reprisals from enraged Koreans. But the official reaction was swift. Their superiors stamped out such behaviour in a matter of weeks and the damage in relations began to heal. In contrast, Koreans greeted the US occupation warmly but after 3 months they were, as mentioned

1071 Cumings, The Korean War, p 167.
1072 Ibid, p 168.
1073 Williams, “Kill ’em All....”
1076 Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 534.
1077 Ibid, p 523.
1079 Cumings, The Korean War, p 158.
above, widely hated.\textsuperscript{1084} This wasn't just the result of US policies, but also of the behaviour of the occupation forces:

By December 1945 most of the specific acts with which the US command contended as the occupation proceeded – open expressions of disrespect toward Koreans, lack of care in avoiding Korean pedestrians while driving American military vehicles, offensive advances toward Korean women, looting and larceny – were common.\textsuperscript{1085}

When the 'replacements' arrived, conscripts taking over from Pacific War veterans, things got worse – they lacked the training and discipline of their predecessors in the Army while possessing all the provincialism and sense of superiority of their older comrades, if not their dehumanizing experience in fighting the Japanese.\textsuperscript{1086} Western reporters at the time found that racist contempt was the norm and that insurmountable alienation was more or less universal.\textsuperscript{1087} I cannot provide a full analysis of Hodge's response to these issues, but it was inadequate – long on rhetoric (such as letters of exhortation to the troops), short on efficacious measures (such as widespread curfews and bans of off-duty personnel or rigorous prosecution of the more common offences, which were not necessarily minor). The fact that a commander with an entire machinery of military discipline at his disposal chose what amounted to begging his personnel to be nice shows that he was (as many have pointed out) a battlefield commander unsuited to the task of running an occupation. The fact that neither subordinates nor superiors did anything about his inefficacy, however, shows a fundamental disinterest in improving the behaviour of US personnel, a lack of will which superseded in relevance any lack in capability on Hodge's part.

Racist violence was fully unleashed once the War was under way. Just as the Germans had conflated Jewishness and Bolshevism, the US in propaganda and military indoctrination conflated 'Asiatic'-ness and Communism.\textsuperscript{1088} Instead of reserving animus for combatant enemies animus was directed at 'gooks', which meant all Koreans regardless of combatant status, political orientation, or gender. It is true that risks vastly differed for different locales and statuses, but it is also true the every single Korean faced at least some risk of being killed by US forces and, as we have seen, local allies were not an exception. A US correspondent wrote that it was 'not a good time to be a Korean, for the Yankees are shooting them all', while a British war correspondent recorded that GIs "never spoke of the enemy as though they were people.... ...[E]very man's dearest wish was to kill a Korean. 'Today... I'll get me a gook.'\textsuperscript{1089}

When US forces went north of the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel massacres also occurred. Details are, of course, sketchier, with DPRK officialdom being an unreliable source. However, as Dong Choon Kim points out: 'While it must be acknowledged that the North has politically exploited such claims, the facts on the ground force us to not discount their veracity.'\textsuperscript{1090} In one instance an estimated 35,380 people in Sinchon were massacred but whereas the DPRK leaders claim that US personnel committed the massacre, it was in fact ROK paramilitary police and militias who were sent north in the tens of thousands.\textsuperscript{1091}

Although subject to commands from the Rhee regime, ROK security forces were ultimately under US command.\textsuperscript{1092} The US military may have been involved in formulating the 'special decree' which initiated widespread massacres south of the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel, but there is no doubt that it was the US which initiated the massacres by ROK security forces north of the 38\textsuperscript{th}. An order was issued to

\textsuperscript{1084} Cumings, \textit{Korea's Place in the Sun}, p 198.
\textsuperscript{1085} Stueck and Yi, "An Alliance Forged in Blood...", p 190.
\textsuperscript{1086} Ibid, p 194.
\textsuperscript{1087} Ibid, pp 195-6.
\textsuperscript{1088} Brewer, \textit{Why America Fights?...}, p 142.
\textsuperscript{1089} Korea, p 88.
\textsuperscript{1090} Kim, "Forgotten War...", p 531.
\textsuperscript{1091} Ibid, p 536.
\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid, p 532.
'liquidate the North Korean Workers' Party', a mass movement which had 14% of the DPRK population as members. Mass arrests were to be followed by the production by the US of 'black lists', the unstated purpose of which is easy enough to guess.\footnote{Cumings, The Korean War, p 195.} This is not an unusual practice for the US: a partial list of occasions when the US has provided clients with lists of persons who the US wishes dead due to their political beliefs or activism includes: Guatemala, 1953;\footnote{Ibarra, “The Culture of Terror...”, p 198.} Iraq 1963,\footnote{Tarig Ali, Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq, London: Verso, 2003, pp 87-8.} 2002-3,\footnote{Max Fuller, “Crying Wolf: Media Disinformation and Death Squads in Occupied Iraq”, GlobalResearch, 10 November 2005. Retrieved 16 April 2006 from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=FUI20051110&articleId=1230.} 2005-7;\footnote{Michael Moss, “How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War”, New York Times, 22 May 2006; Max Fuller, “Silence of the Lambs? Proof of US orchestration of Death Squads Killings in Iraq”, GlobalResearch, 14 March 2007. Retrieved 16 April 2007 from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5081.} Indonesia 1965;\footnote{Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967”, Pacific Affairs, Summer 1985, pp 239-264.} Indochina 1950-75;\footnote{Frank L. Jones, 'Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy', Parameters, Vol. 35, No.3 (Autumn 2005), p 104; Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, pp 204-5.} Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador mid-1970s (Operation Condor);\footnote{Roger Morris, “Donald Rumsfeld's Long March”.} Latin America 1982-91\footnote{Stokes, “Why the End of the Cold War...”, pp 583-4.} (note that in the latter two instances most targets were not directly chosen by the US, but under guidelines created by the US). It is pretty easy to establish that these murders are eliticial in nature by looking at the nature of the victims. They target leading intelligentsia and students, unionists, and peasant organisers. In Vietnam, for instance, the US even invented the term 'Viet Cong Infrastructure'. Prados defines them as 'a shadowy network of Viet Cong village authorities, informers, tax collectors, propaganda teams, officials of community groups, and the like, who collectively came to be called the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).' 'Sympathizers' were also counted.\footnote{Ibid, pp 204-5, 210.} The victims are very clearly non-combatants. For example, in William Blum's survey of US interventions (Killing Hope) there is no index entry given for 'unionists', 'subversives' or 'dissidents'; however, quite tellingly, one can get a fair idea of the approach to such individuals through looking up the entries on 'torture, US connection to.' Out of 14 entries there are three relating to interrogation;\footnote{Ibid, pp 72, 116, 171, 219-21, 232, 359-61, 375.} three, including one entry for Vietnam, where armed activists/guerillas/insurgents were tortured alongside unarmed political activists;\footnote{Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 533.} and 7 entries where only political dissidents are mentioned as victims.\footnote{Ibid, p 534.} We don't know how many died in massacres north of the 38th parallel, but we do have some idea (very roughly) of how many died in mass executions in the south. Of 30,000 political prisoners at the outbreak of war almost all were disposed of (except for 7000 fortunate enough to be imprisoned in Seoul).\footnote{Ibid, pp 128-9, 200-5, 239.} This was the tip of the iceberg. An estimated 350,000 people were enrolled in the Bodayeonmang (National Guidance League, NGL). It was putatively an organistaion for monitoring and rehabilitating left-wing activists, but up to 70% of its members were simply apolitical peasants.\footnote{Ibid, pp 72, 116, 171, 219-21, 232, 359-61, 375.} In a series of enormous mass executions (evidenced by mass graves which, again, provide grim confirmation of eyewitness testimony) somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people were slaughtered (some estimates go as high as 300,000).\footnote{Ibid, p 535.} In Taejon, for instance, 4000-7000 were executed, and when the town was recaptured the mass graves were used
as propaganda under the false claim that it was in fact the Communists who had committed the atrocity.\footnote{Cumings, The Korean War, p 173.} Probably those US personnel and Western reporters who saw the bodies believed it to be true, after all the Communists were the savages in their minds, but the massacre had in fact been attended by US officials.\footnote{Ibid, p 175.}

In recaptured territory, as in the North, many deemed politically suspect due to their activities during the DPRK occupation were liquidated. In the Seoul area, for instance, 50,000 were killed by one estimate.\footnote{Kim, “Forgotten War...”, p 536.} In addition, civilians in areas where guerrillas operated were at risk of being murdered throughout the war. Countershading often meant slaughtering civilian men, women and children deemed by geographical criteria to be supportive of the guerrillas. In Guchang, for instance, “several thousand civilians, including babies, women, and elderly, were killed during the operations named 'Keeping the Position by Cleansing the Fields.'”\footnote{Suh Hee-Kyung, “Atrocities Before and During the Korean War”, Critical Asian Studies, 42:4, p 579.} The US was also using firepower against parts of the countryside deemed inimical. From 5 January 1951 the US began the wholesale use of napalm against villages deemed to be willingly or unwillingly providing some form of support for guerrillas. As Suh Hee-Kyung writes: 'The objects of the bombings now included not only military targets but also civilian homes and towns suspected of harboring communist guerrillas and/or North Korean soldiers. Especially in areas that the North Korean Army and the Chinese Army had invaded, the U.S. Army applied a “scorched earth policy” even if the targeted area was residential.'\footnote{Ibid, p 532.} On 25 January 1951 Lt. General Edward Almond (commander of X Corps) defended the bombing in terms paraphrased by Cumings as, 'The local population was being killed, true, but the meager population remaining appears sympathetic to and harbors the enemy.'\footnote{Ibid, p 532.}

The US also began its bombing campaign in the North. Most of the 1 million tons of US ordinance dropped from the air in the War were used in 'strategic' bombing in the North.\footnote{Kolko, Century of War, p 404.} It is fair to say that in this small and highly urbanised half-country, this tonnage caused a greater degree of destruction than in any other time and place in human history. 'By 1952 just about everything in northern and central Korea was completely levelled. What was left of the population survived in caves, the North Koreans creating an entire life underground, in complexes of dwellings, schools, hospitals, and factories.'\footnote{Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, pp 295-6.} The rough consensus figure is that 1 million civilians died from the US bombing campaign. As Cumings notes:

> The United Nation's Genocide Convention defined the term as acts committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” This would include “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” It was approved in 1948 and entered into force in 1951 – just as the USAF was inflicting genocide, under this definition and under the aegis of the United Nations Command, on the citizens of North Korea. Others note that area bombing of enemy cities was not illegal in World War II, but became so only after the Red Cross Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Wartime, signed in Stockholm in August 1948.

Kim Dong Choon is cautious about the subject of genocide, despite writing in the Journal Of Genocide Studies:

> As we usually label genocide when the shooting and strafing were aimed at a certain race or community with clear cut boundaries and targets, America's military actions towards Korean civilians may not be regarded as a genocidal incident. [Endnote: However, as Bertrand Russell and Jean Paul Sartre argued when they established a 'War Crimes Tribunal' attacking America's in the war against Vietnam, the 'genocidal intent' of...}
This needless caution on Kim's part is saddening. The US (and the ROK forces under US command) systematically killed civilians in various completely different circumstances, and they did so under orders from the very top of the chain of command. One need only to glimpse through the various levels of mortality produced by 'strategic bombing', 'counterinsurgency', and mass executions to see that, taken as a whole, this was a staggering amount of death and a staggering amount of co-ordinated labour employed in causing mass civilian deaths. The level of proof being sought here is, in fact, far higher than that required to label the mass killings in Rwanda or Cambodia as genocides. Indeed such a level of proof would exclude all genocides but those of the Germans against the Jews and Roma of Europe.

There is more. By deliberately drawing out the negotiations for an armistice while instituting a strategy of 'attrition' the war, although a very real war, was made primarily an engine of genocide by the US. In this it became a progenitor of later genocidal war systems. To illustrate this evolution it is necessary to trace the progress of the war. The narrative produced is, like that of the origins of the war, distinctly anomalous at points. In the framework of war, as it is generally understood, such actions were difficult to explain and caused alarm among allies, US personnel themselves, and even US political leaders. The US public, on the other hand, simply hated the war and it destroyed the Truman presidency – Truman holding the record for least popular President on record (with 77% disapproval) until the advent of George W. Bush. But while from a military perspective many US actions seemed counterproductive or at least completely pointless it should be remembered that the narrative ends with the US having won for itself every single advantage that it could have won from an imperial perspective. The previously fragile division of Korea was now stable and consolidated as was the US client regime in the ROK. Each half of the peninsula was tied more firmly in dependency to its superpower patron. Taiwan was saved from unification with China, while the infant PRC was greatly retarded in its development. The US was now in a state of enduring militarisation, armed with both the weaponry and the ideology which would allow the US to exert coercive imperial power over most of the globe. From this perspective an outright military victory would have been considerably less attractive, not least because subsequent US interventions would rely on the false implication that the Communist Bloc posed a military threat to the US.

Korea is not particularly suited to blitzkrieg, it is narrow and hilly with poor roads generally at the bottom of valleys, and a climate which makes operations of any sort difficult. Carter Malkasian describes it as suited for 'strong in-depth defense', by which he means using elevated positions of the sort which would be so bloodily contested later in the war. Inexplicably, however, the ROK commander 'wanted to contain any North Korean attack at the 38th Parallel and rejected a planned withdrawal to stronger positions, such as behind the Han river. The 38th Parallel was on comparatively flat ground, lacking ridges or river-lines on which to form a defensive.'

After capturing Seoul, the KPA waited about a week, apparently awaiting artillery and other supplies, before the next concentrated offensive. 'Lacking detailed plans for operations south of Seoul, North Korean forces had been slow to proceed beyond the Han River.' On July 5 the KPA fought their first engagement with US forces, who did have anti-tank weapons but were nevertheless defeated. 'American combatants had inadequate firepower to resist Soviet-built tanks, and North Korean soldiers were not intimidated by opponents simply because their skin was

1118 Ibid, p 532.
1119 Cumings, The Korean War, p 149.
1121 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 82.
white.... On the contrary, the KPA continued to push, over-running an entire US division when Taejon was captured a week later. It took only until August 1 for the KPA to reach a point less than 50 km west of Pusan. By this stage the KPA faced superior numbers 92,000 (47,000 of them US) to the 70,000 it could bring to the front known as the Pusan perimeter. Only a tiny chunk of the peninsula was unconquered, but more critical for the KPA than being outnumbered was the fact that they had never prepared for this. They could not replace casualties, communications were still far from desirable efficacy, and their stretched supply lines combined with US air and naval power to make resupply difficult. As Malkasian explains the chance to end the war quickly was slipping away: 'Better American bazookas and heavy M-26 Pershing tanks had arrived that could counter the T-34s. The North Koreans waited until 3 September to make their major assault in the Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge. However, by then North Korean strength was ebbing. With only 98,000 men, they faced 180,000 UNC soldiers.

On September 15 the US X Corps made a bold and extremely well executed amphibious landing at Incheon, the port adjacent to Seoul. The DPRK expected this move but had little choice but to throw everything they could at the Pusan perimeter (in the abovementioned Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge). It seems apparent, however, that the DPRK had prepared for withdrawal, and for troops who were cut-off to become guerillas in the hills. Nevertheless, this was a terrible defeat for the KPA who were more or less routed from the South, sustaining heavy casualties and equipment losses. UN forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter on September 23. Seoul fell on the 27th after bitter fighting which caused many civilian deaths. Only around 25,000 KPA reached the 38th parallel before UN forces.

The KPA continued retreating and X Corps pressed northwards. The 38th parallel, crossing which had been condemned as an act of aggression by the UNSC was, little over 2 months later, of no significance. An 'imaginary line' as MacArthur put it, the same phrase being used soon after by the US ambassador to the UN. Malkasian claims that UNGAR 376, passed on October 7, authorised UN forces to proceed north of the 38th. The two major problems with such a contention are that a) by October the 7th UN forces were in places already more than 100 km north of the 38th and b) the resolution says no such thing.

The US rationalised crossing the 38th as a measure to prevent further aggression, but then changed to the annunciated aim of military unification. The Chinese openly avowed that they would respond militarily to a march on the Yalu with PLA Chief of Staff (on Sept 26) and Chou En Lai both telling the Indian ambassador for conveyance to the US. US intelligence agencies claimed, however, to have believed otherwise. When China entered the war, the US reacted at first as if nothing significant had happened then, after suffering defeats in October and November, as if a

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1122 Stueck, The Korean War, p 47.
1124 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 82.
1128 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 97.
1130 Stueck, The Korean War, p 86
1132 Cumings, The Korean War, p 23.
1133 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 29.
1135 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p 118.
1136 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, pp 283-4.
large portion of the PLA had crossed the border en masse:

As American forces rushed pell-mell back down the peninsula, observers at the time wondered why they were moving so fast, often breaking contact with an enemy not necessarily pursuing them. On December 15 a British military attaché wrote, 'The withdrawal continues without any major enemy pressure. There were no signs of defense lines being used to halt the enemy march; it looked like a phony war, or a great hoax.' British military attachés said in early December that the numbers of Chinese were quite exaggerated, with very few confirmed contacts with the Chinese; furthermore, it was often impossible to judge the nationality of enemy units. The number of Chinese POWs being taken did not indicate huge numbers of troops.1137

So yet again US led forces were inexplicably retreating rather than using the defensibility of the hilly terrain, this time back to the 38th parallel in what was known as the 'Big Bug-Out'.1138 Hyperbole exploded in Washington. This was the longest retreat in US military history, but it became transformed into the greatest defeat in US history leading to panic in the corridors of power and many very serious moves towards the use of atomic weapons.1139 This even went as far as the transfer of necessary bomb components to Japan and Guam.1140 The 'Big Bug-Out' didn't merely facilitate a vastly heightened level of threats from the US, it also gave a boost to the racist propaganda deployed on Western peoples, particularly those of the US. Hollywood films (more likely to be about the Pacific War than the unpopular Korean 'police action') featured scenes of marauding Oriental troops; of bearded, unkempt American fighters inhabiting alien hovels in alien lands and dauntlessly improvising devices and designs as they go.1141 Public affairs programming on television was unabashedly infected by official propaganda. One NBC programme was produced out of the White House by a presidential aide, who used it to declare that '[t]he barbarous aggression of the Chinese hoards [sic] in Korea is not only an attack upon the forces of the United Nations – it is an attack upon civilization itself – it is an effort to destroy all the rights and privileges for which mankind has fought and bled since the dawn of time.'1142

In coming months China really did commit massive numbers of personnel (officially 'volunteers') to a series of offensives, perhaps 400,000 by mid-January.1143 The KPA and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) managed to advance about 100km south of the 38th by the end of January, but by February UN counteroffensives had pushed them back across the Han and Seoul was evacuated after massive casualties on 14 March.1144 The KPA and CPV continued to mount offensives, but shortages and heavy casualties inflicted by UN forces brought them inevitably to a stop.1145 Seoul had by this stage changed hands 4 times. As UN forces retreated in January they more or less destroyed the port at Inchon and burnt down large parts of Seoul, just as they had on retreat from northern cities.1146 As the UN was preparing to re-enter the city, US air and ground artillery 'blasted' the city.1147 Indeed, one neglected aspect of the war was that during the mobile phase (which, as has been shown, seemed a little artificial at times) all but some small pockets of the countryside were swept over at least once by the battlefront. In addition to the 1 million tons or ordnance dropped by US aircraft, US guns fired a total of 2.1 million tons of ordnance – on a peninsula less than four-fifths the size of New Zealand the US used 43% as much explosive power as it did in the entirety of

1137 Ibid, p 287.
1138 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 36.
1139 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, pp 289-91.
1142 Brewer, Why America Fights, p 159.
1143 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 144.
1144 Ibid.
1145 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 45.
1146 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 141.
1147 Ibid, p 144.
World War II. Massive amounts of Korean property were destroyed by UN scorched earth policies and by the profligate use of artillery in addition to the massive bombing campaign. In late December 1950, General Matthew Ridgway took over command of the 8th Army which faced the KPA/CPF offensives. In April he was made Supreme Commander of UN forces. From the first he created an offensive spirit and tactics to match. An infantryman put it thus: "We were there to kill Chinese. That's what they told us. The army was done with retreating. General Ridgway was in charge now, and he wasn't a retreating general. We heard it every day from the officers. 'Fix 'em, find 'em, kill 'em.' We went out every day and we attacked. Seems like that's all we did was attack. We hardly ate. We hardly slept. We just attacked.""1150

The doctrine under which this occurred was referred to as 'attrition'. On the surface it seemed to have a military logic, at least in the time from January to March of 1951 in which the Communists were conducting major offensives and the UN conducting counteroffensives. In Malkasian's words Ridgway 'sought to wear down their manpower. To do so, superior UNC firepower was to be exploited to the maximum effect. The hallmark of Ridgway's doctrine of attrition was his directive to his subordinates to maximize enemy casualties while minimizing those of the Eighth Army. Given the daunting Communist numerical superiority, conserving casualties was absolutely crucial.'1151

Implicit in the logic of this 'attrition' were three concepts which as yet had no terminology, but would become central in later genocides – 'body count', 'kill ratio', and 'force protection'. To understand let us contrast this 'attrition' with attrition as it was understood previously by theorists such as Clausewitz. When Clausewitz wrote of a 'war of attrition' he referred to the gradual wearing down of strength through the requirement of movement which fatigued personnel and caused supply problems. Attrition is primarily a function of 'war of manoeuvre' with the center of gravity here being lines of communication. In the World Wars attrition was notably aimed at and achieved by the deprivation of strategic resources – the single most successful way of reducing the military strength of an adversary which was based so firmly in productive capacities. In Korea this sort of attrition was achieved by stretching supply lines, and this certainly provides one explanation for the two major retreats by ROK/US/UN forces. Interdiction was also a way open to the US to cause attrition. The US interdiction campaign during the Korean War was only very modestly successful. The main challenge to it was the fact that Communist forces used a far smaller tonnage of supplies than UN, or more acutely, US forces. They ran, as it were, on the smell of an oily rag. Bear in mind, however, that the CPV were poorly equipped and the Communists lacked the ability to supply sustained offensives of more than about 14 days, but as the war progressed their diversified logistical operations supplied ever greater amounts of material to the front. Communist logistics may have been robust and decentralised, but there was no Ho Chi Minh Trail, and one gets the inevitable impression from the partial success of the interdiction campaign that the Communists would have been highly vulnerable to a programme of interdiction which was as profligately supported as the 'strategic' bombing and the 'meatgrinder' version of

1148 Kolko, Century of War, p 404.
1149 I am not going to delve into the 'controversy' of MacArthur's dismissal, except to point out that one possible interpretation was that MacArthur would have been very unlikely to have supported the stalemate 'attrition' strategy – the 'meatgrinder' – that was to be employed for the rest of the war.
1150 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 38.
1152 Clausewitz, On War, 8.1, p 264.
1153 See for example discussion of those times when a belligerent does not seek a decisive (or any) engagement, 7.16.
1154 Billy C. Mossman, The Effectiveness of Air Interdiction During the Korean War, Arlington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. Historical Manuscripts Collection, file number 2-3.7 AD.H.
1155 Ibid, p 5.
attrition described below.

My point is, and I will return to and illustrate the point, that the Communist forces had to be more vulnerable in their materiel inferiority than in their numerical superiority. This is true notwithstanding the early Chinese belief that 'deception, stealth, and night fighting would enable their poorly armed soldiers to overcome Western technological and materiel superiority.' With offensives severely limited by logistical concerns the Communists could only hope to chip away slowly at UN positions, but there was nothing to stop the UN from using its superior firepower to regain ground as proved to be the case in early 1951. Malkasian writes:

Ridgway's first use of attrition was successful. [CPV commander] Peng [Dehuai] launched the Third Phase Offensive in sub-zero conditions on 31 December 1950. Although Ridgway was forced to abandon Seoul, his withdrawal stretched the Communist supply lines to breaking point, forcing Peng to call off the offensive. Ridgway was anxious to seize the initiative. On 15 January 1951, he mounted a reconnaissance in force, Operation Wolfhound, followed by a full-blown counteroffensive.

Others agree that it was the logistical difficulties that ended Chinese offensive actions. After the failure of the Third Phase Offensive, Peng returned to Beijing to inform Mao that the Communists could not win the war because supply lines had reached their maximum length. Apart from the withdrawal during the Third Phase Offensive, however, Ridgway's 'attrition' had little to do with exploiting and exacerbating logistical weakness. It was about killing. After the capture of Seoul Ridgway ordered a limited offensive north of the 38th to establish the 'Kansas Line' on high ground, but his whole doctrine was more generally to avoid taking territory or holding positions at the expense of casualties, while at the same time inflicting as many casualties as possible through the offensive 'attrition' that became known to soldiers as the 'meat grinder'. This involved staging attacks purely aimed at inflicting as many casualties as possible. This was 'limited war'. In fact, near the start of the 'Big Bug-Out', only 12 days after the Chinese entry into the war, and only 8 days after threatening the use of atomic weapons, Truman publicly abandoned the goal of military unification. 'Limited war' meant, therefore, killing as many people as possible while maintaining a military stalemate, bearing in mind that bombing and massacres were ongoing.

Mao, however, was not to reach the same conclusion as Peng regarding the impossibility of significant military gain until the failure of the Fifth Phase Offensive which came to a halt because of a lack of food and ammunition. The hungry and ill-armed CPV troops were panicked by the inevitable counteroffensive and the UN advanced somewhat north of the Kansas Line, and then stopped. Neither side was trying to win the war now, and the Chinese also began using 'attrition' in the sense of trying to inflict disproportionate casualties in terms relative to total numbers available. Perhaps it made slightly more sense for the numerically superior force to engage in this behaviour, but in the broader picture it was really just playing into the US hands, allowing them to maintain deadly conflict when there was really no military purpose in the killing.

Whether one dates it to the end of the Fifth Phase Offensive or the end of the subsequent UN counteroffensive, the stalemate phase lasted more than twice as long as the mobile phase of the war, and cost more lives. The stalemate was characterised by 'see-saw' battles, wherein the same ground

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1157 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 30.
1159 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 144; Stueck, The Korean War, p 232.
1160 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 144.
1161 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 40.
1163 Malkasian, The Korean War, p 45.
1164 Ibid, p 46.
was taken and retaken many times over in a manner akin to the mindless butchery of World War I. But this time, off centre stage, civilians were dying in numbers much greater than the battlefied deaths and a bitter guerilla war was fought with napalm and atrocities.

Cease-fire negotiations began on 10 July 1951 and continued for just over two years. One writer characterises them thus: 'Throughout the duration of the negotiations U.S. leaders produced harsh ultimatums rather than workable bargaining positions, thereby presumably obviating any form of enemy flexibility.' The Communists tried to maximise the propaganda value of the talks, setting things up originally to give an impression of the UN being there to sue for peace, and they were able to capitalise on US dishonesty by the use of dissident Western journalists. Early on armed Chinese troops paraded by 'mistake' through the demilitarized area. They had mortars and machine guns, but the Chinese claimed that they were military police (MPs). The US, however, made even more drastic 'mistakes'. On August 22 the conference site was bombed and strafed by a 'plane of unknown origin but flying from the south'. In September the UN apologised for two 'accidental' attacks the second of which took the life of a 12 year old. According to Halliday and Cumings the Communists 'claimed that these were deliberate attempts by sectors of the US military to sabotage the talks at key moments – and possibly to assassinate communist delegates. At the time the USA denied most of the charges. The official US military history later acknowledged that the USA carried out a large number of violations, including strafing and bombing the neutral zone and bombing the communist negotiators' convoy en route to the site.

If I were to characterise, very roughly, the nature of the negotiations it would be something like this: Often the Communists didn't take the negotiations that seriously because the US positions were themselves so extreme as to render seriousness difficult. Nevertheless, on a number of issues the Communists would make major concessions, although with minor face-saving conditions. US officials would then vastly exaggerate the significance of such conditions and a compliant Western media would follow the official line that it was in fact the Communists who were demonstrating a lack of good faith. The US was the only UN party at the talks and their British allies were frustrated and blamed the US rather than the Communists for the lack of progress in talks. They also believed that US military actions, publicly rationalised as being designed to force the Communists to negotiate in earnest, actually caused the Communists to harden their line. When talks stalled over the issue of POW repatriation, the UK Foreign Office again held US intransigence to be the cause. From their Korea desk J. M. Addis minuted with words such as 'rapid and unexplained changes of front on the main question and a policy of stepping up demands after concessions have been made – has not contributed to removing the suspicion that undoubtedly exists on the Communist side that the Americans do not sincerely want an armistice.'

A compromise proposed by the PRC wherein POW's who did not wish to be repatriated could be interviewed by a neutral country was scuppered by the US bombing of 5 power stations on Yalu undertaken without consulting the British. Omar Bradley claimed it was a 'purely military operation' designed to apply pressure for negotiations. The proposal had been a major

1167 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p 151.
1168 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 162.
1169 Ibid, p 160.
1170 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p 153.
1171 Ibid, p 156.
1172 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 161.
1174 Ibid, p 105.
concession by the PRC because the 1949 Geneva Convention Article 118 made repatriation compulsory without exception. At the outbreak of war the US (a ratified signatory) and the DPRK (a non-signatory) announced adherence to extant Geneva Conventions (the PRC, a non-signatory, made such an announcement in 1952). Additionaly, while within in the camps there were many who did wish to defect, others were coerced by right-wing elements by threatened starvation and torture sessions.

On the 13th of May the US began a series of bombing raids against DPRK dams. Timed just after the laborious work of rice transplantation, before plants had taken root, the resultant floods caused utter devastation. The bombing of the Toksan dam, for example, 'scooped clean 27 miles of valley' with floodwaters reaching and inundating large parts of Pyongyang. Many thousands must have drowned. Both stores and people were made more vulnerable by having been driven underground. But the direct mortality was less significant than that which was to follow due to the destruction of the rice crop. As a US intelligence report puts it: 'The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple food commodity has for the Asian – starvation and slow death.'

An armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953, but Korean suffering was far from over. Today one is accustomed, for very good reasons, to contrasting the impoverished and repressive DPRK with the wealthy and democratic ROK. One might think that the massive destruction and proportionately far greater death in the DPRK would have initially left them much worse off than those to the South. On the contrary, however, the people of the ROK were in fact worst off. The US was determined that the ROK should be a Third World state producing primary goods only. 'In 1961, eight years after the end of its fratricidal war with North Korea, South Korea’s yearly income stood at $82 per person. The average Korean earned less than half the average Ghanaian citizen ($179). They were ruled by a US client who allowed the US to dictate economic policy and then blamed him for the policies they themselves forced on the ROK.' The US pursued a policy of continued de-industrialisation, it destabilised the ROK economy even during the war, caused destructive inflation, used coercion to get the ROK to effectively abdicate economic sovereignty in 1952, and when people were starving to death due to these policies, the US repressed reports of this and created false statistics claiming that ROK citizens ate more food than they had before the war. As Tony Mitchell observes, the poverty and dependency thus created acted to increase US power and control.

In 1961 the new military dictatorship forced the US to accept a programme of economic nationalism in the ROK, something which was probably only possible because of the existence of

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1178 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 195.
1179 Ibid, p 196.
1183 Ibid, pp 152-3.
1184 Ibid, p 156.
1186 Ibid, p 159.
1187 Ibid, pp 159-60.
1188 Ibid, p 160.
the DPRK. Nevertheless it is a testament to the destructiveness of the antidevelopmentalist economic regime forced on poorer states by the US that it was not until at least the mid-1970s that ROK living standards caught up with those of the DPRK, reaching an average $1000 per capita per annum income in 1977.\textsuperscript{1189}

In terms of repression, the torture and killings under military rule have been discussed, and it was only with great sacrifice and bravery that the South Korean people seized democracy from below in 1987. North Korea also remained a dependency – so much so that the collapse of the Soviet Union destabilised the heavily industrialised and petrochemical dependent agriculture required in a state which is sorely lacking in fertile land. This led within a few years to devastating famines precipitated by flooding.\textsuperscript{1190}

For US imperialists the Korean War must be counted as a resounding success for reasons already twice enumerated. What had happened to Korea can be understood in those terms used by Lemkin to subdivide elements of genocide. They had suffered genocide in the physical, social, economic, political, cultural and moral senses, leaving out only the religious and biological aspects of genocide. The trauma lasts even to this day, even south of the 'demilitarized zone' (DMZ). The suffering, the loss and grief, the crushing of the national hopes of an oppressed people, the social disintegration, the loss of heritage, the millions of dead – these were not unfortunate byproducts, these were not 'collateral damage', they were the \textit{means}. The US had conducted a successful functional genocide, and its very success was to bring about repetition.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1189} Chang, \textit{Bad Samaritans}, xiii.
\bibitem{1190} Marcus Noland, “Famine and Reform in North Korea”, \textit{Asian Economic Papers}, 3:2, pp 1-40.
\end{thebibliography}
Conclusion – From Then Till Now

The US can, in Michael Mandel's words, 'get away with murder'. Consider these recent events written of by Pratap Chatterjee in the *Guardian*:

Last Friday, I met a boy, just before he was assassinated by the CIA. Tariq Aziz was 16, a quiet young man from North Waziristan, who, like most teenagers, enjoyed soccer. Seventy-two hours later, a Hellfire missile is believed to have killed him as he was travelling in a car to meet his aunt in Miran Shah, to take her home after her wedding. Killed with him was his 12-year-old cousin, Waheed Khan.

The boy had attended a conference on the civilian deaths caused by US drone strikes, followed by a public protest. British NGO members had told the conference that, since no Western reporters would cover the story, the only way to raise awareness in the West was for the Waziris themselves to document the killings. Aziz volunteered to become a videographer.

The question I would pose... is this: would a terrorist suspect come to a public meeting and converse openly with foreign lawyers and reporters, and allow himself to be photographed and interviewed? More importantly, since he was so easily available, why could Tariq not have been detained in Islamabad, when we spent 48 hours together? Neither Tariq Aziz nor the lawyers attending this meeting had a highly trained private security detail that could have put up resistance.

....

Unless the CIA can prove that Tariq Aziz posed an imminent threat (as the White House's legal advice stipulates a targeted killing must in order for an attack to be carried out), or that he was a key planner in a war against the US or Pakistan, the killing of this 16 year old was murder, and any jury should convict the CIA accordingly.1191

This occurred less than a month after the US had killed another 16 year-old boy, a US citizen in this case, along with a 17 year-old relative and others. Of the 16 year-old, US officials commented that 'this was a military-aged male travelling with a high-value target.'1192

This is an extension of the long US history of assassination. They have been killing, or attempting to kill, political leaders for some time, most notoriously with their many attempts to kill Fidel Castro beginning in 1959.1193 In addition they have been prolific sponsors/trainers/suppliers of death squads who have targeted community and and union leaders more often than they have targeted armed militants.1194 Recently, however they have increasingly been killing people in other sovereign states using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or 'drones'). Beginning with the murder of 6 ‘suspected al-Qaeda members’ in Yemen in 2002,1195 the US has used UAV launched missile strikes with ever increasing frequency. Effects inside the US occupied states of Iraq and Afghanistan are hard to gauge, but it is fair to expect that many innocents are killed as they are in Pakistan. Afshin Rattansi writes of UAV usage in Pakistan:

Last June, a U.S. attack by unmanned aircraft hit the Pakistani village of Najmarai in South Waziristan and Pakistani intelligence claimed it killed up to 60 people at a funeral. Associated Press wired that Obama's accession heralded a doubling of the number of drones operated by U.S. forces. The U.S. State Department’s Lawrence Richer, rubbed the remarks of Philip Alston, the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions after his complaints about drone attacks. Alston said that the U.S. has created a "zone of impunity" and should track the number of civilians killed in its military operations abroad and limit

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1194 See above.

Collateral damage from unmanned drone attacks: "The government has failed to effectively investigate and punish lower-ranking soldiers for such deaths, and has not held senior officers responsible," Alston said. "Worse, it has effectively created a zone of impunity for private contractors and civilian intelligence agents by only rarely investigating and prosecuting them."\footnote{1196}

Alston wrote an addendum to his 2010 report on extrajudicial killings specifically to deal with the issue of 'targeted killings.' Killings are undertaken by both the military and the CIA. With regard to the latter: “According to media accounts, the head of the CIA's clandestine services, or his deputy, generally gives the final approval for a strike. There is reportedly a list of targets approved by senior Government personnel, although the criteria for inclusion and all other aspects of the program are unknown. The CIA is not required to identify its target by name; rather, targeting decisions may be based on surveillance and 'pattern of life' assessments.”\footnote{1197} The US history of involvement in death squad activity would tend to suggest that it is likely that the US conflates armed activists with those who are simply politically undesirable and there is certainly scope to do so under 'pattern of life' assessments. This historical pattern can only be reinforced by the fact that the US seems to have adopted the practice from Israel which has been conducting 'targeted killings' since the 1990s and has openly admitted the policy since 2000.\footnote{1198} Israel's courts seek to legitimise these killings, but their justification rests on the victims posing an immanent threat\footnote{1199} while in practice no victims pose an immanent threat and less than half are even wanted militants, while the rest are, once again, community leaders or political activists.\footnote{1200} In addition, nearly half of those killed are simply bystanders.\footnote{1201}

So the US commits murder with impunity, but it also abducts and tortures people just as openly and with as little repercussion. There are also acts of mass-murder, acts of terrorism, acts of aggression and other war crimes and crimes against humanity of which it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that US officials are culpable. With a few precautions (for example, Henry Kissinger, the Nobel Peace Laureate, avoids travel to most countries) the US can forestall most legal challenges by threats and simply refuse to comply with others, punishing who dare such challenges as a Monarch might punish acts of lèse majesté.

The US ability to 'get away with murder' relies heavily on an orthodox discourse wherein it is virtually a universal obligation to bend over backwards to interpret US behaviour in a positive light. Where the details of what is done by US forces are undeniably abhorrent (and are not simply ignored) the fallback position is to isolate such incidents as being abberations and as being the unfortunate results of misapplied good intentions. The only significant challenges to this come from those who claim that the US pursues only wealth. This too is exculpatory, for it means that the suffering and destruction brought about are incidental and even ill-advised errors which produce instability and destruction when peace and stability offer far better opportunities for profit.

Central to the apologetic discourse is the ability to maintain an atomised view of mass killings and destruction wherein none are structurally related, although they are often held to demonstrate a US ability to repeat the same 'mistakes' over and over and over and over again (to a level of iterations

which is clearly ridiculous). This is where the academic world plays a central role by actively suppressing any attempts to apply the same analytical framework to the US (and other Western powers) as one might apply to others when dealing with mass killing in particular. In the field of international relations this is achieved, although seemingly without thought, only through considerable violence to academic rigour and, indeed, basic logic.

I have chosen to highlight the concept of genocide in this work. It is the most apt conceptualisation which can describe US 'military' interventions in a fairly comprehensive manner (as opposed particularly to 'war' but also to less inclusive concepts such as 'terrorism'). Predictably the field of genocide studies is distorted by the need to exclude any fundamental critique of US genocides. Genocide, however, is so central to US and Western imperialism (if not all imperialism) that the entire field of genocide studies is an inchoate mess riven with distortion upon distortion. Adam Jones, a scholar of undoubted goodwill and clearly adequate intellect, is simply incapable of producing a work which lives up to its claim of even-handed proportionality.1202 And Jones is an outlier, attacked by many for his willingness to ever apply the term genocide to politics such as the US and Israel.

Genocide scholars complain about the putative inadequacies of the UNCG and propose instead any number of fundamentally useless alternatives, almost seeming to squirm in their need to create definitions in which only the right people might be found guilty. The UNCG may need to narrow its criteria so as to exclude less serious events, but none of these scholars objects in the least to its application to Serbs or Hutu. Indeed, if one wishes to apply the term 'genocide' to, say, Saddam Hussein's killing of Kurds, one doesn't even need to define genocide because Saddam Hussein was a bad person. But US genocides (or at least the most extensive US genocides) are in fact far more inescapably genocidal in nature than 'classic' examples such as Rwanda and Cambodia. They are on a greater scale in terms of mortality, they take place over a longer duration, and they are more comprehensive in terms of matching killing with economic, social and cultural destruction. They far more closely fit the models which inspired Raphaël Lemkin to coin the term genocide in the first place.

The cover story for these genocides has been war. I have already touched on the fact that this also applies to the Armenian and Rwandan genocides and to a very large extent applies to the Holocaust itself. I have also shown that the Korean War provided the opportunity for a US genocide and if not started by the US was certainly sustained one-sidedly for what can only be seen as a genocidal purpose. In Indochina, Afghanistan and Iraq, the military aspect was to shrink, the 'wars' to become, in the end, nothing more than a shabby pretence.

I have already written elsewhere about the Second Indochina War as an Honours thesis. It is very difficult to summarise an unorthodox analysis of a complex event but perhaps some of the facts will speak for themselves:

- The US acted unilaterally to divide Vietnam, as it had Korea.
- Ngo Dinh Diem was transported from the US (just as Rhee was) and was made the autocrat of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by the CIA with Col. Edward Lansdale taking a similar role as Goodfellow.
- Under US auspices Diem acted to create an insurgency by unleashing a wave of 'anti-communist' bloodshed throughout rural areas which forced peasants into taking up arms as self-defence.
- The US itself acted to ensure that the reluctant Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was drawn into the war.

1202 See Chapter 3.
• The US, though various means, was the main supplier of arms and provisions to their
guerilla enemies for much of the war.

• The US used only 'strategies' which could not under any circumstances bring about victory
while any initiative which seemed to promise pacification even on a local or regional level
were subverted or ended outright.

• In Laos and Cambodia similar results were achieved more simply by destabilising
and overthrowing neutral governments and thus making war inevitable.

• The US went to considerable lengths to avoid negotiated settlements.

• On many levels, and in ways far to numerous to mention, the US acted to ensure that the
destruction and death brought about was prolific far beyond any possible military rationale.

• At no time did the US attempt effectively exploit Indochinese resources for profit. On the
contrary it destroyed those resources. Profits were made by 'certain sectional interests', but
the source of these profits was the US taxpayer.

Negotiations, such as did occur, went on much as they did in Korea, and although I did not detail
this in my Honours piece, it is worth noting something about Henry Kissinger's role in negotiations.
At the end of 1968 the war in Vietnam had been rejected by those widely considered to be the
'élites' of US foreign policy. The outgoing Johnson administration sought to end the war through
secret negotiations, sending the Democrat Henry Kissinger. Kissinger deliberately sabotaged the
negotiations and was rewarded with a great deal of power in the incoming Nixon administration
(often referred to as the Nixinger administration). 4 years and many hundreds of thousands of
deaths later, Kissinger signed a peace deal more or less identical to that which was near completion
in 1968.\textsuperscript{1203} The US never honoured the peace deal and, though Kissinger was awarded the Nobel
Peace prize, the war continued for two bloody years. In 1970, when Henry Kissinger briefed
Jonathan 'Fred' Ladd, who was slated to conduct the war in Cambodia, he told him, 'Don't even
think of victory; just keep it alive.'\textsuperscript{1204}

Using a pretext, the US slapped sanctions on Vietnam which lasted until Vietnam adopted neoliberal
economic policies. Increasingly the postwar economic situation of Vietnam, and its adoption of \textit{doi
moi} 'Renovation' (economic liberalisation) causes people to suggest that in geopolitical terms the
Vietnamese lost. Chomsky called Vietnamese poverty 'a vivid refutation of the claim that the US
lost'.\textsuperscript{1205} Cawthorne cites such reasoning as the logic behind his title \textit{Vietnam: A War Lost and
Won}.\textsuperscript{1206} Note firstly that this logic applies equally to Laotians and Cambodians; and secondly that
in such terms it makes more sense to refer to entire peoples rather than regimes or adherents of a
political ideology. Compare this with Lemkin's conception of genocide as war against peoples by
which the Germans hoped to win even should the lose militarily.\textsuperscript{1207} Given that the US seemed to
avoid military victory in either an absolute or a limited sense (as occurred in Korea); and given that
the far greatest amount of death and destruction was meted out not on the DRV, but on putative
allies such as the RVN and Lon Nol's Cambodia, it is difficult not to conclude that there never was a
military aim to this war, that from the beginning military defeat was meant to accompany the
 genocide.

Iraq after 2003 has been a very similar story, what I am referring to as a genocidal war system
wherein 'war' is artificially maintained in order to commit genocide. In what may be the most

\textsuperscript{1203} Christopher Hitchens, “The Case Against Henry Kissinger: Part One, The making of a war criminal”, \textit{Harper’s},

\textsuperscript{1204} Shawcross, \textit{Sideshow}, p 169.

\textsuperscript{1205} Chomsky, \textit{Rethinking Camelot}, p 30.

\textsuperscript{1206} Op cit., p 7.

\textsuperscript{1207} Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p 81.
striking example of atomisation, of Orwellian amnesia, the invasion of 2003 and subsequent occupation is treated as being somehow a completely distinct set of actions and circumstances, as if almost completely unrelated to the sanctions period that went before. Increasingly the sanctions period was considered genocidal as will be discussed, but instead of seeing the massive destruction and killing unleashed from April 2003 as confirmation of genocide, somehow the two are treated as disconnected.

Despite the claims of many, Iraq provided perhaps an even greater nationalist developmentalist challenge to empire than that posed by Korea and Vietnam. Robert Brigham compares Iraqi nationalism unfavourably with that of Vietnam: 'Ethnic, tribal, religious, social and political divisions are the hallmark of modern Iraqi history. Saddam Hussein held these disparate groups only by brute force.'\textsuperscript{1208} The Vietnamese, no matter what their ideological stance, understood 'that Vietnam was a unified nation' and in contrast with the Iraqis 'understood full well the idea of nationhood.'\textsuperscript{1209} In fact, Brigham is doing with regard to Iraq exactly what the French and later US propagandists did with regard to Vietnam. A Vietnamese unified nation was problematic, therefore the first step in weakening or abolishing the undesirable nation is to abolish it semantically. In the case of Iraq a surface plausibility and a narrow, and rather unimportant, element of truth should not conceal the fundamental and wilful wrong-headedness of Brigham and those like him. Iraqi nationalism is very real, notwithstanding internal divisions and complexities. Moreover, in and of itself Iraqi nationalism is more fundamentally important from an imperialist perspective than Korean or Vietnamese nationalism. For an imperial polity whose hegemony is based in large part on the control of energy resources there is a simple formula: nationalism + oil + population = undesirable independence. The existence of schisms and competing or complementary nationalisms doesn't alter that fact. Indeed Kurdish nationalism and pan-Arab national sentiment are also problematic to an imperialist, while the possibility of a co-operative Shi'a bloc must be one of Washington's nightmares (because Shi’a majority areas include the oil resources of Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran's and most of Iraq's proven fields, and because Shi’a have an ingrained historical ideology of resistance to despotisms such as the client regimes that rule most Arab states).\textsuperscript{1210}

The coherence of Iraq as a national state is an important but complex issue and I have included a discussion as Appendix I. In contrast to the usual emphasis on ethnic and sectarian division, the basis for the idea of Iraq as a nation has unusually deep historical roots. Every indication is that it is the exogenous exploitation of extant divisions which has been the real impediment to the coherence of a strong national identity. The divisions in Iraq have been complex and varied but also largely contingent; open to exploitation but at the same time not fundamental. It can certainly be said that in the 1970s, Kurdish problems and brutal authoritarianism notwithstanding, Iraq was well on its way to solid development bringing an increasingly coherent nation-state with a natural degree of regional hegemony and high level of pan-Arab influence. Even after the Iran-Iraq War, it was only a matter of time before Iraq regained that trajectory, unless it could somehow be interrupted.

In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. This was extremely fortuitous timing for the US, in much the same manner that the outbreak of the Korean War was (bearing in mind also Pearl Harbor and the Tonkin Gulf, not to mention the Lusitania or the mysterious sinking of the \textit{USS Maine}, nor yet the temerity with which Mexicans attacked US troops 'on American soil' in 1846,\textsuperscript{1211} and so forth). Michael Gordon and Bernard 'Trainor devote an entire chapter, entitled 'War by Miscalculation', to the 'failure of deterrence'. For them the US had failed to make it clear that it would go to war to defend

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1208} Brigham, \textit{Is Iraq Another Vietnam?}, p 75. \\
\textsuperscript{1209} Ibid, p 79. \\
\textsuperscript{1211} Zinn, \textit{A People's History}, p 149 et passim.
\end{flushright}
Kuwait, but they conclude that:

...Washington and Baghdad were bound to find themselves at odds sooner or later, and from Iraq's standpoint later would have been better than sooner.

In that sense, the Bush administration's policy failure worked to the United States' advantage. The military confrontation would take place at a time of American strength and Iraqi weakness. It would occur before the cuts in American military forces were too far along, at a time when the end of the Cold War had freed up American military resources....

There was far more to this than the US merely neglectfully failing to make it obvious that it was willing to go to war. Consider first the notorious 'green light' from April Glaspie. The Iraqi government made the extremely unusual move of releasing the transcript of the equally unusual interview between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie. They did so because it contains a very clear promise of non-intervention. Having gone to extremes to signal the importance of the meeting by added pomp (an interview with Hussein was in itself highly unusual, Glaspie's first), Saddam Hussein spoke at length. It is difficult to convey what was implied in the diplomatic idiom, but when the context is factored in (Iraqi forces were massing on the border of Kuwait in preparation for the invasion which took place a week later) it is amply clear what was meant. Hussein claimed that there was already a state of war between Iraq and Kuwait because of US backed economic warfare which was strangling Iraq. Iraq intended to take action and, in context, that action could only be an invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was seeking assurance that it would not end up at war with the US. The infamous part of Glaspie's response was 'we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.' As a revealing excerpt those words serve reasonably well, but the really telling thing is the complete lack of any threat. There was no hint that Iraqi actions might incur 'displeasure' or 'extreme displeasure' or any other of those phrases by which US diplomats deter actions with threats. Hussein had indicated that a) Iraq was desperate, b) it was losing faith with diplomacy, c) that it would take action if current last-minute diplomatic initiatives failed, and d) that it was extremely worried about the prospect of ending up in a war with the US. Bizarrely, Glaspie ends the meeting by acting almost as if reassured. Glaspie then presumably delivered Hussein's lengthy message to Bush (to whom many of his words were explicitly addressed) and, with forces massing on the brink of war, promptly went on holiday.

If the Iraqis hoped to reveal US duplicity in this transcript, they totally underestimated the ignorance, stupidity, willful obtuseness and calculated deliberate obtuseness which dominate the Western media discourse and continues to dominate what passes for scholarly discourse of the 'Gulf War'. But the Glaspie 'green light' is only one tiny, if salient, part of a larger picture. It was the US which, as Hussein clearly suspected, was behind the Kuwaiti economic warfare which the Iraqis considered to be an act of aggression. The situation was analogous to that of the Japanese before the Pearl Harbor attack. The al-Sabah ruling family of Kuwait had bent Iraq over an oil barrel, underselling OPEC until oil prices were only $11 per barrel, 'a level at which Iraq's oil was barely enough to meet current expenses, leaving nothing to meet the repayments on foreign loans.... At the same time the al-Sabah's were themselves demanding repayments of loans made to Iraq. Whilst the US was to lead the Iraqi's to believe that they would not intervene militarily if Kuwait was attacked, privately they had encouraged the al-Sabah's to be intractable and made absolute guarantees of US military intervention (highly reminiscent of the 'failure to deter' the DPRK). In fact, the al-Sabah's had begun converting assets to liquid form in May of 1990, suggesting that they

1214 Finlan, The Gulf War, p 25.
1215 Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, p 84.
1216 Lando, Web of Deceit, p 120.
were expecting an Iraqi invasion before the Iraqis themselves planned such an attack.\footnote{1217}

The US continued to support the al-Sabah's in exile as they continued with a completely
intransigent line and infamously used false atrocity propaganda to sway a US public which was
very reluctant to enter into a war (notably the Kuwait Incubator Babies Fraud, wherein a 15-yea-
old al-Sabah posed as a nurse and gave coached testimony to the effect that Iraqis were throwing
infants onto cold hard floors to die, has become an exemplar of atrocity propaganda, but it is still
quite widely believed and was recycled in 2002 by HBO).\footnote{1218} US lies were also playing crucial
roles. I will not go into detail about how the US managed to represent itself as 'going the extra mile'
for a peaceful solution (those were Bush's words,\footnote{1219} but he also compared Saddam Hussein
unfavourably with Hitler)\footnote{1220} while acting rather frantically to ensure that no such solution could
come to pass. Admittedly, the US was aided immensely by Iraqi bluster and hesitation which was
regularly inflated beyond all recognition into proof that it was the Iraqis who, against all
commonsense, were the real impediment to a peaceful solution. They were also aided by the
private news media which, in complete contrast to the general wariness and widespread opposition
of the US public, was so jingoistic and so deceptive that more than one commentator felt that
criticism of media deceptions risked becoming 'such a noise that it drown[ed] out the murderer-
sons themselves.'\footnote{1221} The US government also instituted a 'pool system', a sort of proto-'embedding',
which ensured that rogue critics among the generally obedient media would not have the impact that
they had in Indochina of belying the orthodox deceptions of their journalistic comrades.\footnote{1222}

I will detail one deception, however, that was absolutely crucial in allowing the US to unleash its
military might against Iraq. Dick Cheney and Colin Powell themselves presented 'top-secret'
satellite imagery to Prince Bandar ibn Sultan showing that Iraqi forces were advancing on Saudi
Arabia.\footnote{1223} Indeed the putative threat to Saudi Arabia was not only the only reason that the Saudis
allowed US forces in their territory, it was also the reason that the US Congress itself authorised the
use of force. As the \textit{Christian Science Monitor} would report in late 2002, as the US moved towards
invading Iraq:

Citing top-secret satellite images, Pentagon officials estimated in mid-September that up to 250,000 Iraqi troops
and 1,500 tanks stood on the border, threatening the key US oil supplier.

But when the \textit{St. Petersburg Times} in Florida acquired two commercial Soviet satellite images of the same area,
taken at the same time, no Iraqi troops were visible near the Saudi border – just empty desert.\footnote{1224}

Desert Storm, the bombing campaign which followed, was as genocidal as previous bombing
campaigns, the use of laser-guided weaponry and the incessant propaganda about accuracy serving
only, in a sober analysis, to underscore the intentionality of the crime. The targeting of civilian
infrastructure which had absolutely no bearing on the uneven military contest was the norm. For
example, a baby milk factory was targetted and destroyed while the Pentagon blithely lied and said
it was involved in making biological weapons.\footnote{1225} Ramsey Clark wrote afterwards that there were:

One hundred ten thousand aerial sorties in forty-two days by the United States alone. That's one every 30

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\begin{itemize}
\item 1220 Beamish, “Bush: Saddam Worse Than Hitler”.
\item 1221 Flanders, “Restricting Reality”, p 172.
\item 1222 Ibid, p 166.
\item 1223 Hiro, \textit{Desert Shield...}, pp 108-10.
\item 1224 Peterson, “In war, some facts less factual”.
\end{itemize}
seconds. In an admission against interest, the Pentagon says U.S. aircraft alone dropped the equivalent of 7.5 Hiroshimas - 88,500 tons of explosives.

They say about 7% were directed... They were intended specifically to destroy the life-support system of the whole country. … This is an assault you can't resist. … The United States lost fewer aircraft in 110,000 aerial sorties than it lost in war games for NATO where no live ammunition was used. … There is not a reservoir, a pumping station, the filtration plant that wasn't deliberately destroyed by U.S. bombing to deprive the people of water.

We knocked out the power. It doesn't sound like a big deal. … But it meant, among other things, that 90 per cent of the poultry was lost in a matter of days.... They lost over a third of all their livestock.... Another third was driven out of the country to save them. Because you couldn't pump water.\textsuperscript{1226}

A UN Mission report from March 1990 gave an alarming view of the immanent dangers that were posed by the destruction. I cannot be comprehensive, and so I propose to take the issue of water as exemplary for this and later times. From prewar levels of 450 litres per person per day in Baghdad, supplies were 30-40 litres. This was not safe to drink but while 'the water authority has warned that the water must be boiled, there is little fuel to do this and what exists is diminishing.' Conditions outside of Baghdad were most probably worse in most instances. 'The mission concluded that a catastrophe could be faced at any time if conditions do not change...'\textsuperscript{1227}

Professor Thomas Nagy found declassified documents, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) studies, which showed that the US clearly calculated and comprehensively understood that its bombing and subsequent embargoes would cause massive civilian deaths, particularly to children. Nagy concludes:

For more than ten years, the United States has deliberately pursued a policy of destroying the water treatment system of Iraq, knowing full well the cost in Iraqi lives. The United Nations has estimated that more than 500,000 Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions, and that 5,000 Iraqi children continue to die every month for this reason.

No one can say that the United States didn't know what it was doing.\textsuperscript{1228}

The figure of 500,000 dead children comes from a 1996 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation report which has been seriously criticised for its methodology.\textsuperscript{1229} The absolute numbers were, at this time, debatable but according to first-hand accounts disease and malnutrition had reached levels which beggar belief. I could here quote John Pilger, Robert Fisk, Patrick Cockburn, Kathy Kelly, or a number of others who saw with their own eyes and documented the suffering, but I will return to Ramsey Clark:

During last week, which I spent in Iraq, my fifth annual inspection since the sanctions were imposed, I visited ten hospitals in four governates which have nearly 15 percent of all hospital beds in the country. Conditions are tragic. Lighting is dim, even in operating theaters, for lack of bulbs. Wards are cold. Pharmacies are nearly empty with only a minor fraction of needed medicines and medical supplies. Most equipment, X-ray, CAT scan, incubators, oxygen tanks, dialysis machines, tubes and parts for transfusions and intravenous feeding, and other life-saving items are lacking, scarce, or inoperable for lack of parts. Simple needs like sheets, pillows, pillow cases, towels, bandages, cotton balls, adhesive tape, antiseptic cleaning liquids are unavailable or scarce. Surgery is at levels below 10 percent of the 1989 numbers in all ten hospitals. ...

Death is omnipresent. A young mother weeping in her bed whose infant had just died, an elderly diabetic-his

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feet bloated with open sores without adequate insulin for years, kwashiorkor and marasmus victims living only a few days after admission.¹²³⁰

By 1999 more robust data was available from surveys by UNICEF and the WHO. Combining the data a *Lancet* article found that: 'Infant mortality rose from 47 per 1000 live births during 1984-89 to 108 per 1000 in 1994-99, and under-5 mortality rose from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births.'¹²³¹ Contrary to claims by the US government, the sanctions were the clear cause of this large jump in child mortality.¹²³² In 1999 Ramsey Clark wrote to each UNSC plainly labelling the sanctions as genocide and providing evidence that the 'Oil for Food' programme was insufficient to end the continued mass mortality or even to halt the increase in deaths from water-borne disease: 'The United States has proceeded to frustrate approval of contracts under the program in a systematic way to prolong the genocide against Iraq.'¹²³³ I think it a reasonable surmise that the former US Attorney General did not reach the conclusion that the sanctions constituted genocide without careful consideration and reasoning.

Another establishment figure who came to see the sanctions regime as genocide was Dennis Halliday. After 35 years working for the UN, Halliday resigned after having been less than a year as UN in charge of the 'Oil for Food' programme, citing opposition to the sanctions and freely using the word genocide.¹²³⁴ His successor, Hans von Sponeck, retired from the UN for the same reason and, although less prominent in the usage, also concurred that the sanctions regime was genocide.¹²³⁵ His book on the subject is overly cautious and bureaucratic with Sponeck's own analysis and judgement largely absent from everything but the suggestive title – *A Different Kind of War*. However, what is deeply shocking in its almost irreducible detail is the effort, the unrelenting and energetic effort, that US and UK officials put into exploiting every possible loophole which allowed them to prevent life-saving materials to enter Iraq.¹²³⁶

Sadly, I cannot detail events after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What I can say is that not wishing to repeat the methodological mistakes of the past, a group published the results of mortality studies in the *Lancet* in 2004 and 2006. Using a baseline mortality from January 2002 the 2006 study had the following findings:

Three misattributed clusters were excluded from the final analysis; data from 1849 households that contained 12 801 individuals in 47 clusters was gathered. 1474 births and 629 deaths were reported during the observation period. Pre-invasion mortality rates were 5.5 per 1000 people per year (95% CI 4.3–7.1), compared with 13.3 per 1000 people per year (10.9–16.1) in the 40 months post-invasion. We estimate that as of July, 2006, there have been 654,965 (392,979–942,636) excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war, which corresponds to 2.5% of the population in the study area. Of post-invasion deaths, 601,027 (426,369–793,663) were due to violence, the most common cause being gunfire.¹²³⁷


The majority of those violent deaths attributable to a given party were caused by coalition forces. The implication is that many tens of thousands of Iraqis were shot to death by coalition forces. The *Lancet* studies were attacked, of course, but on grounds which were either completely innumerate or deliberately deceptive. In January 2008, UK polling company Opinion Research Business completed a survey and released the following:

Following responses to ORB’s earlier work, which was based on survey work undertaken in primarily urban locations, we have conducted almost 600 additional interviews in rural communities. By and large the results are in line with the ‘urban results’ and we now estimate that the death toll between March 2003 and August 2007 is likely to have been of the order of 1,033,000. If one takes into account the margin of error associated with survey data of this nature then the estimated range is between 946,000 and 1,120,000.1238

When David Keen coined the term 'war system' he used the Iraq occupation as the prime exemplar. In the very first sentence of his book on the subject he uses the key term 'predictably counterproductive'.1239 Even in Keen's accounting, however, what he means is not that the war system is counterproductive in all senses, but that it is counterproductive to the stated aims and policy; counterproductive to the desires of the people of the US and what they understand to be the purpose of the conflict; counterproductive similarly to the desires of the vast majority of military and civilian personnel engaged in the war system and what they believe they are attempting to achieve; counterproductive even to the desires and aims of most civilian and military officials in high places. I do not mean here to excuse any racial or religious hatred, any wilful self-deception, any ruthless greed, or any callous indifference to suffering. Failure to understand the full horror of the project may mitigate but it does not arrogate culpability.

Though counterproductive in the senses outlined above Keen does admit to 'functions' of the war system. He outlines a number of political benefits to the state, the government, the Republican party, and the Bush administration.1240 He also outlines 'economic functions', and here one comes up against the limitations of Keen's analysis. The 'economic functions' serve some of the usual suspects of contemporary Hobsonian imperial analysis – weapons manufacturers, infrastructure companies and the oil industry.1241 However, no one could fail to notice the the profits and political benefits accrued come nowhere close to accounting for the monetary expense, let alone undertaking the risks of the moral, legal and political hazards of committing acts of aggression, immiseration and mass killing on such a large scale. Keen attempts to fill the vast gap between means and ends here with lengthy but very shallow-rooted psychopolitical theses.1242 I cannot devote the space needed to critique this part of Keen's work, but I can state that even if one does find these concepts useful, they are rendered completely insignificant by inserting that which is glaringly omitted by Keen – the strategic functions of a war system.

One strategic aspect of the war system is related to oil. As can be seen in Appendix J the war system in Iraq, far from being designed to acquire Iraqi oil, serves to ensure that Iraq's oil resources remain undeveloped which, along with the instability produced, serves to drive oil prices up. This is absolutely central to the global imperial hegemony, Hudson's aforementioned 'superimperialism', wherein underdeveloped states are prevented from development whilst surplus producing states are induced to effectively pay tribute. This is a militarised system involving both garrisons and bloody interventions.

The other strategic aspect of a war system is in its utility as a tool of genocide. The affinity should be obvious as the intentional maintenance of a situation of mass violence effectively equates to

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1240 Ibid, pp 75-80.
1242 Ibid, pp 96-209.
genocide. The 'counterinsurgency' and 'counter-terror' measures undertaken ensure continued physical, economic, cultural and social destruction of the genos while providing cover for gendercide and eliticidal death squad activity, referred to in the case of Iraq as the 'Salvador option'.

A war system, like genocide, is a manifold system, a complex system of many varied elements. It is impossible to reduce meaningfully here and I can only outline its dimensions here by omitting full explanations of my interpretations of evidence. The following bullet points should, however, serve to illustrate:

**Background:**
- 1991: Keeping Saddam Hussein in power I – Early in 1991 the US attacked mutinying antiwar Iraqi personnel (notably at Mutla ridge: 'This cold blooded massacre served no other purpose than to preserve the Iraqi state from mutinous armed deserters'); in contrast they allowed the Republican Guard to escape intact and notoriously and gratuitously allowed loyalist forces to use assault helicopters to crush the antiwar anti-Ba’ath uprisings in Basra and Kurdistan. Norman Schwartzkopf even admitted giving material aid to loyalists in their fight to crush the uprising.
- 1991-2003: Keeping Saddam Hussein in power II – Sanctions imposed are widely recognised as consolidating Ba’ath rule. While the 'oil for food' programme continued the genocide and attendant suffering for the Iraqi people it was specifically structured to deepen Saddam Hussein's power and his access to money. In 1995 the CIA suddenly betrayed a very credible coup plot on the eve of execution with the result that hundreds of Saddam Hussein's opponents were rounded up and executed. There were no further serious coup attempts.

**Ensuring Conflict:**
- 2002-3: Lies about WMD – US intelligence capabilities were systematically suborned to create false intelligence, culminating with the famous but understated words of the 'Downing Street Memo': 'Intelligence and facts are being fixed around policy.' Lies were told about yellowcake uranium; 'specially designed aluminium tubes'; 'secret facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas, and under the Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad'. Colin Powell lied to the UN about 'mobile weapons labs' and George W. Bush told the US public that they couldn't wait for

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1250 Baer, *See No Evil*, pp 255-305.
1254 Ibid.
'smoking gun that would appear as a mushroom cloud'. In fact it had be ascertained by 1998 that Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities were negligible.

• 2001-3: Lies about al-Qaeda – through little more than innuendo US officials, pundits and mainstream media outlets created the impression that Saddam Hussein was linked to the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. Nearly 90% of US military personnel serving in Iraq in 2006 thought that the war was 'retaliation for Saddam's role in 9/11'...

• 2002-3: Avoiding peaceful resolution – Milan Rai gives an indispensable account of the lies and ploys utilised by the US in order to ensure that war occurred. It would be impossible to reduce them here, but the US and UK worked very hard to ensure that no compromise could be reached despite some incredible lengths which the Iraqi regime went to in order to preserve itself. They also worked extremely hard to scupper the threat of third-party negotiated solutions.

• January 2003: Lies in Bush's State of the Union Address - 'Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.... U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents.... We have also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.... Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaida.... The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.'

Setting Up for 'Failure'

• Inadequate troop numbers: Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz forcefully overrode military advice and committed less than half of the troop levels thought to be required for an orderly occupation. Immediately, before there was any insurgency, this brought about widespread death which were grotesquely absurd in the manner that Eichmann's mass murder by paperwork was grotesquely banal. People were killed just for going about their daily business – shot at poorly marked and confusing checkpoints manned by camouflaged personnel who are nigh invisible in poor light or riddled with bullets when their cars were unwittingly driven too closely to Coalition or contractor vehicles. Absurd and grotesque too were the number of deaths caused by the simple absence of intelligible translators but...
Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith simply refused to act to correct this and other such deadly problems. ¹²⁶⁵

- Making stability and reconstruction impossible – meticulous State Department and CIA planning for post-invasion was completely suppressed, ¹²⁶⁶ while experienced State Department personnel were blocked from joining ORHA by Rumsfeld. ¹²⁶⁷

Creating the Insurgency

- Deba’athification and disbanding the armed forces – a drastic move in May of 2003 which created 250,000 armed, trained, unemployed and disgruntled men at a single stroke. Fred Kaplan details: 'It is a stunning fact that—despite the massive library of in-depth books, tell-all memoirs, and investigative articles about every tactical decision regarding this war—we do not yet know who made this key strategic decision. Bremer is right about one thing: It wasn't him. Though he wouldn't be so self-demeaning as to admit it, he was a mere errand boy on this point. He arrived in Baghdad on May 14, 2003. The next day, he released CPA Order No. 1, barring members of the Baath Party from all but the lowliest government posts. The next day, he issued CPA Order No. 2, disbanding the Iraqi army. ¹²⁶⁸ A recent academic article elaborates: 'Both of these decisions fueled the insurgency by: (1) alienating hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who could not support themselves or their families; (2) by undermining the normal infrastructure necessary for social and economic activity; (3) by ensuring that there was not sufficient security to carry on normal life; and (4) by creating insurgents who were angry at the US, many of whom had weapons and were trained to use them.' ¹²⁶⁹

- Thomas E. Ricks – In Fiasco Ricks devotes two chapters to 'How to Create an Insurgency' (I and II) ¹²⁷⁰ and has a section headed 'Arming, financing and recruiting the insurgents'. ¹²⁷¹

- Killing and abusing civilians – the primary motivation for those who choose to join the insurgency is the loss of loved ones at the hands of coalition forces. ¹²⁷² US torture also inspired many, ¹²⁷³ as did house demolitions, collective punishment, house raids and detentions. ¹²⁷⁴

There is much more that I could add with regard to the war system in Iraq, and there is still more I could add with regard to genocide and the genocidal war system. The state that Iraq is in now, not to mention the sheer numbers of the dead, make contentions of serial and habitual 'blunders' impossible to sustain, especially given than many individual instances of 'mistakes' do not bear examination. It is worth reflecting that somehow the sanctions regime and the occupation are considered as separate, as if unrelated. Yet in terms of the genocidal effects on the Iraqi people – the economic, social, cultural and physical destruction of Iraqis – the change was only one of using more direct means with greater intensity. Here, from about May 2003, was the genocidal war

¹²⁶⁵ Ricks, Fiasco, pp 169-70.
¹²⁶⁶ Chandrasekeran, Imperial Life..., pp 32-3.
¹²⁶⁷ Ibid, p 35.
¹²⁷⁰ Ricks, Fiasco, pp 149-202.
¹²⁷¹ Ibid, p 190.
¹²⁷² Todenhöfer, Why Do You Kill?, passim.
¹²⁷³ Chomsky, “The Torture Memos”.
¹²⁷⁴ Jamail, Beyond the Green Zone, pp 72-3.
system in full flower. An unlikely and weak insurgency conjured up only with effort by the US becoming a smokescreen for ongoing genocide.


The Contracting Parties, 

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world; 

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and 

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required; 

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.

Article 1.
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Art. 2.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Art. 3.
The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.

Art. 4.
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Art. 5.
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Art. 6.
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Art. 7.

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Art. 8.

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Art. 9.

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Art. 10.

The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

Art. 11.

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Art. 12.

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Art. 13.

On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of
the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Art. 14.
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Art. 15.
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Art. 16.
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Art. 17.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article 11; (b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12; (c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 13; (d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14; (e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15; (f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.

Art. 18.
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.

Art. 19.
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Source:
APPENDIX B – The 'Jack Bauer Candidates'.

The basic facts are undisputed: on 15 April 2004 Ilario Pantano, then a second lieutenant with the US marines, stopped and detained two Iraqi men in a car near Falluja. The Iraqis were unarmed and the car found to be empty of weapons.

Pantano ordered the two men to search the car for a second time and then, with no other US soldiers in view, unloaded a magazine of his M16A4 automatic rifle into them, before reloading and blasting a second magazine at them – some 60 rounds in total.

Over the corpses, he left a placard inscribed with the marine motto: 'No better friend, No worse enemy.'\(^{1275}\) A hearing was to decide whether charges of premeditated murder would be brought against Pantano. Witnesses testified that the victims 'were unthreatening and that their bodies were found in a kneeling position having apparently been shot in the back.'\(^{1276}\) The principle witness, however, had been demoted by Pantano and was considered unreliable.\(^{1277}\) Pantano claimed that the men were 'advancing on him in a threatening manner.'\(^{1278}\) Pantano's counsel closed in the hearing by stating that 'you can't import civilian standards into a combat situation. This isn't Chicago. This is Iraq, Indian Country where bad guys do things like cut your head off....'\(^{1279}\) This is particularly interesting, because although Pantano and his counsel claim that he acted legally in self-defence, his counsel is trying to suggest that his actions cannot and should not be judged at all – rather than making a factual claim, he is suggesting that his client should be granted impunity.

Pantano, his charges dismissed, received an honourable discharge. He wrote a memoir entitled Warlord: No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy. He decided to enter politics as a congressional candidate.\(^{1280}\) Among highlights of his campaign was a fundraiser held at a gun range where supporters were told 'see if you have what it takes to outshoot Ilario Pantano.'\(^{1281}\)

Pantano gained 46.2% of the vote.\(^{1282}\) Allen West, on the other hand, won his election.

As Jen Phillips reports, West has said that 'Islam is a totalitarian theocratic political ideology, it is not a religion. It has not been a religion since 622 AD, and we need to have individuals that stand up and say that.' Phillips continues: '[I]n speeches West equates today’s Muslims with those of medieval Europe, alleging that if Muslims in the US are not stopped, we too will have to change our name like Constantinople.'\(^{1283}\) He is also a self-confessed and proud torturer.

West watched on as four of his men beat an Iraqi policeman on the head and body. He dismissed his men and then staged a mock execution, threatening to kill the detainee and then firing his sidearm next to the blindfolded man's head, causing such terror that the man reportedly urinated.


\(^{1276}\) Ibid.


\(^{1283}\) Ibid.
Kelly

The Context of the Iraq Genocide

involuntarily. West admitted all, claiming 'it's about the lives and safety of my men. I would go through hell with a gasoline can.' Prosecutors claimed that what he did 'amounted to torture'. Under Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention, not to mention the US War Crimes Act and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), it certainly did 'amount to torture.' The prohibition on torture is *jus cogens*, a norm of international law, an absolute prohibition which allows for no exception whatsoever. The US Army Field Manual *The Law of Land Warfare* states: 'No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.' The seriousness with which the US Army takes such laws can be judged from the result – West was fined $5000 and retired with full pension benefits.

Like Pantano, West highlighted rather than hid his actions in Iraq:

Such an incident might be a source of shame for some officers. But not for West, who has developed a superstar following among Republicans by portraying himself as a real-life Jack Bauer.

'You might recall that in 2003, I made the decision where I sacrificed my military career for the lives of my men,' he was quoted in the *South Florida Sun-Sentinel* as saying in a 2007 campaign speech – his first bid for the Florida House seat, which he lost. 'I will sacrifice every ounce of me to be your next congressman.'

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1287 Pleat, “Beck's 'Man of Integrity'...”,

1288 Sarlin, “The New Jack Bauer Republicans”.
APPENDIX C – Exceptionalism and Torture.
In a genocidal war system torture serves three purposes. The first is to generate false intelligence in order to direct US personnel, more or less unwittingly, into committing genocidal acts. The second is to create outrage and alienate target groups from the US and its personnel – one of many ways in which the US acts as a recruiter of its own enemies. The third is as a direct component act of genocide, creating a ‘culture of terror’ which is, in effect, a psychological attack on a whole people.\textsuperscript{1289} In Iraq, for example, by disappearing people to an uncertain fate within a carceral system the US can traumatised not only the direct victims, not only the relatives who may go for months or even years without knowing the fate of their loved ones,\textsuperscript{1290} but an entire nation of people who must go to sleep at night not knowing if the next time they awaken it will be to boots crashing through doors.

US torture must therefore be a matter of public knowledge in order to achieve the latter two effects. Yet, at the same time it is in a strange manner both deniable and denied. For some US torture is a horrifying routine fact, but for others it doesn't really exist. From one direction it is bald-faced, while from another multiple veils are cast to obscure it or leave at best an indistinct shadow. The obscuration begins with the nature of the torture. According to Darius Rejali, contemporary US torture combines two distinct styles which he labels 'French Modern' and 'Anglo-Saxon' modern.\textsuperscript{1291} Key features include electrotorture, water torture, sleep deprivation and positional torture. These are what he labels 'clean torture' techniques, meaning that they are physical tortures which, no matter how much agony they produce, leave no lasting scars: 'Used by authoritarian states abroad, it is torture; but used at home, it is probably good policing.'\textsuperscript{1292} Although Rejali emphasises on innumerable occasions that clean tortures occur in response to monitoring, I think that it is reasonable in this instance to take a more nuanced approach. The US doesn't fear monitoring. Aside from the facts that a former President has happily admitted ordering torture and that Donald Rumsfeld is one of only very few high officials in modern times known to have ordered specific torture techniques to be used,\textsuperscript{1293} systematic US torture is also well documented by NGOs, the UN, and many major news organisations outside of the US. As with other US violations of international law, the consequences are precisely nothing – no arrests, no sanctions, no UN resolutions. On the other hand, although the US still uses electrotorture it has abandoned its favoured technique from Indochina, using the field telephone magneto, in favour of using stun technology. I would argue that psychologically the old style of electrotorture is anything but 'clean'. It is now widely understood to be excruciating and horrifying and, like mass murder, torture must follow contemporary fashion. The 'clean' techniques of today are specifically designed to inflict the maximum of possible agony while still allowing room for those so inclined (including torturers) to deny the fact of the pain inflicted.

To illustrate further: Rejali highlights the importance of Christian Masuy, a Belgian torturer working in France during World War II:\textsuperscript{1294} [P]erhaps the twentieth century does deserve to be called “the Century of Masuy.” Masuy understood that modern torture was fundamentally about emotional shock, not dramatic painful techniques like the Inquisitional water tortures. All this he dismissed as “mise-en-scène,” showmanship. Masuy strove to touch the minds of his victims.\textsuperscript{1295}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1290} Examples of such cases are given by Dahr Jamail (Beyond the Green Zone: Dispatches from an Unembedded Journalist in Occupied Iraq, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2007, pp 72–3; 186–8). From the other perspective the indiscriminate 'counterproductive' mass detention practices are described by Thomas Ricks (Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, London: Penguin, 2007, pp 224-5; 237-8).
\item \textsuperscript{1291} Rejali, Torture and Democracy, pp 20; 420.
\item \textsuperscript{1292} Ibid, p 255.
\item \textsuperscript{1293} Ibid, p 412.
\item \textsuperscript{1294} Ibid, p 109.
\item \textsuperscript{1295} Ibid, p 111.
\end{itemize}
Shock or not, Rejali documents (without himself seeing the significance) that Masuy had within his own mind created a denial of the physical pain, reconstructing his tortures as being psychological in nature when, in fact, they were incredibly agonising.\footnote{1296} This is the dominant discourse of clean torture, including techniques such as 'water-boarding' which cause horrific physical pain. As Rejali points out even sleep deprivation causes physical pain.\footnote{1297} And yet these are widely understood to be psychological techniques, inducing fear and breaking down resistance.

Of course there is a great deal done by US personnel that is not among these 'clean' tortures, including burning, breaking bones,\footnote{1298} rape, anal rape\footnote{1299} and dog bites. Somehow, however, these acts are erased when it comes to analysis. The entire world saw that attack dogs were made to bite naked restrained prisoners with photos such as these:\footnote{1300}

\begin{figure}
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{attack_dogs1.png}
  \includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{attack_dogs2.png}
  \caption{Attack dogs used in torture.}
\end{figure}

Yet whenever the use of dogs is mentioned something strange happens. For Rejali, the Nazis 'set dogs' on prisoners,\footnote{1301} but the US 'threatens' with them.\footnote{1302} Alfred McCoy, another torture specialist and strong critic of the US, takes the same approach, emphasising on multiple occasions the Arab cultural sensitivities and fear of dogs.\footnote{1303} (Apparently Arabs are peculiarly sensitive to being bound naked and blindfolded while military attack dogs savage them. Who would have thought?) A

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item 1296 Ibid.
  \item 1297 Ibid, p 290.
  \item 1298 Former interrogator Tony Lagouranis: 'North Babel was probably the place where I saw the worst evidence of abuse. This was from August to October of 2004, so, it was well after the Abu Ghraib scandal. And we were no longer using any harsh tactics within the prison, but I was working with a marine unit, and they would go out and do a raid and stay in the detainee's homes, and torture them there. They were far worse than anything that I ever saw in a prison. They were breaking bones. They were smashing people's feet with the back of an axe head. They burned people. Yeah, they were doing some pretty harsh stuff.' (Amy Goodman, “Former US Army Interrogator Describes the Harsh Techniques He Used in Iraq,” Democracy Now!, 15 November 2005. Retrieved 21 November 2005 from http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/15/1632233.)
  \item 1300 Photographs retrieved 7 December 2010 from http://www.salomon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/chapter_8_13;
  \item 1301 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, pp 93, 104.
  \item 1302 Ibid, p 433.
leaked US Senate investigation report on 'detainee' abuse notes that using dogs 'to exploit detainee fears' was authorised in 2002 and avoids detailing any use other than 'barking'.\textsuperscript{1304} It is significant that the US officially authorised the use of dogs in an obvious contravention of the Third Geneva Convention, but surely the predictable outcome that interrogators and MPs would exceed guidelines is worth noting, if not emphasising.\textsuperscript{1305}

With the nature of the torture established as being somehow less horrifying than razors or whips, it is the turn of the conveyors of information to add distortion to distortion in the same process of denial generation that is used with regard to genocide. Torture is redefined to conform with the principle that 'we don't torture' – meaning that anything 'we' do is, by definition, not torture. The first step, naturally, is to avoid at all costs the term 'torture'. In 1945 George Orwell wrote: 'In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defencel ess villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification.'\textsuperscript{1306} Torture is referred to as 'enhanced interrogation' by supporters and perpetrators,\textsuperscript{1307} but some indication of the Orwellian nature of current discourse is indicated by the fact that critics often refer to torture as 'harsh interrogation'.\textsuperscript{1308}

The steps of distortion are outlined by McCoy, “the United States moved quickly through the same stages... that the United Kingdom experienced after revelations of British army torture in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s – first, minimizing the torture with euphemisms such as 'interrogation in depth'; next, justifying it on grounds that it was necessary or effective; and finally, attempting to bury the issue by blaming 'a few bad apples'.”\textsuperscript{1309}

Even those of the alternative and 'liberal' media who reject the assertion that that recent US torture was the work of 'bad apples' effectively reinstate the assertion in another form by an unwarranted emphasis on the notion of 'reverse engineering' training given to military and intelligence personnel in 'resistance'. In fact, two psychologists were hired to train interrogators at Guantánamo based on tortures used in 'Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape' (SERE) training along with traditional


\textsuperscript{1305} The use of dogs to attack helpless prisoners was not confined to the one incident illustrated above. Other incidents are alleged to have occurred even in New Jersey's Passaic County Jail where Muslims were detained in large numbers after 11 September 2001 (Nina Bernstein, “9/11 Detainees in New Jersey Say They Were Abused With Dogs,” \textit{New York Times}, 3 April 2006. Retrieved 7 December 2010 from \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/nyregion/03detain.html}.)


\textsuperscript{1307} Andrew Sullivan, “Bush’s torturers follow where the Nazis led”, \textit{The Times}, 10 July 2007. Retrieved 16 July 2007 from \url{http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/andrew_sullivan/article2602564.ece}.


torture techniques.\textsuperscript{1310} Of course, that isn't actually 'reverse engineering,' although it is referred to as such. 'Reverse engineering' is where those who have undergone 'resistance' training, as in the SERE programme, apply what was done to them to others. You cannot teach resistance with these techniques, particularly when long periods of captivity as POWs are envisioned.\textsuperscript{1311} It seems likely that the main purpose of SERE is to enhance the desensitisation and brutalisation that are essential ingredients of military indoctrination.\textsuperscript{1312} As Jessica Wolfendale points out, military indoctrination facilitates the abnegation of responsibility which, among other things, creates a greater propensity for torture.\textsuperscript{1313} But, what is of interest to other torture specialists such as Rejali and McCoy is that these are also formal ways of covertly giving instruction in torture techniques. Rejali is particularly interested because formal dissemination of torture techniques is a very rare thing.\textsuperscript{1314} Without that particular interest there would seem to be little point in bringing up these 'reverse-engineered' techniques when more grotesque, brutal and horrifying techniques are just as common.\textsuperscript{1315}

The frequent mention of SERE techniques throughout the media serves to minimise the severity of torture, suggesting that it is only as intense as SERE instructors are willing to inflict on US personnel. But a technique such as waterboarding can vary in intensity and victims of asphyxiation torture have rated it as being more distressing than having body parts burnt, having teeth pulled out, or having needles inserted under fingernails.\textsuperscript{1316} The reverse-engineering discourse also serves to suggest that this really is the work of individual bad apples, despite the fact that the major news story associated with the phrase is not about reverse-engineering but about the deliberate creation of a formal torture programme for Guantánamo which has been exported elsewhere. Finally the references to SERE all imply that the US practice of torture is a novel outcome of policies instituted in the GWOT, and frequently state outright that the origins of these techniques lie in China and the Soviet Union. Even Democracy Now!, one of the most significant antiwar and anti-imperialist outlets in the US, contains the following completely false assertion:

...[T]he SERE program was focused on techniques that had been used by the Soviet Union, by communist China, by North Korea and North Vietnam, a great pack to be emulating. Those were the techniques against which the SERE program was supposed to insulate, so those are the techniques that SERE incorporated and used as its training program. So, in effect, what we're getting here is a filtered reproduction of communist techniques used by the Soviets, the North Koreans, the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, and psychologists are working along the way to make them more effective.\textsuperscript{1317}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1311} They might, however, sometimes be used to gauge physical and psychological endurance as part of a selection process for élite forces.
\item \textsuperscript{1312} “When raw recruits are faced with seemingly sadistic abuse and hardship... they are – among many other things – being inoculated against the stresses of combat.” (Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New York, Boston: Back Bay Books, 1995, pp 81-2). From this perspective it is easy to see this 'resistance' training as an extension of 'boot camp' or 'basic' training into the later careers of military personnel – a 'booster shot' for Grossman's 'inoculation'.
\item \textsuperscript{1313} Jessica Wolfendale, Torture and the Military Profession, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p 160.
\item \textsuperscript{1314} Rejali, Torture and Democracy, pp 431-4. Note that for Rejali's purposes these are not 'formal' torture training programmes. This is in line with his thesis that torture is a 'craft' learnt almost exclusively through 'apprenticeships'. There is no disputing this thesis, especially given that 'reverse engineering' only contributes a minority of techniques to largely improvised tortures used by US personnel. My point is, however, that these are formal training programmes in which torture techniques are taught. Rejali avoids such direct terminology, but his emphasis is as I have described above.
\item \textsuperscript{1315} In reported levels of distress given by torture victims from the former Yugoslavia most of the worst tortures such as rape, excruciating positional tortures (‘Palestinian hanging' is the example given, but the US also employs others which are equally painful), and mock executions are used by US personnel, but do not derive from 'reverse-engineering' (Metin Başoğlu, Maria Livanoü and Cvetana Crnobarić, “Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?,” Archive of General Psychiatry, 64, pp 277-85.)
\item \textsuperscript{1316} Ibid, p 280, Table 1.
\item \textsuperscript{1317} Amy Goodman, “Obama Releases Bush-Era Memos Authorizing Torture Techniques, Rules Out Prosecuting
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In fact, US torture in general bases itself on techniques developed by France, Britain and the US itself (often in domestic contexts). The SERE programme and its ilk are mostly products of US innovation, including an unprecedented programme of research into psychological torture techniques. The implication is that torture is somehow 'un-American', somehow exceptional. As Noam Chomsky writes:

...[T]orture has been routine practice from the early days of the conquest of the national territory, and then beyond... – extended to the Philippines, Haiti, and elsewhere. ... Accordingly, it is surprising to see the reactions even by some of the most eloquent and forthright critics of Bush malfeasance: for example, that we used to be 'a nation of moral ideals' and never before Bush 'have our leaders so utterly betrayed everything our nation stands for' (Paul Krugman). To say the least, that common view reflects a rather slanted version of history.

... Occasionally the conflict between 'what we stand for' and 'what we do' has been forthrightly addressed. One distinguished scholar who undertook the task is Hans Morgenthau, a founder of realist international relations theory. In a classic study written in the glow of Camelot, Morgenthau developed the standard view that the US has a 'transcendent purpose': establishing peace and freedom at home and indeed everywhere, since 'the arena within which the United States must defend and promote its purpose has become world-wide.' But as a scrupulous scholar, he recognized that the historical record is radically inconsistent with the 'transcendent purpose' of America.

We should not, however, be misled by that discrepancy, Morgenthau advises: in his words, we should not 'confound the abuse of reality with reality itself.' Reality is the unachieved 'national purpose' revealed by 'the evidence of history as our minds reflect it.' What actually happened is merely the 'abuse of reality.' To confound abuse of reality with reality is akin to 'the error of atheism, which denies the validity of religion on similar grounds.' An apt comparison.

Democracy Now! quite clearly overtly rejects these forms of exceptionalism, yet even they are drawn into contextualising torture in a demonstrably false way which lends itself inevitably to supporting George W. Bush's sentiment when he declared of the Abu Ghraib photographs: 'This is not the America I know.' Democracy Now! might disagree with Bush on nearly every aspect of the subject of torture, but despite having broadcast an interview with McCoy detailing the continuity of US torture, they repeat the same exceptionalist tropes with which Bush defends himself.

1318 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, p 406.
1319 McCoy, “Confronting the CIA's Mind Maze...”
APPENDIX D – The 'Tonkin Gulf Incidents'.
What became the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was drafted by Johnson administration and US military officials in Honolulu two months before any incidents took place.\(^{1223}\) This means that the Johnson administration was already intending to widen the war and, given the domestic political circumstances, must have been very desirous of a pretext. The US was conducting a series of provocations, amphibious military raids, known as 'OPLAN 34a', conducted by RVN commandos under US command. These were considered militarily useless and 'essentially worthless' by US officials and tended to result in great numbers of commandos killed or captured.\(^{1224}\)

At the same time the US Navy was conducting 'DESOTO' intelligence gathering missions by using destroyers to 'stimulate and record' DRV defences in order to locate radar installations.\(^{1225}\) For obvious reasons this meant that they had to manoeuvre in such a way as to cause the Vietnamese to believe that there was a potential attack, violating waters that the DRV claimed as territorial. Though officially separate, there were linkages between these US Navy operations and the commando raids sufficient to lead Spencer Tucker to conclude that '[i]t was thus not unreasonable for the DRV to assume that the two programmes were one and the same'.\(^{1226}\) In mid-July 1964 a DESOTO mission was authorised for the USS Maddox. It was to approach up to 4 miles from islands which were the subject of simultaneous OPLAN raids.\(^{1227}\)

On July 30-31 an OPLAN raid was carried out on Hon Me island. On August the 2\(^{nd}\) the USS Maddox, which was in the vicinity of Hon Me, fired on Vietnamese torpedo boats before any fire from the Vietnamese. This is not usually the accepted version of events, so it is worth replicating John Prados' description, which is based on the US Navy's own records:

Now the records show that the Maddox commenced fire at 9,000 yards at precisely 4:08 p.m. local time, three minutes after firing initial warning shots.

...the navy’s official history shows that the Maddox made a positive identification of the PT boats at 9800 yards, but that the lead Vietnamese warship launched its first torpedo—'unobserved by the Maddox'—somewhere between 9,000 and 5,000 yards from the speeding U.S. destroyer.

... Captain Herrick’s messages to higher command make clearer more-over, that he considered the Maddox threatened and expected to defend her. Mission commander and commander of Destroyer Division 192, Herrick had been warned by his NSA detachment of a probable attack, estimated the risk as unacceptable, and asked higher authority to cancel the patrol.

... All evidence indicates the Maddox opened fire based on the approach of the North Vietnamese vessels; initiation of engagement was thus on the basis of perceived intent, without reference to an actual attack.\(^{1228}\)

The point is that anyone who has even a vague grasp of mathematics can discern from the US Navy's official history that the US fired first in the 'First Tonkin Gulf incident'. This was confirmed in a 1998 article for the National Security Agency (NSA) journal Cryptological Quarterly (declassified in 2005).\(^{1229}\) The same article points out that 'Hanoi's tactical specifications for its P-4s called for torpedo launches at ranges under 1,000 yards. At over 6,000 yards, it was unlikely a torpedo launched at a moving target could hit anything.'\(^{1230}\)

After this attack by the US it was announced that the DRV had attacked US vessels in international


\(^{1229}\) Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies...".

\(^{1230}\) Ibid, p 22.
waters, but since the only damage sustained by the Maddox was a single bullet hole, Johnson decided on the minimal reaction of a diplomatic protest. Two days later the Maddox was joined by another destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy which opened fire on non-existent torpedo boats on the basis of false radar and sonar signals. An engagement was briefly reported before being thrown into severe doubt within hours. Within an hour of the second 'incident' the DRV had denied any activity. Herrick sent the following about 4 hours after reporting the incident: 'Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. ... No actual visual sighting by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.' Nonetheless a 'furious' Lyndon Johnson ordered air strikes. Even more brazenly McNamara lied to congress, telling them that both destroyers had been attacked. This helped secure the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had very broad provisions including the right to instantly respond with force in the case of attack on US forces and, on request by any Southeast Asian government, to use 'all measures including the use of armed force to assist that nation in the defense of its political independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion.' That was what facilitated the full-scale invasion of Vietnam; when the illegitimate government that the US had installed over the fictional sovereign state that the US created dutifully invited the 'assistance' of the US.

The events are, admittedly, complicated. For example, I have not even mentioned yet that the DRV boats were apparently intending to attack the Maddox. It seems that Prime Minister Le Duan had gone behind the backs of President Ho Chi Minh and armed forces commander Vo Nuyen Giap to order attacks and that those orders had been countermanded but that this was not received by the DRV torpedo boats. Nor does it alter the fact that the US was engaged in offensive operations against the DRV, and in fact had been attacking with US personnel since no later than 1961. The question is whether to examine the events by emphasizing US mistakes and confusion, or whether base an analysis or narrative on the deliberate and calculated acts of the US. It is, of course, the former which dominates the scholarly discourse.

By concentrating on known deliberate provocations and deceptions we can construct a narrative which completely obviates any need to refer to US mistakes and misunderstandings. That the US wanted to start bombing the DRV and make a major ground force commitment should not be in doubt. As mentioned, the resolution which would make use of the Tonkin Gulf incidents to achieve those ends was already drafted, and US officials where convinced (rightly) that without a major escalation of US involvement they would 'fail'. As will be shown, 'failure' for the US meant a negotiated solution between the leaders in Saigon and other parties, primarily the National Liberation Front (NLF). 'Failure' meant the advent of peace.

The various commando raids committed under US command, usually by RVN personnel who were very callously expended, were clearly deliberate provocations. As mentioned, they were not considered militarily useful. The explanation given by scholars to explain why the US would thus choose to sacrifice lives and resources thus is that they sought to reassure the Saigon regime. As Hanyok puts it, 'if America's determination to succeed could be communicated to Khanh, then the South Vietnamese might be reassured of the prospects for victory.' This begs the question of what exactly is supposed to be reassuring in the US demonstrating that they are willing to sacrifice the lives of the most highly trained and dedicated RVN personnel in militarily useless endeavours?

1333 Langguth, Our Vietnam, pp 301-2.
1334 Schulzinger, A Time for War, pp 151-2.
1337 Ellsberg, Secrets..., pp 1-2.
Either scholars have a rather racially informed view of RVN leader General Nguyen Khanh's intellect and military acumen, or the actual reassurance could only be derived from the knowledge that these were provocations undertaken in order to lay the groundwork for a massive expansion of the war. As it happens Khanh demonstrably was not reassured, not that any scholars seem to think that this fact might be relevant. He sought to neutralise South Vietnam after the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but when the US found out that he sought negotiations with the NLF to end the war they overthrew him.\textsuperscript{1339}

Having provoked a minor response, the only damage to the \textit{Maddox} being a single bullet hole, clearly the Johnson administration felt that the incident was not sufficient to persuade Congress to authorize full-scale war. They warned Hanoi that “any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces” would “inevitably” result in “grave consequences.”\textsuperscript{1340} Those scholars who note Johnson's limited reaction suggest that it indicates his reluctance to take that step, but this is to ignore the wealth of evidence that he actively sought this massive expansion of the war. Among other things Johnson lied about the nature of the first incident, making it seem like a completely unprovoked attack in international waters. Had he wished to avoid war in any way he might still have lied, but using a very different cover story emphasising the potential for mistakes in areas of tension and calling for calm, not accusing the DRV of an act of aggression. Had the US wished in any way to avoid war, they would not have scheduled and conducted another OPLAN raid on the night of 4-5 August, but they did.\textsuperscript{1341} At the same time, immediately after the first incident, the \textit{Maddox} and \textit{C. Turner Joy} were authorised to approach to 11 miles of the DRV coastline (well within range of the destroyers' 5 inch guns)\textsuperscript{1342}, deliberately breaking the territorial limit claimed by the DRV.\textsuperscript{1343}

The second Tonkin Gulf incident and Johnson's reaction to it reinforce the following position: the US persistently and consistently pursued actions designed to prevent a negotiated settlement of the insurgency in the South and simultaneously to facilitate the expansion of the war with major US troop commitments and massive bombing campaigns which would come to engulf most of Indochina. Further, Johnson's appearance of having been deceived is belied by his acts and words at the time and later. As such, the fact that Johnson created deniability over his decision to bomb the DRV is actually suggestive of forward planning.

On August 4 a series of cables arrived at the Pentagon detailing extraordinary events. Daniel Ellsberg gives the following account:

> The messages were vivid. Herrick must have been dictating them from the bridge in between giving orders, as his two ships swerved to avoid torpedoes picked up on the sonar of the \textit{Maddox} and fired in the darkness at targets shown on the radar of the \textit{Turner Joy}: “Torpedoes missed. Another fired at us. Four torpedoes in water. And five torpedoes in water. . . . Have ... successfully avoided at least six torpedoes.”

Nine torpedoes had been fired at his ships, fourteen, twenty-six. More attacking boats had been hit; at least one sunk. This action wasn’t ending after forty minutes or an hour. It was going on, ships dodging and firing in choppy seas, planes overhead firing rockets at locations given them by the \textit{Turner Joy}'s radar, for an incredible two hours before the stream of continuous combat updates finally ended. Then, suddenly, an hour later, full stop. A message arrived that took back not quite all of it, but enough to put everything earlier in question.\textsuperscript{1344}

In fact, there were no attacks at all, nor enemy vessels. It was also clear even during the 'engagement' that both radar and sonar aboard both destroyers were giving unreliable readings.

\textsuperscript{1339} Ironically Khanh had gained US support for his overthrow of his predecessor, General Minh, by citing the threat of neutralism. Obviously, once he gained power he also gained some perspective on the likely outcome of a wider war.
\textsuperscript{1340} Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds....”, p 18.
\textsuperscript{1341} Ibid, p 30.
\textsuperscript{1342} Langguth, \textit{Our Vietnam}, p 300.
\textsuperscript{1343} Schulzinger, \textit{A Time for War}, p 151.
\textsuperscript{1344} Ellsberg, \textit{Secrets}, p 6.
With reports from the field immediately thrown into doubt, it was signals intelligence which was used as the final justification, the only problem being that someone somewhere fabricated the most crucial message. Before this, however, a misinterpretation of a partial intercept warned of a possible attack. Next, a report based on a complete intercept contradicting that was issued at about the exact time that the destroyers opened fire: 'For NSA and the rest of the SIGINT participants, the second Phu Bai report should have acted as a brake to any further reporting about an attack. It directly contradicted the interpretation - remember, it was an interpretation only - contained in the initial Critic which claimed an attack was being prepared. At this point, all the SIGINT community could accurately state was that there was no signals intelligence reflecting a planned or ongoing attack against the Desoto mission.'

With the PT boats being ruled out as attackers the NSA decided that it must be SWATOW boats which were attacking. The problem with this being that these boats were not equipped with torpedoes and were not close enough to have reached the destroyers after the alleged attack order had been issued. Thus signals intelligence fairly well ruled out an attack at an early stage. A complete lack of intercepts, such as DRV radar activity, that would confirm an attack made this a certainty, as Hanyok points out it was the dog that didn't bark in the night.

The intercept which was used, by Robert McNamara, to 'prove' that an attack took place was an after-action report. The original decryption, in Vietnamese, is lost and the translation seems somewhat incoherent, however it is known that the translation altered some of the original message. Additionally, the first version of this 'after-action' report was issued at or before the time at which the destroyers opened fire, but somehow the translation failed to highlight the original transmission time. Worse still, the translation was actually made up from two different intercepts and, as Hanyok points out, it is clear that the original reports were being discussed among intelligence and defence officials.

Johnson and McNamara both deliberately deceived by covering up the doubts to which both were privy. Even if Johnson was himself misled, as Gareth Porter contends, he was still aware that matters left room for doubt, but chose to present the attack as a complete certainty and launched airstrikes with incredible haste. There was no posturing brinksmanship, no ultimatum, no summits, not even bullying, just destruction and death dropped abruptly from above.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed on August the 7th, was nearly as hasty as the air strikes. It is not merely hard but impossible to seriously conceive that the rapidity of these actions was prompted by anything so much as by a knowledge that the casus belli would soon disintegrate. Johnson was on record as expressing doubt before the resolution was passed. McNamara was definitely apprised of ample evidence to conclude that there had been no attacks, but used the fabricated intercept as his 'smoking gun' proof in addressing Congress. Congress bought McNamara's story, as did the media. I. F. Stone was a lone voice when he pointed out that reprisal strikes were illegal in peacetime, so from this point on the precedent for bombing the DRV had been created and the President had been granted virtually unlimited powers with which to prosecute a full-scale war.

My point in spending so much space on the Tonkin Gulf incidents is primarily historiographical. With regard to the first incident, most works touching on the subject will implicitly or explicitly characterise the incident as an unprovoked Vietnamese attack. Until 2005, no one at all

1351 Schulzinger, A Time for War, pp 151-2.
1352 Langguth, Our Vietnam, p 305.
acknowledged that the US had attacked first despite the fact that the evidence had been widely available for decades. The second incident is very odd in its historiography. Often it is mentioned in passing as if roughly equivalent the Gleiwitz incident, staged by the Germans as a pretext for invading Poland. Yet when discussed in more detail, the narrative of the second incident tends to be overtaken with supposed misapprehensions, technical failures, psychological failings.
APPENDIX E – Creating Future Génocidaires in the Great War.

The factors acting to derange the senses of the front line troops began even before enlistment with unrealistic, romantic and chauvinistic expectations of violence, combat and war; 1353 masculinity; 1354 and the martial prowess of their nation. 1355 As to the Great War itself, they genuinely expected it to be 'over by Christmas'. 1356 They, and those who were to remain home, felt that war would cleanse 1357 and unite society 1358 - renewing lost values and providing an 'escape from modernity'. 1359 In training troops were intentionally degraded, brutalised and stripped of individuality. 1360 Perhaps more importantly their training did next to nothing to prepare them for the realities of the front line, and very little to help them fight or survive. 1361

On arrival at the front they were confronted with overwhelming noise 1362 and disorientation in time and space, 1363 producing an immediate and lasting sense of befuddlement. 1364 They had to contend with stench, filth, mud, vermin and, above all, cold. 1365 They were constantly fatigued from hard labour at or behind the front line, 1366 they suffered chronic sleep deprivation exacerbated by the reversal of day/night patterns of activity in the front trenches. 1367 They were malnourished in the field, and many had been malnourished in earlier life. 1368 They were extremely prone to physical disease and were often treated punitively, cruelly or callously on falling ill. 1369 They were starved of any, even basic, strategic information 1370 and deprived, by physical realities, of a visual or tactical understanding of their situation – living in what Leed refers to as the 'labyrinth'. 1371 Winter suggests that these factors caused 'mental depression and physical sluggishness... from... lack of sleep combined with a total lack of information, which added to the lack of a sense of purpose'. 1372 Their lives were expended with what can only be described as great profligacy. In these circumstances the front line soldier inevitably came to see some actions of military superiors and politicians (and

1354 Ibid p 30.
1360 Winter, *Death's Men*, pp 41-3. The destruction of individuality was also *ipso facto* the destruction of identity, or more specifically civilian identity, which was, in theory replaced with a less individual identity as a soldier. The problem, as we shall see, is that a soldier identity, as everyone understood it and as the military attempted to instil it, was totally untenable in the conditions of trench warfare (see below).
1371 Leed, *No Man's Land*, pp 77-80.
by association the 'home') as either gratuitously idiotic or insane,\textsuperscript{1373} or as intentionally murderous.\textsuperscript{1374} 

The three greatest factors impacting the combatants' psyches were the prevalences of fear, immobility and death. Leed emphasises the impact of immobility, contending that it destroyed any sense of identity as an 'offensive' soldier.\textsuperscript{1375} Psychiatric casualty rates certainly reflect the impact of static warfare.\textsuperscript{1376} This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that rates were lower during mobile war phases despite higher death and injury rates.\textsuperscript{1377} On a more basic level than that of identity, however, soldiers were exposed to danger, provoking fear and adrenal response, and prevented from the active defence that both self-preservative cognition and biochemistry demanded. It is only too reasonable to expect that in these circumstances they would become neurasthenic and, as Aldington hinted, begin to morbidity fear itself.\textsuperscript{1378} They were also constantly confronted with manifest death, the importance of which is shown by the centrality of encounters with corpses in both memory\textsuperscript{1379} and in the way combatants framed and interpreted the meaning of the war.\textsuperscript{1380} Killing could prompt guilt (although it should be remembered that only a small minority of infantry soldiers would have killed anyone). The loss of comrades could be a source of grief which, because of the necessarily close bonding of military units, caused a large vertiginous emotional drain, and... a seemingly endless process of mourning.\textsuperscript{1381} Combatants were radically desensitised, losing their normal reactions to both death and decay.\textsuperscript{1382} Leed describes an instance where a soldier is blown by a shell onto the days rotten stomach of an enemy, causing the excreta and rotten entrails of the corpse to enter his mouth – a single incident that illustrates the violation of profound values which confronted soldiers.\textsuperscript{1383} The most damaging aspect of the confrontation with death was the reminder of one's own mortality. In a war where front line soldiers were only too aware that they had little or no agency in their own self-preservation, each corpse represented the viewer's own death save for a small sliver of fate or fortune. All agency and the disbursement of death was relegated to technology, the war-machine,\textsuperscript{1384} the soldiers were 'unprotected by anything but cloth'.\textsuperscript{1385} They could not physically defend themselves and took refuge in superstitions talismans ritual and spells,\textsuperscript{1386} largely abandoning established religion which offered only post-mortem salvation.\textsuperscript{1387} 

The above is but a short list of some of the more prominent aspects of the front line that served to alienate and to enact profound psychic changes. These are two faces of the same coin – the war altered combatants but it was a 'silent teacher' imparting a 'secret which can never be

\textsuperscript{1373} Ibid, pp 213; Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, p 99.
\textsuperscript{1374} Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, pp 106-7.
\textsuperscript{1375} Ibid 180-6.
\textsuperscript{1376} Joanna Bourke, \textit{An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare}, London: Granta, 1999, p 249. See also note 8 above.
\textsuperscript{1377} Stevenson, \textit{1914-1918}, p 215.
\textsuperscript{1378} Winter, \textit{Death's Men}, p 133. Winter paraphrases Aldington as suggesting that men were 'horribly afraid of seeming afraid', however it is a reasonable inference to suggest that, given the risk of death or insanity that uncontrolled fear brought, they truly did fear fear. Such safety as there was against shelling required immobility, which required the control of fear. Again there are resonances with \textit{Catch-22}.
\textsuperscript{1379} Ibid p 181.
\textsuperscript{1380} Ibid p 206-8. There is also the strong, if not clichéd, narrative convention of the encounter with an enemy corpse prompting a realisation of the humanity of the enemy. For example, Erich Maria Remarque, \textit{All Quiet on the Western Front}, London: Vintage, 2005, pp 153-9, wherein the protagonist is also confronted by a protracted death at his own hands.
\textsuperscript{1381} Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, p 210.
\textsuperscript{1383} Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, p 19.
\textsuperscript{1384} Ibid pp 29-33.
\textsuperscript{1386} Leed, \textit{No Man's Land}, pp 127-8; Winter, \textit{Death's Men}, p 118.
\textsuperscript{1387} Stevenson, \textit{1914-1918}, p 215.
communicated’. Walter Benjamin noted that returning soldiers had ‘grown silent – not richer but poorer in communicable experience’. The incommunicability of experience could make home leave unbearable because by itself it could be so intensely alienating.

The ‘silence’ of the front line soldier was exacerbated by their lack of a military ‘offensive’ identity. Soldiers are meant to be killers, shooters, attackers – they are trained as such and people, even today, believe it is their role. In fiction it is hard to find an infantry protagonist who does not kill an enemy soldier at some stage. However in reality, most front line soldiers were not killed, and 58 per cent of deaths that did occur were caused by shellfire. Of the remainder snipers, machine-guns, accident, disease, gas, aircraft and other causes would have accounted for so many that, given the relatively even matching of forces, only a tiny percentage of infantry could have actually killed someone with rifle, bayonet or grenade. The role of the infantry was not to kill but to occupy space. This is a source of cognitive dissonance to the soldier who has been instilled with an ‘offensive’ identity, but also a source of cognitive estrangement from civilians and the values of a ‘society at war’.

The front and the home were even more polarised in their attitudes towards the enemy. Civilian hatred towards the enemy was frequently a source of bitter anger for those serving at the front. The front line soldiers tended to lack hatred towards the enemy and often felt identification or even empathy. To Stevenson this arose from the fact that they were all 'trapped in a killing machine by pressure from above'.

The hatred of the enemy, and the pro-war patriotism of the home front was a source of bitter alienation in itself, greatly aggravated by a blithe ignorance of the horrors facing combatants and a frequent expectation that the soldier should conform to preconceptions and be actively desirous of combat. The home front's enthusiasm for slaughter was not simply a matter of estrangement of perceptions and beliefs, it made them part of the 'killing machine', as much a part of the apparatus as the staff officers in the rear lines. Some soldiers felt that civilians were responsible for maliciously and knowingly sending young men to die for their own profit or enjoyment, deceiving

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1388 Charles Carrington quoted in Leed, No Man's Land, p 12.
1389 Ibid p 209.
1390 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p 212.
1391 Leed, No Man's Land, p 113.
1392 Joanna Bourke opens An Intimate History of Killing with the sentence, 'The characteristic act of men at war is not dying, it is killing.' However, although she seeks to include the imaginary in constructing the meaning of war to participants, the point is not sustained even by her own selected evidence and although she deals with the fear of death she does not draw a link between it and the interpretation of the act of killing (pp 1-3). Denis Winter makes the point that 'danger was the most crucial trigger of aggression and sustainer of it...’ Thus death precedes and shapes the act of killing (Death's Men, p 216). Also in his reconstruction of the experience of battle it is fear of death that preconditions the soldier so intensely that its release leads to an immediate sense of euphoria, but also of detachment and unreality, which could change into positive enjoyment (pp 179-81). As discussed below this can have seldom been linked to killing in reality, and the sequence would suggest that the killing imaginary, and the narrative conventions of killing, are the product of the fear of death and a way of reclaiming agency after profound feelings of helplessness. Bourke herself cites an example of euphoric sensations and coital associations, identical to those that she suggests are associated with killing, deriving from a situation of danger where there was no remote possibility of the subject killing anyone, nor did he envisage or imagine doing so (p 150-1).
1393 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p 184.
1394 Leed, No Man's Land, p 110.
1395 Ibid 106
1396 Ibid p 107; in contrast Winter perceives more hatred, or rather 'dislike', but suggests that it seems to have been linked to the degree of danger and to have rapidly disappeared in time of truce, (Death's Men, pp 209-13).
1397 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p 92.
1398 Winter, Death's Men, p 167.
1399 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture..., p 17.
them as to the nature of military life and the reality of war. To Sassoon war was a 'dirty trick' on his generation perpetuated by the 'callous complacence' of civilians. There was not only bitterness but immense disdain directed at the older generation. Remarque writes of their 'moral bankruptcy' and his protagonist is 'forced to conclude that our generation is more honourable than theirs.'

Even more acute than the anger felt towards elders was that felt towards women. Some held that they derived positive enjoyment from young men's sufferings. Aldington went so far as to write that the news of a son's death was 'almost wholly erotic.' to a mother and that 'all the dying and wounds... [from] a safe distance... gave [women] a great kick....'

More commonly women were blamed as active recruiters, although not entirely without reason.

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1401 Adams, *The Great Adventure*, p 133.
1402 Leed, *No Man's Land*, p 207.
1403 Ibid p 74.
1407 Ibid p 128. Women were psychologically mobilised for the war effort and part of this was an effort to consciously indoctrinate them into viewing the death of their loved one's as a positive sacrifice and a source of satisfaction. It seems unlikely that women were quite so thrilled at losing their sons as Aldington suggests, but the very existence of widespread propaganda to that effect makes Aldington's viewpoint seem less extreme. See Nicoletta F. Gullace, “The Blood of our Sons”: *Men Women and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp 3-4, 53-60, 81-3.
APPENDIX F – The Argentine Genocide.

Like other autogenocides, the Argentine politicide was part of a plan of drastic, if not revolutionary, societal transformation, referred to as el Proceso. The Junta who seized power in 1976 sought a ‘sanitized, purified culture’. Under cover of fighting ‘terrorism’ and insurgency, the Junta implemented a totalitarian anticommunist ‘free-market’ regime by destroying any possible ideological opposition or potentially rival power structures. Feierstein writes: ‘All those targeted had in common not their political identity, but rather the fact that they participated in the social movements of that time.’ In other words it was eliticidal, but it did not target the government apparatus, for obvious reasons, and some social structures (principally the Church) were cleansed rather than disintegrated, becoming instruments of furthering authoritarian obedience. To further ensure unquestioning obedience, books were burned and banned, then a blanket law criminalised writing, publishing, printing, distributing or selling anything found to be ‘subversive’ after the fact. This created a sense of uncertainty and fear. As Galeano puts it: ‘In this program for a society of deaf mutes, each citizen has to become his own Torquemada.’

What stands out most in el Proceso is the disappearances. Argentina has the sad distinction of being the first place to nominalise ‘disappear’ into ‘the disappeared’, just as Guatemala had earlier made its unhappy linguistic contribution with the transitive verb ‘to disappear [someone]’. To disappear someone, rather than to simply gun them down in the streets, is to bring about awful uncertainties about their fate - for the loved ones of the disappeared uncertainty prevents the grieving process and even hope becomes a torment, for everyone the imaginings of protracted torture, usually all too real, become a source of great terror. According to Antonius Robben: ‘Argentine society became terror-stricken. The terror was intended to debilitating people politically and emotionally without them ever fathoming the magnitude of the force that hit them.’

Those targeted were unionists, leaders of agrarian leagues, and community workers working with the urban poor. This was done under the guise of fighting a ‘dirty war’ against ‘terrorist’ guerrillas, despite the fact that Argentina’s Montonero guerrillas were a spent force within 6 months of the coup.

The fate of the disappeared was horrific:

The perpetrators did not refrain from applying any of the mechanisms of destruction of subjectivity from previous genocides or repressive experiences. The concentration camps in Argentina were a compendium of the worst aspects of the concentration camps of Nazism, of the French camps in Algeria, and of the American counter-intelligence practices in Vietnam. Concepts such as torture by means of the “cattle prod,” the “submarine” (systematically submerging the head of the victims in a bucket of water until nearly causing their drowning), the everyday humiliation and denigration of prisoners, mistreatment, overcrowding, and hunger.

These techniques were added to some specific features of the Argentine experience, such as torturing prisoners in front of their children, torturing prisoners’ children or spouses in front of their parents or partners, and the illegal appropriation and subsequent delivery to military families of many children of the “disappeared.”

The camps were sites where, in Michael Humphrey words, there was ‘permission to take

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1409 Ibid, p 105.
1411 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, p 110.
1416 Feierstein, "Political violence in Argentina and its genocidal characteristics.", p 151.
exceptional measures in exceptional times.... The distinction between law and lawlessness collapsed in the clandestine centres. As mentioned above, they resembled ‘Nazi concentration camps’ in as much as they were spaces where anything became possible in the goal of producing the confession...."1417 Torture and confession here, as is often the case, serve no intelligence purpose. Presumably they served a similar, but less dysfunctional, purpose as served by those produced in Kampuchea in places like Tuol Sleng, where torture produced confessions that confirmed an ideological/psychological belief in the danger posed by the victim.1418 Given that no such confessions were made public, they must be considered to be aimed at those working as the security arm of the state. As Humphrey puts it, the confession ‘affirms the validity, at the least for the state, of [the victim’s] selection and fate.’1419

So, why does this not qualify as genocide (from the perspective of the junta, at least)? Because there is no demonstrable intentionality. These events could have taken place without one single person in power in Argentina wishing to destroy the Argentine nation in part, as opposed to what they believed to be strengthening it through radical transformation. It is true that there may have been those among them who were willing to purchase power and wealth with the blood and agony of many, but even those would, almost inevitably, internalise notions that their own profit is for the greater good. Also, autogenocides (or politicides) such as this one seldom reach the levels of exterminatory violence quite common to genocides, because the internal logic places limitations on them, and when they exceed those limitations they become highly dysfunctional and threaten the power structures of the perpetrator. Conversely, this is why genocide is so much more urgent - because massive violence can be of benefit to the perpetrator, who may then repeat such acts.

But, the Argentine politicide was also an act of genocide, in as much as it was the directly violent part of ongoing economic genocide which has caused even more suffering and death. Naomi Klein is careful throughout three chapters on Chile and Argentina to ensure that readers understand that the state violence in those countries was intimately linked with the creation of institutions of structural violence that are even more devastating, and which last to this day, long after the death squads and the censorship have disappeared.1420 In a similar observation during the Guatemalan genocide, Galeano wrote:

The slaughter that is greater but more hidden--the daily genocide of poverty--also continues. In 1968 another expelled priest, Father Blase Bonpane, reported on this sick society in the Washington Post: “Of the 70,000 people who die each year in Guatemala, 30,000 are children. The infant mortality rate in Guatemala is forty times higher than in the United States.”1421

Although it seems that we are often expected to believe that the poor, especially those of colour, are in some way inured to something like the loss of an infant child, the suffering brought about by such death and grinding poverty is every bit as real as that suffered through state terror. And the impetus behind this economic genocide - indeed the sine qua non of economic genocide - is that it is a strategic impetus aimed at perpetuating, and inevitably, strengthening a position of dominance.

1418 Hinton, Why did they Kill?, pp 143-4.
1420 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, pp 75-128.
1421 Galeano, The Open Veins of Latin America, p 113.
APPENDIX G - Deception, Dissimulation and Secrecy.

It is clear that almost any psychopolitical examination of leadership, and indeed the vast majority of orthodox scholarship dealing with political decision making, should be rejected because its evidential basis is more-or-less non-existent. Aside from the general Realist principle that one can never know what actually goes on inside people's brains (no matter what they propound ideologically), there are very specific reasons for rejecting the evinced ideologies of the US administrations and foreign policy élites. Furthermore, there are extremely good reasons for rejecting the evinced psychologies and personalities of the major actors of US genocides.

In 1955, inspired in part by Dwight Eisenhower, Philip K. Dick wrote a story called 'In the Mold of Yancy'. In this story the President of a future society was, in fact, nothing but an animated dummy – a simulacrum. The President would spout earthy homespun truisms which were in fact the product of teams of sophisticated urbane copywriters striving at all times to achieve the sense of rural, spontaneous, natural, folk wisdom. Further, they ensured at all times that what was said by the President was what people wanted to hear, above all what gave them a sense of reassurance, and thus created a near universal depoliticisation. Dick is renowned for accidental, or seemingly accidental, prophecy and this satire is no exception. Today's 'spin doctors' perform exactly the same task that the 'Yance men' of the story did, crafting depoliticised 'messages' either giving a 'spin' to policy and actions or creating an appealing association with 'values' which bear no relation whatsoever to policy. The 'Yance men' worked with an artificial construct in Yancy, but this too reflects the reality that the 'spin doctors' work with synthetic personae – simulations if not simulacra. The career path to high office in the US lies only through decades of public existence in combinations of politics, academia, business and military service. A simulated public image is crafted over this long span of time and may bear little more than incidental resemblance to the actual human being who shares the face and voice of the simulation. This is particularly so where there is a long involvement with the political establishment or the intelligence community, an involvement which may stem from birth.

Consider George W. Bush's periodic stupidity. Able at some times to talk at great length coherently, at other times his incoherence is legendary leading to the term 'Bushism' and numerous books, calendars and websites devoted purely to his humorously idiotic outpourings such as: "Rarely is the question asked: Is our children learning?" This could be the result of brain damage, but that would beg the question of why he was elevated to high office. If, for example, some considered a brain damaged president to be an asset, then ipso facto that brain damage (and attendant ignorance and poor judgement) make the President susceptible to manipulation. There are reasons, however, to be suspicious of Bush's displays of incoherence, idiocy and ignorance. For example, Bush attended Yale where he was 'elected' president of a fraternity and was inducted into the élite Skull and Bones secret society, coasting to graduation....

When someone like that says 'nukuler' (and does so consistently) it is impossible not to suspect affectation. A history of substance abuse might explain some things, but not a mispronunciation of this kind.

And then there is the aforementioned matter of Bush's apparent ignorance of Islam's two main sects. He grew up in a family which had a 'decades-long intimacy' with the Saudi ruling family, and extensive ties to the other 'Big Three' Saudi oligarchic families (including, most notoriously, the Bin Ladens). His father was first DCI, then Vice President for 8 years, then President, during which time he launched a major war in the Middle East. Of course, the accepted story is that GHW Bush...

became DCI with no prior intelligence background. When in 1988 confronted with a 1963 FBI memo discussing 'Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency' his spokesperson claimed it must have been "[s]ome other George Bush". We now know, however, that the CIA was involved in the formation of Bush's Zapata oil in the early 1950's. Furthermore, 'Zapata's annual reports portray a bewildering range of global activities, in the Mideast, Asia and the Caribbean (including off Cuba) that seem outsized for the company's modest bottom line.' At the end of 1967 GHW Bush went for several weeks to Vietnam as a 'cleared and witting commercial asset' according to a CIA memo.\textsuperscript{1425}

As for GW Bush, during his controversial stint in the Texas Air National Guard he was close friends with CIA employee, James Bath, who has become notorious for having invested money from Osama Bin Laden's bother-in-law and his half-brother in Bush's Arbusto Energy. He was also linked to the BCCI and CIA drug smuggling operations.\textsuperscript{1426} During his term of service, Bush disappeared from records for almost exactly one year. His comment was 'I can't remember what I did. I just.... I fulfilled my obligation'.\textsuperscript{1427} Obviously, this leaves a great deal of room for speculation about GW Bush's own involvement in intelligence activities at this time and later through Arbusto's activities. Speculation aside, however, it should be clear that dissimulation and secrecy are a normal part of public life for the Bush family. It would seem that his evinced ignorance of Islam was most likely a theatrical performance, and one must wonder what such efforts are aimed at achieving.

Bush is far from alone in presenting a false front. Consider the public persona of Colin Powell, the upright straight-talking and above all 'moderate' military man. His rise began when 'as a mid-grade careerist [he] was personally involved in a whitewash of the My Lai massacre.'\textsuperscript{1428} He was mentored by Frank Carlucci, a close friend from Princeton of Donald Rumsfeld. Carlucci, another 'moderate'\textsuperscript{1429} was to become Deputy DCI under Carter and Defense Secretary under Reagan. Officially he was a diplomat, unofficially 'Spooky' Frank Carlucci has been accused of orchestrating: 'the overthrow of Joao Goulart in Brazil in 1964, Abeid Karume of Zanzibar in 1972, and Salvador Allende of Chile in 1973, according to the London Times. He was also accused by Italian communists of being behind the 1978 kidnapping of Aldo Moro, and subverting the revolutionary process in Portugal.\textsuperscript{1430} Powell's moderate realist image survived his involvement in the mass deaths of Desert Storm/Sabre and was to become the image (with Powell the actual person as a mere vehicle) which was crucial in facilitating the invasion of Iraq. When Colin Powell presented to the UN a series of completely implausible lies whose actual foundations could never bear scrutiny, the case was actually quite deliberately made to rest on Powell's persona of integrity, a façade which might be completely in harmony with Powell's self-image, but which was always irreconcilable with his actions.

As we continue to investigate the shadier, but known, aspects of GW Bush's circle, the plot thickens. Carlucci, for example, became head of the Carlyle Group, which has profited greatly

from the actions of GW Bush and Osama Bin Laden, which is interesting because the Bushes and Bin Ladens are major investors. GHW Bush is on the board of directors of the Carlyle Group, and as Dan Briody explains there is a great deal of interpenetration between Carlyle and the US government. The first Bush administration was flooded with ex-Carlyle employees taking the first trip through the revolving door, while the group itself has been referred to as the ‘ex-President’s club.’1431 Briody concludes with an intriguing passage:

It’s difficult to explain certain aspects of the company. Like why George Bush Sr., in the face of mounting criticism and the undermining of his son's credibility in office, doesn't simply resign from the company? His is already wealthy, with his family’s legacy secure. And there must be a thousand different job opportunities available for the ex-president that don’t involve obvious conflicts of interest or incidents of international political intrigue. Or why James Baker III, with his own law firm and foundation, feels the need to keep toiling for a firm that clearly threatens his heretofore untarnished reputation. It begs the question: What are these men up to?1432

1431 Ibid, p xxvi.
1432 Ibid, p 159.
APPENDIX H – Rwanda.

“They killed Habyarimana because they knew he was the only one who could stop the Hutus from killing Tutsis. That is why, every day, I say that: the genocide was not planned by Hutus, it was planned by the RPF. Even after the Interahamwe killed my wife, even after all the horrible things that have happened to me, I believe the Tutsis created the genocide. And for me it was a war between brothers: the Hutus had an army and the Tutsis had an army and there was fighting at every level.”

Rwanda has a special place in genocide scholarship as one of only three acknowledged canonical examples (the others being the Shoah and the Armenian Holocaust). Vahakn Dadrian refers to ‘the three principle genocides,’ Jones refers to three “classic genocides”, Levene calls them the ‘prototypical examples’. Yet one would not normally expect a survivor of a 'classic' and 'prototypical' genocide to say that the planners of the genocide were the enemies of those who actually carried out the genocide. In what other case could there be any such doubt? The Rwanda genocide was significant and dramatic, but like the Democratic Kampuchea autogénocide before it, so unusual as to be patently useless as any form of paradigmatic model. In fact, it is probably no coincidence that atypical genocides are such a focus, and that it is they that have become fodder for the Hollywood vision of genocide.

Of late the orthodox or, as René Lemarchand would have it, the 'politically correct' interpretation Rwandan history has been brought into question in broader circles than previously was the case. Recent elections have highlighted the questionable use of the criminal charges of genocide denial, most notably when leading opposition figure Victoire Ingabire was charged in April with 'association with a terrorist group; propagating genocide ideology; negationism and ethnic divisionism.' A month later, the lawyer who flew from the US to defend her was arrested and later proffered charges which included 'denying and downplaying genocide through his publications and conferences,' and 'spreading rumours that are capable of threatening the security of the Rwandan people.' More recently a leaked draft of a UN report claims that if proven in court, actions testified to by victims of Rwandan forces in Congo/Zaire would constitute genocide.

There is some acknowledgement in the literature that Rwanda was unusual in that there was genuine fear amongst the perpetrators. There is even a significant article in the Journal of Genocide Research supporting the survivor testimony above to the effect that the RPF provoked genocide. In another article René Lemarchand writes: 'To put it baldly: Jews did not invade Germany with the massive military and logistical support of a neighboring state....' But to extend the analogy, this was a genocide in which Jews were massacring Germans, in which Himmler was born a Jew, in which Hitler had Jews in his cabinet and as close friends, and in which the most celebrated rescue of Jews was carried out, in part, by the Wehrmacht. All of these factors are elided in the orthodox literature, and the only reasonably contextualised narrative is found in the writings of those who are, more or less, deniers of genocide. I don't agree with the genocide deniers, to me they are ignoring the elephant in the room, which is to say the ample evidence that

1435 Jones, Genocide, p 48.
1436 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I, p 67.
1439 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, pp 61–84.
there was a dramatic mass-murder of Tutsi as such in Rwanda which constitutes one of the most deadly genocides of history. On the other hand, those who support the orthodox interpretation deny the existence of any sort of room and call the elephant a camel.

Among those who are 'more or less' deniers of genocide are Herman and Peterson, whose work I have already referred to. The 18 pages which they devote to events in Rwanda and what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo have provoked considerable criticism. A significant exchange was initiated when Gerald Caplan published a highly critical review.1441 The review is replete with criticisms which are unerringly far short or far wide of the mark. It seems almost certain that to the author and, no doubt, to a substantial proportion of the readers, the very act of denying one of the most horrific mass-slaughters of human history puts Herman and Peterson firmly into the camp of the irrational, if not insane, deniers of the Shoah/Holocaust. The problem I have is that Herman and Peterson never actually come out and say that there was never a genocidal mass-murder of Tutsi. Instead they imply as much with statements to the effect that the orthodox 'propaganda line on Rwanda … turned victim and perpetrator upside down.'1442 Perhaps I read too much into this lack of a positive stance because the authors themselves do not counter allegations of genocide denial in responding to Caplan and to a short piece by Adam Jones.1443 On the other hand, they quote with approval a study which found that 300,000 Tutsi were killed, around 50% of the population.1444 How that could have happened in a matter of 100 days and not constitute genocide is rather hard to fathom.

It is also the Rwanda/DRC section of The Politics of Genocide which I find most problematic. The authors have no problem in levelling very accurate criticisms of the orthodox narrative. On the other hand they often overstep the mark. For example, all of the complexities of Ugandan and Anglo-US support for Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front, which are detailed below, are reduced to the statement that the RPF was 'a wing of the Ugandan army.'1445 Perhaps it is unfortunate that one cannot make such a statement baldly when it probably gives a perfectly accurate understanding of the underlying situation, but it is nevertheless a prima facie falsehood. This leaves the authors open to critiques like that of Caplan who uses this to mock the very idea that the RPF was effectively a proxy force for the US.1446 Interestingly, Herman and Peterson are able to refute this by citing Caplan's own earlier work,1447 but that still does not make the RPF a literal and overt 'wing' of the Ugandan army. In fact, authors undermining their own arguments is a very minor matter. More important is the fact that it is symptomatic of a narrative of events which is the mirror-image of that which it opposes. The authors over-simplify in this matter and others because they, as much as their opponents, seem driven to produce a vision of simplistic moral significance.

The whole polarised debate over Rwanda reveals something very rotten pervading the discourse of genocide and genocide denial. I have already suggested that there is an intellectual reason for avoiding the attachment of a particular moral weight to the concept of genocide in that it can only confuse analysis. There is also, however, a psychological reason. The moral weight given to genocide also seems to produce what can only be described as an atavistic or childish manichaean

1442 Herman and Peterson, The Politics Of Genocide, p 51.
1444 Herman and Peterson, “Adam Jones on Rwanda and Genocide: A Reply ”.
1445 Herman and Peterson, The Politics Of Genocide, p 53.
1446 Caplan, “The politics of denialism”
1447 Herman and Peterson, “Genocide denial and facilitation”.
narrative of victim and perpetrator populations as essences of good and evil. The dangers of this can be seen in the strikingly similar, but diametrically opposed, narratives produced by Adam Jones with regard to RPF killings of Hutu, and that of Herman and Peterson with regard to Interahamwe and/or Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) killings of Tutsis.

When it comes to the RPF led slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Hutu, Jones is very keen on emphasising the agency of the 'Hutu génocidaires' who had, in his interesting turn of phrase, 'staged a mass evacuation'. Translated, this means that millions fled in the face of the RPF takeover of Rwanda. When the RPF led an invasion of Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of Congo) it was because the génocidaires had 'reconstituted themselves as a terrorist force, brutally controlling the refugee population and launching attacks against Tutsis in both Congo and Rwanda.' They invaded again because the man they themselves had put into power in Kinshasa 'fell under the sway of Hutu representatives in Kinshasa, supporting renewed cross-border killing operations in Rwanda.' Jones writes this even though he acknowledges that both Rwanda and Uganda 'have experienced miraculous leaps in their export of key commodities – diamonds, gold, timber, and coltan (an ore used in computer chips and cell phones) – at levels that exceed total domestic production, providing vivid evidence of the pillaging.' Jones uses génocidaires to mean anyone who was in a position of power in Rwanda before the RPF takeover. More than that he means the 'double-plus bad' people. He doesn't concern himself with issues like which among them actually were guilty of committing genocide. The impression he gives is that it is the evil génocidaires who are ultimately responsible for the RPF having entered Zaire/DRC and having massacred hundreds of thousands while Rwandan sponsored Congolese rebels, according to Jones himself (citing a 1999 UN report) were "running torture centers that amounted to 'extermination' sites." Much of his contextualisation of Rwandan aggression and genocide is exactly that given by the Rwandan government. Thus it is deeply ironic when Jones writes of Herman and Peterson: "Herman and Peterson none-too-subtly adopt Hutu Power's justification for slaughtering Tutsi civilians: that they constituted a 'fifth column,' indistinguishable from the invading RPF. This casual parroting of the most virulent Hutu-extremist propaganda effectively blames Rwanda's Tutsis for their own extermination. It is a disgraceful ploy, and by itself it casts Herman and Peterson's 'analysis into utter disrepute.'"

Herman and Peterson are more blatantly partisan than Jones. Despite apparently believing that hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were slaughtered, as mentioned above, they create a simple narrative of good Hutus and bad Tutsis. It is worth quoting Jones's critique at length:

"Would it not have been incredible for Kagame's Tutsi forces to conquer Rwanda in 100 days, and yet the number of minority Tutsi deaths be greater than the number of majority Hutu deaths by a ratio of something like three-to-one? Surely then we would have to count Rwanda 1994 as the only country in history where the victims of genocide triumphed over those who committed genocide against them, and wiped the territory clean of its 'génocidaires' at the same time."

Of course, no mainstream authority has ever claimed that the Tutsi "victims of genocide" in Rwanda in 1994 were drawn from "Kagame's Tutsi forces." The latter were invading from Uganda, as Herman and Peterson themselves emphasize. They were outsiders with no connection to, and apparently no particular sympathy for, the Tutsi civilian population of Rwanda. It was the Rwandan Tutsi population which, by all serious accounts, bore the overwhelming brunt of the Hutu Power genocide.

So Herman and Peterson's mocking reference to the "minority Tutsi" population supposedly bearing the brunt of the massacres, then assuming "complete control" of Rwanda, is pure sleight-of-hand. To repeat the indisputable: it was the foreign-based RPF that took "complete control" in July 1994 and "wiped the territory clean of its 'génocidaires'".

It seems likely that the understandable anger that Herman and Peterson feel at the misuse of accusations of atrocities, fueling far greater atrocities, causes an over-identification with those

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1448 Jones, Genocide, pp 250-2.
1450 Ibid.
demonised in Western propaganda. However, this should not be a reason for excusing the crimes committed by members of a denigrated group against members of another group, even if that group has members who are even greater perpetrators of atrocities. Caplan evinces great indignation that Herman and Peterson should call him a "genocide facilitator" when he has "spent the past decade immersed in genocide prevention,"\textsuperscript{1451} but the description aptly fits Caplan and many others who may genuinely believe that they are working to prevent genocide. Even Jones, who tries very hard to avoid siding with the predominant discourse of apologism and denial of Western crimes, is pulled by emotionality and the very weight of the orthodoxy into the position of minimising the most deadly genocides perpetrated by recidivists who are still very powerful and emphasising the crimes of official enemies of the West who no longer pose a threat to anyone. As Herman and Peterson write regarding \textit{Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction}: 

Jones's chapter on Bosnia and Kosovo also flies in the face of his claim that he "adopt[s] a comparative approach that does not elevate particular genocides over others, except to the extent that scale and intensity warrant special attention." Measured by "scale and intensity," the civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were not remotely in the same league as the U.S. assault on Vietnam, the killings in Indonesia (in the mid-1960s, during and after the overthrow of Sukarno), the two phases of the Iraq genocide (the sanctions era and then war of aggression-occupation), or the still ongoing invasion-occupation of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, his treatment of numbers in Bosnia is deceptive. Jones asserts that "a quarter of a million people died in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in the years up to the Dayton accords in late 1995. But by the time Jones wrote this, two important establishment studies had shown that the total number of war-related deaths on all sides, soldiers as well as civilians, totalled approximately 100,000. Of these deaths, some 40,233 are now reported as non-soldiers (39,199 civilians, and 1,035 policemen). So Jones suppresses information that would show the earlier standard claim of 250,000 deaths to have been an inflation of wartime propaganda.\textsuperscript{1452}

Simply glancing at the contents page of \textit{Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction} confirms that Jones comes nowhere close to basing his emphasis on 'scale and intensity'. A chapter is dedicated to Bosnia and Kosovo, while none of the larger genocides mentioned above get similar treatment.

With regard to Rwanda, there is no question, however, that killings occurred on a scale warranting considerable attention, the problem is rather, as I have written the creation of a highly politicised mythological narrative of the genocidal killing of Tutsi which is problematic. Here, once again, Jones is merely one of the better of an extremely bad lot. The 'Rwandan holocaust' is rather like the mythic and equally political creation based on the Shoah which Norman Finkelstein calls 'The Holocaust': 'Like most ideologies, it bears a connection, if tenuous, with reality.'\textsuperscript{1453} Finkelstein's 'The Holocaust' has its origins in imperial geopolitics: 'Impressed by Israel's overwhelming display of force, the United States moved to incorporate it as a strategic asset. (Already before the June war the United States had cautiously tilted toward Israel as the Egyptian and Syrian regimes charted an increasingly independent course in the mid-1960s.) Military and economic assistance began to pour


\textsuperscript{1452} Herman and Peterson, "Adam Jones on Rwanda and Genocide: A Reply". The citations given by the authors read as follows:

Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, "War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results," \textit{European Journal of Population}, Vol. 21, June, 2005, pp. 187-215. In section 3.3, "Overall Numbers" (pp. 205-207), they estimated 102,622 total war-related deaths on all sides, of which 55,261 (54%) were civilians at the time of death, and 47,360 (46%) were military or combatants (p. 207).

For the later of the two studies, see Patrick Ball \textit{et al.}, \textit{Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the Database}, Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo, June, 2007, Table 23a, "Victims Reported in BBD by Status in War," p. 30. At the time this study was released, Ball \textit{et al.} estimated 96,895 total war-related deaths, of which 56,662 were soldiers at the time of death (58.5%), and 40,233 were civilians or policemen (41.6%). Here we'd like to emphasize that earlier drafts of this work were in circulation since 2005 (see, e.g., "Research Halves Bosnia War Death Toll to 100,000," Reuters, November 23, 2005); in citing the June 2007 draft, we do not imply that Adam Jones could have cited it in his 2006 textbook.

in as Israel turned into a proxy for US power in the Middle East. In Rwanda the geopolitical imperatives existed before the genocide actually took place, and the resulting myth, which would have it that what happened in Rwanda was very similar to the Shoah, has a far more tenuous connection with reality than the mythical 'Holocaust'.

The deceptions and ludicrous excesses of the mythical Rwanda genocide seem to actually fuel denial, a fact which I am sure also applies to other instances of genocide denial. There is a surprisingly fine line between those who deny and those who seek to give lie to the myths. This is a very different phenomenon to Holocaust denial, and as with Herman and Peterson I usually can't tell whether or not a given author is really committed to the proposition that no genocide of Tutsi occurred. One such denier is former UN special rapporteur on genocide Keith Harmon Snow. In an article that won him the a Project Censored award for suppressed is news, he writes, ‘Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, that’s clear. There was large-scale butchery of Tutsis. And Hutus. Children and old women were killed. There was mass rape. There were many acts of genocide. But was it genocide or civil war? There are two things to consider here: First, should the events of 1994 be referred to as a genocide or as a civil war in which a genocide occurred? Second, were there mutual genocides of Hutu and Tutsi in 1994, in short a ‘double genocide’?

In the first instance, I have already stated that I believe any given set of events should only be characterised as a genocide if the majority of victims are victims of genocide. In this case, there are simply no trustworthy sources available to make that determination. For example, in ‘testing the double genocide thesis’ Philip Verwimp finds from household sampling that 79 of 138 deaths in 1994 (57.2%) were Tutsi. Given that Tutsi represented only 8.4% of the sample (which, interestingly enough, is exactly the percentage of Tutsi in the 1991 census), this certainly proves genocide. The problems with this are that the sampling is from central and southern Rwanda and that it avoids any killing before 1994. Verwimp admits on both counts that this avoids counting the victims of RPF massacres, but explains that ‘very few scholars will use the word genocide to describe the killings committed by the RPF before, during, and after 1994.' So far from actually ‘testing the double genocide thesis’ Verwimp actually makes an a priori exclusion of the possibility. In terms of the problem of whether the bulk of those killed in the period were Tutsi we are left with no answers except that, given that there is such an evident bias in sampling, one might tentatively infer that the bulk of victims were not Tutsi. According to Harmon Snow: ‘Professors Christian Davenport (U. Maryland) and Allan Stam (Dartmouth) published research in 2004 that showed that the killings began with a small, dedicated cadre of Hutu militiamen, but quickly cascaded in an ever-widening circle, with Hutu and Tutsi playing the roles of both attackers and victims. Their team of researchers also found that only 250,000 people were killed, not the 800,000 plus advanced by the RPF, and that for every Tutsi killed two Hutus were killed. The research unleashed a firestorm: the media jumped on them for denying genocide.' Should it then be considered a civil war? That too is problematic due to the fact that only a miniscule percentage of those killed were combatants.

As for the double genocide thesis, this is nearly as difficult. Certainly before April 1994 there are good reasons to believe that RPF massacres were indiscriminate in the matter of ethnicity. Largely this seems to be because they were primarily interested in what Samuel Huntington labelled ‘refugee generation.’ According to Harmon Snow ‘The RPF practiced a scorched earth policy: they

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1458 Verwimp, "Testing the Double-Genocide Thesis...."
did not want to have to administer a territory or deal with local populations. The RPF displaced people, shelled the IDP camps, and marched on. They killed some captives, buried them in mass graves or burned corpses, and used survivors as porters to transport ammunition, dig trenches or cook their meals. Sometimes this involved the massacre of Tutsis, as Joan Casòliva and Joan Carrero report: ‘In some regions there were attacks and killings directed against the Tutsi population. Principal amongst these were those against the Bagogwe, a Tutsi sub-group from the north, in January 1991, and against the Tutsis of Bugesera in March of 1992.’ Other reports, particularly from the ‘100 days’ period in which enormous numbers of Tutsis were being massacred, suggest that RPF massacres were directed against Hutu, which may well be true but might equally be a presumption. On the whole, however, the ‘double genocide thesis’ is somewhat of a red herring. Structurally, as I will show, it was more the case that having ‘provoked’ the Tutsi genocide, Rwanda’s RPF controlled Government of National Unity (GNU) exploited the initial genocide to launch a subsequent genocide of Hutu.

The initial RPA invasion of Rwanda was in effect an invasion by the Ugandan military with US backing. RPA forces were uniformed Ugandan military using Ugandan arms which were supplied throughout the civil war thanks to an increase of US and UK military aid after the invasion. At this time Tutsi refugees enjoyed a stable privileged position in Uganda while those who remained in Rwanda, or had subsequently returned, formed the ‘majority of economic operators’. The RPF attack intentionally pre-empted Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s moves towards allowing the peaceful return of all Tutsi refugees, because the RPF felt that this would be of detriment to their plan to take control of Rwanda. Uganda’s military dictator, Yoweri Museveni (whom Madeleine Albright spoke as ‘a beacon of hope for Africa’), feigned shock and surprise that a massive proportion of his military forces had mutinied, but continued supplying them with arms supplied to him mainly by the US. The orthodox explanation, ascribed to even by Kuperman, is that he was going to disarm the RPA but had his feelings hurt when Habyarimana publicly accused him of involvement. In fact Museveni was deeply complicit. He even gave a speech to his military officers which, in Philpot’s words, ‘reads like a blueprint for the invasion and war that some of his officers were soon to conduct in Rwanda…’

We had to reject the concept of ‘a small but efficient’ army…. This notion is nothing but suicidal. Insurgents do not have to do much, but they will have succeeded in their devices if they simply terrorize the population, stop them from producing wealth for the country, dismantle the network of civil administration and block communications. Once the state does not stop insurgents from doing this on a large scale, the country will rapidly lose income and find it impossible to support the army…. Insurgents will be in a position to create a situation of strategic stalemate or even to launch a strategic counteroffensive to seize state power.

1465 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, p 68.
1467 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, pp 70-1.
1469 Ibid.
This is a far cry from normal assymetrical guerilla warfare, instead it is a way for a small force (but not a noticeably inferior one) to effect an invasion and occupation of a country with a hostile population in a manner that would normally take a large superiority of forces. The FAR was a government force vulnerable to the degradation of the Rwandan state, while the RPA was superior in arms and had invulnerable external supply and a safe rear area in Uganda. Accordingly they depopulated Rwanda’s most productive agricultural region.

Two and a half years after the invasion, only 1800 people lived in an area of northern Rwanda that previously had a population of 800,000. As the “liberators” advanced, the Hutu peasants fled. By April 1993, Rwanda had more than one million internal refugees. That means one million farmers (one seventh of the total population) who are no longer producing on the most fertile lands in the country. It also means one million people to house and feed, and hundreds of thousands of children absent from school which caused great anxiety among parents.

The Rwandan Minister of Agriculture, Husbandry and Forests in 1992, James Gasana, described the situation in the war torn Byumba prefecture north of Kigali in a book published in 2002. “A prefecture that had been the country’s breadbasket now had the largest population in need of welfare and the highest mortality rate due to malnutrition.”

In Kigali and elsewhere large numbers of clandestine RPF cells operated, often using ‘human rights’ NGOs as cover. They carried out sabotage, bombings of public places, and an elitictical assassination campaign in order to terrorise the population and destabilise the government. At the same time the Rwandan government was also destabilised by what amounted to an attack by the US dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ‘donor institutions’ of the West, who demanded that, in the midst of civil war, Rwanda must dismantle its interventionist state apparatus. During this time the RPF avoided a peaceful settlement, despite increasingly large and clearly desperate concessions by Habyarimana and despite the fact that they knew that Tutsi massacres were an almost inevitable outcome of the growing chaos and fear.

According to testimony obtained by French prosecutor Jean-Louis Bruguiere, RPF leader Paul Kagame was consistent in telling RPA troops that he had no intention of honouring peace accords.

Then, in what one RPF defector described as ‘a macabre plan to drive the country into chaos’ the RPF assassinated Habyarimana. A UN report describes the assassination merely as ‘a plane crash’. Similarly Adam Jones notes only that the plane ‘was shot down’ without addressing the impolitic issue of who exactly shot it down. Kuperman merely notes that ‘Hutu extremists’ blamed the RPF. For Lemarchand, writing in 2002, ‘responsibility remains a mystery’. This is an act of wilful blindness. In 1997 an ICTR team recommended that RPF leaders be prosecuted (although the report was quashed and the lead investigator told to burn his notes, it survived and is now part of the ICTR record). In 2003 the ICTR itself announced plans to indict RPF leaders, but the US and UK had the chief prosecutor, who announced these plans, replaced. By 2005 a Spanish court which indicted 40 members of the RPF/GNU leadership for war crimes and crimes against humanity cited RPF responsibility for the assassination. Finally, in France, Bruguiere

1470 Ibid.
1474 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, pp 72-3.
1478 Jones, Genocide, p 238.
1479 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, p 78.
1480 Lemarchand, “Disconecting the threads”, p 512.
1481 Erlinder, “Bush and Other War Criminals Meet in Rwanda”.
1482 Ibid.
issued a detailed indictment of 9 RPF leaders in 2006.  

The RPF decision to pursue violent means was not surprising. By 1993 their strategy of terror and massacre had driven away the support they initially received from Rwandan opposition parties and they had been handed a resounding defeat in election in September of 1992, showing that they could not hope to gain control of Rwanda by democratic means.

What ensued definitely involved a massive genocidal slaughter of Tutsis, primarily by the Interahamwe and other militias. However, the fact that the Interahamwe leader was a Tutsi or at least a former Tutsi, and other members were Tutsi including a district president, should be a source of considerable interest for scholars, but it is seldom remarked. Levene does mention it in his introductory volume, but only to stress its lack of import.

Beyond the fact that there were large scale massacres, little is said that is credible. Consider that there were only 650,000-800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda. Most accounts would have it that the vast majority (around 80%) were killed. This is not inconceivable, but it seems highly unusual for a 100 day period of largely civilian orchestrated massacres – especially considering that through that time the Tutsi-led RPF controlled ever more of the country. Naturally, the number of Tutsi brings into question some of the high-end estimates of total mortality. For example, Adam Jones gives the following interesting snippet:

About 80 percent of victims died in a “hurricane of death . . . between the second week of April and the third week of May,” noted Gérard Prunier. “If we consider that probably around 800,000 people were slaughtered during that short period . . . the daily killing rate was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps.”

Further, “[o]n April 20, at the parish of Karama in Butare prefecture, “between thirty-five and forty-three thousand people died in less than six hours.” For someone like Jones who, no doubt, has read many accounts of mass killing and cites Christopher Browning, it should be obvious that ill-equipped militia led civilians could not round up such a number and physically kill so many in such a short space of time using small arms and machetes. Nor does anyone explain how this occurred without the same sort of compunction and reticence which people ordinarily feel on some level when it comes to taking human life – especially when in close proximity, especially for non-military, and especially when it is someone who has not killed before. Although some writers do delve into the factors that caused 175,000 to 210,000 to participate in murder, I can’t help but feel that such uncritical acceptance of hyperbole indicates in many a racially informed vision of orgiastic bloodletting. As for Jones’s source, it is an organisation called African Rights. According to Philpot they were involved in financing the RPF and he later quotes Professor Filip Reyntjens: “As for African Rights, the political and historical analyses made by that group have a flagrant pro-RPF bias that is incompatible with the mission and code of conduct of any serious

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1484 Kuperman, “Provoking genocide”, p 74.
1486 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State: Volume I, p 99.
1487 The 1991 census put the number at 596,400, although some believe that their numbers were under-reported, the proportion (8.4%) would not be that inconsistent with what would be expected after the exodus of Tutsi after 1959. Marijke Verpoorten estimates that there were between 717,300 and 837,100 Tutsi in Rwanda ("The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province, " Population (English ed.), 60(4), 2005.) Verpoorten, extrapolating from a south-western province, estimates 600,000 to 800,000 Tutsi killed. The methodology, however, is based on current population adjusted for population growth, death and various forms of migration. It involves a large number of variables and necessary assumptions and I believe that this is an issue that is far, far from settled.
1488 Jones, Genocide, p 232.
1489 Ibid, p 239.
1491 Strauss, “How many perpetrators were therein the Rwandan genocide?”, p 93.
association devoted to promoting human rights."\footnote{1493}

As surely as there were massacres of Tutsi by the \textit{Interahamwe} and others, there were also massacres by the RPF during the ‘100 days’, the extent of which are likewise impossible to determine at this stage. Even Roméo Dallaire did not deny this, and originally denied any coordinated genocide:

On September 14, 1994, on CBC’s French language magazine, \textit{Le Point}, General Roméo Dallaire answered the following question from a Rwandan who lived in Quebec City: “In your opinion, was there a genocide in Rwanda, that is the carrying out of a plan to eliminate ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda?”

“I would say there was a national genocide, a genocide based on a political basis, not only ethnic,” replied Roméo Dallaire. “Many Hutus and many Tutsis were killed… I think that the explosion we saw could not have been planned. I don’t think that anybody could ever have planned an explosion of that magnitude.”\footnote{1494}

Bear in mind that Dallaire was anything but neutral:

“Romeo Dallaire was very close to the RPF”, says Gilbert Ngijol, political assistant to Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. “He let the RPF get arms. He allowed UNAMIR troops to train RPF soldiers. United Nations troops provided the logistics for the RPF. They even fed them.”

The [UN] Secretary General’s Special Representative to Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh confirmed this when he broke 10 years of silence regarding Rwanda in an interview published in \textit{Africa International}. “In the field, he abandoned his work as military commander and got involved in politics; he violated the principle of UNAMIR’s neutrality and became the objective ally of one of the parties in the conflict.”\footnote{1495}

There are also suggestions that RPF massacres have wrongly been blamed on \textit{Interahamwe}:

The Belgian Marcel Gerin concluded ... that in 1994 he and his wife were left trapped by the Rwandan war. They were witnesses to the indiscriminate killings in the area they lived in and they were able to confirm, through the fact of having been held prisoners, how those who apparently seemed to be Interahamwe militia were no more than mercenaries in the pay of the Tutsi army. Although they state that in their residential zone the Interahamwes killed a thousand people in the church, the majoriy of the massacres were carried out with the arrival of those mercenaries who killed whoever they met without any ethnic discrimination, in a clear operation of whole territory cleansing. Whatever images of the situation emerged gave one to believe that the authors were the Hutu Interahamwe militia. Santos Ganuza, a Navarrese missionary, was the rector of the Kiziguro parish, also in the east of the country. He says:

“For many years I was the parish rector in the east of the country. In 1994 the Interahamwe arrived and killed some 1,000 Tutsis who had taken refuge in the church without my being able to do anything to prevent it. A few days later, the Tutsi military arrived and killed 10,000 Hutus. The Western world’s televisions broadcast pictures of these Hutus assassinated in my parish, identifying them as Tutsis”\footnote{1496}

After the RPF takeover the Tutsi genocide was exploited to create a state that “even Britain’s \textit{Economist} has called ‘the most repressive in Africa’.”\footnote{1497} This has been recognised by some in the genocide field including Kasaija Phillip Apuuli,\footnote{1498} and Lars Waldorf.\footnote{1499} The GNU claimed that it governed a ‘criminal population’.\footnote{1500} According to the GNU themselves, there were 109,499 imprisoned by 2000 awaiting genocide charges.\footnote{1501} They widely accused any political opponents of being \textit{génocidaires} and when that label ceased its usefulness, switched to accusing people of ‘divisionism’, ‘negationism’ and ‘genocide ideology’.\footnote{1502} The latter, of which the GNU accuses

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1494} Ibid, \url{http://www.taylor-report.com/Rwanda_1994/index.php?id=ch3}.
\item \textbf{1495} Ibid, \url{http://www.taylor-report.com/Rwanda_1994/index.php?id=ch5}.
\item \textbf{1496} Casoliva and Carrero, \textit{The African Great Lakes}, pp 9-10.
\item \textbf{1497} Erlinder, “Bush and Other War Criminals Meet in Rwanda”.
\item \textbf{1500} Scott Strauss, "How many perpetrators were therein the Rwandan genocide? An estimate," Journal of Genocide Research (2004), 6(1),March, p 94.
\item \textbf{1501} Ibid, p 90.
\end{itemize}
those such as the famed rescuer Paul Rusesabagina (hero of Hotel Rwanda) for having denounced RPF atrocities and two of their own government’s former Prime Ministers, now attracts a 10 to 50 year prison sentence in Rwanda.  

Though many thousands suffer terribly due to this form of genocide exploitation, this pales in comparison with the hundreds of thousands who died when the RPF used the Tutsi genocide to launch their own genocide. It is widely acknowledged that tens of thousands of Hutu were massacred within Rwanda, but a far greater death toll occurred in Zaire. One might think that this would be of considerable interest to genocide scholars, but apparently it is not. When the RPF took over Rwanda 2 million people fled, 1.2 million of them into Zaire. Meanwhile, the US was advancing certain plans:

At the very moment the tragic refugee operation was underway, French journalist Jean Daniel was meeting the assistant Secretary of State, John Kornblum, in his Washington office. His account of that meeting is hair-raising.

“France? We want to get along with France. Chirac? A man of good will. We like him. But: (1) no question of keeping Boutros-Ghali; (2) no question of keeping Mobutu in power… Let’s get together again in six months time. We’ll see if I am mistaken. Watch out for Africa: France has it all wrong. The strong man is in Uganda, not in Kinshasa.”

In his own words, Jean Daniel left that meeting “dumbfounded by the cynical detailing of events to come, and the arrogance of the vocabulary used”.

Kornblum was prophetic. To revisit Jones’s orthodox rendition:

Hutu génocidaires staged a mass evacuation of populations under their control, across the Congolese border to the city of Goma. Ironically, it was this humanitarian crisis that galvanized the world, not the genocide against Tutsis. Ironically, too, that the outside aid that flooded in was instrumental in permitting the génocidaires to reconstitute themselves as a terrorist force, brutally controlling the refugee population and launching attacks against Tutsis in both Congo and Rwanda.

In the face of this threat, in 1997 Rwanda assisted the overthrow of the Mobutu regime by Laurent Désiré Kabila…

Jones doesn’t bother with details such as how or why a campaign against some guerillas turned into the invasion of the massive country then known as Zaire.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees were killed or starved to death with 50% of the victims being under 15 years of age. One UN report on the genocide mysteriously dropped the use of the word in its final draft. ‘In the UN it is explained that ‘following deep discussions’ in New York the report’s authors ‘themselves’ decided to retract the term ’genocide’. A more recent (2010) report, now released presumably because the leak mentioned above made suppression likely to be counterproductive, summarises as follows:

These attacks resulted in a very large number of victims, probably tens of thousands of members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities combined. In the vast majority of cases reported, it was not a question of people killed unintentionally in the course of combat, but people targeted primarily by AFDL[Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo]/[RPA]/FAB[Forces armées burundaises] forces and executed in their hundreds, often with edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces. Numerous serious attacks on the physical or psychological integrity of members of the group were also committed, with a very high number of Hutus shot, raped, burnt or beaten. Very large numbers of victims were forced to flee and travel long distances to escape

Reference:

1504 Jones, Genocide, p 244.
1505 Strauss, “How many perpetrators were therein the Rwandan genocide?” p 97.
1507 Jones, Genocide, p 250.
their pursuers, who were trying to kill them. The hunt lasted for months, resulting in the deaths of an unknown number of people subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading living conditions, without access to food or medication. On several occasions, the humanitarian aid intended for them was deliberately blocked, in particular in Orientale Province, depriving them of assistance essential to their survival.¹⁵¹⁰

The report mentions “the 'awareness-raising speeches' made by the AFDL/[RPA] in certain places, according to which any Hutu still present in Zaire must necessarily be a perpetrator of genocide, since the “real” refugees had already returned to Rwanda. These “awareness-raising speeches” made in North Kivu also incited the population to look for, kill or help to kill Rwandan Hutu refugees, whom they called “pigs”. This type of language would have been in widespread use during the operations in this region.”¹⁵¹¹ Meanwhile, Western interests were amply served. As Philpot puts it:

It has been said that the invasion of Rwanda by Ugandan troops in 1990 was aimed at Kinshasa not Kigali. The war that has followed in the Congo and the scramble by Western corporations for control of the vast Congolese natural resources makes that interpretation very plausible. ...

Since the war began in the Congo in 1996, the rush of American, Belgian, Canadian, British and French corporations for diamonds and gold and other natural resources in the region has been widely documented and denounced.¹⁵¹²

¹⁵¹⁰ Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, June 2010 (draft), para 512, p 256.
¹⁵¹¹ Ibid, para 515, p 258.
APPENDIX I – Iraqi Nationalism.

The Iraqi people can claim association with a 'history' longer than that of any other geographic locale on the planet. *Al-Iraq* means the shore and fertile area alongside a river, and has been used in reference to 'Mesopotamia' (the land between the rivers; i.e. the Tigris and Euphrates, also known as the 'Fertile Crescent'), since at least the eighth century.\(^{1513}\) The area saw, almost simultaneously with Egypt and the Indus valley, the rise of the first civilisations around 4000 BCE.\(^{1514}\) Arguably the most significant early civilisation, Sumer, arose in *al-Iraq* no later than 3500 BCE and endured for over a millennium until 2340.\(^{1515}\) Sumer produced the first known writing,\(^{1516}\) and the first mathematical computations appeared there between 3500 and 3000.\(^{1517}\) Perhaps less to be celebrated is the Sumerian invention of interest bearing loans.\(^{1518}\) After Sumer, *al-Iraq* was home to the Assyrian and Babylonian civilisations which are significant in their own rights.

The 'Fertile Crescent' was the first place outside of Arabia settled by Arabs.\(^{1519}\) After the advent of Islam Iraq developed a lasting significance for Muslims. Two cities became significant as holy cities for Shi’a, Najaf, where Ali, the fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, is believed to be buried, and Karbala, where Ali’s son, Hussein was killed along with a handful of followers.\(^{1520}\) Indeed the very origins of Shi’a can be traced to Ali’s Kufa-centred support against the Damascus based Ummayads – support which was transferred to Hussein.\(^{1521}\) Though Kufa remained the centre of Shi’a opposition, the demise of the Ummayads in 750 saw the successor dynasty, the Abbassids, shift the capital of an empire, now stretching from Spain to India, to *al-Iraq*. First to Kufa, then Anbar, then to Baghdad, where it remained.\(^{1522}\) Baghdad as a seat of power, of learning and of culture, assumed a significant place in Arab consciousness (and in the Western imagination).

By the nineteenth century, what would become Iraq was three provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.\(^{1523}\) The Sheik of Kuwait, part of Basra province, exercised a certain autonomy and aspired to more. This suited the British, who wanted to secure the route to India through the Suez. They cultivated a relationship leading to the signing in 1899 of an agreement: 

Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not, to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.\(^{1524}\)

In 1901 the British announced to the Ottomans that Kuwait was now a British protectorate, and in 1913 the Turks recognised Kuwaiti autonomy.\(^{1525}\) The British were perfectly aware that there was

oil in the region and, although the reader may recall that the decision to switch to oil in naval vessels was not finalised until 1905, Admiral Lord Fisher, who was made First Sea Lord in 1904, had been arguing for the change since 1882.

The British created Iraq, but they were not the only ones with the idea. Ottoman military officers in the al-Ahd Arab nationalist movement formed al-Ahd al-Iraqi with the intent of creating an Iraqi state based on the three provinces. Many, notably including Nuri al-Said, thought that working with the British was the best way of achieving this, but those who lived in areas occupied by the British tended to feel otherwise. Although the Ottomans had treated the three provinces as separate, Arab nationalists formed factions and secret societies based on the three provinces. Charles Tripp ascribes this to the political centrality of Baghdad but adds the following: 'Equally,... personal links were being forged between members of these groupings – links which were often reinforced by family connections through trade or through membership of the Ottoman administration or officer corps.' In other words the political gravity of Baghdad formed a degree of de facto administrative unity across the three provinces which was leading to the formation of a genos which was beginning to incline aspirations to statehood, if not nationhood, towards an Iraq based on the three provinces. It is also worth noting that these three provinces provided most of the officers in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Thus began a long tradition of resistance the Ottoman's, the British, and even the Ba'ath which drew together Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shi’a.

In creating Iraq, the British did two things of interest. The first is that they created an independent state out of Kuwait despite the fact that Kuwait was part of Basra province. They did so 'with the specific intention of denying Iraq access to the sea, and thus making it more dependent on Britain', as Christopher Hitchens put it. The second is that the British seized Mosul on 1 November 1918. It was a grotesquely treacherous act because they had signed an armistice with the Turks on the very day before. Additionally, it was a betrayal of the war-weakened French, to whom Mosul was awarded in the Sykes-Picot agreement (which was itself a betrayal of the Arabs), but as we have seen, while Britain was devoting considerable efforts to capturing oil fields, France was forced to fight in Europe and had no troops in the Middle East to claim the only part of its designated spoils which had oil resources. For good measure, the British decided that they would hang on to Palestine too.

The Kurds were an immediate problem for the British, and it must be admitted that taken as a whole they have never at any instant been unproblematically Iraqi in nationality (bearing in mind that one may feel part of more than one 'nation' be it Iraqi and Kurd, or Iraqi and Arab). In Iraq, however, the different ethnic and sectarian groups have a long shared history of being distinct but together. One thing I found quite striking was an account of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258. While it would seem to me that the only required explanation for the fall was the arrival of 200,000 Mongols, historians blame factional struggles between Sunni and Shi’i notables. Some suspect the Shi’i Wazir of betrayal, others finger the Kurdish tribes. The implied relations of 750 years ago seem to be remarkably similar to those of today. Note too, that the powerful Wazir of a massive Sunni empire is a Shi’i. Muslims often complain that Westerners project too much of the nature of the Catholic/Protestant schism onto a much less encompassing split. In fact, though a single state religion is the norm in Islamic states, rulers have almost never decided on questions of faith, let

1526 Lando, Web of Deceit, p 9.
1527 Engdahl, A Century of War, pp 29-30.
1528 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p 36.
1530 Ibid, p 33.
1532 Engdahl, A Century of War, p 53.
alone imposed them.\textsuperscript{1534} Compare this with Britain, where it was not until the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 that Catholics could hold political office.\textsuperscript{1535}

I am not suggesting here that there is never animosity and violence between Sunni and Shi’a. In fact, the irony is that while Western ‘Orientalist’ discourse posits an eternal insoluble and fundamental animosity and Muslims like to think of sectarian strife as a fact of past history since overcome,\textsuperscript{1536} it is probably more relevant today than in the past thanks to the rise of Islamism\textsuperscript{1537} and Western attempts to exploit sectarian differences as a divide and rule tactic. What I would suggest is that violence and division arises from the politicisation of sectarian matters, not from theological disputes. This is evidenced not only by the history of Shi’ism, where there was an abandonment of the very political aspiration which brought about a schism and the adoption of a political quietism and antipathy towards political imposition of doctrine (both considered common traits in historical Islam),\textsuperscript{1538} but also by the history of the Catholic/Protestant schism, such as the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia which ended it (wherein sectarianism was effectively decoupled from international politics).\textsuperscript{1539}

History seems to suggest that an Iraqi national identity was forged in response to unwanted exogenous impositions and repression. Kurdish resistance had a distinct, if not uniform, element of Kurdish nationalism, with demands for a Kurdish state based on linguistic criteria. In 1919, when the Kurds revolted against British rule, however, as Charles Tripp describes, social and linguistic differences within the Kurds meant that ‘this idea was not always well understood or well received.’\textsuperscript{1540} Nevertheless a significant core of persistent Kurdish nationalist political formations cohered. British repression in 1923 drove the Kurdish nationalists into a mountain-based guerilla campaign.\textsuperscript{1541} Needing outside support, Kurdish nationalists naturally became easy proxies for those wishing to attack Iraq. Most notoriously, in 1972 the US and Israel joined Iran in giving material support to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) for a resumption of military struggle. Iran was siding with the KDP against the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).\textsuperscript{1542} According a US congressional report, before the outbreak of fighting the Kurds were likely to have been able to reach an accommodation with Baghdad which would have granted ‘a measure of autonomy’. Instead, according to the report, Nixon, Kissinger and Shah Mohhammed Reza Pahlavi saw the Kurds as ‘a card to play’ to undermine Iraq and did not want them to succeed.\textsuperscript{1543} The US and Israel gave Kurdish fighters captured Soviet weapons (their support not being secret so much as deniable) while Iran gave not only food and ammunition, but artillery support.\textsuperscript{1544} In 1975, however, Iran signed a treaty of friendship with Iraq, and the Kurds were quite simply hung out to dry in the most ruthless manner. Iraq launched a major assault as soon as matters were settled with Iran, and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Brown, Religion and State, p 80.
\item ‘Political Islam’ owes its much of its currency to Western intervention. As will be discussed, this is not simply, nor even mainly, an unresolved guidance to Western foreign policy, but derives from over a century of systematic repression of Islamic modernism and equally systematic, if piecemeal, support from the West for the very Islamist movements which Western leaders rhetorically claim to be the most implacable, irreconcilable foe of liberal values.
\item Tripp, A History of Iraq, p 34.
\item Ibid, p 54.
\item Ali, Bush in Babylon, pp 119-20.
\item Lando, Web of Deceit, p 86.
\item Ibid, pp 84-5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
desperate Kurds begged again and again for help from the US which ignored their pleas. Kissinger also refused even humanitarian aid, and when questioned on his actions replied: 'One should not confuse undercover action with social work.' \(^{1545}\)

There are matters which confuse straightforward notions of Kurdish nationalism as antithetical to Iraqi nationalism. One arises from the divisions among Kurdish nationalists. The most prominent Kurdish nationalist formations are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Historically these groups have moved from alliance to a state of civil war and back several times. At any time they may court, and sometimes receive, support from Iran, Turkey or Iraq, all bitter enemies at other times. Thus, for example, the PUK aligned itself with Baghdad when Iran (co-operating with the KDP) advanced into Kurdistan in 1983. \(^{1546}\) The establishment of de facto autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 led to renewed conflict. \(^{1547}\) Both parties maintained contacts with Baghdad and when Iran entered PUK territory, the KDP called on Baghdad who sent 30,000 troops, helping the KDP seize Arbil. \(^{1548}\) In fact, the KDP henceforward became the primary smugglers of oil for the Ba’ath regime without whom they could not survive. \(^{1549}\) (Something to ponder, to which I will return, is why the US, who could have stopped the smuggling, did not do so. As Robert Baer writes: 'What I couldn't understand was why the White House didn't intervene. ... For Iraqi's, of course, the arrangement made perfect sense. By turning a blind eye to the smuggled oil, the US managed to turn the Kurdish opposition against itself even as it helped Saddam pay for his praetorian guard...') \(^{1550}\)

The most important factor, however, which might cast doubt on the depth of Kurdish nationalism is the popular sentiment. Leaders of Kurdish factions have an obvious vested interest in promoting Kurdish nationalism, but many Kurds, particularly those living in cities, live intermingled with Arabs, Turkmen and others. This can be a source of strife, but resistance to authority, oppression or occupation can lead to a rejection of division as an act of resistance in itself. For example, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) drew a great deal of support from Kurds and Kurdish majority areas became its stronghold. \(^{1551}\) It is easy to see why, for some Kurds, it made little sense to follow a Kurdish nationalist leadership which was largely made up of landowners in an area of massive inequality in wealth, power and ownership. \(^{1552}\) Even in 1991 – after the genocidal al-Anfal campaign, the use of poison gas against the Kurds, and other politicial/genocidal massacres \(^{1553}\) – the Kurdish population seems to have had more concern for social justice than for exchanging one master for another. In July 1991 a document was published by a peshmerga defector 'who left the nationalists before the real heavy inter-fratricidal killings because it was becoming like a partisan army — killing soldiers, etc. — and completely outside the real movement.' \(^{1554}\) It begins:

The following is an account of the uprising in Kurdistan in 1991 together with an historical critique of the Kurdish nationalist parties. It buries the lies of the western media which presented this proletarian uprising as the work of nationalist parties in the north or Shi’ite religious fanatics in the south.

The great popular uprising of the exploited of Iraq in March this year threatened the aims and interests of both contending sides in the Gulf war. From Kurdistan to southern Iraq the poor rose up against the Baathist/Fascist

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1546 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p 234.
1547 Ibid, pp 254-5.
1548 Ibid, p 256.
1550 Ibid, p 269.
1551 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp 112-4.
1552 Ibid, p 112.
1553 See section 4.3.
1554 Various Authors, The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan’s Nationalist Shop Front and Its Negotiations with the Baathist/Fascist Regime. Earth: The Anarchist Library, 1991, p 16. The work referred to is the eponymous article of a collection of writings and documents produced in Kurdistan at the time of the uprising or soon after in exile.
regime and against the consequences of the war created by both this regime and the coalition allies. The allied coalition of western capital — particularly Bush, who was worried about extending the war into another Vietnam scenario — stopped the war in order to allow Saddam to crush this uprising.\textsuperscript{1553}

It would be impossible to do justice to the complexities of fluid inter-factional alliance and enmity revealed in this short article (which can be confirmed up to a point by Hanna Batatu's well-documented \textit{The Old social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq}).\textsuperscript{1556} What is constant is that the poor of Iraq in general and Kurdistan in particular emerge as a 'pawn in the chess game of improving relations with the west and of rival political factions (nationalist and so-called communist)'.\textsuperscript{1557} This includes instances of Kurdish nationalist groups acting as the oppressor of their own people – imprisoning, torturing and killing left-wing dissidents, sometimes at the behest of Baghdad or Tehran.\textsuperscript{1558} The leadership of various powerful groups did whatever was politically expedient at any given moment (including the ICP who were in alliance with the Ba’ath from 1973-78 and enthusiastically backed the genocidal assault on the Kurds because of the KDP's receipt of aid from Iran and the CIA,\textsuperscript{1559} despite the fact that most ICP leaders were Kurds).\textsuperscript{1560} Against the Byzantine and unedifying confusion of the factional political arena of Kurdish nationalists, the Iraqi government and its factions, and foreign governments; should be weighed the far more clear and constant desire of the Kurdish people for security and economic justice. Despite all that has happened, I suspect that even now if there was a strong and promising left-wing political movement in Iraq which was open to the people of Kurdistan, many would abandon Kurdish nationalism.

In 1991 the Kurds were not alone in rejecting the characterisation of the anti-Ba’ath insurgency as sectarian and ethnically divided in nature. This misrepresentation was seen as a deliberate way of undercutting the resistance in Iraq, and during 1991 exiles campaigned, principally in Britain, to correct the distorted view. The most widely read document from the campaign was a pamphlet entitled \textit{Ten Days the Shook Iraq}. The claims it makes are fundamentally at odds with all Western historiography. With regard to Kurdistan:

People were openly hostile to the bourgeois policies of the Kurdish Nationalists. In Sulaimania the Nationalist peshmergas were excluded from the city and the exiled leader of the [PUK], Jalal Talabani, was prevented from returning to his home town. When the [KDP] leader, Massoud Barzani, went to Chamcharal, near to Sulaimania, he was attacked and two of his bodyguards were killed. When the Nationalists broadcast the slogan: 'Now's the time to kill the Ba’athists!' the people of Sulaimania replied with the slogan: 'Now's the time for the Nationalists to loot Porches!'\textsuperscript{1561}

\textit{...}

The original aim of the uprising was expressed in the slogan: 'We will celebrate our New Year with the Arabs in Baghdad!' The defeat of this rebellion owed as much to the Kurdish Nationalists as to the Western powers and the Iraqi state.\textsuperscript{1562}

With regard to Basra:

Basra is one of the most secular areas in the Middle East. Almost no one goes to the mosques in Basra. The radical traditions in this area are not those of Islamic fundamentalism but rather those of Arab Nationalism and Stalinism. The [ICP] is the only bourgeois party with any significant influence in this region. The cities of Basra, Nasriah and Hilah have long been known as the region of the Communist Party and have a long history of open rebellion against both religion and the state.\textsuperscript{1563}

\textsuperscript{1553} Ibid, p 4.
\textsuperscript{1556} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{1557} Various Authors, \textit{The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan’s Nationalist Shop Front...}, p 11.
\textsuperscript{1558} Ibid, pp 10-13 et passim.
\textsuperscript{1559} Ibid, p 11.
\textsuperscript{1560} Ibid, p 9.
\textsuperscript{1562} Ibid, p 6.
\textsuperscript{1563} Ibid, pp 3-4.
APPENDIX J – The Petrodollar Recycling System.

Most probably, for David Keen, like most people, the realm of the strategic is the realm of 'national security'. A war system in that sense is as strategically counterproductive as it is tactically counterproductive. To illustrate the flaws in this view, I will examine the issue of oil in Iraq. Keen mentions oil under the heading of 'economic functions'. He states that calling the Iraq War a ‘war for oil’ is an 'oversimplification'; but that the US did want access to oil; that the Bush administration was heavily interpenetrated with oil interests; that Richard Cheney made a very prominent call for diversification of supply in 2001; that oil was a very major consideration in invading; and that Iraq produces lots of oil but could produce much more.\textsuperscript{1564} The impression is that there was a desire to make an oil grab, but this could hardly be an economic function of a war system which is by its nature destabilising and a threat to supply. In the instance of Iraq the war system also prevents the development of the oil infrastructure needed for Iraq to approach its potential output. Keen, notwithstanding his mention of diversifying sources, treats the most significant strategic resource in the world as if it were nothing more than a valued commodity. He is not alone, this is the almost completely unexcepted mode of analysis. This type of analysis, if not Vulgar Marxist then at least unreflective materialist, is more appropriate for analysing a game of Monopoly than imperial oil geopolitics. Like so many others Keen is shackled to the cliché of the 'capitalist' – the top hat and monocle wearing shark that must autonomically accumulate or die.

In contrast, at least when it comes to Iraq's oil, is Greg Palast. For him the point of invading was 'keeping Iraq's oil in the ground', adding that: 'An international industry policy of suppressing Iraqi oil production has been in place since 1927.' He gives a neat little summary at the end of an article on the subject:

A History of Oil in Iraq

Suppressing It, Not Pumping It

- 1925-28 "Mr. 5%" [Calouste Gulbenkian] sells his monopoly on Iraq's oil to British Petroleum and Exxon, who sign a "Red-Line Agreement" vowing not to compete by drilling independently in Iraq.
- 1948 Red-Line Agreement ended, replaced by oil combines' "dog in the manger" strategy -- taking control of fields, then capping production--drilling shallow holes where "there was no danger of striking oil."
- 1961 OPEC, founded the year before, places quotas on Iraq's exports equal to Iran's, locking in suppression policy.
- 1991-2003 United Nations Oil embargo (zero legal exports) followed by Oil-for-Food Program limiting Iraqi sales to 2 million barrels a day.
- 2003-? "Insurgents" sabotage Iraq's pipelines and infrastructure.
- 2004 Options for Iraqi Oil, [t]he secret plan adopted by U.S. State Department[,] overturns Pentagon proposal to massively increase oil production. State Department plan, adopted by government of occupied Iraq, limits state oil company to OPEC quotas.\textsuperscript{1565}

The result of US actions was a massive spike in oil prices and record profits posted year after year for BP, Exxon-Mobil and others. In 2005 profits for the 5 major oil companies (four of whom were former partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company) had tripled from 2002 levels.\textsuperscript{1566} But there is much more to this than private profit. The high oil prices also constrained the development of rivals, especially energy hungry China, and further ensured that third world states remained mired in debt

\textsuperscript{1564} Ibid, pp 69-71.
\textsuperscript{1566} Ibid.
bondage. Even that, however, is ancillary to the main benefit to the US empire.

The dollar was established as the international reserve currency through the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, when the US had the bulk of world gold reserves and, as mentioned, half of its manufacturing capacity.  What followed was an era of global developmentalism referred to as a 'golden age' where global economic growth far outstripped population growth. Exports, outside of the Communist bloc, grew an average of 6% per annum from 1948 to 1960, rising to an average of 9% from 1960 to 1973. Western countries practised 'embedded liberalism', wherein trade barriers were reduced under a stable system of exchange, but many non-aligned states practised economic nationalism. While it is obligatory to denounce the shoddy inefficiencies of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and the nepotist corruption of Third World populist corporatism of the time, it should nevertheless be observed (but usually isn't) that these were part-and-parcel of a developmentalist approach which performed almost immeasurably better than the imposed neoliberalism which followed.

The problem with the US dollar being the reserve currency was that in order to provide liquidity to other states the US had to run a balance of payments deficit leading to indebtedness. The unsustainable but cunning system adopted to provide liquidity whilst simultaneously imposing hegemony has already been described in the previous chapter. After the initiation of this system with the advent of the Korean War, the US dollar was backed by gold at a rate of $35 per ounce, a price set in 1934. The Second Indochina War, however, depleted gold reserves: 'In 1958, US dollar liabilities accounted for only 80 per cent of the country’s gold reserves. But by 1967, US gold reserves could cover only 30 per cent of liabilities. [...] The deficit had spiralled out of control, dollar liabilities massively outweighed US gold reserves, and confidence in the system began to subside.' A similar problem had as much as spelled the impending end of the British empire after World War I, but this was not to be true of the US empire and its financial hegemony:

[...] Just as World Wars I and II had bankrupted Europe, so the Vietnam War threatened to bankrupt the United States.

... 

By March 1968, after a six-month run, America’s gold stock fell to the $10 billion floor beyond which the

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1569 ISI is a set of policies adopted by many developing countries in the 1950s, including most Latin American states. ISI failed to lift the Latin American countries out of dependency and it was felt that a more radical change was needed (Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson, *The Economic Factor in International Relations*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp 109-10). On the other hand, states which have successfully industrialised have all initially followed an ISI strategy which clearly plays an important role in creating capacities which can only be oriented towards exporting once they are able to compete. For example see Stephan Haggard, Byung-kook Kim, Chung-in Moon, “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 50:4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 850-873 (the authors do not draw this conclusion themselves, having a different focus, but in my judgement it is implicit).
1570 For example that in Egypt, the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR), Iraq and Syria. As Nazih Ayubi reveals these Arab states are less notable for their cronyism than for their statist authoritarianism with government domination of economic activity and nepotism found in appointments rather than in ownership and profits (Nazih N. Ayubi, “Withered socialism or whether socialism? the radical Arab states as populist-corporatist regimes,” *Third World Quarterly*, 13:1, 1992, pp 89-105).
Treasury had let it be known that it would suspend further gold sales. The London Gold Pool was disbanded and informal agreement (i.e., diplomatic arm-twisting) was reached among the world’s central banks to stop converting their dollar inflows into gold.

This broke the link between the dollar and the market price of gold. Two prices for gold emerged, a rising open-market price and the lower “official” price of $35 an ounce at which the world’s central banks continued to value their monetary reserves.

Three years later, in August 1971, President Nixon made the gold embargo official. The key-currency standard based on the dollar’s convertibility into gold was dead. The U.S. Treasury-bill standard – that is, the dollar-debt standard based on dollar inconvertibility – was inaugurated. Instead of being able to use their dollars to buy American gold, foreign governments found themselves able only to purchase U.S. Treasury obligations (and, to a much lesser extent, U.S. corporate stocks and bonds).

As foreign central banks received dollars from their exporters and commercial banks that preferred domestic currency, they had little choice but to lend these dollars to the U.S. Government. Running a dollar surplus in their balance of payments became synonymous with lending this surplus to the U.S. Treasury. The world’s richest nation was enabled to borrow automatically from foreign central banks simply by running a payments deficit. The larger the U.S. payments deficit grew, the more dollars ended up in foreign central banks, which then lent them back to the U.S. Government by investing them in Treasury obligations of varying degrees of liquidity and marketability.

One of the consequences of repudiating dollar convertibility was that US imperial strength became ever closer linked to US control of oil resources. As Engdahl explains it, after 1971 the US dollar fell precipitately, as might be expected, but while US financial hegemony seemed doomed “policy insiders prepared a bold new monetarist design, a ‘paradigm shift’, as some preferred to term it.”

In May 1973 a meeting of the 'Bilderberg Group' was presented a ‘scenario’ by oil economist Walter Levy wherein there would be a 400% rise in oil prices, and planned how to take advantage of such a circumstance by what Henry Kissinger was later to refer to as 'recycling the petro-dollar flows'.

Engdahl continues: 'In 1973, the powerful men grouped around Bilderberg decided to launch a colossal assault against industrial growth in the world, in order to tilt the balance of power back to the advantage of Anglo-American financial interests. In order to do this, they determined to use their most prized weapon – control of the world's oil flows. Bilderberg policy was to trigger a global oil embargo in order to force a dramatic increase in world oil prices. Since 1945, world oil trade had, by international custom, been priced in dollars. American oil companies dominated the postwar market. A sharp sudden increase in the world price of oil, therefore, meant an equally dramatic increase in world demand for U.S. dollars to pay for that necessary oil.'

Engdahl's phraseology, for example 'Bilderberg policy', is unfortunate in sometimes giving the impression that this was a plot hatched at the Bilderberg conference by conferees. This has caused a predictably enthusiastic response from conspiracy theorists interested in the Bilderberg Group. Engdahl's source is the official proceedings for the discussion led by Levy and it would be most accurate to characterise it as a means of giving attendees timely information about future events.

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1576 'Present at Sallsleepbaden [where the meeting took place] were Robert O. Anderson of Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.; Lord Greenhill, chairman of British Petroleum; Sir Eric Roll of S.G. Warburg, creator of the Eurobonds; George Ball of Lehman Brothers investment bank the man who some ten years earlier, as Assistant Secretary of State, told his banker friend Sieg mund Warburg to develop London's Eurodollar market; David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank; Zbigniew Brzezinski; the man soon to be President Carter's National Security Adviser; Italy's Gianni Agnelli, and Germany's Otto Wolff von Amerongen, among others. Henry Kissinger was a regular participant at the Bilderberg gatherings.' Ibid, p 149.
1577 Ibid.
which could be managed to the advantage of Western oligarchic interests. That is, after all, the nature of the plan, to take the otherwise unwelcome force of events driven by the oil producing countries and to turn that force, in Judo fashion, to one's own advantage while greatly strengthening its impact. Levy had already publicly written on this theme in a 1971 Foreign Affairs article. The article makes interesting reading, with one of the key points being that he treats oil first and foremost as a strategic concern. Also of interest is his glowing praise of oil companies acting as a global cartel. In his rendition of events these companies are guarantors of security, while poor oil producing countries are treated with barely veiled hostility due to their 'lingering heritage of emotional resentments against former colonial administrations and concessionary circumstances.'

According to Engdahl, "the 'Yom Kippur' war was not the result of simple miscalculation, a blunder, or an Arab decision to launch a military strike against the state of Israel. The entire constellation of events surrounding outbreak of the October war was secretly orchestrated from Washington and London...." This was achieved by feeding false intelligence to both sides, particularly by withholding evidence of a military buildup from Israel. The architect of the war and the resultant oil embargo, Henry Kissinger, was then able to adopt the pretence of being a peacemaker, through 'shuttle diplomacy,' while the blame for the suffering caused by his scheme fell firmly on the Arab world. Engdahl's rendition may seem unlikely. Indeed, a journal review of the book he cites as his source mentions no such revelation. However, a writer may, intentionally or otherwise, reveal more than they claim, and the work in question was heavily censored (causing some controversy at the time). It should also be noted that the US used almost identical tactics in ensuring that war ensued between Iran and Iraq and, similarly, to guarantee their own war against Iraq in 1990. Both of these cases are well documented and have been discussed already in this work, but mention should also be made of the equally, if not more, duplicitous deceptions that were deployed to facilitate the major US commitment of troops to Indochina (namely the 'Tonkin Gulf Incidents') and the deceptions used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Then there is the question of cui bono – who benefits? The US was entering a phase of seemingly perpetual debt rollover but it had, and still has, the unique 'privilege' of paying its debt in its own currency. To reduce its liabilities all it had to do was induce a global surge in commodity prices, which it could achieve by creating a glut of dollars. At the same time, however, US financial and economic hegemony was widely considered to be on its last legs, a situation which should have been worsened by increased commodity prices and the damage thus done to the US and global economies. But the US Treasury and the New York and London banks were geared up for the massive increases in oil prices, and when the Nixon administration sent a senior official to the Treasury to explore ways of inducing OPEC to lower prices, he was 'bluntly turned away' and recorded, in a memo, that "It was the banking leaders who swept aside this advice and pressed for a 'recycling' program to accommodate to higher oil prices. This was the fatal decision..."

By January 1974 oil prices had increased 400%, just as envisioned in the 'scenario' outlined only 8 months earlier to the Bilderberg Group. Suddenly everyone needed US dollar reserves which had a

1580 Ibid, p 150.
1582 Ibid, p 137.
very beneficial effect for New York banks and for London banks who traded the largest pool of ‘offshore’ US dollars.\textsuperscript{1587} Large oil companies made record profits (just as they would in later oil shocks including that created by the 2003 invasion of Iraq) and the previously risky North Sea venture became an instantly guaranteed moneymaker.\textsuperscript{1588} Real economies suffered throughout the developed world and the degradation of US infrastructure accelerated.\textsuperscript{1589} The impact on the ‘developing’ world (as it might accurately have been called up until this point) was far more devastating. In India, for example, the balance of payments switched at from surplus to deficit at a stroke. ‘As a whole, over 1974 developing countries incurred a total trade deficit of $35 billion according to the IMF, a colossal sum in that day, and, not surprisingly, a deficit precisely 4 times as large as in 1973, or just in proportion to the oil price increase.’\textsuperscript{1590} In the decade until 1974 developing counties saw economic growth of 5\% per annum, about 2.5\% above that of population growth.\textsuperscript{1591} For the poorest quintile (20\%) of countries, in \textit{per capita} income, the period of 1980 to 200 saw an average 0.5\% decline in economic activity, while the next two quintiles had lower economic growth than population growth.\textsuperscript{1592}

The poor states of the world plunged into ever more astronomical debt, growing from $60 billion in 1970 to $2 trillion in 1997,\textsuperscript{1593} to $2.5 trillion in 2004.\textsuperscript{1594} That is a 42 fold increase in 34 years. The trap is hideous. Private banks lend for high returns and when states default Western taxpayer money is given directly to these banks\textsuperscript{1595} which is characterised as ‘aid’ to the stricken state, as mentioned. This is just an interventionist form of rollover, which must otherwise be arranged with the private banks, often at increased interest rates,\textsuperscript{1596} because the debt is simply unpayable. In terms of ratio of external debt to exports, the figures are: 340\% for sub-Saharan Africa; 202\% for Latin America; and 121\% for Asia.\textsuperscript{1597} The situation mirrors that of many former belligerents after the First World War, debtors are forced to sell assets and commodities simply to service debt which, regardless, continues to grow. It is perpetually rolled over and ever increasing. The debtor countries are forced into antidevelopmental policies which further entrap them.\textsuperscript{1598}

While poor countries labour under this burden, the richest country in the world is also the largest debtor, but circumstances are very different for the US. As Hudson explains: ‘If the United States had followed the creditor-oriented rules to which European governments had adhered after World Wars I and II, it would have sacrificed its world position. Its gold would have flowed out and Americans would have been obliged to sell off their international investments to pay for military activities abroad. This was what U.S. officials had demanded of their allies in World Wars I and II, but the United States was unwilling to abide by such rules itself. Unlike earlier nations in a similar position, it continued to spend abroad, and at home as well, without regard for the balance-of-

\textsuperscript{1587} Ibid, p 138.  
\textsuperscript{1588} Ibid, p 151.  
\textsuperscript{1589} Ibid, p 154.  
\textsuperscript{1590} Ibid, p 155.  
\textsuperscript{1592} Ray Kiely, \textit{The Clash of Globalisations : Neo-liberalism, the Third Way, and Antiglobalisation}, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005, pp 147-8  
\textsuperscript{1593} Carl Sagan, \textit{Billions and Billions: Thoughts on Life and Death at the Brink of the Millennium}, New York, Ballantine, 1997, p 5.  
\textsuperscript{1596} Ibid, p 465.  
\textsuperscript{1598} See above.
payments consequences."\textsuperscript{1599} Creditor nations were forced to buy low-yielding Treasury obligations.\textsuperscript{1600} Oil producing countries, in particular, were forced to return their profits to the US and when Saudi Arabia and Iran considered buying US companies they were told that this would be considered and act of war.\textsuperscript{1601} OPEC was told that it could raise oil prices all it wanted, as long as it used the proceeds to buy U.S. Government bonds. That way, Americans could pay for oil in their own currency, not in gold or other “money of the world.” Oil exports to the United States, as well as German and Japanese autos and sales by other countries, were bought with paper dollars that could be created \textit{ad infinitum}.\textsuperscript{1602}

The US dollar predominance is reinforced by the proclivity of all US client states to spend large amounts of money on arms purchases from the US. As mentioned with regards to Iran, the figures for oil producing countries are very high, as Abbas Bakhtiar reveals: 'From 1990 to 2004, Saudi Arabia, with a population of 21.4 million has spent a whopping $268.6 billion dollars on arms. … One would have thought that with this kind of expenditure the Saudis would have felt safe by now. But apparently they don’t, or at least this is the view of U.S. and U.K., two major arms suppliers to these countries. But Saudi Arabia is not alone in this. Take the tiny country of United Arab Emirates. This country with a population of 2.6 million souls has spent $38.6 billion dollars for defence in 1990-2004 period.'\textsuperscript{1603} Commenting on the largest ever single arms sale, another writer asks: 'Saudi Arabia hasn’t fought a war since the 1930s, and already spends about 13% of its GDP on defense—so why would it agree to buy even more weapons as part of the richest arms sales ever by the U.S. government?'\textsuperscript{1604}

In summary, the US maintains an imperial system which, like that of the British before, utilises a predominance in certain key strategic areas in order to effect a more general predominance. Crucial strengths are circular and self-replicating – for example, indebtedness is used to abrogate state sovereignty to impose policies which will ensure the continuance of indebtedness – but also strengths are mutually reinforcing with military predominance ultimately underwriting all other forms of dominance. Financial hegemony combines that of the London and New York banks, and that of the US dollar. Dollar hegemony is heavily reliant on the ability to control petroleum resources, or more specifically, the ability to raise or lower oil outputs through the use of diplomatic, economic and military power. Added to this is the power accrued through the relationship with the major oil companies, who act as a cartel protecting imperial interests at the same time as the empire protects their interests and ensures their profits. This is, of course, not uncontested, but that is exactly why the US takes such an activist approach which is especially noticeable in its economic, covert and military actions which regularly override the sovereignty of states.

Military power is central to the extent that William Engdahl opines that 'since August 1971 the dollar is no longer backed by gold. Instead, it is backed by F-16s and Abrams battle tanks, operating in some 130 US bases around the world, defending liberty and the dollar.'\textsuperscript{1605} This is reflected in military 'doctrine'. The Pentagon's \textit{Joint Vision 2020} famously promulgated 'full

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\item \textsuperscript{1600} Ibid, p 28.
\item \textsuperscript{1601} Ibid, p 8.
\item \textsuperscript{1602} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1604} Noel Brinkerhoff, “Why Did the Saudi Royal Family Agree to Buy $60 Billion of U.S. Weapons It Doesn’t Need?”, \textit{AllGov}, 20 September 2010. Retrieved 16 February 2012 from \url{http://www.allgov.com/US_and_the_World/ViewNews/Why_Did_the_Saudi_Royal_Family_Agree_to_Buy_60_Billion_Dollars_of_U.S._Weapons_It_Doesnt_Need_100920}.
\item \textsuperscript{1605} William Engdahl, “Why Iran's oil bourse can't break the buck,” \textit{Asia Times}, 10 March 2006.
\end{itemize}
spectrum dominance. The US Army field manual on operations elaborates on 'full spectrum operations' which add 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW) to the military role of fighting wars. Although room is allowed for offence and defence, what dominates MOOTW are 'stability operations' which are defined as follows: 'Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Note that here coercion is part of stability. In case the point is missed, the chapter on stability operations produces a graph with two extremes, one 'peace' and one 'war' with all between being termed 'conflict'. The most noteworthy role for the army in stability operations is 'foreign internal security' which the field manual proudly exemplifies with US Army operations in El Salvador in 'creating a crack counterinsurgency force that fought the guerrillas to a standstill and established the groundwork for a negotiated settlement.'

1609 Ibid, 9-10 (p 203).
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