The Nature of the US Empire

So, where to begin? As feudal societies became non-feudal, privilege was transmuted and became vested in property ownership rather than a designated position within the hierarchy. The areas over which feudal individuals might have rights were converted into the property of the highest ranking. The lord became outright owner and was no longer subject to feudal obligations with regard to those beneath him. Serfs were freed of obligations, but deprived of exploitation rights. Thus the social order was transformed, but preserved. This was the advent of liberalism, and it is good to bear in mind that the Magna Carta, by any reckoning an important foundation for liberal rights, was a defence of aristocratic privilege and power against the sovereign.

At a time that began with the ongoing enclosure of commons and continued through the rise of industrial technology, a time when the ownership of the “means of production” (in which I include land and natural resources) was increasingly concentrated and there was growing inequality of wealth; liberalism made the ownership of property sacrosanct. At a time of growing franchise and waning monarchical power, liberalism proposed strict limits to government power and the principle summarised by Jefferson as ‘that government is best which governs least.’ Liberalism proposed equality before the law, but as Rudolf Rocker objects this ‘remains merely a pious fraud, since the laws are made by those who find themselves in possession of the social wealth.’ The ability to make laws became a way of creating new forms of privilege. The net result was that liberalism provided new modes of ensuring the dominance of a largely unchanged ruling class. In short order a two party system arose in which, despite putative opposition, both parties were representing the same interests to the same ends with only the means being in dispute, or, as Jonathan Swift famously satirised in Gulliver’s Travels, arguing about which way up an egg should be eaten.

Post-feudal forms of privilege became precedents for a modern imperial system, increasingly referred to as “corporatist”, which strongly resembles feudalism in key respects. A key privilege, providing in some respects a model for corporatist privilege, is that afforded to banks. Britain chose to legitimise the practice initiated by goldsmiths of lending more money than had been deposited with them. To put it simply, banks were able to create their own money. Lending and earning interest from money you don't actually have is not a privilege extended to the rest of us, but there is a further aspect of privilege in that creating money in this manner is inflationary and thus the fundamental basis of profits for banks is a form of taxation on the entire population. Banks make their profits by devaluing everyone's money, which is fine if you own appreciating and/or interest earning assets, but at times, particularly those of hardship, it becomes simply another privileged manner in which the rich take the wealth of the poor. The notable precedent set by banking privileges is that, of necessity, they must be regulated. Thus there is a “fractional reserve” system, preventing banks from lending infinite amounts of money and destroying its value altogether. Of interest here are the inevitable ramifications, in that while it is in the banks' own interest to be regulated, they more than any other industry until recent times, had an unavoidable interest in exerting influence to maximise the profitability of the regulatory environment. The impact that the

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1 Drawing, for example, on John Locke's discussion on property rights in The Second Treatise of Government. Locke conveniently, and tellingly, ignores the fact that land ownership in England was based on inheritance largely established by military power, and states that individual property rights derive from the expenditure of labour. According to Locke's reasoning, labour is an inalienable 'unquestionable property of the owner,' thus the property rights which derive from it are equally sacrosanct. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1690), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997, pp 16-30.


3 Ibid.


5 Ibid. It is perhaps unsurprising that, in fact, fractional reserve banking began in China over a thousand years ago, but this has no direct bearing on its evolution in the West.
finance industry has had on governments cannot be overstated, but the dynamic is complicated. The
distinction between state and private interest became blurred and fluid in a manner which has
extended to other strategic sectors, but as we shall see it is still necessary that state interest is not
subsumed to private interest, however closely they might be entwined.

The right to enclose commons was another privilege and, equally, enclosure was an extension of
privilege. Peers, and later gentry, were able to convert conditional landholdings, where commoners
had traditional usage rights, to outright ownership. As Karl Polanyi wrote: 'Enclosures have
appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor. The lords and nobles were
upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of violence,
often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the
common, tearing down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had
regarded as theirs and their heirs'. Of course anyone could buy private property. A peasant who
somehow struck it rich could buy a large tract of land and in that respect would have equal rights to
those of a peer. However, by 1873 the average peer owned roughly 67,000 times as much land as
the average cottager.

The enclosures also contributed to urbanisation and to proletarianisation of both rural and urban
labour. With independent access to resources abrogated, the new landless proletarians were a
dependent class. The bondage of serfdom was long gone, but dependence for survival brought
about a new form of bondage – not to a given lord or piece of land, but to the ruling class as a
whole. Liberal economic theory (which does not recognise power relationships, only markets, and
wherein the necessities of survival are no different to any other commodity) offered labour
possibilities of elevation but they remained hypothetical. Of men leaving over £200,000 on dying
between 1924-6, 18% were born to fathers who left less than £1000, but the vast majority of such
“self-made men” were sons of less affluent businessmen. There was no realistic escape from
working-class status until after World War II. But the plight of Britain's proletariat was less than
half of the story.

The industrial revolution occurred at a far from coincidental period of imperial expansion. While
the industrial proletariat and “capitalism” exerted a fascination on Marx, they were only, and could
only ever be, the tip of an iceberg of a quite differently ordered society. Even the Marxist Rosa
Luxemburg wrote that “capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist
strata and social organisations existing side by side with it.” She referred here to many things,
including the continued importance of commodities produced in a non-capitalist system. More
importantly she referred to the essential production of not only raw materials but also commodities
outside of Britain, responding not to the mechanics of the capitalist system, nor to “market forces”,
but rather to the direct application of imperial coercion. She noted that “[w]hen the War of
Secession interfered with the import of American cotton, causing the notorious ‘cotton famine’ in
the Lancashire district, new and immense cotton plantations sprang up in Egypt almost at once, as if
by magic.”

The British ruling class were now at the top of an imperial system. At the bottom were subjects of
formal and informal empire. The informal empire was remarkably extensive, including many
places where the British had never exerted formal control, and a number of places that were

6 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (1944), Boston: Beacon
7 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (1944), Boston: Beacon
9 Ibid, p 144.
11 Ibid, p 337.
formally colonised by other powers. Colonised labour was usually slavery in various open or disguised forms,\textsuperscript{12} indeed entire economies were effectively enslaved by economic dependence.\textsuperscript{13} The very imposition of monetised market economies, and the suffering thus brought about, on colonies was not, as Polanyi noted, “economic in essence”,\textsuperscript{14} but “veiled forms of pressure” which he compared to the effects of lenclosures in Britain.\textsuperscript{15}

One might derive the belief, from this evolution of British ruling class power, that the purpose of the empire was the enrichment of those few. Seeing, however, that imperial activities were deleterious to the whole, John Hobson concluded that only certain interests were served by imperialism: “Seeing that the Imperialism of the last three decades is clearly condemned as a business policy, in that at enormous expense it has procured a small, bad, unsafe increase of markets, and has jeopardised the entire wealth of the nation in rousing the strong resentment of other nations, we may ask, 'How is the British nation induced to embark upon such unsound business?' The only possible answer is that the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain.”\textsuperscript{16} Hobson has been influential, not only on understandings of imperialism generally, but also on analyses of the purpose of the US invasion of Iraq (at least those which do not rely on clearly dishonest claims made by the Bush administration and the Pentagon).

Hobson's imperialism is directly linked to economic liberalism. Polanyi's \textit{The Great Transformation} details how the advent of laissez faire policies, in particular the repeal of the Corn Law, caused a massive decline in the British economy.\textsuperscript{17} As Engdahl points out: “Repeal opened the door to a flood of cheap products in agriculture, which created ruin among not only English but also other nations' farmers. ... In effect, repeal of Corn Laws protectionism opened the floodgates throughout the British empire to a 'cheap labor policy.' The only ones to benefit, following an initial surge of cheap food prices in England, were the giant international London trading houses, and the merchant banks which financed them.”\textsuperscript{18} Those profiting were not those pursuing industrial development, but those whose entire ethos was 'buy cheap; sell dear’ – a dictum which was 'raised to the level of national economic strategy.'\textsuperscript{19} Britain was forced to abandon strict laissez faire, but forced other states to adopt it. Indeed, not only Britain but other Western nations embarked on policies of hypocritical protectionism when social stability or oligarchic profits were threatened while promoting or enforcing free-trade on weaker states or when only the poor of their own nations were further impoverished.\textsuperscript{20} Ricardian\textsuperscript{21} liberalism played the role that the Friedmanite

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{13}See, for example, the discussion of 19\textsuperscript{th} century imperial practices in the previous section.
\bibitem{15}Ibid, p 302.
\bibitem{17}Karl Polanyi, \textit{The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time} (1944), Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, passim.
\bibitem{19}Ibid, p 11.
\bibitem{21}David Ricardo 'proved' that free trade benefits even weaker underdeveloped states by a very reductionist conceptualisation of ‘comparative advantage (Ricardo approached economics as purely mathematical). One work summarises his idea thus: 'A simple numerical example can help make this point clear. Suppose both Japan and the US each produce two goods – automobiles and rice. In the US, one worker can produce either one car or one ton of rice in any given year. In Japan, one agricultural worker can produce two tons of rice in a year, and one manufacturing worker can produce three cars in one year. For both rice production and automobile manufacturing Japanese workers are absolutely more productive than American workers. However, Japanese workers are relatively more efficient at producing cars and US workers are relatively less inefficient at producing rice. Japanese workers are three times more efficient in manufacturing cars, and US workers are only half as efficient as the Japanese when it comes to growing rice.
\end{thebibliography}
neoliberalism and monetarism of the Washington Consensus plays today – that of 'useful foolishness' to use Michael Hudson's words.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, liberalism didn't just provide the means of creating a crypto-feudal social order domestically, it became the vehicle for a crypto-mercantilist foreign policy wherein trade policies and suchlike were seen as forms of warfare.

In the meantime, 'British capital flowed in prodigious amounts into especially Argentina, Brazil and the United States, to form bonds of financial dependence in many ways more effective than formal colonial titles.'\textsuperscript{23} In Argentina this was "in order to finance, build, then run their national rail and transport infrastructure, a role usually encouraged by generous concessions from the host government. English capital also went to develop the local country's steamship lines and their ports. So were the economies of Argentina and other English 'client states' effectively made into economic captives, with terms of trade and finance dictated from the City of London, by British merchant houses and trade finance banks. These client states of England thereby found that they had surrendered control over their essential economic sovereignty far more efficiently than if British troops had occupied Buenos Aires to enforce tax collection in support of the British Empire."\textsuperscript{24} The flip-side of this extension of power was that British industry was starved of capital. From 1880 to 1914 Germany outstripped the British in technological development and overtook it in many key areas of industrial output.\textsuperscript{25} Nor did the recipients of British capital fare well. Far from being the great gift to the world that Niall Ferguson claims, the resultant infrastructure was for the benefit of British traders, and the resultant 'free movement of goods, capital and labour,' which he praises\textsuperscript{26} meant that in times of want the flow of commodities to Britain was unimpeded even while, in the case of India, millions starved to death:

The worsening depression in world trade [1876] had been spreading misery and igniting discontent throughout cotton-exporting districts of the Deccan, where in any case forest enclosures and the displacement of grass by cotton had greatly reduced local food security. The traditional system of household and village grain reserves regulated by complex networks of patrimonial obligation had been largely supplanted since the Mutiny by merchant inventories and the cash nexus. Although rice and wheat production in the rest of India (which now included bonanzas of coarse rice from the recently conquered Irrawaddy delta) had been above average for the past three years, much of the surplus had been exported to England. Londoners were in effect eating India's bread. 'It seems an anomaly' wrote a troubled observer, 'that, with her famines on hand, India is able to supply food for other parts of the world.' There were other 'anomalies.' The nearly constructed railroads, lauded as institutional safeguards against famine, were instead used by merchants to ship grain inventories from outlying drought-stricken districts to central depots for hoarding (as well as protection from rioters). Likewise the telegraph ensured that price hikes were coordinated in a thousand towns at once, regardless of local supply trends. Moreover British antipathy to price control invited anyone who had the money to join in the frenzy of grain speculation.

...The earlier optimism of mid-Victorian observers - Karl Marx as well as Lord Salisbury - about the velocity of economic transformation in India, especially the railroad revolution, had failed to adequately discount

What Ricardo demonstrated is that both the US and Japan would gain from specializing in what each does better at making, and then trading with each other. The argument runs as follows. Suppose the US has 200 workers and Japan has 100 workers, and that workers are divided equally between car production and rice production in each country. The US then produces 100 cars and 100 tons of rice, while Japan produces 150 cars and 100 tons of rice for the year. Combined output for both countries is 250 cars and 200 tons of rice.

Now consider what happens when Japan specializes in car production and the US specializes in rice production. In Japan, 100 workers make 300 cars; in the US, 200 workers produce 200 tons of rice. World output has gone up by 50 automobile due to specialization. Many people will be better off because more cars get produced.' (Steven Pressman, \textit{Fifty Major Economists} (1999), London: Routledge, 2006, p 53.)

Space does not allow a full account of the many pertinent matters elided in Ricardo's formula, but it is worth noting that Britain was the only significantly industrialised nation at the time and, under Ricardo's suggestion, it would have remained so in perpetuity.

for the fiscal impact of such ‘modernization.’ The taxes that financed the railroads had also crushed the ryots. Their inability to purchase subsistence was further compounded by the depreciation of the rupee due to the new international Gold Standard (which India had not adopted), which steeply raised the cost of imports. Thanks to the price explosion, the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts like Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu.27

The famine that came in 1878-80 resulted in an estimated minimum of 7.1 million deaths (without even counting the increased disease mortality in subsequent years), and mortality was, even at the time, measurably greater in those areas served by rail infrastructure.28

The inflow of capital did induce economic activity, but in the informal empire the debt incurred, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, ‘led to a debt crisis very similar to that of the 1980s.’ According to Engdahl: “During the 1880’s, Argentina's new railroads brought her goods, especially beef and wheat, to its ports for export. Exports doubled and her external debts, mainly to London banks, increased 700%. The country was a debt vassal of the British Empire; ‘imperialism on the cheap', as one commentator dubbed it. It was manifestly not the intent of British policy to develop strong sovereign industrial economies from these client-state relationships. Rather, it was to make the minimum investment necessary to exert control, while ensuring that other rival powers did not gain coveted raw materials or other treasures of economic power.”30 Note that power is central to policy, while profit, though not insubstantial for banking interests, seems to be a subsidiary concern.

A Hobsonian interpretation of US, or British, imperialism clearly does not suffice. Economics had become akin to international warfare when the richer nations adopted the selective use of *laissez faire* with 'as a weapon against sovereign national economic policy of rival powers.'31 With regard to US imperialism, Hudson is adamant on this point: 'One must do more than merely read John Hobson and V. I. Lenin to perceive the dynamics of U.S. diplomacy over the past eight decades. ... One lesson of U.S. experience is that the national diplomacy embodied in what now is called the Washington Consensus is not simply an extension of business drives. It has been shaped by overriding concerns for world power (euphemised as national security) and economic advantage as perceived by American strategists quite apart from the profit motives of private investors.'32 For Hudson US imperialism is 'the exploitation of governments by a single government, that of the United States, via the central banks and multilateral control institutions of intergovernmental capital rather than via the activities of private corporations seeking profits.'33 Hudson's view of US imperialism is certainly more robust than a Hobsonian or Marxian view, but it too does not quite suffice. It is clear that at least some private interests play a role in determining US policy that needs to be explicated.

Engdahl writes of 'three pillars of the British empire.' These were strategic sectors which the British sought to dominate absolutely. The pillars were finance; naval power and shipping; and access to strategic raw materials.34 This evolving system, which has been directly passed to the US empire, is akin to a multi-levelled hydraulic empire approach.35 In such a system a zero-sum

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28 Ibid, pp 110-1.
33 Ibid, p 37.
35 A ‘hydraulic empire’ or ‘hydraulic despotism’ is one in which the control of a single essential resource (the prime instance being water, hence the name) allows absolute domination.
calculus is created and 'strategic denial' plays as important a role as acquisition. Indeed, where finite resources are involved there are circumstances where strategic denial may be more important than acquisition as those resources are devalued if acquired in large quantities. This was true of gold for the British empire in 19th century, and I will argue that it is even more true of oil for the US empire today.

Fittingly, perhaps, for the nation of the original CABAL, the 'three pillars' were maintained by a 'covert marriage of private commercial power with government.' The British have long incorporated private interests into the functions of the state. They used privateers to fight the Spanish; the East India Company fought a war with the Dutch, and conquered a large part of India, and ran it with their own government, but as a sort of corporate vassal to the British crown. At the same time Britain parleyed its weak position into strategic superiority by concentrating on building naval pre-eminence. In the end, India became too important and lucrative and fell under direct rule, but a precedent for semi-privatised imperialism was well established. For Engdahl this was most clearly embodied in the creation of the Security Intelligence Service:

Unlike the empires of France or other nations, Britain modelled its post-Waterloo empire on an extremely sophisticated marriage between top bankers and financiers of the City of London, Government cabinet ministers, heads of key industrial companies deemed strategic to the national interest, and the heads of the espionage services.

Representative of this arrangement was City of London merchant banking scion, Sir Charles Jocelyn Hambro, who sat as a director of the Bank of England from 1928 until his death in 1963. During the Second World War, Hambro was Executive Chief of British secret intelligence's Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the Government's Ministry of Economic Warfare, which ran wartime economic warfare against Germany, and trained the entire leadership of what was to become the postwar American Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence elite, including William Casey, Charles Kindleberger, Walt Rostow and Robert Roosa, later Kennedy Treasury Deputy Secretary and partner of Wall Street's elite Brown Brothers, Harriman.

Rather than the traditional service to provide data from agents of espionage in foreign capitals, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service head was himself part of a secret, freemasonic-like network which wove together the immense powers of British banking, shipping, large industry, and government. Because it was secret, it wielded immense power over credulous or unsuspecting foreign economies.

Hobson, when defining the 'certain sectional interests' who benefit from imperialism at the expense of all others, singled out 'the shipbuilding, boiler-making, and gun and ammunition making trades' (which is to say the British empire's 'military-industrial complex'), and the finance sector. What should stand out, indeed what should be screamingly obvious to those not dulled by preconception, is that these are not merely beneficiaries of imperialism, these are arms of the empire, no less significant and crucial in the Anglo-US imperial system than the government and its military. They were the fundamental basis of Britain's economic and military coercive power. The same is true of the traders benefiting from imperial coercion; they are beneficiaries, but as discussed above, they are an indispensable part of creating economic dependency working fist-in-glove with the bankers and gunboats.

37 An acronym from the names of the 5 leading advisors to Charles II.
41 Ibid, p 29.
42 Ibid, p 33.
The situation of these strategic interests is similar to that of the banks discussed above. Hobson is right in that, ultimately, public wealth is taken and by various means turned into their private profit. To do so it behoves these private interests to exercise power and influence to ensure a maximum return, but also to avoid killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Individual representatives of these interests join the government, while others in government more concerned for the extension of imperial power are inclined to ensure that these strategic interests get what they want. There is a confluence of imperatives, or what Hossein-zadeh labels a 'convergence of interests.'

By 1914, other countries had adopted the British model. According to Gabriel Kolko, the US and Germany had the most tight 'strategic industry' systems before World War I, wherein a handful of big corporations controlled key industries. Numerous class formations in various states found 'the synthesis of state and private power during 1914-18 quite acceptable....' The war profits accrued were massive.

At times these 'strategic industries' might act in ways counter to the strategic state interest. For example, Krupp, which had close ties to the Kaiser, monopolised German consumption of artillery and still exported 50% of product, including to enemies of Germany. From the narrow strategic perspective of the Anglo-US form of imperialism, however, such behaviour is only problematic if you lose the war. Ford, along with General Motors, played a crucial role in the German war effort in World War II. Ford went far further than Krupp, supplying not only materiel, but employing Germans and being, in short, a fully-fledged part of the German military-industrial complex. Ford Werke, the second largest supplier of trucks in Germany grew considerably through the course of the war. Ford also produced for the Axis war effort in subsidiaries throughout occupied Europe, in Vichy France, and in North Africa. It is true that Ford contributed to innumerable Allied deaths, including those of many US personnel, but, as will become evident in later discussions of defoliant use, depleted uranium, Gulf War Syndrome and the treatment of US veterans, imperialist policy is not concerned with the loss of US lives at all, except to the extent that combat casualties have a negative impact on public opinion and political discourse. Many within the US government were aghast at Ford's role in the German war machine, but Ford, and others, were not stopped. Ford cost US taxpayers dearly, but equally they profited from German taxpayers. It is also true that the Soviet Union was inevitably harmed to a far greater extent than the US by Ford's contribution to German military capabilities.

While the US and Germany were busily growing their industrial capacities, Britain used financial hegemony to extend the empire. I have already written of the mechanics of this with regard to Argentina, but a more revealing sequence occurred in Egypt. In 1874, after having been 'an interest milk-cow' for European capital for 20 years, Egypt was nearing bankruptcy. This was largely due to the fact that it had paid for 72% (£11.5 million) of the construction costs of the Suez Canal and

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47 The multiple allegiances of officials in the George W. Bush administration could be discussed at some length.
49 Ibid, p 66.
51 Ibid, p 535.
received none of the returns. The very existence of the canal was a strategic boon for Britain, but the opportunity presented itself for further gain. Borrowing £4 million from the Rothschilds, Britain purchased 44% of Canal Company shares from the Khedive, a snip that had a market value of £6 million after 2 years and was worth £24 million by 1898. The Khedive agreed to pay 5% of share values each year in lieu of dividends. Private capital also saw its chance, with the Rothschilds and others making predatory loans to the stricken country. Ensuring the flow of debt repayments gave the British and French the pretext for installing their own citizens as Ministers of Finance and Public Works.

Contributing to the bankruptcy was a drop in cotton prices – as Luxemburg noted, Egypt was almost magically transformed into a cotton producer when Britain needed it, but US cotton had returned to the market. Egypt defaulted on repayments in 1876 and all control of revenue was handed to the British and French. Drought struck and the Nile's level was so low that over one-third of the crop area could not be irrigated. British and French creditors chose this moment to tighten credit. 78.5% of Egyptian revenue went to bondholders, and torture was routinely used in the collection of taxes. From this one can easily infer that the job of the French Minister for Public Works was to ensure that no public works were actually undertaken.

At the same time, Egyptian peasants themselves were also highly indebted and their European creditors were given the right to take their property. “Under extreme European pressure, regiments of tax collectors, with moneylenders following them 'like a vulture after a cow,' imposed a reign of terror throughout the Nile Valley. Peasants who hid cattle or resisted the confiscation of their property were brutally flogged in front of their neighbors.”

In 1879 the Khedive dismissed the Anglo-French government. He was promptly replaced by his more pliant son, but the Egyptian military responded by taking over under the leadership of Urabi Pasha. It was feared that Urabi intended to end European economic dominance. The British dispatched warships to Alexandria in May of 1882. In July, nationalist riots in Alexandria (with a large well-armed European population) left around 250 Egyptians dead. About 50 Europeans were killed, among their number 3 British seamen. The British responded by shelling Alexandria, killing hundreds more. A land force surprised Urabi's larger army near Tel-el-Kebir and destroyed it. 57 British were killed and anywhere between 2000 and 10,000 Egyptians. The stock market responded positively and, among others, Prime Minister Gladstone made a handsome profit. Politically, Gladstone also rode on a wave of patriotic fervour while he and Queen Victoria hoped that Urabi 'could be hung without any inclemency.' Egypt remained nominally sovereign, but British troops occupied it for the next 40 years.
These events in Egypt foreshadow much that typifies US imperialism. The mix of public and private imperialist agents, of strategic and material concerns, of economic and military means; the use of debt to acquire economic sovereignty; the 'disaster capitalism' (which Klein defines as 'orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities...'), the profit-making of high officials; the insecurities of globalised commodity markets; the long military occupation of a state without the acknowledgement of formal dominance. This segment of history even seems to suggest that private or governmental agents may have acted as 'economic hit men', if that is, indeed, a useful term.

However, there was one more crucial element needed to complete the imperial model passed on to the US, that of oil. The British love affair with oil arose naturally from their desire to maintain naval dominance. By 1860 the British had by far the world's largest navy, unbeatable 'ironclads,' and fully 1/3 of all merchant tonnage. By 1905, however, the British government accepted that maintaining naval superiority required switching to petroleum fuelled vessels, but Britain had no oil. In that very year, thanks in part to the work of Sidney Reilly 'Ace of Spies', Britain was able to obtain an 60 year exclusive concession for oil exploitation in virtually the entirety of Iran. Without any oil resources itself, Britain set out to dominate world oil. By 1912 Britain controlled 12% of oil resources; by 1919 it was the indisputable world leader in oil resources; by 1925 it controlled the majority of known oil resources. This was achieved with a typical public-private approach, but though there were profits to be made, the strategic importance ensured that imperial power was the foremost priority:

[Chairman of Mexican Eagle Petroleum, Weetman] Pearson worked for British Secret Intelligence, as did all other major British oil groups. In 1926, he sold his Mexican Eagle interests to Deterding's Royal Dutch Shell group. Pearson became Lord Cowdray, and his Mexican oil fortune was established in a protected trust, the Pearson Group, which as remains today one of the most influential corporate groups in Britain. It owns the publishing enterprises of the London Economist and the Financial Times, and a significant share of the influential London-New York-Paris merchant bank, Lazard Freres. In global pursuit of major oil reserves, the policy of the British Foreign Office, Secret Intelligence services, and British oil interests, were intermeshed in a secret and highly effective manner, as no other country's, were at this time, with the possible exception of Bolshevik Russia.

By the early 1920s the British Government controlled a formidable arsenal of apparently private companies which in reality served the direct interests of Her Majesty's Government to dominate and ultimately control all the identified major regions believed to contain significant petroleum deposits.

The duplicity and ruthlessness of the British in acquiring these oil resources was almost without measure. World War I was a great opportunity for the advancement of this programme, and the British committed over 1,400,00 troops to the East under the pretext of strengthening Russia: “This was not quite the reality however. Following 1918, England continued to maintain almost one million soldiers stationed throughout the Middle East. The Persian Gulf had become an 'English Lake' by 1919. The angry French feebly protested that, while millions of their forces bled on the Western Front, Britain took advantage of the stalemate to win victories against the weaker Turkish Empire. France had lost almost 1,500,000 soldiers....” In the aftermath they betrayed not one, but every individual interested state or people with whom they had reached agreements over the Middle

68 Described as 'highly paid professionals who cheat countries around the globe out of trillions of dollars. ... They play a game as old as empire, but one that has taken on new and terrifying dimensions during this time of globalization.' John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2004, p ix.
71 Ibid, pp 31-2.
72 Ibid, p 75.
73 Ibid, pp 72-3.
74 One of the results was the creation of the state of Iraq.
East. 76

The British oil-grab put them in conflict with the US. From 1910 they battled over Mexico, frequently with British proxy forces in fighting directly against US marines. 77 In the mid-1920s the oil wars ended with the formation of an Anglo-US cartel known as the 'Seven Sisters':

Their secret pact was formalized as the 'As Is Agreement of 1928,' or the 'Achnacarry Agreement.' British and American oil majors agreed to accept the existing market divisions and shares, to set a secret world cartel price, and end the destructive competition and price wars of the last decade. The respective governments merely ratified this private accord the same year in what became the 'Red Line Agreement.' Since this time, with minor interruption, the Anglo-American grip over the world's oil reserves has been hegemonic. Threats to break that grip have been met with ruthless response, as we shall later see. 78

Though co-operation had been common between the US and UK before this time, and conflict of a sort was not unknown thereafter, the mid-1920s saw the formation of a UK-US condominium which continues to this day. Although the British had gained the greatest control over oil resources, it became the junior partner because of high levels of intergovernmental debt. Post-war inter-Ally debt stood at $28 billion in 1923. 79 Britain was owed large sums by France and in reparation from Germany, but its debt to the US was so great that threatened British independence. While British intransigence ensured that Germany could never honour its imposed reparations obligations, US intransigence meant that Britain could never trade her way out of debt. 80 Debt diplomacy had become, like British led laissez-faire in prior decades, an instrument of a type of inter-state warfare leading the British ambassador to Washington to comment in 1921 that the US intended 'to prevent us from paying our debt by sending goods to America and they look for an opportunity to treat us as a vassal state so long as our debt remains unpaid.' 81

The US had taken up the practice of using debt to gain the ability to exercise imperial power, much like the informal imperialism of the British, but with the US Treasury itself as one of the creditors. The system was, and is, one in which astronomical debts are rolled-over by new loans in given in order to pay interest, thus the principle increases and becomes ever more impossible to repay. The creditor state (the US) is able to use its economic power and the threat of cessation of credit to dictate economic policy which allows both the extraction of surpluses and the imposition of antidevelopmental policies which ensure that the debtor remains dependent on the continued extension of credit. Debt is never forgiven. The effective bankruptcy of a state is an opportunity to increase their indebtedness by extending loans to them which are often, disturbingly, referred to as 'aid'. Latterly, fiscal crisis is also used to push through neoliberal policies which are known to be ineffectual in solving the crises, although care is taken to maintain the pretence that these policies are somehow a means of ameliorating or curing the crises. 82 This allows for the piratical raiding of stricken states by Western, and particularly US capital. As Klein explains, no country has ever adopted these policies without being forced to by serious crisis: "Want to save your country? Sell it off. [Harvard economist Dani] Rodrik even conceded that privatization and free trade – two central pieces of the structural adjustment package – had no direct link with creating stability. To argue otherwise, according to Rodrik, was 'bad economics.'" 83

In the meantime the 'aid' (debt relief in the form of increased debt) never actually makes an

76 Note that I do not include the Balfour Declaration as an agreement.
78 Ibid, p 87.
83 Ibid, p 167.
appearance in the desperate debtor country, but goes instead directly to New York and London financiers. The 1980s debt crisis saw developing country indebtedness grow from $839 billion in 1982 to nearly $1300 billion in 1987. In conjunction, these states are forced to devalue their currencies to 'spur exports'. This immediately proportionately multiplies the debt burden on debtor governments as their revenues are rendered ever more insufficient, forcing austerity measures which include the abandonment of proper infrastructure maintenance, let alone any developmental programmes (just as it did in Egypt over 100 years before) ensuring that the debt cycle intensifies without an end in sight.

Debtor countries thus become slave states with their sovereignty suborned to the economic dictates of the empire. The experience of the newly industrialised economies of East Asia before and after the 1996-7 crisis shows firstly that even before the crisis direct foreign investment only aided development when matched with proactive developmental policies by the state. The liberalisation policies imposed under duress by the IMF as the crisis developed ensured that the flood of opportunistic raiding capital tended towards asset stripping and short-term profits:

It was dubbed "the world's biggest going-out-of-business sale," by The New York Times, and a "business buying bazaar" by BusinessWeek. In fact, it was a preview of the kind of disaster capitalism that would become the market norm after September 11: a terrible tragedy was exploited to allow foreign firms to storm Asia. They were there not to build their own businesses and compete but to snap up the entire apparatus, workforce, customer base and brand value built over decades by Korean companies, often to break them apart, downsize them or shut them completely in order to eliminate competition for their imports.

The Korean titan Samsung, for instance, was broken up and sold for parts; Volvo got its heavy industry division, SC Johnson & Son its pharmaceutical arm, General Electric its lighting division. A few years later, Daewoo's once-mighty car division, which the company had valued at $6 billion, was sold off to GM for just $400 million—a steal worthy of Russia's shock therapy. But this time, unlike what happened in Russia, local firms were getting wiped out by the multinationals.

This is an extreme example, but it illustrates quite accurately what capital does when freed from constraints. Similar to Polanyi before him, Ajit Singh cites financial liberalisation as 'causally linked' with the 'uninspiring [economic] performance' of industrialised economies themselves, concluding that for developing economies 'further financial liberalization will hinder rather than help industrialization and long-term economic growth....' Jomo writes that liberalisation threatens the necessary 'virtuous cycle' of human development and economic growth. It should also be noted that liberalisation under the aegis of the WTO (not to mention the World Bank, IMF and US government) is very selectively applied, just as was 19th century laissez faire. Liberalisation is enforced where it benefits the West, but WTO rules and strengthened intellectual property rights are protectionist with regards to technology transfer, allowing transnational corporations to charge monopoly rents and 'further frustrating late industrialization efforts.'

What should be noted here is not that some private concerns realise a quick dirty profit, but that when the opportunity of a crisis presents itself, both the fiscal austerity and liberalisation policies imposed coercively are antidevelopmental in effect. The East Asian crisis saw a massive

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88 Ibid p 162.
degradation of economic capacities. In 1998 alone, for example, the Indonesian economy contracted by 15.5 percent in per capita terms. There was an accompanying jump in poverty from 11.3 per cent in 1996 to 19.9 per cent in 1998.

In literature dealing with liberal and neoliberal policies, antidevelopmental effects appear over and over again, but they are ascribed either to a profit motive or to ideologically spawned mistakes. This is true even in works dealing with multiple examples such as Klein's *Shock Doctrine*, which posits a Hobsonian corporatist system of profit making, while even Mike Davis allows that British imperial depredations in India may have been 'Smithian in intention.' But the same antidevelopmental practices occur in the literature of US foreign interventions where, in addition to the above, they are ascribed to Cold War irrationality or just plain stupidity. (The very same practices occur in the literature of genocide, beginning with Lemkin's *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, but, consistent with the nature of academic genocide discourse (which is virtually totally dedicated to creating a usage of the term “genocide” which prejudicially excludes acts by nice western countries), the strategic purposes of such behaviour are effaced and the picture produced is of ideologically driven double-plus bad authoritarian racists who are in every respect the antithesis of 'liberal' Western democracies.)

Although there are none who tackle Western genocides, there is at least one prominent economist who has dealt with systemic and strategic antidevelopmentalism by Western nations utilising their power directly and through the Bretton Woods institutions which were originally created to do almost the complete opposite. That author is Cambridge economist Ha Joon Chang who deals with this topic in books like *Kicking Away the Ladder* and *Bad Samaritans*. He is also very entertaining and likes to point out to his market fundamentalist opponents that since he has sold millions of books and they haven't the market is actually on his side.

To get a sense of the pattern behind antidevelopmental practices it is worth listing some of the individual instances wherein a hegemonic power has systematically degraded “the foundations of the economic existence of a national group” (in Lemkin's words). In the 19th century the British imposed antidevelopmental policies on Egypt, India, China, Brazil, and, more generally, everywhere they could coerce conformance to *laissez faire* principles. In 20th century wars, the

93 Ibid, p 41.
98 Ibid.
US destroyed the economic foundations of life for much of the Philippines at the turn of the
century, 104 in Japan in 1945, 105 in South Korea, 106 in North Korea, 107 in Cambodia, 108 in Laos, 109 in
South Vietnam, 110 in North Vietnam, 111 in Serbia, 112 and, not least, in Iraq; 113 the Germans did against
Jews and Slavs; 114 the South Africans in using their 'Total Strategy' against their neighbours 115
(which, according to the UN, killed at least 1.5 million people); 116 the Israelis in Lebanon and
elsewhere. 117 Client regimes installed and supported by the US have pursued antidevelopmental
policies (at least initially) in the Philippines, 118 Iran, 119 Guatemala, 120 Chile. 121 This list could go on,
covering every single US client state with three important exceptions – South Korea, Taiwan and
Japan. Economist Jomo K. S. explains it in these terms, 'the Americans were anxious for [these
states] to "succeed" economically in order to be showcased.... Hence the Americans were quite
happy to tolerate trade, finance, investment and intellectual property and other policies violating
laissez-faire market or neo-liberal economic norms.' 122 Policies which would have earned any Latin
American government accusations of communism and a short, sharp coup were actually instigated
by the US in order to build strong economies. I should add that Naomi Klein's Shock Doctrine
documents at least 25 states in which antidevelopmental policies have been imposed in the wake of
upheaval or disaster. 123 In addition, it should be remembered that the US penchant for corrupt
regimes 124 is also antidevelopmental. Currently most proceeds of corruption do not go to
ostentatious luxury, but into Western financial institutions. Raymond Baker has extensively
documented the extent and nature of corruption and concludes that it alone renders economic
development impossible for countries of the global 'South'. 125

123 Chile, Argentina, Thailand, the US, the UK, Indonesia, South Africa, Bolivia, Brazil, Iraq, Poland, Russia, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Honduras, the Maldives, Ecuador, El Salvador (by implication), Guatemala, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Palestine, Nicaragua. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, New York: Henry Holt, 2007, passim.
124 See above.
All of the above – a very, very incomplete list – refers only to discrete lengths of time because only the literature of economic dependency deals with antidevelopmental subjugation as an imperial system in itself and it does so without reference to such things as war or Klein's 'disaster capitalism'. Any instance here is, almost without exception, preceded and followed by other antidevelopmental efforts by the hegemonic power. A coup may be preceded by economic warfare and destabilisation and, when the regime drifts towards economic nationalism and dependence, followed by one or more further coups. A war may be preceded, for instance, by antidevelopmental colonial policies, and followed by sanctions or less overt economic warfare. It might be objected that all of the instances of war used merely go to show that economic destruction is inherent in modern war. This may be true, but it begs the question of the nature and purpose of such wars. It is frequently the case that wars are fought to wreak economic destruction rather than economic destruction being wrought to fight wars. It should be noted that the wars mentioned above range from 'total war', to limited conventional war, to counterinsurgency. They involve very different circumstances and the military rationales given are nearly as numerous as the different conflicts, often being used interchangeably.126

US imperialism has a structure based around exercising dominance and the extraction of surpluses through the use of debt and the maintenance of a state of dependence. The military and economic power accrued is used to perpetuate the accrual of that very power. It seems like a self-contained imperial system, but unfortunately,127 though it is the most bulky part of the US imperial structure it is far from all of it. The debt trap is not sustainable in itself, and furthermore, counts little towards explaining US motives in committing genocide in Iraq. Further matters require explanation. The US and UK have, at times, practised drastic antidevelopmental policies within their own states, seemingly in order to maintain or deepen social hierarchy by increasing the gap between rich and poor. Indeed, British and US imperial practices seem to suggest that interstate and interclass relations are, from an imperialist's perspective, an undifferentiated struggle for ever greater dominance. The need to slow or reverse economic development domestically led the US (just as it did in Britain a century before) to apply the brakes to global development with considerable success. The system that arose linked the US dollar to oil allowing (with unveiled threats and actual uses of massive military force) the maintenance of financial hegemony despite the loss of creditor status. The dollar was thus able to remain the reserve currency and creditor nations, most importantly oil producing nations, were forced by various means to pay a form of tribute by investing in US treasury bonds or other non-controlling investments, and in many cases to spend obscene amounts of money on US military hardware.

To tackle first the basic continuity between imperialist approaches to interstate and interclass domination. I have discussed already the way in which enclosure, liberalisation and proletarianisation created dependence among British workers which facilitated the immiseration and yet greater dependence inherent in a liberal 'cheap labour policy'.128 The working class laboured far longer hours. Admittedly their monetary income increased as a whole,129 but proletarianisation, urbanisation, enclosure, rural unemployment and underemployment, and the decline of piecework all combined to deprive the poor of access to material resources and commodities previously available through informal economic practices.130 It is impossible to measure the gains against the losses, but the poverty of the British poor was justly notorious throughout the 19th century and probably only exceeded in Western Europe by Spain (whose own imperial activities had

127For this author and, perhaps, for the weary, if not dizzy, reader.
128See above.
130Meaning not only access to commons and barter, but also the exchange of labour for part payment in food and shelter.
immiserated the peasant majority through inflation long before) and Portugal (an economic dependency of Great Britain). Even Ferguson is forced to admit that the only poor Britons who gained from the empire were those who emigrated to the colonies (although he thinks it significant that those left behind, though mired in poverty, could vicariously partake in the 'excitement' of imperialism).

Coevally, similar changes were afoot throughout the informal and formal British empire. In India traditional forms of mutual assistance and land tenure were dissolved. Commons were enclosed; class antagonisms were created, making co-operative hydraulic and development works impossible; peasants became highly indebted to a new non-productive class of rack-renters, usurers and brokers; interest rates were very high which immiserated the Indian peasantry but also further starved Britain of necessary capital; terms of trade worsened immensely for agricultural products and fiscal autonomy was destroyed by forced subsumption to the Gold Standard leading to yet greater degradation of economic infrastructure. Land ownership was concentrated with the British consciously ensuring that a certain number of smallholders would be unable to meet tax obligations each year. In short, the Indian economy was violently and suddenly monetised and globalised, and this was done in the full knowledge that it was 'inimical to development'. As has been mentioned, when droughts struck, millions died as a direct result. Far from derailing the programmes of monetisation and globalisation (with the inevitable concentration of ownership and economic degradation) droughts were an occasion for predatory 'disaster capitalism', or rather 'disaster imperialism'. This was not only true of India, but of the British in Southern Africa, the Italians in the Horn of Africa, the Germans in China, and the US in the Philippines.

If this monetisation and globalisation process was central to late nineteenth century imperialism, it is equally so in post-World War II neocolonialism. The primary engine behind the application of these forces is the 'Washington Consensus' of US/Western controlled 'multilateral' institutions such as the IMF which, as has been discussed, forces trade liberalisation under a 'disaster imperialism' model. In poor tropical countries this has been augmented by the 'green revolution' which imposes monetised agriculture based on industrial agriculture models from far richer temperate countries. The predictable effect is exactly that which British imperialism had on Indian agriculture,
summarised thus by John Zerzan: [B]illed as the salvation of the impoverished Third World by American capital and technology. But rather than feeding the hungry, the Green Revolution drove millions of poor people from farmlands in Asia, Latin America and Africa as victims of the program that fosters large corporate farms. It amounted to an enormous technological colonization creating dependency on capital-intensive agribusiness, destroying older agrarian communalism, requiring massive fossil fuel consumption and assaulting nature on an unprecedented scale. Desertification, or loss of soil due to agriculture, has been steadily increasing. Each year, a total area equivalent to more than two Belgiums is being converted to desert worldwide.

What lies behind such destructive transformation? Once again, there is money to be made by certain interests, but in a global sense more money is lost, and economies suffer from the centre through to the periphery. What happens is that the resources of a people (including their labour) come under far greater control of state, empire and “market”. It is true that the process dislocates many from land and other resources, not bringing them into the formal economy but actually excluding them totally. According to UN figures there are over 1 billion people living in urban slums. In Planet of Slums, Mike Davis draws the threads together. Enclosure and monetisation (or proletarianisation) leading to 'land inflation and property speculation' created slums in Britain which fuelled massive profits for rack-renting slum lords. In the empire the British were antipathetic to existing or new urbanisation but, paradoxically, were 'arguably the greatest slum-builders of all time,' forcing native labour to live 'on the fringes of segregated and restricted cities'. Modern experience demonstrates that these new urbanites are not drawn by opportunities in urban industry (as some would have it) but driven by creation of poverty in the rural sector. The result is an 'informal working class, without legal recognition or rights' which has direct antecedents in the Victorian slums of Dublin, London and Naples, where a 'chronic super-abundance of labour' leads to a precarious form of informal economic existence. The informal urban sector of today is like the landless proletarian rural labour of the 19th century and the slum-dwelling unemployed or underemployed of that time. They form the 'reserve army of labour' – a source of cheap labour that maintains a low-wage economy.

The imperial power, thus, does not distinguish greatly whether it is a colonial or domestic populace, but seeks in both cases to alienate their economic resources and extend control over their very bodies by destroying economic independence and creating a striated system where some are disciplined within the formal economic sector while others, equally dependent, are forced into compliance to survive in an even more exploitative informal sector. There are, of course, the counter-currents of organised labour and mutual assistance which occur even in resource-starved slums, but these are faced with ongoing divisive measures from the state-and-market system. As detailed by Davis, the human cost in pain, death and unremitting servitude staggers the imagination, but space does not allow a full exploration here.

The need to maintain control, to maintain the social order domestically, seems to have contributed to a switch in post-World War II US foreign policy from a broadly developmentalist approach to a universally antidevelopmentalist approach initiated in 1971. Engdahl traces the switch to a low-wage, low reinvestment, 'buy cheap, sell dear' imperialist economy to 1957 when, largely at the

144 As will be discussed below the 'private' interests of the wealthy are no less a part of the state than the government is. These 'private' interest are, in any case, intermixed with government power and it is a combination of government and such interests that control markets.
146 ibid, pp 82-3.
147 ibid, p 52.
148 ibid, pp 14-6.
149 ibid, pp 174-6.
150 ibid, p 181.
151 ibid, p 184.
behest of the East Coast financial institutions, 'U.S. industry was persuaded to commit systematic suicide....' This can be explained fully by Hobsonian tendencies amongst imperialist private interests in a fairly recently expanded empire, but a fuller picture emerges with hindsight over a further half-century of imperial economics. It would be impossible to summarise the specifics of various policies over this time, but to illustrate the general trend, bearing in mind that different and seemingly opposed policies may have the same overall outcome, I will discuss the cases of the high interest-rate monetarist 'Volcker shock' period and the more recent low interest-rate period within the US.

In the 1970s inflation and unemployment were both increasing drastically in Europe and the US. The initial response was a surge of popular agitation for dirigiste measure with a strong redistributive component, especially in Europe where socialist and communist movements were gaining support. As David Harvey explains: 'There was, in this, a clear political threat to economic elites and ruling classes everywhere, both in the advanced capitalist countries (such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal) and in many developing countries (such as Chile, Mexico, and Argentina). In Sweden, for example, what was known as the Rehn–Meidner plan literally offered to gradually buy out the owners’ share in their own businesses and turn the country into a worker/share-owner democracy. But, beyond this, the economic threat to the position of ruling elites and classes was now becoming palpable. One condition of the post-war settlement in almost all countries was that the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a much larger share of the economic pie.'

A table reproduced by Harvey eloquently tells of the developing situation and the ultimate nature of the response:

![Graph showing the wealth crash of the 1970s](image)

By 2003 the share of assets of the top 1% had left the scale of this graph, reaching 57.5%. Since

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154 Ibid, p 16.
that time the impact of further reductions to taxes on the most wealthy and likely impact of the financial crisis may have significantly increased the share of assets held by the wealthiest 1%.

The turning point in wealth disparity came before neoliberal 'Reaganomics' with the imposition of the 'Volcker Shock'. Federal reserve chairman Paul Volcker raised interest rates to very high levels which lasted into the mid-1980s. As a result bankruptcies soared and mortgage defaults tripled. This was monetarism in action, an economic theory essentially embedded within neoliberalism.

Timothy Canova comments:

According to the conventional wisdom of the late 1970s, the U.S. price inflation was largely the result of demand-pull forces, i.e., excess demand pulling up prices in tight markets. According to the emerging monetarist dogma, inflation was simply the result of "too much money chasing too few goods." That explanation, however, largely ignored the low capacity utilization rates for capital and labor and failed to consider that the real money supply was growing at a slower rate than the real Gross National Product. However flawed, Chicago school 'monetarism' did provide the theoretical justification for higher interest rates. Tight money became the policy of choice. At a critical moment in time, perception was more important than reality and the policy makers shared a common enthusiasm for austerity to wring the inflationary fevers out of the economy. President Carter's 1979 appointment of Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve Board confirmed this outlook. Under Volcker, the Fed announced that it would ignore the rising level of interest rates. Instead it would try to control the entire supply of money and credit in a $3.5 trillion economy by targeting the growth of volatile monetary aggregates.

Unfortunately, tight money was a particularly inappropriate method of dealing with cost-push inflationary forces such as the rise of marginal costs in a slow market. Moderate increases in interest rates were passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices and the recessionary costs of tight money led to even greater inflationary pressures. To effectively impede price escalation, the Volcker policy therefore required the brutal logic of more 'credible' increases in interest rates. Ever tighter money, ever higher nominal interest rates, and eventually higher real interest rates, wrung inflation out of the economy, by destroying private industry and throwing millions of citizens out of work, thereby adding to both public and private sector deficits.

Even if one accepts, unlike Canova, the fundamental premise of monetarism, derived from Milton Friedman, that growth in money supply is the primary driver of inflation, the prescriptions which monetarists put forward, again following Friedman, are duplicitous and devious in the extreme. An obvious solution to any oversupply of money is to force banks to scale the percentage of reserves up in times of high inflation (an idea which was unspeakable until the financial debacle of 2008). The tightening credit produced would harm production admittedly, but far less than the combination of tight credit and high interest. Another solution is to rescind the privilege of creating money accorded to banks and find another way of facilitating investment. Instead, monetarists insist that real interest rates must rise, which means that banks are able to make even greater profits in a situation of tighter credit. The impact on productive investment was predictable: "For any industrial investment to be 'profitable' at 20% or even 17% interest rate levels, would mean that any normal investment which required more than four to five years to complete, was simply not possible. Interest charges on the construction alone prohibited this." Equally inevitable, and no secret, is the fact that such a policy effectively redistributes income upwards, sharply increasing inequality.

from http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0412-32.htm. Different sources arrive at different measurements, but the source use here, the Congressional Budget Office, gives a figure of 38.7% for 1991 which, as can be seen from the graph, seems to indicate at degree of parity sufficiently close that the comparison can be made.

The 'Volcker Shock' had, within the US, two impacts – it caused, according even to a writer for the *Economist*, 'the worst recession since the Second World War',\(^{161}\) and, as has been mentioned, it almost instantaneously caused a dramatic growth in wealth inequality. One might think, then, that a policy of low interest rates would have the opposite effect, improving investment in the real economy with a rise in labour productivity and real wages. Instead what occurred was asset price inflation and a massive increase in indebtedness, creating what Michael Hudson described as a 'new road to serfdom.'\(^{162}\) Writing in 2006, Hudson predicted the oncoming result of falling real estate prices on the millions who borrowed in expectation of rising prices: 'Homeowners with negative equity are trapped. They can’t sell – the declining market price won’t cover what they owe the bank – but they still have to make those (often growing) monthly payments.'\(^{163}\)

Hudson's accuracy can be seen in this summary of circumstances given by Tom Engelhardt in late November 2009:

23% of U.S. homeowners owe more on their mortgages than their properties are worth, according to Ruth Simon and James R. Hagerty of the *Wall Street Journal*. They possess, in the vivid lingo of the housing industry, 'underwater mortgages.' Among them, 5.3 million households have mortgages that are at least 20% higher than their home’s value, 520,000 of whom have already received default notices. In the meantime, home-loan delinquencies and home repossessions are now at record highs. According to E. Scott Reckard of the *Los Angeles Times*, by the end of September, 'one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure,' and the chief economist for the Mortgage Bankers Association expects the number of foreclosures to keep rising deep into 2010.

....

There was, however, a rare ray of good news amid this dismal scene: Wall Street has, according to Louise Story of the *Times*, figured out how to make money from the mortgage mess by 'buying billions of dollars’ worth of home loans, discounted from the loans’ original value' and pocketing profits while shifting 'nearly all the risk for the loans to the federal government – and ultimately taxpayers.'\(^{164}\)

For those with privilege low interest rates gave access to short term loans for quick non-productive profit making through, for example, currency speculation or leveraged buyouts followed by asset stripping.\(^{165}\) Productive investment in the real economy is less attractive. An artificially high dollar\(^{166}\) and high cost of living (not least because of the cost of housing) cause high labour costs while capital has made ever more free, especially through 'free trade' treaties like NAFTA, to relocate operations or outsource production – a practice which is akin to private Hobsonian imperialism, harming both central and peripheral populations:

> For ordinary people in the US these treaties represent yet more opportunities to wave goodbye to employment while big corporations outsource production overseas so as to sell themselves cheap imports further down the line. They represent decapitalization of the US economy while adding virtually nil investment to the less developed country where the outsourced activity takes place. Instead of being invested in health, education, infrastructure or environmental protection in the country concerned, the inflated profits end up in tax paradises for the benefit of a small group of shareholders and overpaid

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163 Ibid, p 46.
executives. Another point worth noting, although perhaps only stating the obvious, is that the benefits of the corporate welfare these treaties dispense so generously apply to any corporation with some US component. By definition multinational corporations like Spain's Repsol, the Britain's BP-Amoco, Dutch-British Shell and other similar huge corporations all have US ties of one kind or another. For the poor majority in the target victim countries, the experience of Mexico reveals what lies in store. Insecure maquila employment exploiting a desperate, pauperised workforce, a dramatic decline in domestic agriculture, increased environmental degradation, increased unemployment and migration, worsening social indicators. In the first semester of this year alone capital flight out of Mexico amounted to over US$10 billion.\textsuperscript{167}

At the same time US infrastructure has been greatly degraded. From the 1960s: 'Investment in transport, electric power installations, water supplies, and other necessary infrastructure, began to steadily deteriorate as a portion of the total economy. If you don't care about producing industrial goods any more, the New York bankers reasoned, why invest more in roads or bridges to carry them to market?'\textsuperscript{168}

Taken as a whole the situation ensures that the wealth gap continues to grow, accompanied by a lowering of taxes on the most wealthy\textsuperscript{169} and a precipitate rise in income disparity: 'The top 0.1 per cent of income earners in the US increased their share of the national income from 2 per cent in 1978 to over 6 per cent by 1999, while the ratio of the median compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000...\textsuperscript{170} In two now notorious leaked memos to top investors from 2005 and 2006, Citibank announced the death of democracy in the US and the advent of “Plutonomy” a system in which only the top 1% mattered in any way. But at the same time that some of the necessities of life have become unaffordable to even skilled workers\textsuperscript{171} and the middle class itself heads towards something approximating impoverishment, consumer commodities remain affordable. Pan et circenses (“bread and circuses”) can now be translated as Big Macs\textsuperscript{TM} and Playstations\textsuperscript{TM}.

The neoliberal 'ideology' used to justify these policies is, like laissez faire principles in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, a thin pretext easily put aside when not useful. As David Harvey puts it: 'Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite. The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable.'\textsuperscript{172}

The links between US domestic economic policy and its foreign policy are deeper than the use of neoliberal Washington Consensus rationales to justify antidevelopmentalist policies. In order for the US economy to dominate without having the unwanted effects of spreading wealth that continued growth in the real economy would bring about, it had to commit itself further to the 'hydraulic empire' approach of using military dominance combined with control of key resources.

\textsuperscript{170}Ibid, p 16.
\textsuperscript{171}One particularly apposite example is that of Joshua Key who, despite always having work, including welding work, was unable to afford decent housing or health care – a circumstance which led him to enlist in the Army and later become one of the most famous deserters of the Iraq War. Joshua Key and Lawrence Hill, \textit{The Deserter’s Tale: Why I Walked Away from the War in Iraq}, Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2007, pp 31-2. For an equally revealing description of the poverty in which Key grew up, in the 1980s and 90s, see pp 12-22.
\textsuperscript{172}David Harvey, \textit{A Brief History of Neoliberalism}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p 19.
Central to this was the continued use of US dollars as a reserve currency.

The dollar was established as the international reserve currency via the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, when the US had the bulk of world gold reserves and, as mentioned, half of its manufacturing capacity.\textsuperscript{173} What followed was an era of global developmentalism referred to as a 'golden age' where global economic growth far outstripped population growth. Exports, outside of the Communist bloc, grew an average of 6\% per annum from 1948 to 1960, rising to an average of 9\% from 1960 to 1973.\textsuperscript{174} Western countries practised 'embedded liberalism', wherein trade barriers were reduced under a stable system of exchange, but many non-aligned states practised economic nationalism. While it is obligatory to denounce the shoddy inefficiencies of import substitution industrialisation (ISI)\textsuperscript{175} and the nepotist corruption of Third World populist corporatism\textsuperscript{176} of the time, it should nevertheless be observed (but oddly isn't) that these were part-and-parcel of a developmentalist approach which performed almost immeasurably better than the imposed neoliberalism which followed.

The problem with the US dollar being the reserve currency was that in order to provide liquidity to other states the US had to run a balance of payments deficit leading to indebtedness.\textsuperscript{177} The US dollar was backed by gold at a rate of $35 per ounce set in 1934.\textsuperscript{178} The Second Indochina War, however, depleted gold reserves: 'In 1958, US dollar liabilities accounted for only 80 per cent of the country’s gold reserves. But by 1967, US gold reserves could cover only 30 per cent of liabilities. ... [T]he deficit had spiralled out of control, dollar liabilities massively outweighed US gold reserves, and confidence in the system began to subside.'\textsuperscript{179} A similar problem had as much as spelled the end of the British empire after World War I, but this was not to be true of the US empire and its financial hegemony:

\begin{quote}
[J]ust as World Wars I and II had bankrupted Europe, so the Vietnam War threatened to bankrupt the United States. 

[...]

[B]y March 1968, after a six-month run, America’s gold stock fell to the $10 billion floor beyond which the Treasury had let it be known that it would suspend further gold sales. The London Gold Pool was disbanded and informal agreement (\textit{i.e.}, diplomatic arm-twisting) was reached among the world’s central banks to stop converting their dollar inflows into gold.

This broke the link between the dollar and the market price of gold. Two prices for gold emerged, a rising open-market price and the lower “official” price of $35 an ounce at which the world’s central banks
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{175}ISI is a set of policies adopted by many developing countries in the 1950s, including most Latin American states. ISI failed to lift the Latin American countries out of dependency and it was felt that a more radical change was needed (Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson, \textit{The Economic Factor in International Relations}, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp 109-10). On the other hand, states which have successfully industrialised have all initially followed an ISI strategy which clearly plays an important role in creating capacities which can only be oriented towards exporting once they are able to compete. For example see Stephan Haggard, Byung-kook Kim, Chung-in Moon, “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966,” \textit{The Journal of Asian Studies}, 50:4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 850-873 (the authors do not draw this conclusion themselves, having a different focus, but in my judgement it is implicit).

\textsuperscript{176}For example that in Egypt, the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR), Iraq and Syria . As Nazih Ayubi reveals these Arab states are less notable for their cronynism than for their statist authoritarianism with government domination of economic activity and nepotism found in appointments rather than in ownership and profits (Nazih N. Ayubi, “Withered socialism or whether socialism? the radical Arab states as populist-corporatist regimes,” \textit{Third World Quarterly}, 13:1, 1992, pp 89-105).


\textsuperscript{179}Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson, \textit{The Economic Factor in International Relations}, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, p 78.
continued to value their monetary reserves.

Three years later, in August 1971, President Nixon made the gold embargo official. The key-currency standard based on the dollar’s convertibility into gold was dead. The U.S. Treasury-bill standard – that is, the dollar-debt standard based on dollar inconvertibility – was inaugurated. Instead of being able to use their dollars to buy American gold, foreign governments found themselves able only to purchase U.S. Treasury obligations (and, to a much lesser extent, U.S. corporate stocks and bonds). As foreign central banks received dollars from their exporters and commercial banks that preferred domestic currency, they had little choice but to lend these dollars to the U.S. Government. Running a dollar surplus in their balance of payments became synonymous with lending this surplus to the U.S. Treasury. The world’s richest nation was enabled to borrow automatically from foreign central banks simply by running a payments deficit. The larger the U.S. payments deficit grew, the more dollars ended up in foreign central banks, which then lent them back to the U.S. Government by investing them in Treasury obligations of varying degrees of liquidity and marketability.\footnote{Michael Hudson, \textit{Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire} (2nd ed.), London: Pluto Press, 2003, pp 26-7.}

One of the consequences of repudiating dollar convertibility was that US imperial strength became ever closer linked to US control of oil resources. As Engdahl explains it, after 1971 the US dollar fell precipitately, as might be expected, but while US financial hegemony seemed doomed “policy insiders prepared a bold new monetarist design, a 'paradigm shift', as some preferred to term it.”\footnote{F. William Engdahl, \textit{A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order}, Ulm: Dr. Bottiger Verlags-GmbH, 1993, p 148.}

In May 1973 a meeting of the 'Bilderberg Group'\footnote{Present at Saltsjoebaden [where the meeting took place] were Robert O. Anderson of Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.; Lord Greenhill, chairman of British Petroleum; Sir Eric Roll of S.G. Warburg, creator of the Eurobonds; George Ball of Lehman Brothers investment bank the man who some ten years earlier, as Assistant Secretary of State, told his banker friend Siegmond Warburg to develop London's Eurodollar market; David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank; Zbigniew Brzezinski; the man soon to be President Carter's National Security Adviser; Italy's Gianni Agnelli, and Germany's Otto Wolff von Amerongen, among others. Henry Kissinger was a regular participant at the Bilderberg gatherings.' Ibid, p 149.} was presented a 'scenario' by oil economist Walter Levy wherein there would be a 400% rise in oil prices, and planned how to take advantage of such a circumstance by what Henry Kissinger was later to refer to as 'recycling the petro-dollar flows”.\footnote{Ibid.}

Engdahl continues: 'In 1973, the powerful men grouped around Bilderberg decided to launch a colossal assault against industrial growth in the world, in order to tilt the balance of power back to the advantage of Anglo-American financial interests. In order to do this, they determined to use their most prized weapon – control of the world's oil flows. Bilderberg policy was to trigger a global oil embargo in order to force a dramatic increase in world oil prices. Since 1945, world oil trade had, by international custom, been priced in dollars. American oil companies dominated the postwar market. A sharp sudden increase in the world price of oil, therefore, meant an equally dramatic increase in world demand for U.S. dollars to pay for that necessary oil.”\footnote{Ibid, pp 149-50.}

Engdahl's phraseology, for example 'Bilderberg policy', is unfortunate in sometimes giving the impression that this was a plot hatched at the Bilderberg conference by conferees. This has caused a predictably enthusiastic response from conspiracy theorists interested in the Bilderberg Group. Engdahl's source is the official proceedings for the discussion led by Levy and it would be most accurate to characterise it as a means of giving attendees timely information about future events which could be managed to the advantage of Western oligarchic interests. That is, after all, the nature of the plan, to take the otherwise unwelcome force of events driven by the oil producing countries and to turn that force, in Judo fashion, to one's own advantage while greatly strengthening its impact. Levy had already publicly written on this theme in a 1971 \textit{Foreign Affairs} article. The article makes interesting reading, with one of the key points being that he treats oil first and foremost as a strategic concern. Also of interest is his glowing praise of oil companies acting as a...
global cartel. In his rendition of events these companies are guarantors of security, while poor oil producing countries are treated with barely veiled hostility due to their 'lingering heritage of emotional resentments against former colonial administrations and concessionary circumstances.'

According to Engdahl, ‘the 'Yom Kippur' war was not the result of simple miscalculation, a blunder, or an Arab decision to launch a military strike against the state of Israel. The entire constellation of events surrounding outbreak of the October war was secretly orchestrated from Washington and London....’” This was achieved by feeding false intelligence to both sides, particularly by withholding evidence of a military buildup from Israel. The architect of the war and the resultant oil embargo, Henry Kissinger, was then able to adopt the pretence of being a peacemaker, through 'shuttle diplomacy,' while the blame for the suffering caused by his scheme fell firmly on the Arab world. This may seem unlikely. Indeed, a journal review of the book he cites as his source mentions no such revelation. However, a writer may, intentionally or otherwise, reveal more than they claim, and this particular work was heavily censored (causing some controversy at the time). It should also be noted that the US used almost identical tactics in ensuring that war ensued between Iran and Iraq and, similarly, to guarantee their own war against Iraq in 1990. Both of these cases are well documented, but mention should also be made of the equally, if not more, duplicitous deceptions that were deployed to facilitate the major US commitment of troops to Indochina (namely the 'Tonkin Gulf Incidents') and the deceptions used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Then there is the question of cui bono – who benefits? The US was entering a phase of seemingly perpetual debt rollover but it had, and still has, the unique 'privilege' of paying its debt in its own currency. To reduce its liabilities all it had to do was induce a global surge in commodity prices, which it could achieve by creating a glut of dollars. At the same time, however, US financial and economic hegemony was widely considered to be on its last legs, a situation which should have been worsened by increased commodity prices and the damage thus done to the US and global economies. But the US Treasury and the New York and London banks were geared up for the massive increases in oil prices, and when the Nixon administration sent a senior official to the Treasury to explore ways of inducing OPEC to lower prices, he was 'bluntly turned away' and recorded, in a memo, that “It was the banking leaders who swept aside this advice and pressed for a 'recycling' program to accommodate to higher oil prices. This was the fatal decision...”

By January 1974 oil prices had increased 400%, just as envisioned in the 'scenario' outlined only 8 months earlier to the Bilderberg Group. Suddenly everyone needed US dollar reserves which had a very beneficial effect for New York banks and for London banks who traded the largest pool of 'offshore' US dollars. Large oil companies made record profits, just as they would in later oil shocks including that created by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the previously risky North Sea venture became an instantly guaranteed moneymaker. Real economies suffered throughout the

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186Ibid, p 150.
188Ibid, p 137.
194Ibid, p 151.
developed world and the degradation of US infrastructure accelerated. The impact on the 'developing' world (as it might accurately have been called up until this point) was far more devastating. In India, for example, the balance of payments switched at from surplus to deficit at a stroke. As a whole, over 1974 developing countries incurred a total trade deficit of $35 billion according to the IMF, a colossal sum in that day, and, not surprisingly, a deficit precisely 4 times as large as in 1973, or just in proportion to the oil price increase. In the decade until 1974 developing counties saw economic growth of 5% per annum, about 2.5% above that of population growth. For the poorest quintile (20%) of countries, in per capita income, the period of 1980 to 200 saw an average 0.5% decline in economic activity, while the next two quintiles had lower economic growth than population growth.

The poor states of the world plunged into ever more astronomical debt, growing from $60 billion in 1970 to $2 trillion in 1997, to $2.5 trillion in 2004. That is a 42 fold increase in 34 years. The trap is hideous. Private banks lend for high returns and when states default Western taxpayer money is given directly to these banks which is characterised as 'aid' to the stricken state, as mentioned. This is just an interventionist form of rollover, which must otherwise be arranged with the private banks, often at increased interest rates, because the debt is simply unpayable. In terms of ratio of external debt to exports, the figures are: 340% for sub-Saharan Africa; 202% for Latin America; and 121% for Asia. The situation mirrors that of many former belligerents after the First World War, debtors are forced to sell assets and commodities simply to service debt which, regardless, continues to grow. It is perpetually rolled over and ever increasing. The debtor countries are forced into antidevelopmental policies which further entrap them.

While poor countries labour under this burden, the richest country in the world is also the largest debtor, but circumstances are very different for the US. As Hudson explains: 'If the United States had followed the creditor-oriented rules to which European governments had adhered after World Wars I and II, it would have sacrificed its world position. Its gold would have flowed out and Americans would have been obliged to sell off their international investments to pay for military activities abroad. This was what U.S. officials had demanded of their allies in World Wars I and II, but the United States was unwilling to abide by such rules itself. Unlike earlier nations in a similar position, it continued to spend abroad, and at home as well, without regard for the balance-of-payments consequences.'

Creditor nations were forced to buy low-yielding Treasury obligations. Oil producing countries, in particular, were forced to return their profits to the US and when Saudi Arabia and Iran considered by US companies they were told that this would be considered and act of war. OPEC was told that it could raise oil prices all it wanted, as long as it used the proceeds to buy U.S. Government bonds. That way, Americans could pay for oil in their

204See above.
own currency, not in gold or other “money of the world.” Oil exports to the United States, as well as German and Japanese autos and sales by other countries, were bought with paper dollars that could be created ad infinitum.\textsuperscript{208}

The US dollar predominance is reinforced by the proclivity of all US client states to spend large amounts of money on arms purchases from the US. As mentioned with regards to Iran, the figures for oil producing countries are very high, as Abbas Bakhtiar reveals: 'From 1990 to 2004, Saudi Arabia, with a population of 21.4 million has spent a whopping $268.6 billion dollars on arms. ... One would have thought that with this kind of expenditure the Saudis would have felt safe by now. But apparently they don’t, or at least this is the view of U.S. and U.K., two major arms suppliers to these countries. But Saudi Arabia is not alone in this. Take the tiny country of United Arab Emirates. This country with a population of 2.6 million souls has spent $38.6 billion dollars for defence in 1990-2004 period.'\textsuperscript{209}

In summary, the US maintains an imperial system which, like that of the British before, utilises a predominance in certain key strategic areas in order to effect a more general predominance. Crucial strengths are circular and self-replicating – for example, indebtedness is used to abrogate state sovereignty to impose policies which will ensure the continuance of indebtedness – but also strengths are mutually reinforcing with military predominance ultimately underwriting all other forms of dominance. Financial hegemony combines that of the London and New York banks, and that of the US dollar. Dollar hegemony is heavily reliant on the ability to control petroleum resources, or more specifically, the ability to raise or lower oil outputs through the use of diplomatic, economic and military power. Added to this is the power accrued through the relationship with the major oil companies, who act as a cartel protecting imperial interests at the same time as the empire protects their interests and ensures their profits. This is, of course, not uncontested, but that is exactly why the US takes such an activist approach which is especially noticeable in its economic, covert and military actions which regularly override the sovereignty of states.

Military power is central to the extent that William Engdahl opines that 'since August 1971 the dollar is no longer backed by gold. Instead, it is backed by F-16s and Abrams battle tanks, operating in some 130 US bases around the world, defending liberty and the dollar.'\textsuperscript{210} This is reflected in military 'doctrine'. The Pentagon's Joint Vision 2020 famously promulgated 'full spectrum dominance.'\textsuperscript{211} The US Army field manual on operations elaborates on 'full spectrum operations' which add 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW) to the military role of fighting wars. Although room is allowed for offence and defence, what dominates MOOTW are 'stability operations' which are defined as follows: 'Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.'\textsuperscript{212} Note that here coercion is part of stability. In case the point is missed, the chapter on stability operations produces a graph with two extremes, one 'peace' and one 'war' with all between being termed 'conflict.'\textsuperscript{213} The most noteworthy role for the army in stability operations is 'foreign internal security' which the field manual proudly exemplifies with US Army operations in El Salvador in 'creating a crack counterinsurgency force that fought the guerrillas to a standstill and established the groundwork for a negotiated settlement.'\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{208}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{210}William Engdahl, “Why Iran's oil bourse can't break the buck,” Asia Times, 10 March 2006.


\textsuperscript{212}Ibid, 9-2 (p 195).


\textsuperscript{214}Ibid, 9-10 (p 203).
Interventionism and the GWOT

The conceptualisation of 'conflict' and 'military operations other than war' with which US Army personnel are, literally, indoctrinated bring to mind Joseph Schumpeter's words about the Roman Empire:

> There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to in danger or under actual attack. If the interest were not Roman, they were those of Rome's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest – why, then it was the national honour that had been insulted. The fight was always invested with an aura of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbours, always fighting for a breathing space. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs.215

The military half of the full spectrum dominance equation prepares the military as an instrument of unlimited interventionism. On the political side the bones of full spectrum dominance were fleshed out in September 2002 in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. The document is mainly noted for embracing a doctrine of preventive war with words such as 'Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling [sic], the power of the United States. … [A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. … defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. … We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed.'216 The 'Bush Doctrine', espousing illegal preventive war, is a natural and inevitable corollary of full spectrum dominance. Predominance cannot be maintained without ensuring that none develop enough power to assert independence, and thus framing the strategy in terms of 'threats' and 'security' is nothing more than a deception. As Noam Chomsky points out, with relation to the CFR's Grand Area strategy (see above), there is nothing new in the 2002 strategy which merely recapitulates that which had been in place since early in World War II.217

What has changed is that the US must be more explicit in the post-Cold War era. William Blum describes the Cold War as '[t]he cleverest protection racket since men convinced women that they needed men to protect them....'218 In it every US intervention could be framed as a response to the International Communist Conspiracy. Now it is necessary to invent a whole grey area between the putatively absolute states of 'peace' and 'war' called 'conflict' (it would not do to admit to a state of permanent warfare, although the US military championed the term 'Long War' for several years as an alternative to GWOT).219 Blum later continues, 'The Soviet threat, the terrorist threat, the new enemies, the same old same old, feverishly fostered at home and abroad, the mentality that the

Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, et al, have critical, life-saving, catastrophe-preventing missions thrust upon them … working the old protection racket again.²²⁰

In reality, the Cold War was an era of distended unipolarity. The Communist Bloc played the role of the 'healthy dwarf' to the US crypto-monopoly. To be certain, the Soviet Union made cautious challenges to the US at times, perhaps most notably in the Middle East, but on the whole its existence was a boost to US imperial power.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a severe challenge. As Alain de Benoist writes: “At the end of the 1990s, Gorbachev’s adviser Arbatov declared to the Americans: ‘We are dealing you the worst blow: we are going to deprive you of your enemy’. These are significant words. The disappearance of the Soviet ‘Evil Empire’ threatened to eradicate all ideological legitimation of American hegemony over its allies. This means that, from then on, the Americans needed to find an alternative enemy, the threat, real or imaginary, of which would allow them a continued imposition of hegemony over their partners, who had been more or less transformed into vassals. In conceptualizing the notion of ‘global terrorism’ two years after the 9/11 attacks, the Americans have found their new enemy.”²²¹

It is significant that Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed devotes perhaps half of his introduction to a work on the 'War on Terror' to describing the nature of the Cold War as a cover for global dominance,²²² in this the GWOT is the true successor to the Cold War. 'Interventionism' is the common strand throughout both, and in the interregnum of the Bush Sr. and Clinton era when interventions continued apace without such justifications. By William Blum's documented count, from 1945 until 1999 the US ‘attempted to overthrow more than 40 foreign governments, and to crush more than 30 populist-nationalist movements struggling against intolerable regimes.’²²³

Having set itself the goal of unchallenged global dominance, the US must constantly intervene against 'emerging threats before they are fully formed.' The threats, however, are not threats to security, but threats to dominance. Intervention is for the purpose of ensuring subservience, directly or through demonstration. Economic interventions are the most common form (too numerable to count). Backed by armed covert and overt actions they have successfully mired the poorest states in inescapable poverty and dependence. As Arnold Toynbee wrote 50 years ago: 'America is today the leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in the defence of vested interests. She now stands for what Rome stood for: Rome consistently supported the rich against the poor … and since the poor, so far, have always and everywhere been far more numerous than the rich, Rome's policy made for inequality, for injustice, and for the least happiness of the greatest number.'²²⁴ However, given that the US now openly pursues a policy of global dominance, and more covertly pursued the same policy during the Cold War, I must reiterate that US neocolonialism maintains that dominance through economic means, with its material gains being secondary.

Economic subjugation is the real source of the 'structural violence' in the world. Jean Ziegler, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food wrote a book entitled L'Empire de la Honte (Empire of Shame) in which, according to his interviewer, 'He explains why, at the time of the French revolution, the idea of providing enough food for all human beings on Earth was still a utopia, a

dream, but how today that would be a technically possible thing. But it is impossible because of the way the wealth in the world is captured by a few people, whom he calls the Lords of the Economic War. Those people constitute a Feudal Order and their principal weapon is nothing other than the American military power, which operates from now on without the approval of the UN, without any control.' When asked about structural violence, Ziegler responds: 'In the empire of shame, controlled by organized scarcity, war is not sporadic any more, it is permanent. It is not any more a crisis, a pathology, but normality. It does not any more imply the eclipse of reason -- as Horkheimer expressed-- it is the very raison d'être of the empire. The lords of the financial war have put the planet under the scalpel of organized economic destruction. They attack the normative power of the States, challenge the sovereignty of the people, subvert democracy, wreak havoc on nature, destroy human beings and their freedoms. The liberalization of the economy, the "invisible hand" of the market, is their way of dealing with the universe; the maximalization of profit is the way it works. I call this practice and this cosmogony structural violence.\footnote{Gian Paolo Accardo, “Empire of Shame: A Conversation with Jean Ziegler,” The Crisis Papers, 31 December 2005. Retrieved 16 January 2006 from http://www.crisispapers.org/guests/ziegler.htm.}\footnote{John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp 4-5.}

Structural violence is then a result of economic warfare – the economic warfare of the laissez faire period taken to extremes, applied more broadly, and creating numerous famines on the order of those generated by similar policies imposed on late 19th century India. Millions die as a matter of course and a robust argument can and should be made that this constitutes a grave and deadly act (or acts) of genocide. The world, however, seems unready to accept that there is even agency behind all of this death and suffering (like the advent of the British and US empires, these things just happen to happen) let alone intent and culpability. This is small wonder given the control which the perpetrator groups (however defined) exert over the dissemination and interpretation of information. In other areas of intervention, however, the US has been so blatantly illegal that no amount of 'soft power' can entirely conceal the consistent pattern of criminality, yet somehow it is excpected, accepted and largely subjected to a form of amnesia which excludes it from political analysis.

Maintaining world dominance requires constant intervention – constant illegal intervention. There are now debates between those who essentially defend illegality and those who condemn it. On the one hand we have law professor John Murphy who declares in the introduction to a book on the subject: ‘The primary goal of the study is not to search out cases where the United States violated its international obligations, much less to make a case that the United States has been an international outlaw. Rather, such cases are examined only to the extent that they are illustrative of wide-ranging difficulties standing in the way of US adherence to the rule of law.’\footnote{Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity, London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2004.} On the other hand we have the work of law professor Michael Mandel who makes his position clear in the title How America Gets Away With Murder.\footnote{Primarily, Murphy simply treats the US as if it were in no way comparable to other states. Reasons for US illegality are constructed as something like excuses with no recognition that other states might also have similar psychological and strategic imperatives. US illegality is simply a fact of life to be accepted while he 'balances' this by pointing out the occasions on which the US actually complies with international law (when most states do so as a matter of course).} Even Murphy's apologist work hardly paints a pretty picture of its subject, being far too replete with misdeeds, like Ferguson's Empire, to successfully excuse despite every effort to do so.\footnote{Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity, London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2004, p 3.} Mandel is far more forthright, opening with the statement that: ‘America’s war on Iraq in 2003 was its third illegal war in just under four years. Each one was a bloody horror, but the Iraq war distinguished itself both for its bloodiness and for the flagrancy of its illegality. Both works expose a litany of illegality which is difficult to reduce, but they tend to deal with larger
matters – acts of aggression, large scale violations of treaties, defiance of international norms and so forth.

On a smaller scale the US has been committing serious national and international crimes since the end of World War II, as has been discussed, but these have become accepted and normalised. The US never actually stopped the small-scale special forces and covert military operation that it began during World War II and it has expanded them to include such things as bombing such as occurred in 1954 in Guatemala.\(^{230}\) US personnel have conducted illegal deadly attacks with such frequency that such occurrences are barely remarked upon. For example, the US (in cooperation with Israel and Britain) has been conducting operations within Iran for at least 8 years.\(^{231}\) In addition the US has been using the the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, listed by the State Department as a terrorist organisation, to conduct attacks in Iran – although one report has it that '[Stephen] Cambone [then Undersecretary of Defense Intelligence] and those guys made MEK members swear an oath to Democracy and resign from the MEK and then our guys incorporated them into their unit and trained them.'\(^{232}\) The reaction to such behaviour is, to say the least, muted. Imagine the reaction if Iranian Special Forces were known to be operating in the US.

Also of interest is the US history of assassination. They have been killing, or attempting to kill, political leaders for a long time, most notoriously with their many attempts to kill Fidel Castro beginning in 1959.\(^{233}\) In addition they have been prolific sponsors/trainers/suppliers of death squads who have targeted community and and union leaders as surely as they have targeted armed militants.\(^{234}\) Recently, however, they have added another technique, killing people in other sovereign states using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or 'drones'). Beginning with the murder of 6 'suspected al-Qaeda members' in Yemen in 2002,\(^{235}\) the US has used UAV launched missile strikes with ever increasing frequency. Effects inside the US occupied states of Iraq and Afghanistan are hard to gauge, but it is fair to expect that many innocents are killed as they are in Pakistan. Afshin Rattansi writes of UAV usage in Pakistan:

Last June, a U.S. attack by unmanned aircraft hit the Pakistani village of Najmarai in South Waziristan and Pakistani intelligence claimed it killed up to 60 people at a funeral. Associated Press wired that Obama’s accession heralded a doubling of the number of drones operated by U.S. forces. The U.S. State Department’s Lawrence Richter, rubbished the remarks of Philip Alston, the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions after his complaints about drone attacks. Alston said that the U.S. has created a "zone of impunity" and should track the number of civilians killed in its military operations abroad and limit collateral damage from unmanned drone attacks: "The government has failed to effectively investigate and punish lower-ranking soldiers for such deaths, and has not held senior officers responsible," Alston said. "Worse, it has effectively created a zone of impunity for private contractors and civilian intelligence agents by only rarely investigating and prosecuting them."\(^{236}\)

Alston wrote an addendum to his 2010 report on extrajudicial killings specifically to deal with the issue of 'targeted killings.' Killings are undertaken by both the military and the CIA. With regard to the latter: “According to media accounts, the head of the CIA's clandestine services, or his deputy, ...
This practice of 'extraordinary rendition:'

were tortured by both US personnel and those of their allies.

off to the intelligence services in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan and Syria for interrogations.' Abductees

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As well as launching missiles and killing people in other sovereign states with impunity, the US has

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jails Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland and... Guantanamo, Cuba. It handed hundreds more prisoners

off to the intelligence services in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan and Syria for interrogations.' Abductees

were tortured by both US personnel and those of their allies. In addition, nearly half of those

killed are simply bystanders.241

Extraordinary renditions -- the kidnapping of terror suspects and their transport to countries willing to

torture them for the Bush administration -- have been the rage (for the CIA) in Europe in recent years and

have enraged European publics. But far less is often known about what happens to those kidnappees on the

other end of the process. Craig Murray, however, knows more than most of us. He was the British

Ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2002 to 2004, a time when that country's strong man, Islam Karimov, was

described by Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld as an 'important ally' of George Bush

in his war on terror. Murray was dismissed by the British government in October 2004 when he made

public his findings on extraordinary renditions to Uzbekistan and the torture by Uzbek security personnel

of those rendered into their hands by the CIA.

Murray describes Karimov as having longstanding ties with Bush. These seem to have begun in 1997 when

Bush was still governor of Texas. He then met with Uzbek Ambassador Sadyk Safaev, a meeting (for which

there is documented evidence) organized by Ken Lay, CEO of Enron, in order to enlist the governor in

brokering a two billion-dollar gas deal between the corporation and that oil-rich country. Karimov, says

Murray, 'was a guest in the White House in 2002. It's very easy to find photos of George Bush shaking

Karimov's hand.' Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was, he added, 'particularly chummy with

Karimov' back then and, at the time, the administration was making use of the Karshi-Khanabad air base,

also known as K2, in that country.

Murray is not alone in considering Karimov one of the most vicious dictators on the planet, a man

personally responsible for the death of thousands. The ambassador helped uncover evidence of one

detainee who 'had had his fingernails extracted, he had been severely beaten, particularly about the face,

and he died of immersion in boiling liquid. And it was immersion, rather than splashing, because there is a

clear tide mark around the upper torso and arms, which gives you some idea of the level of brutality of this

regime.'

237Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum:

Study on targeted killings (A/HRC/14/24/Add.6), 28 May 2010, p 8. Retrieved 28 June 2010 from


238Ibid, p 7.

239Michael L. Gross, 'Killing civilians intentionally: double effect, reprisal, and necessity in the Middle East', Political


Verso, 2005, p 132.

241Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum:

Study on targeted killings (A/HRC/14/24/Add.6), 28 May 2010, p 7. Retrieved 28 June 2010 from


While not certain that detainees who had been rendered were boiled alive, about extraordinary rendition Murray said, 'There is no doubt that George Bush and Condoleezza Rice have been lying through their teeth about extraordinary rendition for some time.' As he put it, 'The United States, as a matter of policy, is willing to accept intelligence got by torture by foreign agencies. I can give direct firsthand evidence of that and back it up with documents.'

Murray claims that political dissidents in one country are tortured into implicating dissidents in other countries (with whom they are completely unfamiliar) creating a tissue of fictitious terror networks used to justify political persecution. This is only one of a range of ways in which false intelligence is produced in order to create security threats as a justification for the use of force.

Though the US is by no means alone in intervening in the affairs of other sovereign states, nor in illegality, it does so with a scope unmatched by any contemporary and perhaps in all of history if one excludes World War II. George Kennan wrote in 1948, the 'real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain a position of disparity.' In 1992 Colin Powell ‘told members of the House Armed Services Committee, required 'sufficient power' to 'deter any challenger from ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage.' To emphasize the point, he cast the United States in the role of street thug. 'I want to be the bully on the block,' he said, implanting in the mind of potential opponents that 'there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of the United States.' Dick Cheney, at this time, wrote the first version of his Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which “stated that the 'first objective' of U.S. defense strategy was to 'prevent the re-emergence of a new rival.' Achieving this objective required that the United States 'prevent any hostile power from dominating a region' of strategic significance.” In 2000, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) stated that '[a]t present the United States faces no global rival [and] America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.' Such strategic aspirations necessitate deadly interventions and it is inevitable that violence be used broadly and, on some occasions, on a massive scale.

'Feudal,' 'corporatist,' 'capitalist, 'liberal,' and even 'corrupt' are words with no absolute and reducible meaning. I have argued that the word 'genocide' has a certain clear meaning and that alternates are logically unsustainable, but it is a technical term coined for a specific usage. The provenance and usage of each of these other terms, however, defies such reduction. I mention this because if I should embrace a description of the US empire as being 'corporatist', for example, it does not mean that I am rejecting a description of it as 'liberal' – quite the opposite. The fact that many putatively contradictory terms may be applied to a single polity is quite revealing, unlike the schizophrenic analytical discourse which inevitably results.

The word 'liberal' can be seen to be highly problematic. What it means in theory and what it means in practice are two very different things. The descendants of classical liberalism, whether French, British or that of the 'Founding Fathers' of the US, include anarchism, 'right-wing' libertarianism and, of course, neoliberalism. At the same time there persists a less-defined general mainstream 'liberalism' which encompasses many outspoken critics of market fundamentalism as varied as Keynes, Polanyi, Stiglitz and Galbraith. The policies of the 'Golden Age' of developmentalism after

World War II are justifiably termed ‘embedded liberalism.’ But some claim that such policies were only adhered to as long as the communist bloc provided what seemed a viable alternative. Apart from this interregnum the results of liberalism, as it is practised, are quite clear. The ideologies of mainstream liberalism, because they do not challenge the coercive power inherent in the private ownership of resources needed for survival (but rather term this 'freedom'), are only of interest in this work to the extent that they enable coercive market fundamentalism because that is the most historically significant role of liberalism.

The US empire may be termed, among other things, a liberal feudalism. For Jean Ziegler the moment that the French Revolution overthrew the old feudal order was the moment that refeudalisation was set in train. A failure to recognise that liberty cannot exist where there is material want and the embrace of the ‘puissance de l’argent’ (power of money), became the basis of the 'empire of shame.' The empire is one of organised scarcity, where hunger and debt are used by transnational 'cosmocrats' to control a world of perpetual war.

Tracing the history of British liberalism, instead of French, confirms the basic thesis of L'Empire de la Honte but draws into question Ziegler's emphasis on non-state capitalist 'cosmocrats.' Following the 'revolution of the rich against the poor' Britain was well placed to end its vestigial feudalism without revolution, nor indeed any significant change in relations of power. Then, as now, the application of 'market forces' to an aspect of human life gives power to those are able to claim ownership of resources under a liberal/neoliberal paradigm. Nothing is naturally a commodity and the commodification of 'commons' such as naturally occurring genetic material, or water resources, or fisheries involves gifting ownership (often gratis) to those who are already rich. Where state owned or common properties are not alienated wholesale, alienable shares or title are often given to poor individuals whose poverty may force them to sell. As one author puts it: 'Given the unequal levels of power that exist in the marketplace, the result of such incorporation [into liberal property relations] would most likely be the massive shift of that property from the poor to the rich.' It has certainly proven so in the past under the impact of Western colonialism as well as in some cases where the 'Green Revolution' has brought farmers into the market, and it is further confirmed by the recent experiences of Russian people forced to sell shares in former state-owned enterprises (when 'vouchers' for some privatised assets were given to people whose incomes were dropping precipitately) at far below their value. This ownership, however gained, confers power that was previously sovereign. The decentralised sovereignty resulting most certainly has a feudal character. The new enclosures change fundamental constitutional arrangements, creating another revolution of the rich against the poor.

As has been discussed, when liberalism became a political movement in Britain, led by Richard Cobden (who was apparently an idealist), roughly half of the gentry and peerage became Whigs. They argued, metaphorically, with their Tory opponents about which way up an egg should be eaten, but it can be presumed that both sides knew which side their bread was buttered on. Any given individual may have been a self-sacrificing idealist, but collectively they acted as Marx would have predicted.

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250 Ibid, p 27.  
251 Ibid, p 41.  
252 Ibid, passim.  
253 Namely the enclosure movement; see above.  
have predicted – in their own interest. Just as Ziegler's revolutionaries of 1793 promised liberty but brought a new form of domination,\(^{257}\) Cobden's fight against aristocratic privilege and corruption merely renewed and strengthened it in another guise. The natural reaction, already touched upon, is for the powerful and rich to increase their wealth and power by extending the advantageous mechanism of the 'market' to every possible resource and every area of human endeavour and to destroy all popular or governmental restraints. The result, as Polanyi detailed, was an economic nosedive.\(^{258}\) The resultant 'capitalism' was like 'liberalism' in that what it meant in theory was quite different than what it meant in practice.

Liberals and Marxists are in agreement that there is a system called 'capitalism' which is more or less mechanistic, driven by 'laws' and 'forces.' But just as the law of gravity does not wholly determine the shape of a building, let alone a city, the 'laws' of supply and demand do not shape a single enterprise let alone an economy. One would not place the blame for an architectural monstrosity on gravity. Artifice is a necessity to maintain economic activity, and the rich of post-Corn Law Britain maximised both their private privilege of power through ownership and their control of governmental political power, but acted to conceal both with the rhetoric of liberal freedom. This is liberalism as it is practised and, indeed, as it has been espoused by leading theorists of political liberalism such as Walter Lippmann. In the 19th century, governmental power was retained by the rich by restricting the franchise, by purchasing political favour, or, frequently, by personally buying direct governmental power such as through the purchasable parliamentary seats of Britain's 'rotten boroughs.' Lippmann, who popularised the term 'Cold War,'\(^{259}\) believed that the masses were ignorant and irresponsible, but felt that this could be cured through propaganda in a process he referred to as the 'manufacture of consent.'\(^{260}\) And thus Lippmann, along with Edward Bernays, pointed the way to continued plutocratic control of government. With neat irony, Bernays, who had written the book *Propaganda*,\(^{261}\) recognising the negative connotations of 'propaganda,' gained largely due to the lies spread by the World War I Committee for Public Information which both he and Lippmann served on, gave propaganda a public relations makeover by renaming it 'public relations.'\(^{262}\) Money remained the key to governmental power, because it was now, within limits, able to buy people's opinions.

Private power and governmental power are theoretically divisible, but in practice intermarried and it is the combination that should properly be referred to as state power. One thing that has become unmistakably overt since the advent of the beginning of George W. Bush's first presidency is that those who decisively exercise power in the US possess both forms of state power. Each form of power serves and bolsters the other. At one level there is the infamous 'revolving door' which circulates people between government and corporate employment. To take the example of the arms industry Frida Berrigan writes that "a May [2008] report titled 'Post-Government Employment of Former DoD Officials Needs Greater Transparency,' the GAO [Government Accountability Office] found that thousands of senior Pentagon officials take refuge in the corporate world. In fact, of the almost 2,500 former Pentagon officials analyzed, almost two thirds of them went on to senior positions at just seven companies – SAIC, Northrop Grumman, Booz Allen Hamilton, L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Raytheon. Except for the consulting firm Booz Allen, all seven are on the Pentagon’s list of top ten contractors. Together, they received

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more than $87 billion in contracts from the DoD in 2007. The GAO report asserts that 'our results indicate that defense contractors may employ a substantial number of former DoD officials on assignments related to their former DoD agencies or direct responsibilities.' Then there is also the lobbying industry, also a favourite employment option for officials and legislators. William Astore writes: “And when it comes to taking, according to Eric Lichtblau of the New York Times, 'more than 125 former Congressional aides and lawmakers are now working for financial firms as part of a multibillion-dollar effort to shape, and often scale back, federal regulatory power.' In other words, the regulators and their aides legislate the rules and then simply step through that infamous revolving door and pick up a handsome check on the other side. There are, in fact, at least 11,000 well-employed registered lobbyists in Washington today. A $3.4 billion 'industry' in 2009, lobbying is definitely a field to get into, even in bad times, and according to the Christian Science Monitor, 'when the cost of grass-roots efforts and of strategic advisers are all counted, total spending on influencing policy in Washington approaches $9.6 billion a year.'

It is fair to assume that lobbyists realise a return on their investments, and this is equally true of political campaign contributions. Greg Palast estimates that George W. Bush received $447 million from corporate contributions of various forms for his 2000 election campaign and, as he goes on to detail, 'ya dance with them what brung ya.' Both subsequent presidential elections have set new records in campaign spending. And then there are the vested interests of high officials themselves. The links between Bush administration officials and oil and military-industrial interests which profited immensely from the invasion of Iraq will have to be left for another time. Suffice it to say at this point that it almost beggars disbelief that those wielding governmental power should profit so expansively from pursuing any policy, let alone launching a major war in such controversial circumstances, and it is inconceivable that any other state (developed or otherwise) would tolerate such a situation. As Jim Hightower commented to Greg Palast, 'They've eliminated the middleman. The corporations don't have to lobby the government anymore. They are the government.'

One might be forgiven for drawing the Hobsonian conclusion that 'certain sectional interests' run the US empire for private profit. But money alone does not get you a seat at the table. The thrust of US policy clearly demonstrates a determination to exert dominance. Events in Iraq, discussed hereafter, show that US corporatism extends only to strategic interests which confer the greatest ability to dominate the global populace. In essence, the British empire's 'three pillars' have been added to. In the US empire the many pillars include oil and energy; essential infrastructure; media and public relations; finance; arms; food and biotechnology; and health and pharmaceuticals. It must be admitted that at another level the US relies on a much broader range of multinational concerns to maintain Ziegler's 'organised scarcity', but these interests, although they benefit from policy, do not have access to the US public purse and they do not have the same access to positions of power through the 'revolving door.'

Analysts prefer to see the transfer of personnel between corporation and government as a means of securing profit rather than seeing their choice of moving into strategic industries as a way of continuing to wield power in an oligarchic system in which the pursuit of profits and the extension of domination are harmonised, indeed inseparable, objectives. For example, Frank Carlucci launched his career by organising the overthrow of Patrice Lamumba and is widely believed to

266Ibid, p 86.
267Replacing him with Mobutu Sese Seko. See above.
have at least assented to his murder.268 A friend of Donald Rumsfeld from Princeton,269 Carlucci is believed to have led the overthrows of Goulart in Brazil, Abaid Karume in Zanzibar, and Salvador Allende in Chile. He is also accused of being behind the abduction of Aldo Moro in Italy.270 He rose to become Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan. After leaving office he joined the Carlyle Group, who almost immediately began to attract huge defence contracts.271 Dan Briody's book on the Carlyle group is called The Iron Triangle. The phrase was actually coined by Eisenhower in being critical of the relationship between the Pentagon, the industries that profit from war and 'defence' spending, and Congress, which is charged with declaring war and appropriating defence funds.272 Now, however, it is openly embraced in certain circles. It demonstrates the soundness of a sure-win recession-proof investment. Beyond the issue of profitability, however, if we view Carlucci as a novus homo, one who has risen through the ranks due to a proven ability to do dirty work and keep his mouth shut, then it could equally be said that the Carlyle Group is the corporate equivalent, a novus corporato. The first Bush administration was flooded with ex-Carlyle employees taking the first trip through the revolving door, while the group itself has been referred to as the 'ex-President's club.'273 Briody concludes with an intriguing passage:

It's difficult to explain certain aspects of the company. Like why George Bush Sr., in the face of mounting criticism and the undermining of his son's credibility in office, doesn't simply resign from the company? His is already wealthy, with his family's legacy secure. And there must be a thousand different job opportunities available for the ex-president that don't involve obvious conflicts of interest or incidents of international political intrigue. Or why James Baker III, with his own law firm and foundation, feels the need to toiling for a firm that clearly threatens his heretofore untarnished reputation. It begs the question: What are these men up to?274

It is possible to dispense with any Hobsonian thesis, whether based on a national or multinational cabal of special interests. It is equally possible to dispense with the idea that more general business interests and the mechanics of 'capitalism' are the driving forces behind the US empire. Michael Hudson is absolutely correct in stating that policy 'has been shaped by overriding concerns for world power.'275 This still leaves, however, the possibility of a 'functionalist' thesis which posits that all actors are actually directed by irresistible systemic forces. As I have written elsewhere, a sophisticated variant of this arose in response to the US war in Indochina.276 After all, it does explain how the war continued for years after, as Noam Chomsky has pointed out many times, 'elite opinion' began to turn against the war in 1965 and was decidedly against it by the end of 1968.277 A contemporary personal example which seems to support a 'functionalist' interpretation can be read into the recent history of George Soros. As Naomi Klein writes, 'In the early days of the fall of Communism, Soros... had been one of the prime movers behind the push for the shock approach to economic transformation. By the late nineties, however, he had an apparent change of heart, becoming one of the leading critics of shock therapy and directing his foundations to fund NGOs that focus on putting anticorruption measures in place before privatizations occur.'278 More recently,

271Ibid, p 32.
273Ibid, p xxvi.
274Ibid, p 159.
276http://ongenocide.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/beyond-stalemate1.pdf
as mentioned, he has railed against the market fundamentalism in finance. The interesting thing is
that a man who is possibly the richest individual ever to live can have such a drastic effect when he
puts his efforts into supporting a neoliberal agenda and so little effect when opposing it. Could it be
that the very structure of US and global political society makes it easier to move in one direction
than another? I should hope that this work contains enough examples of cold calculation that the
reader does not entertain such a belief. Soros at one time behaved in ways which enriched his
clients and deepened US dominance of the world. Now that he plays no role in furthering US
geostrategic and demostrategic ends, he is nigh irrelevant. That is not some accident of a stochastic
self-generating imperial system, rather it is yet another reminder of where the real power resides.

A Genocidal Empire

Central to understanding the US empire's proclivity to commit genocide is an understanding of the
sources of power which might allow a nation state or a people to escape or defy US domination. In
a world where US military and economic supremacy has been beyond any challenge, such power in
another state can be seen as primarily significant for its deterrence value. Perhaps even deterrence
is the wrong word, the real significance is in the ability conveyed to defy orders backed with
threats. In conjunction with military and economic power there is the power conferred by the
possession of resources in which can be included the human population. I could make more
divisions within these categories, but as it is these divisions are artificial, each one exists in an
interplay with each other. In order to confidently defy the US one would need defence in depth on
multiple fronts – military, economic, and demographic (and to a large extent geographic). This is
all a matter of degree and, clearly, problematic calculation. From the imperialist perspective it is
simpler, the increase of any form of power must be opposed because it may allow the development
of other forms of power. Hence the antidevelopmental thrust of policy, hence the Bush doctrine,
and hence, when circumstances dictate, large-scale genocidal military actions.

What I mean may become clearer with some examples. Consider the Soviet Union: With a huge
population, massive territory, and strong military, the Soviet Union was also far less vulnerable on
the economic front than most states (though still clearly open to pressure on this front). The Soviet
Union constantly feared a US attack, but mainly because of a carefully created image of irrational
ideological fervour and paranoia.

In the case of China, on the other hand, the threat of a US nuclear first-strike was negligible because
China could not be constructed as a mortal threat to the US. China had a very high ability to resist
US coercion, and so it was incorporated into the empire in a different position than that originally
sought by US planners after World War II. Instead, an accommodation was reached in 1971.
Currently it would seem that transnational feudal elements (Ziegler's 'cosmocrats') are attempting to
create the same interpenetration that exists, under US hegemony, throughout the rest of the globe so
that any change in the relative power of the most powerful states (counting the EU as being a 'state'
for this purpose) will not change the global imperial dynamic.

Iran is like the former examples, but scaled down in each respect. Iran defies the US, indeed it has
little choice because as a slated enemy (a fact which derives from its strengths) its cooperative
overtures have been rebuffed and each concession is met with ever more unreasonable demands.
Iran's defiance comes at a cost, however, and there is never any guarantee that it will not be subject
to military attack. Wars have a tendency of breaking out when it suits US purposes.

Compare these states with the Congo/Zaire. It has large amounts of mineral wealth and other
resources, a large territory and a large population. Left alone it could, and presumably would,
establish a degree of independence. It could use its primary production income to further develop agriculture and indigenously controlled extractive industries and, with a huge potential domestic market, could industrialise. To many that might seem far-fetched, and it certainly is in the Congo of today. But this is a state whose nationalist leader was killed very shortly after the Congo finally freed itself from the most notoriously destructive colonial regime since La Conquista, and replaced by US intervention with the client kleptocrat Mobutu Sese Seko, and, since his demise after falling out of favour with the US, has been repeatedly invaded by US clients with at least some support from US special forces. King Leopold's reign of terror is considered genocide, having killed around 10 million Congolese, about half of the population. The post-colonial regime of repression and war has killed more Congolese in absolute terms, to the same effect – continued immiseration and exploitation by (neo)colonial powers. Given the clear and essential role of exogenous forces, with the US to the fore, why would this not be considered genocide?

In Guatemala, US trained and equipped forces have been adjudged to have committed genocide. Although, clearly, the finding of genocide was made easier by the blatant ethnic bias in state violence, the nature of the violence itself was identical to that employed in greater or lesser degree by other US clients, notably, but not solely, in Latin America. If a national population is attacked by a narrow oligarchy at the behest of, with the support of, and to the benefit of an imperial or neocolonial power, why should that not be considered genocide? Greg Grandin sees the Guatemalan genocide as a model for subsequently initiated 'counterinsurgency' in Latin America. Small wonder given that many US clients participated in Operation Condor, an intelligence sharing operation for death squad and disappearance activity between Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador. Strong evidence, including testimony from wanted terrorist Jose Posada Carriles (whom the US refuses to extradite to face trial) points to US involvement. Roger Morris comments that the operation occurred with 'Pentagon attaches and intelligence advisors looking on approvingly.' Something of the US view of the operation can at least be gathered by the fact that when it ended they tried to reconstitute it.

Why Iraq?

The US can, in Michael Mandel's eponymous words, 'get away with murder'. Consider these recent events written of by Pratap Chatterjee in the Guardian:

Last Friday, I met a boy, just before he was assassinated by the CIA. Tariq Aziz was 16, a quiet young man from North Waziristan, who, like most teenagers, enjoyed soccer. Seventy-two hours later, a Hellfire missile is believed to have killed him as he was travelling in a car to meet his aunt in Miran Shah, to take her home after her wedding. Killed with him was his 12-year-old cousin, Waheed Khan.

The boy had attended a conference on the civilian deaths caused by US drone strikes, followed by a public protest. British NGO members had told the conference that, since no Western reporters would cover the story, the only way to raise awareness in the West was for the Waziris themselves to document the killings. Aziz volunteered to become a videographer.

The question I would pose... is this: would a terrorist suspect come to a public meeting and converse openly with

279See above.
283See above.
foreign lawyers and reporters, and allow himself to be photographed and interviewed? More importantly, since he was so easily available, why could Tariq not have been detained in Islamabad, when we spent 48 hours together? Neither Tariz Aziz nor the lawyers attending this meeting had a highly trained private security detail that could have put up resistance.

Unless the CIA can prove that Tariq Aziz posed an imminent threat (as the White House's legal advice stipulates a targeted killing must in order for an attack to be carried out), or that he was a key planner in a war against the US or Pakistan, the killing of this 16 year old was murder, and any jury should convict the CIA accordingly.\textsuperscript{287} This occurred less than a month after the US had killed another 16 year-old boy, a US citizen in this case, along with a 17 year-old relative and others. Of the 16 year-old, US officials commented that 'this was a military-aged male travelling with a high-value target.'\textsuperscript{288} So the US commits murder with impunity, but it also abducts and tortures people just as openly and with as little repercussion. There are also acts of mass-murder, acts of terrorism, acts of aggression and other war crimes and crimes against humanity of which it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that US officials are culpable. With a few precautions (for example, Henry Kissinger, the Nobel Peace Laureate, avoids travel to most countries) the US can forestall most legal challenges by threats and simply refuse to comply with others, punishing who dare such challenges as an emperor might punish acts of \textit{lèse majesté.}

The US ability to 'get away with murder' relies heavily on an orthodox discourse wherein it virtually a universal obligation to bend over backwards to interpret US behaviour in a positive light. Where the details of what is done by US forces are undeniably abhorrent (and are not simply ignored) the fallback position is to isolate such incidents as being aberrations and as being the unfortunate results of misapplied good intentions. The only significant challenges to this come from those who claim that the US pursues only wealth. This too is exculpatory, for it means that the suffering and destruction brought about are incidental and even ill-advised errors which produce instability and destruction when peace and stability offer far better opportunities for profit.

Central to the apologistic discourse is the ability to maintain an atomised view of mass killings and destruction wherein none are structurally related, although they are often held to demonstrate a US ability to repeat the same 'mistakes' over and over and over and over again (to a level of iterations which is clearly ridiculous). This is where the academic world plays a central role by actively suppressing any attempts to apply the same analytical framework to the US (and other Western powers) as one might apply to others when dealing with mass killing in particular. In the field of international relations this is achieved, although seemingly without thought, only through considerable violence to academic rigour and, indeed, basic logic.

I have chosen to highlight the concept of genocide in this work. It is the most apt conceptualisation which can describe US 'military' interventions in a fairly comprehensive manner (as opposed particularly to 'war' but also to less inclusive concepts such as 'terrorism'). Predictably the field of genocide studies is distorted by the need to exclude any fundamental critique of US genocides. Genocide, however, is so central to US and Western imperialism (if not all imperialism) that the entire field of genocide studies is an inchoate mess riven with distortion upon distortion. Adam Jones, a scholar of undoubted goodwill and clearly adequate intellect, is simply \textit{incapable} of producing a work which lives up to its claim of even-handed proportionality.\textsuperscript{289} And Jones is an outlier, attacked by many for his willingness to \textit{ever} apply the term genocide to polities such as the US and Israel.

\textsuperscript{287}Pratap Chaterjee, “The CIA’s unaccountable drone war claims another casualty”, \textit{Guardian}, 7 November 2011. Retrieved 1 December 2011 from \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/nov/07/cia-unaccountable-drone-war}.


\textsuperscript{289}See \url{http://ongenocide.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/context-of-iraq-genocide.pdf} Chapter 2.
Genocide scholars complain about the putative inadequacies of the UNCG and propose instead any number of utterly ludicrous and fundamentally useless alternatives, almost seeming to squirm in their need to create definitions in which only the right people might be found guilty. The UNCG may need to narrow its criteria so as to exclude less serious events, but none of these scholars objects in the least to its application to Serbs or Tutsi. Indeed, if one wishes to apply the term 'genocide' to, say, Saddam Hussein's killing of Kurds, one doesn't even need to define genocide because Saddam Hussein was a bad person. But US genocides (or at least the most extensive US genocides) are in fact far more inescapably genocidal in nature than 'classic' examples such as Rwanda and Cambodia. They are on a greater scale in terms of mortality, they take place over a longer duration, and they are more comprehensive in terms of matching killing with economic, social and cultural destruction. They far more closely fit the models which inspired Raphaël Lemkin to coin the term genocide in the first place.

The cover story for these genocides has been war. I have already touched on the fact that this also applies to the Armenian and Rwandan genocides and to a very large extent applies to the Holocaust itself. I have also shown that the Korean War provided the opportunity for a US genocide and if not started by the US was certainly sustained one-sidedly for what can only be seen as a genocidal purpose. In Indochina, Afghanistan and Iraq, the military aspect was to shrink, the 'wars' to become, in the end, nothing more than a shabby pretence.

I have already written elsewhere about the Second Indochina War as an Honours thesis. It is very difficult to summarise an unorthodox analysis of a complex event but perhaps some of the facts will speak for themselves:

- The US acted unilaterally to divide Vietnam, as it had Korea.
- Ngo Dinh Diem was transported from the US (just as Rhee was) and was made the autocrat of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by the CIA with Col. Edward Lansdale (represented in literature as the 'Quiet American' or the 'Ugly American') taking a similar role as Goodfellow.
- Under US auspices Diem acted to create an insurgency by unleashing a wave of 'anti-communist' bloodshed throughout rural areas which forced peasants into taking up arms as self-defence.
- The US itself acted to ensure that the reluctant Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was drawn into the war.
- The US, though various means, was the main supplier of arms and provisions to their enemy for much of the war.
- The US used only 'strategies' which could not under any circumstances bring about victory while any initiative which seemed to promise pacification even on a local or regional level were subverted or ended outright.
- In Laos and Cambodia similar results were achieved more simply by destabilising and overthrowing neutral governments and thus making war inevitable.
- The US went to considerable lengths to avoid negotiated settlements.
- On many levels, and in ways far to numerous to mention, the US acted to ensure that the destruction and death brought about was prolific far beyond any possible military rationale.
- At no time did the US attempt effectively exploit Indochinese ressources for profit. On the contrary it destroyed those resources. Profits were made, in Hobsonian fashion, by certain interests, but the source of these profits was the US taxpayer.

Negotiations, such as did occur, went on much as they did in Korea, and although I did not detail this in my Honours piece, it is worth noting something about Henry Kissinger's role in negotiations.
At the end of 1968 the war in Vietnam had been rejected by those widely considered to be the 'elites' of US foreign policy. The outgoing Johnson administration sought to end the war through secret negotiations, sending the Democrat Henry Kissinger. Kissinger deliberately sabotaged the negotiations and was rewarded with a great deal of power in the incoming Nixon administration (often referred to as the Nixinger administration). 4 years and many hundreds of thousands of deaths later, Kissinger signed a peace deal more or less identical to that which was near completion in 1968. The US never honoured the peace deal and, though Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace prize, the war continued for two bloody years.

In 1970, when Henry Kissinger briefed Jonathan 'Fred' Ladd, who was slated to conduct the war in Cambodia, he told him, 'Don't even think of victory; just keep it alive.'

Using a pretext, the US slapped sanctions on Vietnam which lasted until Vietnam adopted neoliberal economic policies. Increasingly the postwar economic situation of Vietnam, and its adoption of doi moi 'Renovation' (economic liberalisation) causes people to suggest that in geopolitical terms the Vietnamese lost. Chomsky called Vietnamese poverty 'a vivid refutation of the claim that the US lost'. Cawthorne cites such reasoning as the logic behind his title Vietnam: A War Lost and Won. Note firstly that this logic applies equally to Laotians and Cambodians; and secondly that in such terms it makes more sense to refer to entire peoples rather than regimes or adherents of a political ideology. Compare this with Lemkin's conception of genocide as war against peoples by which the Germans hoped to win even should the lose militarily. Given that the US seemed to avoid military victory in either an absolute or a limited sense (as occurred in Korea); and given that the far greatest amount of death and destruction was meted out not on the DRV, but on putative allies such as the RVN and Lon Nol's Cambodia, it is difficult not to conclude that there never was a military aim to this war, that from the beginning military defeat was meant to accompany the genocide.

Iraq after 2003 has been a very similar story, what I am referring to as a genocidal war system wherein 'war' is artificially maintained in order to commit genocide. But before even considering that in what may be the most striking example of atomisation, of Orwellian amnesia, the invasion of 2003 and subsequent occupation is treated as being somehow a completely distinct set of actions and circumstances, as if almost completely unrelated to the sanctions period that went before. Increasingly the sanctions period was considered genocidal as will be discussed, but instead of seeing the massive destruction and killing unleashed from April 2003 as undeniable confirmation of genocide, somehow the two are treated as disconnected.

Despite the claims of many, Iraq provided perhaps an even greater nationalist developmentalist challenge to empire than that posed by Korea and Vietnam. Robert Brigham compares Iraqi nationalism unfavourably with that of Vietnam: 'Ethnic, tribal, religious, social and political divisions are the hallmark of modern Iraqi history. Saddam Hussein held these disparate groups only by brute force.' The Vietnamese, no matter what their ideological stance, understood 'that Vietnam was a unified nation' and in contrast with the Iraqis 'understood full well the idea of nationhood.' In fact, Brigham is doing with regard to Iraq exactly what the French and later US propagandists did with regard to Vietnam. A Vietnamese unified nation was problematic, therefore the first step in weakening or abolishing the undesirable nation is to abolish it semantically. In the case of Iraq a surface plausibility and a narrow, and rather unimportant, element of truth should not conceal the fundamental and wilful wrong-headedness of Brigham and those like him. Iraqi nationalism is very real, notwithstanding internal divisions and complexities. Moreover, in and of

291Shawcross, Sideshow, p 169.
292Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot, p 30.
293Op cit., p 7.
294Lemkin, Axis Rule, p 81.
296Ibid, p 79.
The Iraqi people can claim association with a 'history' longer than that of any other geographic locale on the planet. *Al-Iraq* means the shore and fertile area alongside a river, and has been used in reference to 'Mesopotamia' (the land between the rivers; i.e. the Tigris and Euphrates, also known as the 'Fertile Crescent'), since at least the eighth century. The area saw, almost simultaneously with Egypt and the Indus valley, the rise of the first civilisations around 4000 BCE. Arguably the most significant early civilisation, Sumer, arose in *al-Iraq* no later than 3500 BCE and endured for over a millennium until 2340. Sumer produced the first known writing, and the first mathematical computations appeared there between 3500 and 3000. Perhaps less to be celebrated is the Sumerian invention of interest bearing loans. After Sumer, *al-Iraq* was home to the Assyrian and Babylonian civilisations which are significant in their own rights. The 'Fertile Crescent' was the first place outside of Arabia settled by Arabs. After the advent of Islam Iraq developed a lasting significance for Muslims. Two cities became significant as holy cities for Shi‘a, Najaf, where Ali, the fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, is believed to be buried, and Karbala, where Ali’s son, Hussein was killed along with a handful of followers. Indeed the very origins of Shi‘a can be traced to Ali’s Kufa-centred support against the Damascus based Ummayads – support which was transferred to Hussein. Though Kufa remained the centre of Shi‘a opposition, the demise of the Ummayads in 750 saw the successor dynasty, the Abbassids, shift the capital of an empire, now stretching from Spain to India, to *al-Iraq*. First to Kufa, then Anbar, then to Baghdad, where it remained. Baghdad as a seat of power, of learning and of culture, assumed a significant place in Arab consciousness (and in the Western imagination).

By the nineteenth century, what would become Iraq was three provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. The Sheik of Kuwait, part of Basra province, exercised a certain autonomy and aspired to more. This suited the British, who wanted to secure the route to India through the Suez. They cultivated a relationship leading to the signing in 1899 of an agreement:

Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not, to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or at any other
place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.  

In 1901 the British announced to the Ottomans that Kuwait was now a British protectorate, and in 1913 the Turks recognised Kuwaiti autonomy. The British were perfectly aware that there was oil in the region and, although the reader may recall that the decision to switch to oil in naval vessels was not finalised until 1905, Admiral Lord Fisher, who was made First Sea Lord in 1904, had been arguing for the change since 1882.

The British created Iraq, but they were not the only ones with the idea. Ottoman military officers in the al-Ahd Arab nationalist movement formed al-Ahd al-Iraqi with the intent of creating an Iraqi state based on the three provinces. Many, notably including Nuri al-Said, thought that working with the British was the best way of achieving this, but those who in areas occupied by the British tended to feel otherwise. Although the Ottomans had treated the three provinces as separate, Arab nationalists formed factions and secret societies based on the three provinces. Charles Tripp ascribes this to the political centrality of Baghdad but adds the following: 'Equally,... personal links were being forged between members of these groupings – links which were often reinforced by family connections through trade or through membership of the Ottoman administration or officer corps.' In other words the political gravity of Baghdad formed a degree of de facto administrative unity across the three provinces which was leading to the formation of a genos which was beginning to incline aspirations to statehood, if not nationhood, towards an Iraq based on the three provinces. It is also worth noting that these three provinces provided most of the officers in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Thus began a long tradition of resistance the Ottoman's, the British, and even the Ba’ath which drew together Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shi’a.

In creating Iraq, the British did two things of interest. The first is that they created an independent state out of Kuwait despite the fact that Kuwait was part of Basra province. They did so 'with the specific intention of denying Iraq access to the sea, and thus making it more dependent on Britain', as Christopher Hitchens once put it. The second is that the British seized Mosul on 1 November 1918. It was a grotesquely treacherous act because they had signed an armistice with the Turks on the very day before. Additionally, it was a betrayal of the war weakened French, to whom Mosul was awarded in the Sykes-Picot agreement (which was itself a betrayal of the Arabs), but as we have seen, while Britain was devoting considerable efforts to capturing oil fields, France was forced to fight in Europe and had no troops in the Middle East to claim the only part of its designated spoils which had oil resources. For good measure, the British decided that they would hang on to Palestine too.

The Kurds were an immediate problem for the British, and it must be admitted that taken as a whole they have never at any instant been unproblematically Iraqi in nationality (bearing in mind that one may feel part of more than one 'nation' be it Iraqi and Kurd, or Iraqi and Arab). In Iraq, however,
the different ethnic and sectarian groups have a long shared history of being distinct but together. One thing I found quite striking was an account of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258. While it would seem to me that the only required explanation for the fall was the arrival of 200,000 Mongols, historians blame factional struggles between Sunni and Shiʿi notables. Some suspect the Shiʿi Wazir of betrayal, others finger the Kurdish tribes.\textsuperscript{318} The implied relations of 750 years ago seem to be remarkably similar to those of today. Note too, that the powerful Wazir of a massive Sunni empire is a Shiʿa. Muslims often complain that Westerners project too much of the nature of the Catholic/Protestant schism onto a much less encompassing split. In fact, though a single state religion is the norm in Islamic states, rulers have not, as a rule, decided on questions of faith, let alone imposed them.\textsuperscript{319} Compare this with Britain, where it was not until the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 that Catholics could hold political office.\textsuperscript{320} The theoretical ability to take office is not the same as the actuality though, and even recently Tony Blair waited discreetly until after leaving office before converting to a religion which offered him absolution.

I am not suggesting here that there is never animosity and violence between Sunni and Shiʿa. In fact, the irony is that while Western 'Orientalist' discourse posits an eternal insoluble and fundamental animosity and Muslims like to think of sectarian strife as a fact of past history since overcome,\textsuperscript{321} it is probably more relevant today than in the past thanks to the rise of Islamism\textsuperscript{322} and Western attempts to exploit sectarian differences as a divide and rule tactic. What I would suggest is that violence and division arises from the politicisation of sectarian matters, not from theological disputes. This is evidenced not only by the history of Shiʿism, where there was an abandonment of the very political aspiration which brought about a schism and the adoption of a political quietism and antipathy towards political imposition of doctrine (both considered common traits in historical Islam),\textsuperscript{323} but also by the history of the Catholic/Protestant schism, such as the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia which ended it (wherein sectarianism was effectively decoupled from international politics).\textsuperscript{324}

History tends to suggest that an Iraqi national identity was forged in response to unwanted exogenous impositions and repression. Kurdish resistance had a distinct, if not uniform, element of Kurdish nationalism, with demands for a Kurdish state based on linguistic criteria. In 1919, when the Kurds revolted against British rule, however, as Charles Tripp describes, social and linguistic differences meant that 'this idea was not always well understood or well received.'\textsuperscript{325} Nevertheless a significant core of persistent Kurdish nationalist political formations cohered. British repression in 1923 drove the Kurdish nationalists into a mountain-based guerilla campaign.\textsuperscript{326} Needing outside support, Kurdish nationalists naturally became easy proxies for those wishing to attack Iraq. Most notoriously, in 1972 the US and Israel joined Iran in giving material support to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) for a resumption of military struggle. Iran was siding with the KDP

\begin{footnotes}
\item[T322] 'Political Islam' owes its much of its currency to Western intervention. As will be discussed, this is not simply, nor even mainly, an unguided reaction to Western foreign policy, but derives from over a century of systematic repression of Islamic modernism and equally systematic, if piecemeal, support from the West for the very Islamist movements which Western leaders rhetorically claim to be the most implacable, irreconcilable foe of liberal values.\textsuperscript{326}
\item[T324] I put it in simple terms, but I think it is a fair condensation of the essence. See, for example, Johannes Burkhardt, “The Thirty Years' War” in R. Po-chia Hsia (ed.) \textit{A Companion to the Reformation World}. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp 286-7.
\item[T326] ibid, p 54.
\end{footnotes}
against the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). According a US congressional report, before the outbreak of fighting the Kurds were likely to have been able to reach an accommodation with Baghdad which would have granted 'a measure of autonomy'. Instead, according to the report, Nixon, Kissinger and Shah Mohhammed Reza Pahlavi saw the Kurds as 'a card to play' to undermine Iraq and did not want them to succeed. The US and Israel gave Kurdish fighters captured Soviet weapons (their support not being secret so much as deniable) while Iran gave not only food and ammunition, but artillery support. In 1975, however, Iran signed a treaty of friendship with Iraq, and the Kurds were quite simply hung out to dry in the most ruthless manner. Iraq launched a major assault as soon as matters were settled with Iran, and the desperate Kurds begged again and again for help from the US which ignored their pleas. Kissinger also refused even humanitarian aid, and when questioned on his actions replied: 'One should not confuse undercover action with social work.'

There are matters which confuse straightforward notions of Kurdish nationalism as antithetical to Iraqi nationalism. One arises from the divisions among Kurdish nationalists. The most prominent Kurdish nationalist formations are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Historically these groups have moved from alliance to a state of civil war and back several times. At any time they may court, and sometimes receive, support from Iran, Turkey or Iraq, all bitter enemies at other times. Thus, for example, the PUK aligned itself with Baghdad when Iran (co-operating with the KDP) advanced into Kurdistan in 1983. The establishment of de facto autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 led to renewed conflict. Both parties maintained contacts with Baghdad and when Iran entered PUK territory, the KDP called on Baghdad who sent 30,000 troops, helping the KDP seize Arbil. In fact, the KDP henceforward became the primary smugglers of oil for the Ba’ath regime without whom they could not survive. (Something to ponder, to which I will return, is why the US, who could have stopped the smuggling, did not do so. As Robert Baer writes: 'What I couldn’t understand was why the White House didn’t intervene. ... For Iraqi’s, of course, the arrangement made perfect sense. By turning a blind eye to the smuggled oil, the US managed to turn the Kurdish opposition against itself even as it helped Saddam pay for his praetorian guard...')

The most important factor, however, which might cast doubt on the depth of Kurdish nationalism is the popular sentiment. Leaders of Kurdish factions have an obvious vested interest in promoting Kurdish nationalism, but many Kurds, particularly those living in cities, live intermingled with Arabs, Turkmen and others. This can be a source of strife, but resistance to authority, oppression or occupation can lead to a rejection of division as an act of resistance in itself. For example, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) drew a great deal of support from Kurds and Kurdish majority areas became its stronghold. It is easy to see why, for some Kurds, it made little sense to follow a Kurdish nationalist leadership which was largely made up of landowners in an area of massive inequality in wealth, power and ownership. Even in 1991 – after the genocidal al-Anfal campaign, the use of poison gas against the Kurds, and other politicidal/genocidal massacres – the Kurdish population seems to have had more concern for social justice than for exchanging one master for another. In July 1991 the a document was published by a peshmerga defector 'who left

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329Ibid, pp 84-5.
332Ibid, pp 254-5.
333Ibid, p 256.
335Ibid, p 269.
337Ibid, p 112.
338See section 4.3.
the nationalists before the real heavy inter-fratricidal killings because it was becoming like a partisan army — killing soldiers, etc. — and completely outside the real movement. It begins:

The following is an account of the uprising in Kurdistan in 1991 together with an historical critique of the Kurdish nationalist parties. It buries the lies of the western media which presented this proletarian uprising as the work of nationalist parties in the north or Shi‘ite religious fanatics in the south.

The great popular uprising of the exploited of Iraq in March this year threatened the aims and interests of both contending sides in the Gulf war. From Kurdistan to southern Iraq the poor rose up against the Ba’athist/Fascist regime and against the consequences of the war created by both this regime and the coalition allies. The allied coalition of western capital — particularly Bush, who was worried about extending the war into another Vietnam scenario — stopped the war in order to allow Saddam to crush this uprising.

It would be impossible to do justice to the complexities of fluid inter-factional alliance and enmity revealed in this short article (which can be confirmed up to a point by Hanna Batatu's well-documented The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq). What is constant is that the poor of Iraq in general and Kurdistan in particular emerge as a 'pawn in the chess game of improving relations with the west and of rival political factions (nationalist and so-called communist). This includes instances of Kurdish nationalist groups acting as the oppressor of their own people – imprisoning, torturing and killing left-wing dissidents, sometimes at the behest of Baghdad or Teheran. The leadership of various powerful groups did whatever was politically expedient at any given moment (including the ICP who were in alliance with the Ba’ath from 1973-78 and enthusiastically backed the genocidal assault on the Kurds because of the KDP's receipt of aid from Iran and the CIA, despite the fact that most ICP leaders were Kurds).

Against the Byzantine and unedifying confusion of the factional political arena of Kurdish nationalists, the Iraqi government and its factions, and foreign governments; should be weighed the far more clear and constant desire of the Kurdish people for security and economic justice. Despite all that has happened, I suspect that even now if there was a strong and promising left-wing political movement in Iraq which was open to the people of Kurdistan, many would abandon Kurdish nationalism.

In 1991 the Kurds were not alone in rejecting the characterisation of the anti-Ba’ath insurgency as sectarian and ethnically divided in nature. This misrepresentation was seen as a deliberate way of undercutting the resistance in Iraq, and during 1991 exiles campaigned, principally in Britain, to correct the distorted view. The most widely read document from the campaign was a pamphlet entitled Ten Days that Shook Iraq. The claims it makes are fundamentally at odds with all Western historiography. With regard to Kurdistan:

People were openly hostile to the bourgeois policies of the Kurdish Nationalists. In Sulaimania the Nationalist peshmargas were excluded from the city and the exiled leader of the [PUK], Jalal Talabani, was prevented from returning to his home town. When the [KDP] leader, Massoud Barzani, went to Chamcharnal, near to Sulaimania, he was attacked and two of his bodyguards were killed. When the Nationalists broadcast the slogan: 'Now's the time to kill the Ba’athists!' the people of Sulaimania replied with the slogan: 'Now's the time for the Nationalists to loot Porches!'... The original aim of the uprising was expressed in the slogan: 'We will celebrate our New Year with the Arabs in Baghdad!' The defeat of this rebellion owed as much to the Kurdish Nationalists as to the Western powers and the


341 Ibid.


343 Ibid, pp 10-13 et passim.

344 Ibid, p 11.


With regard to Basra:

Basra is one of the most secular areas in the Middle East. Almost no one goes to the mosques in Basra. The radical traditions in this area are not those of Islamic fundamentalism but rather those of Arab Nationalism and Stalinism. The [ICP] is the only bourgeois party with any significant influence in this region. The cities of Basra, Nasriah and Hilah have long been known as the region of the Communist Party and have a long history of open rebellion against both religion and the state.

So the divisions in Iraq were complex and varied but also largely contingent; open to exploitation but at the same time not fundamental. It can certainly be said that in the 1970s, Kurdish problems and brutal authoritarianism notwithstanding, Iraq was well on its way to solid development bringing an increasingly coherent nation-state with a natural degree of regional hegemony and high level of pan-Arab influence. Even after the Iran-Iraq War, it was only a matter of time before Iraq regained that trajectory, unless it could somehow be interrupted.

In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. This was extremely fortuitous timing for the US, in much the same manner that the outbreak of the Korean War was (bearing in mind also Pearl Harbor and the Tonkin Gulf, not to mention the Lusitania or the mysterious sinking of the USS Maine, nor yet the temerity with which Mexicans attacked US troops 'on American soil' in 1846, and so forth). Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor devote an entire chapter, entitled 'War by Miscalculation', to the 'failure of deterrence'. For them the US had failed to make it clear that it would go to war to defend Kuwait, but they conclude that:

"...Washington and Baghdad were bound to find themselves at odds sooner or later, and from Iraq's standpoint later would have been better than sooner."

In that sense, the Bush administration's policy failure worked to the United States' advantage. The military confrontation would take place at a time of American strength and Iraqi weakness. It would occur before the cuts in American military forces were too far along, at a time when the end of the Cold War had freed up American military resources...

There was far more to this than the US merely neglectfully failing to make it obvious that it was willing to go to war. Consider first the notorious 'green light' from April Glaspie. The Iraqi government made the extremely unusual move of releasing the transcript of the extremely unusual interview between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie. They did so because it contains a very clear promise of non-intervention. Having gone to extremes to signal the importance of the meeting by added pomp (an interview with Hussein was in itself highly unusual, Glaspie's first), Saddam Hussein spoke at length. It is difficult to convey what was implied in the diplomatic idiom, but when the context is factored in (Iraqi forces were massing on the border of Kuwait in preparation for the invasion which took place a week later) it is amply clear what was meant. Hussein claimed that there was already a state of war between Iraq and Kuwait because of US backed economic warfare which was strangling Iraq. Iraq intended to take action and, in context, that action could only be an invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was seeking assurance that it would not end up at war with the US. The infamous part of Glaspie's response was 'we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.' As a revealing excerpt those words serve reasonably well, but the really telling thing is the complete lack of any threat. There was no hint that Iraqi actions might incur 'displeasure' or 'extreme displeasure' or any other of those phrases by which US diplomats deter actions with threats. Hussein had indicated that a) Iraq was desperate, b) it was losing faith with diplomacy, c) that it would take action if current last-minute diplomatic initiatives failed, and d) that it was extremely worried about the prospect of ending up in a war with the US.

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348 Ibid, pp 3-4.
349 Zinn, A People's History, p 149 et passim.
Bizarrely, Glaspie ends the meeting by acting almost as if reassured.\textsuperscript{351} Glaspie then presumably delivered Hussein's lengthy message to Bush (to whom many of his words were explicitly addressed) and, with forces massing on the brink of war, promptly went on holiday.\textsuperscript{352}

If the Iraqis hoped to reveal US duplicity in this transcript, they totally underestimated the ignorance, stupidity, willful obtuseness and calculated deliberate obtuseness which dominate the Western media discourse and continues to dominate what passes for scholarly discourse of the 'Gulf War'. But the Glaspie 'green light' is only one tiny, if salient, part of a larger picture. It was the US which, as Hussein clearly suspected, was behind the Kuwaiti economic warfare which the Iraqis considered to be an act of aggression. The situation was analogous to that of the Japanese before the Pearl Harbor attack. The al-Sabah ruling family of Kuwait had been bent Iraq over an oil barrel, underselling OPEC until oil prices were only $11 per barrel, 'a level at which Iraq's oil was barely enough to meet current expenses, leaving nothing to meet the repayments on foreign loans....'\textsuperscript{353} At the same time the al-Sabah's were themselves demanding repayments of loans made by the US. Whilst the US was to lead the Iraqis to believe that they would not intervene militarily if Kuwait was attacked, privately they had encouraged the al-Sabah's to be intractable and made absolute guarantees of US military intervention.\textsuperscript{354} In fact, the al-Sabah's had begun converting assets to liquid form in May of 1990, suggesting that they were expecting an Iraqi invasion long before the Iraqis themselves planned such an attack.\textsuperscript{355}

The US continued to support the al-Sabah's in exile as they continued with a completely intransigent line and infamously used false atrocity propaganda to sway a US public which was very reluctant to enter into a war (the Kuwait Incubator Babies Fraud, wherein a 15 year-old al-Sabah posed as a nurse and gave coached testimony to the effect that Iraqis were throwing infants onto cold hard floors to die, has become an exemplar of atrocity propaganda, but it is still quite widely believed and was recycled in 2002 by HBO).\textsuperscript{356} US lies were also playing crucial roles. I will not go into detail about how the US managed to represent itself as 'going the extra mile' for a peaceful solution (those were Bush's words,\textsuperscript{357} but he also compared Saddam Hussein unfavourably with Hitler)\textsuperscript{358} while acting rather frantically to ensure that no such solution could come to pass. Admittedly, the US was aided immensely by Iraqi bluster and hesitation which was regularly inflated beyond all recognition into proof that it was the Iraqis who, against all commonsense, were the real impediment to a peaceful solution. They were also aided by the private news media which, in complete contrast to the general wariness and widespread opposition of the US public, was so jingoistic and so deceptive that more than one commentator felt that criticism of media deceptions risked becoming 'such a noise that it drown[ed] out the murderers themselves.'\textsuperscript{359} The US government also instituted a 'pool system', a sort of proto-embedding, which ensured that rogue critics among the generally obeisant media would not have the impact that they had in Indochina of belying the orthodox deceptions of their journalistic comrades.\textsuperscript{360}

\textsuperscript{354}Lando, \textit{Web of Deceit}, p 120.
\textsuperscript{360}Ibid, p 166.
I will detail one deception, however, that was absolutely crucial in allowing the US to unleash its military might against Iraq. Dick Cheney and Colin Powell themselves presented 'top-secret' satellite imagery to Prince Bandar ibn Sultan showing that Iraqi forces were advancing on Saudi Arabia. Indeed the putative threat to Saudi Arabia was not only the only reason that the Saudis allowed US forces in their territory, it was also the reason that the US Congress itself authorised the use of force. As the Christian Science Monitor would report in late 2002, as the US moved towards invading Iraq:

Citing top-secret satellite images, Pentagon officials estimated in mid-September that up to 250,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks stood on the border, threatening the key US oil supplier.

But when the St. Petersburg Times in Florida acquired two commercial Soviet satellite images of the same area, taken at the same time, no Iraqi troops were visible near the Saudi border – just empty desert.

Desert Storm, the bombing campaign which followed, was every bit as genocidal as previous bombing campaigns, the use of laser-guided weaponry and the incessant propaganda about accuracy serving only, in a sober analysis, to underscore the intentionality of the crime. The targetting of civilian infrastructure which had absolutely no bearing on the uneven military contest was the norm. For example, a baby milk factory was targetted and destroyed while the Pentagon blithely lied and said it was involved in making biological weapons. Ramsey Clark wrote afterwards that there were:

One hundred ten thousand aerial sorties in forty-two days by the United States alone. That's one every 30 seconds. In an admission against interest, the Pentagon says U.S. aircraft alone dropped the equivalent of 7.5 Hiroshimas - 88,500 tons of explosives.

They say about 7% were directed. They were intended specifically to destroy the life-support system of the whole country. … This is an assault you can't resist. … The United States lost fewer aircraft in 110,000 aerial sorties than it lost in war games for NATO where no live ammunition was used. … There is not a reservoir, a pumping station, the filtration plant that wasn't deliberate and the destroyed by U.S. bombing to deprive the people of water.

We knocked out the power. It doesn't sound like a big deal. … But it meant, among other things, that 90 per cent of the poultry was lost in a matter of days. … They lost over a third of all their livestock. … Another third was driven out of the country to save them. Because you couldn't pump water.

A UN Mission report from March 1990 gave an alarming view of the inmanent dangers that were posed by the destruction. I cannot be comprehensive, and so I propose to take the issue of water as exemplary for this and later times. From prewar levels of 450 litres per person per day in Baghdad, supplies were 30-40 litres. This was not safe to drink but while 'the water authority has warned that the water must be boiled, there is little fuel to do this and what exists is diminishing.' Conditions outside of Baghdad were most probably worse in most instances. 'The mission concluded that a catastrophe could be faced at any time if conditions do not change…'

Professor Thomas Nagy found declassified documents, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) studies, which showed that the US clearly calculated and comprehensively understood that its bombing and subsequent embargoes would cause massive civilian deaths, particularly to children. Nagy concludes:

For more than ten years, the United States has deliberately pursued a policy of destroying the water treatment system of Iraq, knowing full well the cost in Iraqi lives. The United Nations has estimated that more than 500,000 Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions, and that 5,000 Iraqi children continue to die every month for this

361Hiro, Desert Shield…, pp 108-10.
The figure of 500,000 dead children comes from a 1996 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation report which has been seriously criticised for its methodology. The absolute numbers were, at this time, debateable but according to first-hand accounts disease and malnutrition had reached levels which beggar belief. I could here quote John Pilger, Robert Fisk, Patrick Cockburn, Kathy Kelly, or a number of others who saw with their own eyes and documented the suffering, but I will return to Ramsey Clark:

During last week, which I spent in Iraq, my fifth annual inspection since the sanctions were imposed, I visited ten hospitals in four governates which have nearly 15 percent of all hospital beds in the country. Conditions are tragic. Lighting is dim, even in operating theaters, for lack of bulbs. Wards are cold. Pharmacies are nearly empty with only a minor fraction of needed medicines and medical supplies. Most equipment, X-ray, CAT scan, incubators, oxygen tanks, dialysis machines, tubes and parts for transfusions and intravenous feeding, and other life-saving items are lacking, scarce, or inoperable for lack of parts. Simple needs like sheets, pillows, pillow cases, towels, bandages, cotton balls, adhesive tape, antiseptic cleaning liquids are unavailable or scarce. Surgery is at levels below 10 percent of the 1989 numbers in all ten hospitals. ...

Death is omnipresent. A young mother weeping in her bed whose infant had just died, an elderly diabetic-his feet bloated with open sores without adequate insulin for years, kwashiorkor and marasmus victims living only a few days after admission.

By 1999 more robust data was available from surveys by UNICEF and the WHO. Combining the data a Lancet article found that: 'Infant mortality rose from 47 per 1000 live births during 1984-89 to 108 per 1000 in 1994-99, and under-5 mortality rose from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births. Contrary to claims by the US government, the sanctions were the clear cause of this large jump in child mortality. In 1999 Ramsey Clark wrote to each UNSC plainly labelling the sanctions as genocide and providing evidence the the 'Oil for Food' programme was insufficient to end the continued mass mortality or even to halt the increase in deaths from water-borne disease: 'The United States has proceeded to frustrate approval of contracts under the program in a systematic way to prolong the genocide against Iraq. I think it a reasonable surmise that the former US Attorney General did not reach the conclusion that the sanctions constituted genocide without careful consideration and reasoning.

Another establishment figure who came to see the sanctions regime as genocide was Dennis Halliday. After 35 years working for the UN, Halliday resigned after having been less than a year as UN in charge of the 'Oil for Food' programme, citing opposition to the sanctions and freely using the word genocide. His successor, Hans von Sponeck, retired from the UN for the same reason and, although less prominent in the usage, also concurred that the sanctions regime was genocide.

His book on the subject is overly cautious and bureaucratic with Sponeck's own analysis and judgement absent from everything but the suggestive title – *A Different Kind of War*. However, what is deeply shocking in its almost irreducible detail is the effort, the unrelenting and energetic effort, that US and UK officials put into exploiting every possible loophole which allowed them to prevent life-saving materials to enter Iraq.\(^{374}\)

Sadly, I cannot detail events after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What I can say is that not wishing to repeat the methodological mistakes of the past, a group published the results of mortality studies in the *Lancet* in 2004 and 2006. Using a baseline mortality from January 2002 the 2006 study had the following findings:

Three misattributed clusters were excluded from the final analysis; data from 1849 households that contained 12 801 individuals in 47 clusters was gathered. 1474 births and 629 deaths were reported during the observation period. Pre-invasion mortality rates were 5·5 per 1000 people per year (95% CI 4·3–7·1), compared with 13·3 per 1000 people per year (10·9–16·1) in the 40 months post-invasion. We estimate that as of July, 2006, there have been 654 965 (392 979–942 636) excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war, which corresponds to 2·5% of the population in the study area. Of post-invasion deaths, 601 027 (426 369–793 663) were due to violence, the most common cause being gunfire.\(^{375}\)

The majority of those violent deaths attributable to a given party were caused by coalition forces. The implication is that many tens of thousands of Iraqis were shot to death by coalition forces. Would that I could detail all of the ways in which, systematically, this was brought to pass. The *Lancet* studies were attacked, of course, but on grounds which were either completely innumerate or deliberately deceptive. In January 2008, UK polling company Opinion Research Business completed a survey and released the following:

Following responses to ORB’s earlier work, which was based on survey work undertaken in primarily urban locations, we have conducted almost 600 additional interviews in rural communities. By and large the results are in line with the ‘urban results’ and we now estimate that the death toll between March 2003 and August 2007 is likely to have been of the order of 1,033,000. If one takes into account the margin of error associated with survey data of this nature then the estimated range is between 946,000 and 1,120,000.\(^{376}\)

It is worth reflecting that somehow the sanctions regime and the occupation are considered as separate, as if unrelated. Yet, in terms of the genocidal effects on the Iraqi people – the economic, social, cultural and physical destruction of Iraqis – the change was only one of using more direct means with greater intensity. Here, though I cannot detail it, was the genocidal war system in full flower. An unlikely and weak insurgency conjured up only with effort by the US becoming a smokescreen for ongoing genocide.

